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Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006. The Third Review of the Evidence Act 2006 [2023] NZLCIP 50; Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006. The Third Review of the Evidence Act 2006 [2023] NZLCIP 50
Last Updated: 11 May 2023
Haratua | May 2023
Te Whanganui-a-Tara, Aotearoa
Wellington, New Zealand
![A picture containing font, graphics, text, graphic designDescription automatically generated](2023_5001.png)
He Puka Kaupapa | Issues Paper 50
Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006
The
Third Review of the Evidence Act 2006
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is an independent, publicly funded,
central advisory body established by statute to undertake
the systematic review,
reform and development of the law of Aotearoa New Zealand. Its purpose is to
help achieve law that is just,
principled and accessible and that reflects the
values and aspirations of the people of Aotearoa New Zealand.
Te Aka Matua in the Commission’s Māori name refers to the parent
vine that Tāwhaki used to climb up to the heavens.
At the foot of the
ascent, he and his brother Karihi find their grandmother Whaitiri, who guards
the vines that form the pathway
into the sky. Karihi tries to climb the vines
first but makes the error of climbing up the aka taepa or hanging vine. He is
blown
violently around by the winds of heaven and falls to his death. Following
Whaitiri’s advice, Tāwhaki climbs the aka matua
or parent vine,
reaches the heavens and receives the three baskets of knowledge.
Kia whanake ngā ture o Aotearoa mā te arotake
motuhake
Better law for Aotearoa New Zealand through independent
review
The Commissioners are:
Amokura Kawharu – Tumu Whakarae | President
Geof Shirtcliffe – Tumu Whakarae Tuarua | Deputy President
Claudia Geiringer – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner
The Hon Justice Christian Whata – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner
Kei te pātengi raraunga o Te Puna Mātauranga o Aotearoa te
whakarārangi o tēnei pukapuka.
A catalogue record for this title is
available from the National Library of New Zealand.
ISBN 978-1-99-115992-2 (Online)
ISSN 1177-7877 (Online)
This title may be cited as NZLC IP50. This title is available on the internet
at the website of Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission:
www.lawcom.govt.nz
![A picture containing font, graphics, text, graphic designDescription automatically generated](2023_5002.png)
Copyright © 2023 Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International licence. In essence, you are free to copy, distribute
and adapt
the work, as long as you attribute the work to Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission and abide by other licence terms.
To view a copy of this licence,
visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0.
Have
your say
-
- The Issues
Paper sets out the potential issues we have identified with how the Evidence Act
2006 is working in practice.
- We want to know
what you think about the issues and options we have identified.
- This paper
covers a wide range of topics and asks many questions. You are welcome to focus
only on those topics that concern you
or about which you have views. There is no
need to answer all the questions. When answering questions, we ask that you
provide details
to explain your views.
- The feedback we
receive will help inform our recommendations to the Government in our final
report.
- Submissions
must be received by 30 June 2023.
-
WAYS TO MAKE A SUBMISSION
- There
are different ways you can make a submission on this paper:
- Complete a
submission form from our website and send this to us by email or post at the
addresses below.
- Email us at
evidence@lawcom.govt.nz.
- Write to us
at:
- The Third
Review of the Evidence Act
- Law
Commission
- PO Box
2590
- Wellington
6140
WHAT HAPPENS TO YOUR SUBMISSION?
- Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission will use your submission to inform our
review, and we may refer to your submission in our
publications. We will also
keep all submissions as part of our official records. Information given to the
Commission is subject to
the Official Information Act 1982 and the Privacy Act
2020.
- We will publish
the submissions we receive on our website once we have published our final
report. Your submission will be publicly
available, but if you are submitting as
an individual, we will not publish your name without your agreement.
- If you do not
want us to publish or refer in our publications to all or parts of your
submission, please tell us which parts should
be withheld and the reasons. We
will take your views into account in deciding:
- whether to
withhold or release any information requested under the Official Information
Act;
- whether and how
to make your submission publicly available on our website; and
- whether and how
to refer to your submission in our publications.
Acknowledgements
- Te Aka Matua o
te Ture | Law Commission gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the
individuals and organisations who have helped
shape this paper, especially those
who kindly shared their expertise and views with us in the preliminary
engagement stage of this
review.
- We acknowledge
the contribution of members of our Expert Advisory Group and Judicial Advisory
Committee who have generously given,
and continue to give, their time and
expertise to assist with this review.
- The members of
the Expert Advisory Group are:
- Associate
Professor Anna High, University of Otago
- Echo Haronga,
barrister
- Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald MNZM, University of Canterbury
- Jack
Oliver-Hood, barrister
- Mark Lillico,
Crown Law Office
- Associate
Professor Scott Optican, University of Auckland
- Tania Singh,
Public Defence Service
- The members of
the Judicial Advisory Committee are:
- The Hon Justice
Christine French
- The Hon Justice
Matthew Downs
- Judge Stephen
Harrop
- We are also
grateful for the support and guidance of the Māori Liaison Committee to Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission.
- We emphasise
nevertheless that the views expressed in this Issues Paper are those of the
Commission and not necessarily those of
the people who have helped us.
- Nō reira,
ko tēnei mātou e mihi nei ki a koutou, kua whai wā ki te
āwhina i a mātou. Tēnā
koutou, tēnā koutou,
tēnā koutou katoa.
- The
Commissioner responsible for this project is Amokura Kawharu. The preparation of
this Issues Paper has been led by Principal
Legal and Policy Adviser Nichola
Lambie. The legal and policy advisers who have worked on this Issues Paper are
Dena Valente, Jesse
Watts and Ruth Campbell. The law clerks who have worked on
this Issues Paper are Kaea Hudson and Sophie Colson.
HE AITUā
- The
Commission acknowledges the passing of Justice Simon France in April 2023.
Justice France made significant contributions to the
law of evidence in Aotearoa
New Zealand. We also acknowledge the passing of Andrew Beck in 2022 and his
contribution to this review
as well as his wider contributions to the law of
Aotearoa New Zealand.
Contents
CHAPTER 1
1 Introduction
- 1.1 Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is conducting its third and final statutory
review of the operation of the provisions
of the Evidence Act 2006 (the Act).
- 1.2 The Act
brings together most of the rules of evidence in a single statute. It governs
what evidence can be admitted in criminal
and civil court proceedings and how
evidence can be given.[1] Evidence is
used to establish the facts on which proceedings are determined, so the rules of
evidence are of vital importance to
securing just processes and outcomes.
- 1.3 The purpose
of this Issues Paper is to seek feedback on how the Act is operating in
practice. We have identified a range of potential
issues with the Act, from
relatively narrow operational issues through to significant and potentially
contentious issues that question
the underlying policy of some important rules
of evidence. The feedback we receive on this Issues Paper will be critical in
helping
us to decide what recommendations to make in our final report to the
Government.
BACKGROUND
- 1.4 The
Act is based on the Commission’s 1999 Report on the law of evidence and
its proposed Evidence Code (the Evidence
Code),[2] which was the product of a
decade-long review of evidence law in Aotearoa New Zealand. At that time, the
law of evidence was largely
found in judicial decisions (case law), which were
supplemented by some statutory
provisions.[3] The purpose of the
Commission’s review was “[t]o make the law of evidence as clear,
simple and accessible as is practicable,
and to facilitate the fair, just and
speedy resolution of
disputes”.[4] With that purpose
in mind, the Commission was asked to examine the law of evidence and make
recommendations for its reform with a
view to
codification.[5]
- 1.5 The Evidence
Code was intended to replace most of the common law and statutory provisions on
the admissibility and use of evidence
in court proceedings with one
comprehensive scheme.[6] The Evidence
Bill introduced by the Government in 2005 largely reflected the
Commission’s recommendations. The Bill was considered
by the Justice and
Electoral Committee, which made a number of changes to the Bill. The underlying
legislative purpose, however,
remained the same: the simplification and drawing
together of the laws of evidence in one
place.[7]
- 1.6 An important
change made to the Bill at select committee stage was to insert a requirement
that the Commission review the operation
of the Act every five years to make
sure it is working well in practice. This requirement for a five-yearly
operational review was
included in section 202 of the Act. The Commission
completed its first review in 2013 (the 2013
Review).[8] It reported that the Act
was generally working well and there was widespread acceptance of the value of
codification of the law in
this area. It made a range of recommendations for
reform, some of which were adopted in the Evidence Amendment Act 2016.
- 1.7 The
Commission completed its Second Review of the Act in 2019 (the Second
Review).[9] As in the 2013 Review, it
found the Act was generally working well but that several important further
amendments were warranted.
Some of these recommendations have since been
implemented by the Sexual Violence Legislation Act 2021. The Government intended
to progress or further consider some other recommendations as part of the
development of an evidence amendment
bill. At the time of writing, no such bill
has been introduced to Parliament.
- 1.8 In the
Second Review the Commission also recommended the repeal of section 202 of the
Act, noting that no other area of the law
is subject to regular statutory review
by the Commission in this way. The Government accepted this recommendation, and
the Statutes
Amendment Act 2022 repealed section 202. This will not, however,
prevent future reviews of evidence law (or discrete aspects of it).
SCOPE AND TIMING OF THIS REVIEW
- 1.9 The
scope and timing of this review is governed by section 202 of the Act (now
repealed) and by the Minister of Justice’s
letter referring this review to
the Commission dated 23 February
2022.[10] These require the
Commission to consider:
(a) the operation of the provisions of the Act since the Commission’s last
operational review (the Second Review, which was
completed in 2019); and
(b) whether repeal or amendment of any provisions of the Act is “necessary
or desirable”.
- 1.10 The
Commission must report to the Minister on the above matters by 23 February
2024.[11]
- 1.11 We
published terms of reference for this review on 28 September 2022. The terms of
reference confirmed the scope of this review
pursuant to section 202 of the Act
and highlighted some of the key areas this Issues Paper would
address.[12]
- 1.12 As
confirmed by the terms of reference, this review will not consider amendments to
the Act made by the Sexual Violence Legislation Act 2021 given the recency of
those amendments.
OUR PROCESS SO FAR
- 1.13 Given
this is an operational review of the Act and not a “first
principles” review of the rules of evidence, our
process so far has
focused on identifying potential issues with the Act’s operation, deciding
which of those issues warrant
consideration in this review and exploring some
possible options for reform. Examples of such issues include possible problems
with
the wording or interpretation of a particular provision or combination of
provisions that may be resulting in uncertainty or inconsistency
in practice. We
have also identified some issues where there is concern that the underlying
policy of a provision is not reflected
in the wording of that provision or is
not being achieved in practice. In some circumstances, an issue requires us to
re-examine
the underlying policy of a provision.
- 1.14 We
identified potential issues with the operation of the Act through research and
preliminary feedback from stakeholders. We
examined appellate case law,
commentary and research published since
2018.[13]
Operational issues are not always evident from case law and commentary. We also
therefore invited preliminary feedback on potential
issues for inclusion in this
review from the judiciary, interested organisations and individuals within the
legal profession and
academic community. The Minister of Justice’s letter
of referral also suggested the following issues for our
consideration:[14]
(a) whether the process for determining whether improperly obtained evidence is
admissible in criminal proceedings (section 30) gives
sufficient weight to the
impropriety;
(b) whether there should be additional controls on the admissibility of
statements made by defendants to fellow prisoners;
(c) whether the provisions controlling anonymous evidence given by undercover
police officers require amendment; and
(d) whether any clarifications are needed regarding privilege in criminal
proceedings for information obtained by medical practitioners
and clinical
psychologists.
- 1.15 We
developed a set of criteria to determine what issues to include in this Issues
Paper. We have generally only included an issue
if it meets all the following
criteria, or if we think that it cannot be properly assessed against these
criteria without first seeking
submissions on the issue from interested
parties:[15]
(a) First, the issue is more than minor or technical in nature (that is, the
issue has the potential to cause a real problem in practice).
(b) Second, the issue relates to the operation of the Act since the last review,
or the issue pre-dates the last review but is of
such significance that we think
it should be included in this review, given the repeal of section 202.
(c) Third, the issue was not comprehensively considered in the
Commission’s earlier reviews of the Act, or new material (such
as
subsequent case law or commentary) suggests there is a need to revisit the
conclusions reached by the Commission in its earlier
review(s).
- 1.16 We have
also considered how the Act recognises and provides for te ao Māori. In
Chapter 2, we examine whether the Act adequately
provides for the admission
of evidence of mātauranga Māori, including tikanga Māori, and
seek feedback on other potential
issues with how the Act recognises and provides
for te ao Māori.[16]
- 1.17 In
preparing this Issues Paper we met with our Expert Advisory Group and the
Judicial Advisory Committee established by the Chief
Justice for this review. We
have been guided on our approach to ao Māori issues by the
Commission’s Māori Liaison
Committee.
PROPOSED APPROACH TO ASSESSING POTENTIAL AMENDMENTS
- 1.18 When
considering whether to recommend any amendments to the Act, we must consider
whether such action is “necessary or
desirable”.[17] Not every
issue with the Act will meet this threshold, and we have not reached a
preliminary view on many of the issues discussed
in this Issues Paper. We
therefore encourage submitters to provide feedback on both the nature and extent
of potential issues in
practice as well as preferred reform options. The
feedback we receive will be important in our analysis of the case for reform.
- 1.19 Consistent
with the Commission’s approach in the Second Review, we intend to assess
the case for reform in relation to
each issue by reference to the purpose
statement in section 6 of the Act. This will require considering the extent to
which any potential
amendment would better achieve the Act’s purpose,
which is:[18]
- ... to help
secure the just determination of proceedings by—
- (a) providing
for facts to be established by the application of logical rules; and
- (b) providing
rules of evidence that recognise the importance of the rights affirmed by the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990;
and
- (c) promoting
fairness to parties and witnesses; and
- (d) protecting
rights of confidentiality and other important public interests; and
- (e) avoiding
unjustifiable expense and delay; and
- (f) enhancing
access to the law of evidence.
- 1.20 It is
important to recognise that legislative amendment is not the only way to address
an issue with the operation of the Act.
In assessing whether reform is necessary
or desirable we will, therefore, also consider whether the issue is best left to
be resolved
by the courts on a case-by-case basis, or whether non-legislative
measures, such as practice rules or guidance, are more appropriate
alternatives
to law reform. Such options can be more flexible and responsive to changing
circumstances or emerging best practice
than legislative amendment.
- 1.21 Finally, we
recognise it is always important when making recommendations for legislative
amendment to ensure, as far as practicable,
that they do not have unintended
consequences. The risk of unintended consequences may, in some cases, weigh
against reform, particularly
where there is limited evidence of an issue causing
significant problems in practice.
STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER
- 1.22 The
remainder of this Issues Paper is organised into chapters that, apart from
Chapters 2 and 15, follow the structure of the
Act:
(a) Chapter 2 considers te ao Māori and the Act.
(b) Chapters 3 to 13 consider issues concerning the rules of admissibility in
Part 2 of the Act.
(c) Chapter 14 considers issues concerning the trial process rules in Part 3 of
the Act.
(d) Chapter 15 considers several other issues that relate to specific
stand-alone topics.
- 1.23 While most
of the issues discussed in this Issues Paper primarily concern rules of evidence
in criminal proceedings, a number
of issues will be of particular significance
in civil proceedings. These include issues relating to:
(a) the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings (Chapter 3);
(b) legal advice privilege, litigation privilege and settlement privilege
(Chapter 13); and
(c) cross-examination duties in civil proceedings (Chapter 14).
- 1.24 We ask
questions throughout this Issues Paper to seek your views. You are welcome to
focus only on those topics you wish to provide
feedback on. There is no need to
answer all the questions. You can also raise any other issues with the operation
of the Act that
we have not addressed in this Issues Paper.
QUESTION
Q1
Are there any issues with the operation of the Act that are not addressed in
this Issues Paper that you think we should consider?
CHAPTER 2
2 Te ao Māori and the Evidence Act
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on issues relating to:
- how the Act
provides for the admission of mātauranga Māori and tikanga Māori;
and
- other potential
issues with how the Act recognises and provides for te ao Māori.
BACKGROUND
- 2.1 When
developing the Evidence Code, Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission examined
issues of potential concern to Māori
and considered how the Evidence Code
should address those issues. This included consideration of how evidence of
Māori custom
is admitted in court, whether the confidentiality of
communications on marae and with kaumātua, Māori spiritual leaders
and
rongoā practitioners should be protected, and how the process for giving
evidence should accommodate the specific needs
of
Māori.[19]
- 2.2 As a result,
while the Evidence Code did not expressly recognise te ao Māori or make
specific provision for tikanga or te
Tiriti o Waitangi | Treaty of Waitangi (the
Treaty), several provisions in the Evidence Code and the resulting Act were
drafted in
a way that was intended to address potential issues of concern.
- 2.3 The
Commission revisited these potential issues of concern in its Second Review of
the Evidence Act 2006.[20] However,
at that point there had been “surprisingly little case law relating to the
Act and te ao Māori”, which
made it difficult to draw any conclusions
about how well the provisions of the Act were recognising Māori
interests.[21] The Commission sought
feedback on whether any provisions of the Act were creating difficulties for
Māori,[22] and noted in its
Report that submitters did not point to specific practical issues nor suggest
that there were barriers to admitting
evidence of Māori custom or
protecting the confidentiality of communications with kaumātua or
rongoā practitioners.[23]
- 2.4 The
Commission did, however, conclude in the Second Review that there was scope to
promote greater recognition of tikanga Māori
in courtroom procedure. It
recommended the Act be amended to make it clear that courts can regulate
procedures for giving evidence
in a manner that recognises
tikanga.[24] The Government accepted
this recommendation in principle, noting that the courts already do this to a
certain extent using their
inherent and implied powers. Its view, however, was
that further consideration of the potential operational impacts was
required.[25]
- 2.5 In this
chapter, we examine whether the Act adequately accommodates the admission of
evidence of mātauranga Māori (Māori
knowledge), including tikanga
Māori. We also seek feedback on whether there is any new material that
suggests other potential
issues that have been previously identified by the
Commission should be revisited.
ADMISSIBILITY OF MāTAURANGA MāORI AND TIKANGA
MāORI
- 2.6 The
Act’s rules of admissibility have their origins in the English common law.
It has long been recognised that some rules,
specifically the hearsay and
opinion rules, can create challenges for the admission of relevant evidence
relating to mātauranga
Māori and tikanga
Māori[26] due to the oral
tradition in te ao Māori.
- 2.7 The
Commission is considering tikanga Māori and its position in Aotearoa New
Zealand’s legal landscape in a separate
project. In this operational
review, our focus is on the existing rules of evidence and whether they properly
allow for the admission
of mātauranga Māori and tikanga Māori. We
note the observations of te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court in Ellis v R
that suggest treating tikanga as a question of fact to be proved by evidence
will not always be the most feasible or appropriate method
for bringing tikanga
before the courts.[27] Nonetheless,
as a matter of procedural and substantive fairness. it is important that the Act
is able to admit such evidence when
appropriate, particularly in light of the
changing legal, political and social landscape. The courts are increasingly
being called
upon to consider and recognise Māori rights and interests,
including those arising under tikanga and the Treaty, as well as
the general
application of tikanga
Māori.[28] Evidence of tikanga
and mātauranga, such as tribal history, is often central to determining
these cases.
- 2.8 We discuss
the different pathways for admitting evidence under the Act below, especially in
light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ellis v
R,[29] and then examine relevant
case law to see how the Act is operating in practice.
Admitting evidence under the Act
- 2.9 A
fundamental principle of the Act is that all relevant evidence is admissible,
unless it is excluded or inadmissible under any
provision of the Act or any
other Act.[30] Evidence is relevant
if it “has a tendency to prove or disprove anything that is of consequence
to the determination of the
proceeding”.[31]
- 2.10 The two
rules in particular that have the potential to exclude relevant evidence of
mātauranga Māori and tikanga Māori
are:
(a) the rule against hearsay; and
(b) the rule against opinion evidence.
The rule against hearsay
- 2.11 A
“hearsay statement” is a statement that was made by a person other
than a witness that is offered in evidence to
prove the truth of its
contents.[32] The general rule under
the Act is that hearsay statements are not
admissible.[33] This is premised on
the belief that such statements may be unreliable and misleading (relying as
they do on the witness’ memory
of what they heard and not the
speaker’s/maker’s intention) and cannot be tested under
cross-examination (beyond asking
the witness, for example, whether they could
have misheard or misinterpreted the maker’s
words).[34] We discuss the hearsay
provisions in more detail in Chapter 3.
- 2.12 The rule
against hearsay is subject to exceptions. In particular, a hearsay statement can
be admitted if the circumstances relating
to the statement “provide
reasonable assurance that the statement is reliable”, and the maker of the
statement is unavailable
as a witness (for example, because they have
died).[35]
- 2.13 The
Commission acknowledged the difficulties the rule against hearsay can pose for
Māori in its 1991 Preliminary Paper on
hearsay:[36]
- The hearsay
rule has always posed problems for the reception of evidence of Māori
custom. Such evidence is usually of an oral
nature and, as the law at present
stands, is technically inadmissible as hearsay unless it falls within one of the
common law or
statutory exceptions.
- 2.14 At that
time, the Commission envisaged that its proposals, which underpin the
Act’s current hearsay provisions, would “eliminate
the current
problems concerning evidence of Māori
custom”.[37] In particular,
the proposals would make it easier for the law to take proper account of
reliable oral sources in te ao Māori,
anticipating that the threshold of
reasonable assurance of reliability may well be met in the case of evidence from
a recipient of
a long-standing oral
tradition.[38]
The rule against opinion evidence and the admissibility of
expert evidence
- 2.15 Under
the Act, a statement of opinion is not admissible in any
proceeding.[39] This is subject to
exceptions, including for opinions that are given by an “expert”
witness.[40] The Act defines an
expert as “a person who has specialised knowledge or skill based on
training, study or
experience”.[41] Expert
opinion evidence is only admissible if the fact-finder is likely to obtain
substantial help from the opinion in understanding
other evidence in the
proceeding or in ascertaining any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the
proceeding.[42]
- 2.16 In its
initial work on the Evidence Code, the Commission’s expectation was that
the exception for expert evidence would
continue to provide for the admission of
“[r]elevant evidence about experiences of Māori that is beyond the
knowledge
of the fact
finder”.[43] Earlier case law
had already confirmed that expert evidence from those qualified in terms of
Māori culture was
admissible.[44] It was expected that
the Evidence Code and resulting Act would continue this
approach.[45]
Other mechanisms for admitting evidence of mātauranga
Māori and tikanga Māori
- 2.17 Several
other mechanisms are available under the Act, but these are generally limited to
undisputed evidence:
(a) Agreed statements of fact: Evidence that may not otherwise be
admissible can be admitted with the agreement of all
parties.[46] In Ellis v R,
an agreed statement of facts was filed following a wānanga with
independent pūkenga (experts). Appended to the agreed statement
of facts
was a statement of tikanga authored by Tā Hirini Moko Mead and Tā Pou
Temara, which was supported by the tikanga
experts who attended the
wānanga.[47]
(b) Notice of uncontroverted facts: A judge or jury can take notice of
“facts so known and accepted either generally or in the locality in which
the proceeding
is being held that they cannot reasonably be
questioned”.[48] In addition,
a judge can take notice of, or direct a jury in relation to, facts
“capable of accurate and ready determination
by reference to sources whose
accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned”.[49] While this
sets a high bar, te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal has previously taken
judicial notice of “the fact that
whanaungatanga is one of the fundamental
precepts of tikanga, and indeed Māori
society”.[50]
(c) Reliance on published material: Published documents can be admitted
in matters of “public history” if the judge considers that the
sources of information
are
reliable.[51] Te Rōpū
Whakamana i te Tiriti o Waitangi | Waitangi Tribunal reports have been admitted
under this provision, including
in situations where a party is “unable to
give anything but a hearsay account” of relevant historical
events.[52] This allows a court to
rely on historical facts as found by the Tribunal in situations where they might
otherwise be unable to engage
in a historical fact-finding process based on the
evidence before them.[53] In some
cases, questions of tikanga might be dealt with through submissions, with
reference to published material. Glazebrook J in
Ellis v R observed that
this might be appropriate “[i]n simple cases where tikanga is relevant and
uncontroversial”.[54] A recent
example of this approach is te Kōti Matua | High Court case of Doney v
Adlam.[55] In that case,
the Court had adjourned proceedings to enable the engagement of a tikanga expert
but counsel were unable to do so in
the time
available.[56] In the absence of
expert evidence, the Court relied on several authoritative texts, books,
articles and case law, both historic and
contemporary, to consider the
application of tikanga principles in that
case.[57]
- 2.18 Other
mechanisms exist outside the Act. The High Court can appoint pūkenga as
independent court experts for opinion or advice
on
tikanga.[58] Such a mechanism might
helpfully be engaged if there is a lack of relevant information before the court
as to relevant tikanga or
conversely if there is a significant amount of expert
evidence before the court. In Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v
Attorney-General, Palmer J declined to appoint pūkenga given the ample
expert evidence offered by the
parties,[59] however later observed
that “[i]n retrospect, I consider it would have been beneficial to appoint
an independent pūkenga
to conduct the conference of tikanga experts, and an
independent chair of the historian
experts”.[60]
- 2.19 The High
Court can also refer any question of fact relating to Māori rights or
interests in land or personal property, or
any question of tikanga, to the
Māori Appellate Court.[61]
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ellis v R
- 2.20 The
Supreme Court canvassed the different avenues outlined above for ascertaining
tikanga in Ellis v R. Glazebrook J observed that “[t]he best
approach will be contextual, depending on the issues, the significance of
tikanga to
the case as well as matters of accessibility and
cost”.[62] However, the Court
emphasised the need to preserve the integrity of tikanga. In the Statement of
Tikanga appended to the judgment,
Mead and Temara explained that, when tikanga
comes before the courts, the courts must “use processes and practice that
encourage
the preservation of the integrity of
tikanga”.[63]
- 2.21 The Supreme
Court also expressed caution about the “orthodox approach” of
treating tikanga as something to be proved
as a matter of fact by expert
evidence, in the same way as foreign
law.[64] Glazebrook J observed that
while tikanga may need to be established and ascertained by evidence or through
another suitable process,
it is “not appropriate to refer to it as having
to be proved as a question of
fact”.[65] Williams J was also
“somewhat uncomfortable” with the application of the evidential
approach to indigenous law, noting
that this was likely “simply a
convenient and efficient way of getting unfamiliar material before the judge who
then had to
apply it”.[66]
Williams J observed that there are multiple available techniques for assisting
the courts to understand and, if necessary, apply
tikanga.[67]
How is the Act operating in practice?
Operation of the rules against hearsay and opinion
evidence
- 2.22 Few
cases have expressly addressed the admissibility of mātauranga Māori
and tikanga Māori under the rules against
hearsay or opinion evidence in
the Act.
- 2.23 The first
case to do so appears to be R v Saxton, a case decided after the
Act had been passed but before it came into
force.[68] In that case, the
defendant sought to rely on evidence of customary rights in relation to pounamu.
Te Kōti-ā-Rohe | District
Court noted that, while the Act did not
apply in that case, the hearsay provisions in the Act “seem to allow the
admission
of evidence of this
kind”.[69] This was accepted
by counsel on appeal.[70] Another
case that directly addressed this issue was Proprietors of Wakatū Inc v
Attorney-General. The Attorney-General objected to the admission of evidence
containing traditional, oral accounts of the collective histories of
whānau,
hapū and iwi on the basis that it was inadmissible and
irrelevant hearsay and opinion
evidence.[71] The High Court
admitted the evidence,
concluding:[72]
- In terms of the
Evidence Act 2006, the admissibility gateways for traditional, oral evidence
would appear to involve a mixture of
rules relating to opinion and hearsay
evidence, and general questions of relevance (probative value). As a matter of
principle, and
noting the approaches outlined in the various cases referred to,
I think it would be surprising if appropriate evidence of oral history
was not
admissible simply because it did not fit easily within the concepts of hearsay
and opinion evidence as it is most commonly
dealt with.
- 2.24 We noted
these cases in the Second Review but said that the lack of case law made it
difficult to draw conclusions about how
the operation of the Act’s
provisions are recognising Māori interests in practice.
- 2.25 Since then,
the High Court considered the application of the hearsay provisions in relation
to tribal history in Te Ara Rangatū o Te Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua
Inc v Attorney-General, a case concerning claims relating to the
Crown’s acquisition and subsequent confiscation of ancestral land from
Ngāti Te
Ata in 1864 and subsequent
events.[73] The Court noted the
“difficulty in resolving disputed facts relating to events which took
place some 160 years ago”,
and that “factual findings concerning
those historical events can only be made on the basis of admissible evidence put
before
the Court in these
proceedings”.[74] The Court
noted that, unlike the situation in Wakatū, where the relevant facts
could largely be drawn from a reasonably comprehensive documentary record,
evidence of detailed discussions
and relationships between the parties was
“scant to say the
least”.[75] Many of the facts
were in dispute and were the subject of competing expert historian
evidence.[76]
- 2.26 In relation
to that evidence, the Court’s observations record the difficulty in
applying current categories of evidence
to
mātauranga:[77]
- Some of the
evidence I heard was strictly hearsay. There was nevertheless no formal
objection taken by any party to the evidence
adduced at trial. I accordingly
proceed on the basis the evidence was admitted by agreement pursuant to s 9 of
the Evidence Act 2006.
Where appropriate however, I have taken these matters
into account when considering the weight to be given to particular items of
evidence. This has been particularly necessary in the case of some of the
historical materials, which are not complete and thus the
full context to
certain events and communications is unknown.
- 2.27 While
recourse to section 9 in that case enabled the Court to consider the evidence,
such an approach will not provide a solution
in all cases. Section 9 would not,
for example, be available in cases where the evidence is contested. A question
also arises as
to whether this is an appropriate application of section 9, which
was intended to require express agreement of the parties in relation to
agreed statements of
fact.[78]
Ascertaining tikanga through expert evidence
- 2.28 While
few cases have examined the operation of the rules against hearsay or opinion
evidence in relation to mātauranga Māori
and tikanga Māori, there
are ample examples of expert evidence from pūkenga being admitted in cases
since 2018 in a range
of different contexts,
including:[79]
(a) in cases involving disputes between iwi,
hapū[80] and
whānau;[81]
(b) in cases against the Crown,[82]
including cases relating to individual rights and
entitlements;[83]
(c) in a judicial review of a preliminary determination of the Waitangi
Tribunal;[84] and
(d) in a criminal proceeding, where evidence of tikanga practices was relevant
to the defendant’s
defence.[85]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 2.29 Our
review of available cases suggest that the expert evidence provisions of the Act
are routinely engaged to admit evidence
of mātauranga Māori and
tikanga Māori from pūkenga.
- 2.30 There is,
however, less clarity as to whether there is scope for the admission of
mātauranga Māori or tikanga Māori
outside the expert evidence
provisions in the Act. We have identified few cases that have examined this
issue and no cases that have
embarked on an assessment of whether such evidence
is in fact hearsay or whether it can be admitted as an exception to the rule
against
hearsay because it meets the reliability threshold. While section 9
(admission by agreement) has provided a pragmatic approach to
date, we do not
think it provides an adequate or principled response to this issue.
- 2.31 As the
courts are increasingly being asked to consider tikanga and mātauranga in
proceedings subject to the Act,[86]
it is desirable to consider whether further clarity is required as to the
appropriate approach to such evidence. As judicial awareness
of commonly
understood tikanga Māori increases, the need to ascertain that tikanga by
way of evidence in every case may diminish
over time. This does not, however,
reduce the need for the Act to properly accommodate such evidence in appropriate
cases.
- 2.32 The
approach under the Act can also be contrasted with the more flexible approach to
evidence in other jurisdictions where the
Act does not apply and Māori
interests are often central, including in te Kooti Whenua Māori |
Māori Land Court, te
Kōti Taiao | Environment Court and claims under
the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act
2011.[87] By way of example, in
Ngati Hokopu Ki Hokowhitu v Whakatane District Council, the
Environment Court explained that the rules about hearsay, opinion evidence and
witness bias are normally applied for good reasons,
however:[88]
- Against that,
we have to bear in mind that Ngati Awa, and Māori generally, have a culture
in which oral statements are the accepted
method of discourse on serious issues,
and statements of whakapapa are very important as connecting individuals to
their land. In
the absence of other evidence from experts on tikanga Maori, the
evidence of tangata whenua must be given some weight (and in appropriate
cases
considerable, perhaps even determinative, weight). In the end the weight to be
given to the evidence in any case is unique
to that case.
- 2.33 The Court
went on to state that:[89]
- In these
proceedings we heard a good deal of hearsay evidence from Ngati Awa witnesses
... which also included opinion evidence -
for example that the 100 acre block
is or is not waahi tapu. All those witnesses were biased, in the legal sense, in
that they had
an interest in the proceedings. Despite that, we have considered
the evidence of all the witnesses, whether they qualify as experts
on tikanga
Māori or not.
Options for reform
- 2.34 We
have identified two options for reform should legislative reform be considered
necessary or desirable to future proof the
rules of evidence in light of the
ongoing relevance of tikanga and mātauranga in proceedings to which the Act
applies. These
options could be considered as alternative reform options or both
options could be progressed together.
Option 1: Tailored exception to the rules against hearsay and
opinion evidence
- 2.35 This
option is based on the Australian approach. There, concerns about the effect of
these rules on the admission of evidence
from Aboriginal people and Torres
Strait Islanders have resulted in the adoption of tailored exceptions for
evidence about traditional
laws and
customs.[90] Commonwealth
legislation (which is replicated in most states and territories) now
provides:[91]
- Exception:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs
- The hearsay
rule does not apply to evidence of a representation about the existence or
non-existence, or the content, of the traditional
laws and customs of an
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group.
- 2.36 A similar
exception applies in relation to the rule against opinion
evidence.[92] We are interested in
exploring whether similar exceptions would be appropriate in Aotearoa New
Zealand to clarify that the hearsay
and opinion rules do not apply to evidence
of tikanga Māori. We are also interested in exploring whether such
exceptions should
also address mātauranga Māori, thereby covering a
wider field of knowledge, such as tribal histories that are passed on
through
the generations.
- 2.37 We note,
however, that rules on hearsay and opinion evidence in Australia are similar but
not identical to New Zealand law, so
this option would require careful
consideration to determine if it is appropriate in the New Zealand context and,
if so, how the
exception should be drafted. This would need to include
consideration of the different situations when it would be appropriate to
admit
evidence of either tikanga Māori or mātauranga Māori of a person
who would not otherwise meet the definition
of expert under the
Act.[93]
- 2.38 There may
be merit in adopting a broad exception to the hearsay and opinion rules that
would include other cultures where traditional
knowledge systems and methods of
storing knowledge are oral in nature. As the Supreme Court recognised in Deng
v Zheng, cases in which one or more parties have a cultural background that
differs from that of a judge are common in New Zealand courts
and are likely to
become more common in future.[94] It
may be desirable for the Act to more clearly acknowledge and accommodate oral
traditions in other cultures. This may be most appropriate
where such knowledge
systems employ sophisticated techniques for recording history or knowledge
orally, as is the case in relation
to mātauranga Māori, so that
concerns about reliability and verification that underpin the rule against
hearsay have less
or no relevance. We welcome feedback on this point.
Option 2: Prescribing interpretative guidance
- 2.39 The
second option is to introduce statutory guidance as to the need to interpret and
apply the provisions of the Act having regard
to te ao
Māori.[95]
- 2.40 Currently,
the Act does not expressly refer to te ao Māori or tikanga Māori. This
is despite attention being given
to te ao Māori issues in the development
of the Evidence Code and a clear desire to ensure the Act appropriately
accommodates
te ao Māori. Since the Act was passed, the courts have
increasingly been engaging with tikanga and considering Māori rights
and
interests, including those arising under the Treaty. It is important that the
Act can respond to these changes.
- 2.41 An
advantage of expressly requiring the courts to have regard to te ao Māori
would be to assist the courts in their application
of the rules of evidence in
cases involving Māori interests and help normalise the admission of such
evidence in appropriate
cases.
- 2.42 Other
legislation under which Māori interests are relevant to court proceedings
already make similar provision. The Resource
Management Act 1991 provides that
the Environment Court shall recognise tikanga Māori where
appropriate,[96] and Te Ture Whenua
Maori Act 1993 provides that a judge of the Māori Land Court or the
Māori Appellate Court may apply
such rules of marae kawa as they consider
appropriate.[97]
- 2.43 This option
is more general in nature than Option 1, but arguably that is appropriate if the
intention is to future proof the
Act in a general sense. Option 2 would enable
the reliability of hearsay evidence or the application of the expert evidence
provisions
to be considered through a te ao Māori lens and in light of
mātauranga Māori methodologies for storing and transmitting
information.
- 2.44 Option 2
would also apply more broadly to other provisions of the Act. It would guide a
judge to consider questions of relevance
under section 7 from a te ao Māori
perspective, which may be different to the judge’s own perspective. For
example, the
whakapapa of a person or a place may not initially seem relevant to
the judge but it may well be relevant to the kaumātua giving
evidence or to
the parties themselves. It could also assist the court when deciding whether to
exclude evidence under section 69,
discussed below.
- 2.45 A
disadvantage, however, of including any interpretative guidance of general
effect is that its application can be uncertain
and may result in unintended
consequences for the application of other specific provisions in the Act.
QUESTION
Q2
Should the Act be amended to address the admissibility of tikanga and
mātauranga in proceedings to which the Act applies? If
so, should the Act
be amended to:
- introduce
statutory exceptions to the rules against hearsay and opinion evidence for
evidence of tikanga Māori (and potentially
mātauranga Māori);
and/or
- introduce
guidance as to the need to interpret and apply the provisions of the Act having
regard to te ao Māori?
OTHER POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH HOW THE ACT RECOGNISES AND PROVIDES
FOR TE AO MāORI
Operation of section 30 (improperly obtained evidence) and
racial bias
- 2.46 Section
30 governs the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence and is examined in
detail in Chapter 7. An issue raised
with us through preliminary feedback is
that the current application of section 30 fails to discourage poor policing
practices and
that has a disproportionate impact on Māori.
- 2.47 A more
specific concern relates to the application of section 30 when racial bias has
impacted the gathering of evidence in a
particular case. Māori and other
ethnic minorities are stopped and searched by Police
disproportionately.[98] New Zealand
Police has acknowledged this issue and appointed an independent panel to conduct
research into fair and equitable
policing.[99] While racial bias in
policing is a broad issue that cannot be addressed solely – or even
substantially – through the
law of evidence (as evidence law is only
concerned with breaches of rights retrospectively and only if proceedings are
initiated),
it is nonetheless important that section 30 responds appropriately
when racial bias has impacted the gathering of evidence subsequently
presented
in court.
- 2.48 In
Kearns v R, the Court of Appeal considered an argument that
evidence obtained through an exercise of search powers was improperly obtained
on
the basis that the search was motivated by racial
bias.[100] The Court found
there was an evidential basis to support the allegation that the defendant was
approached by a constable (leading
to a search of his vehicle) because of his
race or skin colour.[101] The
District Court judge had therefore erred in failing to determine whether the
evidence disclosed by the search had been improperly
obtained, for example, in
breach of section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (freedom from
discrimination). The case
was remitted back to the District Court to be
reheard.
- 2.49 It appears
Kearns has only been considered in one case subsequently. In that case,
the Court of Appeal recognised an argument that evidence was obtained
pursuant
to a search motivated by institutional bias could be a matter of general and
public importance justifying a second
appeal.[102] Unlike in
Kearns, however, there was no evidential foundation for the
argument in that case.
- 2.50 We seek
submissions on whether the application of section 30 in cases of potential
racial bias is sufficiently clear as a result
of Kearns. In particular,
we are interested in whether counsel are confident raising issues of racial bias
where appropriate and how judges
approach such matters at trial (which may not
always be reflected in judgments).
Protecting confidential communications
- 2.51 When
developing the Evidence Code, the Commission considered how marae
discussions and communications with kaumātua, tohunga and rongoā
practitioners should
be
treated.[103] It was anticipated
that section 69, which gives the court discretion to exclude confidential
communications, would provide the necessary
discretion in appropriate cases. The
Second Review did not identify any concerns with how this provision is
operating, and we have
not identified any relevant cases since then. However, we
seek feedback on this issue to see whether there have been any other significant
developments in recent years that suggest this area should be revisited, or
significant concerns about how the law is operating in
practice.
Judicial warnings on cross-cultural identification bias and
the risk of assessing credibility based on cultural stereotypes
- 2.52 During
the development of the Evidence Code the Commission was alive to research that
indicated that:
(a) attempts to identify a person of a different racial appearance are generally
less reliable than attempts to identify a person
of the same racial appearance;
and
(b) assessments of witness credibility can be influenced by cultural
stereotypes.
- 2.53 The Act
does not include specific directions on these matters. A judge can, however,
give a warning in criminal proceedings in
which the case depends wholly or
substantially on the correctness of visual identification as to the special need
for caution when
relying on such
evidence.[104]
- 2.54 In the
Second Review, the Commission examined research and case law on these two
matters and considered whether to reform the
Act to provide for judicial
directions on cross-cultural identifications and/or demeanour
assessments.[105] Ultimately, the
Commission did not recommend reform, emphasising the need for any judicial
direction to be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.[106] We invite feedback on
whether there have been any developments in recent years that suggest this area
should be revisited.
Giving evidence in court
- 2.55 In
the Second Review, the Commission recommended the Act be amended to make it
clear that courts can regulate procedures for
giving evidence in a manner that
recognises tikanga.[107] The
Government accepted this recommendation in principle, noting that the courts
already do this to a certain extent using their
inherent and implied powers.
However its view was that further consideration of the potential operational
impacts was required.[108]
- 2.56 This
recommendation, if implemented, could meaningfully address several concerns we
have identified with courtroom procedures
and their disconnect with tikanga
Māori. This may lend further support to the Commission’s
recommendation in its Second
Review.
- 2.57 The first
issue relates to the way in which counsel and judges deal with challenges to
pūkenga evidence. Often such evidence
is not contested or
challenged.[109] However, that is
not always the case, particularly in relation to competing claims among iwi or
hapū. In such cases, the parties
may present different or competing
evidence. The conventional approach in an adversarial system is to highlight
inconsistencies in
evidence through cross-examination to show that a witness may
be unreliable or untruthful. In te ao Māori, however, it may not
be
approrpiate to attribute differences in accounts from pūkenga, or changing
accounts over time, to questions of credibility
or reliability. The conventional
approach to cross-examination may therefore in some circumstances be regarded as
inappropriate and
potentially a breach of tikanga. As the Commission observed in
its commentary on the Evidence
Code:[110]
- The
question-and-answer format is not the way Māori traditionally resolve
disputes or discuss issues. Thus cross-examination
of kaumātua can amount
to an insult to their mana, especially when questioning is directed at
impeaching their credibility or
exposing them to ridicule.
- 2.58 There is
also a concern that, when cross-examination of pūkenga is conducted without
regard to or understanding of the methodologies
used within te ao Māori to
gather and store information, or the tikanga processes associated with
resolution of disputes in
te ao Māori, this can result in misunderstanding
and can waste court time. Effective cross-examination therefore demands
sufficient
expertise of mātauranga Māori and tikanga Māori by
cross-examining counsel and the judge. Where that expertise is
absent, there is
an increased risk of breaching tikanga, misunderstandings and/or unnecessarily
taking up court time.
- 2.59 The Act
already permits a judge to have regard to the linguistic or cultural background
of the witness in considering whether
any question, or the way in which it is
asked, is improper. The judge can disallow the question or direct that the
witness is not
obliged to answer
it.[111] The Commission envisaged
that this would “allow judges to exert some control over cross-examination
that may be culturally
offensive”.[112] The
recommendation made in the Second Review would give the courts greater direction
on their ability to facilitate the giving of
evidence (including
cross-examination) in a way that does not unnecessarily denigrate the mana of
witnesses.
- 2.60 The issue
is not whether pūkenga evidence can be tested in cross-examination, but
rather how that evidence is tested. Our
expectation is that the recommendation
made in the Second Review would promote a tikanga-consistent approach to
cross-examination
of pūkenga. This would be similar to the way in which
sophisticated principles and procedures have developed in other specific
areas
to address improper questioning of witnesses, including processes that seek to
protect vulnerable witnesses from undue pressure
or irrelevant inquiry.
- 2.61 The second
issue relates to the availability of support people to witnesses giving evidence
in court. Several submitters on the
Second Review supported the ability for more
than one support person to allow whānau to provide support in alternative
ways.
Again, we note that the recommendation made in the Second Review would
facilitate the courts interpreting their discretion to appoint
more than one
support person in a way that is consistent with
tikanga.[113]
- 2.62 The third
issue relates to procedures for relying on written briefs of evidence and was
highlighted in the recent case of Bamber v Official
Assignee.[114] On
appeal from a District Court decision, it was argued that the Judge should have
allowed kaumātua to speak to their affidavit
evidence at the hearing, and
that the failure to do so demonstrated a disrespect towards and a
non-recognition of tikanga
Māori.[115] On appeal the
High Court acknowledged that, for completeness, it might have been preferable
for the Judge to have permitted the kaumātua
to speak during the hearing,
but that it was within the Judge’s authority to determine the procedure
for the case and to rely
on affidavit
evidence.[116]
QUESTION
Q3
Are any other provisions in the Act failing to adequately provide for te ao
Māori in practice? If so, how should the Act be amended
to better recognise
te ao Māori?
CHAPTER 3
3 Hearsay
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on issues with the operation
of the hearsay provisions relating to:
- the meaning of
when a person is “unavailable as a witness”;
- the meaning of
when a person “cannot with reasonable diligence” be found; and
- hearsay in civil
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
- 3.1 The
Evidence Act 2006 is based on the principle of
orality.[117] This recognises the
fundamental importance of transparency in the administration of justice through
the courts, and rests upon the
assumption that the fact-finder is likely to
benefit from seeing and hearing witnesses give their
evidence.[118] Evidence is
therefore ordinarily given orally in court by witnesses who are available for
cross-examination.[119] To
facilitate this, section 71 provides that every person is eligible and
compellable to give evidence in court unless they fall
into one of the narrow
exceptions in sections 72 to 75 of the
Act.[120]
- 3.2 An
out-of-court statement that was made by a person who is not a witness can only
be offered in evidence to prove the truth of
its contents in limited
circumstances. These are “hearsay
statements”.[121] The
general test for admitting hearsay statements is contained in section 18 of the
Act, which provides:
- 18 General
admissibility of hearsay
- (1) A hearsay
statement is admissible in any proceeding if—
- (a) the
circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable assurance that the
statement is reliable; and
- (b) either—
- (i) the maker
of the statement is unavailable as a witness; or
- (ii) the Judge
considers that undue expense or delay would be caused if the maker of the
statement were required to be a witness.
- ...
- 3.3 Section
16(2) of the Act states that a person is “unavailable as a witness”
for the purposes of the hearsay provisions
if the person:
- (a) is dead; or
- (b) is outside
New Zealand and it is not reasonably practicable for him or her to be a witness;
or
- (c) is unfit to
be a witness because of age or physical or mental condition; or
- (d) cannot with
reasonable diligence be identified or found; or
- (e) is not
compellable to give evidence.
WHEN A PERSON IS “UNAVAILABLE AS A WITNESS”
- 3.4 The
Act narrowly prescribes situations when a person is unavailable as a witness for
the purpose of the hearsay provisions. It
does not confer any general discretion
on the court to find that a person is unavailable for reasons other than those
listed in section
16(2).
What is the issue?
- 3.5 Recent
case law suggests the law remains unsettled as to whether the categories of
unavailability for hearsay purposes can be
interpreted in a way that includes
situations where a person is excused by the court from giving evidence. This
raises a broader
question as to whether the categories of unavailability should
provide for situations where a person has a good reason or “just
excuse” for not giving evidence.
- 3.6 Awatere v
R considered the interrelationship between the hearsay provisions and the
Criminal Procedure Act 2011.[122]
That Act provides mechanisms for enforcing obligations on compellable witnesses
to attend court and give
evidence.[123] Under section 165,
if a person refuses to give evidence the court may order that they be detained
in custody for a period not exceeding
seven
days.[124] However, the court may
exercise its discretion not to make such an order, thereby excusing a person
from giving evidence, if they
can offer a “just
excuse”.[125]
- 3.7 In
Awatere, the complainant left the courtroom in a distressed state during
questioning by the prosecution after being declared a hostile
witness.[126] The Judge then ruled
the complainant’s statement to Police was
admissible.[127] On appeal, te
Kōti Matua | High Court held that the complainant’s police statement
was hearsay.[128] The issue
therefore became whether the hearsay statement could be admitted on the basis
that the complainant was “unavailable
as a witness”. The Court
commented that, “as a matter of logic”, section 165 of the
Criminal Procedure Act “could be read as modifying or
glossing” the
Act’s rules about compellability and therefore the meaning of
“unavailable” under the hearsay
rules.[129] However, the Court
found it unnecessary to determine the issue because the trial judge had made no
formal ruling that the complainant
had a “just excuse” under section
165 of the Criminal Procedure
Act.[130]
- 3.8 In addition
to Awatere, we are aware of two other recent cases that considered
the application of the hearsay provisions to an out-of-court statement made
by a
person who was excused from giving
evidence.[131] Like
Awatere, these cases suggested it could be possible that having a
“just excuse” under the Criminal Procedure Act might constitute
being “unavailable” for hearsay purposes, but neither case had to
decide the issue.
Policy and legislative history
- 3.9 The
hearsay provisions were based on Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s
Evidence Code.[132] When
developing the Evidence Code, the Commission considered whether it should treat
witnesses as unavailable in other situations.
Specifically, the Commission
considered people who were too frightened or traumatised to give
evidence.[133] Ultimately, it
decided that “trauma” would be sufficiently covered by
unavailability due to a mental condition (under
what is now section 16(2)(c)),
and that frightened witnesses could be accommodated through other
measures.[134] The Commission also
decided against treating as unavailable a witness who was physically present in
court but refused to give
evidence.[135]
- 3.10 The
Commission was, however, concerned about the effect of abolishing the spousal
non-compellability rule for domestic violence
complainants, who may be put at
risk of retaliatory violence if compelled to give
evidence.[136] The Commission had
consulted on a proposal to give judges a discretion to excuse a witness if the
judge was not satisfied that the
witness could be protected from
retaliation.[137] That proposal
received a mixed response, with some commentators of the view that such a
discretionary rule should in fairness extend
to all frightened witnesses, not
just to victims of family
violence.[138] The Commission was
concerned that extending such a rule to all frightened witnesses would
“potentially allow a large number
of crucial prosecution witnesses to be
excused, which is clearly
undesirable”.[139] Conceding
the issue had caused “considerable
difficulty”,[140] the
Commission ultimately decided it was premature to include in the Evidence Code
special rules dealing with the compellability
of victims of family
violence.[141] It did not address
the consequences of such rules for the admissibility of hearsay statements.
- 3.11 The
Evidence Bill as introduced did address partners at risk of family violence.
Clause 71 provided a discretion to excuse those
in “close personal
relationships” with defendants from giving evidence. The consequence of a
decision to excuse a person
was that the person was deemed
“unavailable” for hearsay purposes. A Cabinet paper on this matter
referred explicitly
to the court’s existing power to excuse a witness with
just excuse from giving evidence as “bolstering” the
proposal.[142] The clause was,
however, removed at select committee stage due to concerns about incentivising
coercion, the potential arbitrariness
of determining what constitutes a close
personal relationship, and the undesirability of admitting statements through
the hearsay
provisions without opportunity for
cross-examination.[143]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 3.12 Our
preliminary view is that legislative reform may be desirable to clarify the
scope of the hearsay provisions. The question
then becomes, as a matter of
policy, how the Act should respond to situations where a person has a good
reason or “just excuse”
not to give evidence.
- 3.13 This
question engages fundamental and competing public
interests.[144] As a general rule,
it is in the interests of justice that all relevant information should be
available to the fact-finder. It is
also important to consider the interests of
the witness. In some cases, a witness may face adverse consequences if they give
evidence,
such as intimidation or retaliation. However, relying on hearsay
statements means that a defendant is deprived of the opportunity
to challenge
that evidence in cross-examination. This engages a defendant’s fundamental
right to a fair trial, which is enshrined
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 and includes the right to cross-examine
witnesses.[145]
Options for reform
- 3.14 There
are, broadly speaking, two opposing legislative options for reform, which
reflect the stark policy choice involved.
Option 1: Clarify that there is no jurisdiction to admit
hearsay from people excused from giving evidence
- 3.15 This
option gives priority to a defendant’s right to a fair trial by clarifying
that a person who is available as a witness
and compellable to give evidence
must be available for cross-examination if their evidence is to be admitted in
court. This option
could be achieved by amending the Act to clarify that
“compellability” for hearsay purposes is defined by sections 71
to
75 of the Act. This would respond to the question raised in Awatere and
confirm that the term “compellable to give evidence” in section 16
is to be given its meaning in the Act rather than
being modified or glossed by
section 165 of the Criminal Procedure
Act.[146]
- 3.16 Under this
option, concerns about witnesses who may have a good reason for not giving
evidence would need to be addressed through
the Act’s provision of
alternative ways of giving
evidence.[147]
- 3.17 There is
some support for this approach. One commentator, writing on the High Court
decision in Awatere, has argued that any extension of the
exceptions to the rule against hearsay to encompass statements of witnesses who
“choose
not to give evidence” would tilt the balance too far against
the accused by precluding
cross-examination.[148] They
suggest that a decision by the court to excuse a person from giving evidence, or
a failure of the existing sanctions to facilitate
a person giving evidence,
should not result in the admission of hearsay. Rather, “[i]t is simply the
nature of criminal law
that in some cases there will be insufficient admissible
evidence on which to base a
conviction”.[149]
- 3.18 This option
seems broadly consistent with Parliament’s intention when passing the Act.
The policy history discussed above
demonstrates that consideration was given to
different situations where a witness may have a good reason for not giving
evidence.
Ultimately, greater weight was placed on the defendant’s fair
trial rights, the importance of preserving the availability of
cross-examination, and the availability of alternative ways of giving
evidence.[150]
Limitations of Option 1
- 3.19 This
option would not provide for situations where the defendant, through threats or
other actions, causes a person to have a
just excuse to not give evidence
(discussed under Option 2 below).
- 3.20 This option
also leaves people who may have a good reason for not giving evidence in a
difficult position. For example, where
there is no way for the prosecution to
prove a family violence charge without the complainant’s evidence, and no
way to admit
the complainant’s hearsay statement even if they have a good
reason for not giving evidence, then the prosecution needs to
summon that
complainant under threat of imprisonment for not complying with the summons and,
if necessary, have them declared hostile
in court in order to admit their
previous statement as
evidence.[151] These issues have
long been recognised.[152] As the
Commission observed in its 1994 Preliminary Paper on
privilege:[153]
- The public may
well question the adequacy of a justice system in which a battered woman who
refuses to testify against her partner
is imprisoned for contempt while the
defendant goes free.
- 3.21 This option
also fails to resolve some of the anomalies under the Act. If, for example, a
complainant who fears retaliation is
successful in avoiding Police, then their
reliable hearsay statement can be admitted on the basis that they “cannot
with reasonable
diligence be...
found”.[154] Similarly, if a
person is outside Aotearoa New Zealand, their fear of retaliation for giving
evidence can be considered when determining
whether it is “reasonably
practicable” for them to be a
witness.[155] If, however, they
are found in Aotearoa New Zealand and are compelled to attend court but refuse
to give evidence (regardless of
the legal sanctions they face for refusing to do
so), their hearsay statement is inadmissible regardless of its reliability.
- 3.22 The cases
discussed above suggest that there will be situations where the court does not
consider it to be in the interests of
justice to exclude hearsay statements from
a person who has a good reason for not giving evidence. This option would not
accommodate
these situations. It is also arguable that such a restrictive
approach is not necessary to preserve a defendant’s fair trial
rights
provided there are other adequate safeguards. We address this further under
Option 2.
Option 2: A new discretion to admit a hearsay statement when a
person has a good reason not to give evidence
- 3.23 This
option would expand the situations in which a person’s hearsay statement
could be admitted. It could be achieved by
introducing a new category of
“unavailability” in section 16(2) or providing a new alternative to
the unavailability
requirement in section 18(1)(b).
- 3.24 The
objective of this option would be to ensure relevant and reliable information is
available to the court when it considers
a person should not be required to give
evidence.
- 3.25 We have
adopted the language of “good reason” in this discussion to avoid
conflating this option with a finding of
“just excuse” under section
165 of the Criminal Procedure
Act.[156] Requiring a finding of
“just excuse” under the Criminal Procedure Act to engage the hearsay
provisions would result in
procedural difficulties. A judge can only exercise
their discretion under section 165 at the trial, and only if the person is
present
in court. Further, a determination under section 165 is also made for a
separate purpose – to decide whether a witness should
be detained in order
to compel them to give evidence in court – not to decide whether their
hearsay statement should be admissible.
Different considerations are engaged,
including, in the latter situation, the importance of the availability of
cross-examination.
For these reasons, under this option, we think a judge should
be able to make a determination of “good reason” independently
under
the Act for the purposes of assessing the admissibility of a hearsay statement.
The existing notice provision in section 22
of the Act requiring a party to give
advance notice of an intention to offer a hearsay statement in evidence would
apply. We discuss
how “good reason” could be defined below.
- 3.26 This option
departs from the original underpinning policy of the hearsay provisions,
discussed above. However, we think it is
appropriate to reconsider whether the
Act strikes the right balance between the competing public policy interests,
given the problems
identified in the case law outlined above, the criticism of
the decision to abolish spousal non-compellability in the Act given its
impact
on victims of family
violence,[157] and developments in
international human rights law on this issue, which we discuss below.
- 3.27 This option
would address concerns identified by some
commentators,[158] and is broadly
consistent with more expansive approaches taken in comparable
jurisdictions.[159] Of most
assistance is the approach in England and Wales.
The fear-based approach in England and Wales
- 3.28 The
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) includes similar categories of unavailability for
hearsay purposes as the Act, with one notable
additional category, which applies
when:[160]
- ... through
fear the relevant person does not give (or does not continue to give) oral
evidence in the proceedings, either at all
or in connection with the subject
matter of the statement, and the court gives leave for the statement to be given
in evidence.
- 3.29 The term
“fear” is to be “widely construed” and includes fear of
the death or injury of another person
or of financial
loss.[161] Any application to
admit hearsay evidence under the “fear” category may be granted only
if the court considers that the
statement ought to be admitted in the interests
of justice.[162] In doing so, the
court must have regard to the statement’s contents, any risk that its
admission or exclusion will result in
unfairness to any party to the proceedings
(and, in particular, to how difficult it will be to challenge the statement if
the relevant
person does not give oral evidence) and, in appropriate cases, the
fact that special measures for the giving of evidence by “fearful
witnesses” could be
made.[163]
- 3.30 The
Criminal Justice Act also provides a residual discretion for the judge to admit
hearsay evidence if satisfied that it is
in the interests of justice, having
regard to a range of prescribed
considerations.[164]
Grand Chamber consideration of the fear-based approach
- 3.31 The
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) considered
whether the category for “fear”
is compatible with fair trial rights
(including the right to
cross-examine)[165] in Al
Khawaja and Tahery v United
Kingdom.[166]
- 3.32 The Grand
Chamber observed there were two requirements that follow from the general
principle that the accused should be given
an opportunity to challenge and
question a witness against
them:[167]
- First, there
must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness. Second, when a
conviction is based solely or to a decisive
degree on depositions that have been
made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have
examined, whether
during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the
defence may be restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the
guarantees
provided by Article 6.
- 3.33 The Grand
Chamber went on to discuss whether absence owing to fear is a “good
reason” for
non-attendance.[168] A distinction
was drawn between two types of fear: fear that was attributable to threats or
other actions of the defendant or those
acting on their behalf, and fear that is
attributable to a more general fear of what will happen if they give evidence at
trial.[169] In relation to fear
attributable to the defendant or those acting on their behalf, the Grand Chamber
considered that:[170]
- ... it is
appropriate to allow the evidence of that witness to be introduced at trial
without the need for the witness to give live
evidence or be examined by the
defendant or his representatives – even if such evidence was the sole or
decisive evidence against
the defendant. To allow the defendant to benefit from
the fear he has engendered in witnesses would be incompatible with the rights
of
victims and witnesses. No court could be expected to allow the integrity of its
proceedings to be subverted in this way. Consequently,
a defendant who has acted
in this manner must be taken to have waived his rights to question such
witnesses under Article 6 §
3(d). The same conclusion must apply when the
threats or actions which lead to the witness being afraid to testify come from
those
who act on behalf of the defendant or with his knowledge and
approval.
- 3.34 The Grand
Chamber acknowledged the concern that it was “notoriously difficult”
for any court to be certain that a
defendant had threatened a witness but
considered that such difficulties were “not
insuperable”.[171]
- 3.35 In relation
to the “more common” situation, where fear is attributable to a
general fear of the consequences of giving
evidence, the Grand Chamber
observed:[172]
- There is ... no
requirement that a witness’s fear be attributable directly to threats made
by the defendant in order for that
witness to be excused from giving evidence at
trial. Moreover, fear of death or injury of another person or of financial loss
are
all relevant considerations in determining whether a witness should not be
required to give oral evidence. This does not mean, however,
that any subjective
fear of the witness will suffice. The trial court must conduct appropriate
enquiries to determine first, whether
or not there are objective grounds for
that fear, and, second, whether those objective grounds are supported by
evidence ...
- 3.36 The Grand
Chamber emphasised that the admission of hearsay statements “must be a
measure of last resort”, and the
trial court must be satisfied that all
available alternatives, such as witness anonymity and other special measures,
would be inappropriate
or
impracticable.[173]
- 3.37 The Grand
Chamber went on to conclude that, where a hearsay statement is the sole or
decisive evidence against a defendant, its
admission will not automatically
result in a breach of fair trial rights relating to cross-examination. However,
any court must “subject
the proceedings to the most searching
scrutiny”.[174] An important
factor in any assessment will be the presence of “sufficient
counterbalancing factors”, including the existence
of strong procedural
safeguards.[175]
- 3.38 The
Grand Chamber considered the safeguards in the Criminal Procedure Act (UK) were,
in principle, strong safeguards designed
to ensure
fairness.[176] These include
provision to admit evidence relevant to the credibility of the maker of the
hearsay statement even where that evidence
would not have been admissible had
the person given evidence in
court,[177] the residual
discretion to refuse to admit a hearsay statement if satisfied that the case for
its exclusion substantially outweighs
the case for admitting
it,[178] and the requirement that
the judge stop the case if the hearsay evidence is “so unconvincing that,
considering its importance
to the case against the defendant, his conviction of
the offence would be
unsafe”.[179]
How would “good reason” be defined?
- 3.39 This
option could introduce a discretion that simply applies when a judge is
satisfied that a person has a good reason not to
give evidence. Alternatively,
more focused language could be adopted, such as the formulation of
“fear” in England and
Wales. The benefit of the latter approach is
that existing case law would provide some guidance as to how it should be
applied in
the Aotearoa New Zealand context. It would, however, potentially be
narrower than a general “good reason” formulation.
- 3.40 We have
identified two broad subcategories that could potentially warrant inclusion
within any new discretionary category:
(a) When a person is subjected to intimidation attributable to the
defendant. This would apply where a judge is satisfied that a person has
been intimidated by or on behalf of the defendant. There are good reasons
for
including this subcategory, as noted by the Grand Chamber and set out at
paragraph 3.33 above. It would also provide a clear
deterrent to defendants
engaging in intimidatory tactics that may otherwise interfere with the proper
administration of justice.
It may, however, be difficult to prove intimidation
in any given case, so adopting this subcategory alone may have little utility
in
practice.
(b) When a person fears retaliation if they give evidence. This could
have most application in situations where a complainant is in a violent
relationship with the defendant, but it would
not necessarily be limited to such
situations. To avoid infringing a defendant’s fair trial rights, this
subcategory would
require a high threshold. It would therefore, not be
appropriate to regard this as a complete answer to “the vexed
issue”,
identified in Awatere, of how the law of evidence,
and the courts as a matter of practicality, deal with victims of family violence
who, for reasons of fear,
do not wish to give
evidence.[180] For example, a fear
of adverse social, emotional or financial consequences of giving evidence would
be unlikely to qualify under
this
category.[181] As te Kōti
Pīra | Court of Appeal observed in the pre-Act case R v Manase, to
admit hearsay evidence “simply because the witness would prefer not to
face the ordeal or giving evidence or would find
it difficult to do so ... would
be to tilt the balance too far against the
accused”.[182] Additionally,
satisfying a judge that they have good reason under this subcategory may be as
much of a hurdle for a complainant as
giving
evidence.[183] Even if a
complainant is excused, the fact that their hearsay statement is relied on in
court instead will not necessarily protect
them from future
violence.[184]
- 3.41 People who
may be too traumatised to give evidence can, we think, be considered under the
existing category of unavailability
that applies to people who are “unfit
to be a witness because of age or physical or mental
condition”.[185] As noted
above, the Commission intended that this would sufficiently cover people who are
too traumatised to give
evidence.[186] Early case law
interpreted this section as imposing a high threshold that required more than
evidence that a person is “simply
distressed or
depressed”.[187] However, in
the recent case of Downes v R, the Court of Appeal preferred a
different approach that appears to be more in line with the Commission’s
original intention:[188]
- We do not
consider that it is helpful to describe the threshold as “a high
one”; the inquiry should focus on the statutory
language without that
gloss. The possibility that a pre-existing mental condition may have the effect
of rendering a person unavailable
to give evidence is expressly contemplated by
the Act; whether it has that effect in a particular case turns on [an]
“intensely
factual” inquiry...
Is there a need for further safeguards?
- 3.42 A
determination that a person has “good reason” not to give evidence
would not mean that their hearsay statement
will automatically be admissible.
The statement would still need to meet the reliability threshold for hearsay
statements in section
18(1)(a) and under section 8 the probative value of the
statement must outweigh the risk of unfair prejudicial effect, taking into
account the right of the defendant to offer an effective defence.
- 3.43 The
veracity and propensity provisions in the Act already permit a defendant to
offer evidence in relation to any “person”,
which would appear to
include the maker of a hearsay
statement.[189]
- 3.44 We are
interested in views on whether additional safeguards would be desirable under
this option. Like the approach in England
and Wales, this option could require
the judge to be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to admit the
hearsay statement.[190] Relevant
considerations could be prescribed in statute and could include the availability
of alternative ways of giving evidence.
This would ensure that excusing a
witness from giving evidence and relying on a hearsay statement is a measure of
last resort. Another
option would be for the judge to have the power to stop
proceedings if satisfied that the hearsay evidence is so unconvincing that
a
conviction would be
unsafe.[191]
QUESTIONS
Q4
Should the Act be amended to clarify the application of the hearsay
provisions? If so, should the Act be amended to:
- clarify
that a court finding that a person has a just excuse not to give evidence under
the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 does not affect the application of the
hearsay provisions under the Evidence Act; or
- introduce
a new discretion to permit the court to admit reliable hearsay statements when a
person has a good reason not to give evidence?
Q5
If the Act were amended to introduce a new discretion, should this be:
- a
general discretion for situations where a person has a “good reason”
not to give evidence; or
- a
narrow discretion founded on fear, similar to the approach in England and
Wales?
Q6
If a new discretion to admit hearsay statements is introduced, what
additional safeguards, if any, should be inserted into the Act?
WHEN A PERSON “CANNOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE” BE
FOUND
- 3.45 Section
16(2)(d) of the Act states that a person is “unavailable as a
witness” for the purposes of the hearsay provisions
if the person
“cannot with reasonable diligence be identified or found”. If a
person is unavailable as a witness, their
hearsay statement is admissible
provided that the circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable
assurance that the statement
is
reliable.[192]
Is there an issue?
- 3.46 Preliminary
feedback identified a concern about the lack of guidance in the Act or case law
as to what is required to satisfy
the “reasonable diligence”
requirement in section 16(2)(d). There is concern that this may be a growing
issue given the
increasing practice of video recording police statements and
interviews.[193] If a witness
cannot be found, their hearsay statement could provide an important source of
information for the fact-finder. In some
cases, it may be the only direct
evidence to support the charges. As discussed above, however, the use of any
hearsay statement engages
fair trial rights because it deprives the defendant of
the opportunity to challenge that evidence in cross-examination.
- 3.47 This issue
arose in Huritu v
Police.[194] The
defendant had been charged with assaulting the complainant. The complainant had
been summoned to give evidence at the District
Court trial and, when she did not
appear, was arrested pursuant to a warrant and released on bail to appear at the
rescheduled trial.
When the complainant failed to appear on the morning of the
rescheduled trial, a warrant for her arrest was issued and the trial
judge gave
police until that afternoon to locate her. Police unsuccessfully attempted to
locate the complainant by visiting her house
and that of a friend, and also by
calling her. Later that day, the Court granted an application to admit the
complainant’s
hearsay statement on the basis that she could not with
reasonable diligence be
found.[195]
- 3.48 The High
Court rejected the defendant’s argument that a higher threshold of
diligence should have been applied to locate
the complainant in circumstances
where without the hearsay statement, the defendant had no case to
answer.[196] On further appeal,
defence counsel invited the Court of Appeal to adopt a set of principles (based
on a number of judgments of the
Court of Appeal of England and Wales) to guide
trial judges in the application of the reasonable diligence
test.[197] The Court declined to
do so, finding that the question of whether a witness is or is not able to be
found “is a simple question
of fact” and
that:[198]
- The question of
whether reasonable diligence has been applied in attempting to find a witness
requires an assessment of what has
been done in the overall circumstances. There
is no difficulty in the statutory language. What is required is simply an
assessment
as to whether what has been done amounts to reasonable diligence. We
consider Ms Hoskin was correct to submit that issue is to be
determined by
looking at the steps taken to find the witness and ought not to be influenced by
a consideration of what role the witness
will play in the trial if he or she is
located and gives evidence.
- 3.49 The Court
noted that a factual determination that a person is unavailable as a witness
does not mean their hearsay statement
will for that reason be admissible. There
must still be reasonable assurance that the statement is reliable (section
18(1)(a)) and
the probative value of the statement must outweigh the risk that
the statement would have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding
(section 8). The Court noted that the latter issue is to be assessed taking into
account the right of the defendant to offer an effective
defence.[199]
- 3.50 Te
Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court declined leave to appeal the decision. The
Judges that considered the leave application
affirmed the Court of
Appeal’s view that whether the reasonable diligence test was met required
a factual inquiry.[200] They
observed that:[201]
- There may be
room for differing views about the reasonableness of the steps taken by the
police in this case in light of their responsibilities,
the complainant’s
earlier non-appearance and the history of the relationship between the applicant
and complainant. That possibility
does not, however, detract from the factual
nature of inquiry to be undertaken. Further, the assessment made here is one
which, on
the face of it, comes within the policy of the legislative
scheme.
How does the current approach compare with overseas
approaches?
- 3.51 In
England and Wales, the relevant statutory test is that the person “cannot
be found although such steps as it is reasonably
practicable to take to find him
have been taken”.[202] As
noted above, the Court of Appeal in England and Wales has provided some guidance
on how this test is to be applied. These requirements
start with the witness
being given all possible support and made to understand the importance of their
duty to give evidence.[203] If a
witness is difficult to contact, then it may be necessary for the trial to be
delayed in order for additional steps to be
taken.[204] Unlike the New Zealand
Court’s approach in Huritu, multiple cases have found that
the importance of the evidence to the case is a relevant
factor.[205] Some cases have also
found the seriousness of the charge to be
relevant.[206]
- 3.52 The test in
Australia is similar to that in England and Wales, requiring that “all
reasonable steps have been taken, by
the party seeking to prove the person is
not available, to find the person or secure his or her attendance, but without
success”.[207] This
requirement was considered by the New South Wales Supreme Court in Huang v
Wei. The Court concluded that it was not possible to set out an
all-encompassing list of relevant considerations (given the fact-specific
nature
of the inquiry), but suggested that at least some of the following
considerations will be
relevant:[208]
(a) The nature of the case (suggesting that a higher bar for criminal cases may
be justifiable).
(b) The importance of the evidence.
(c) The inquiries that have been made and their outcome.
(d) Who the party is that is making the inquiries and about whom the inquiries
are being made.
(e) The likelihood of any specific step yielding useful information.
(f) The cost and delay that a particular step might cause.
- 3.53 The Court
noted that the following factors might also be
relevant:[209]
(a) Is the identity of the potential witness known?
(b) Are the location or other contact details for the potential witness known?
(c) What, if anything, is known about the person’s attitude to giving
evidence?
(d) The practicability of compelling the witness to give evidence.
(e) When did the party applying for the benefit of the exception become aware of
the existence of the witness and the evidence the
witness could give?
(f) The ability of the other party to respond to the evidence.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 3.54 We
seek feedback on whether the current approach to the reasonable diligence
requirement is causing problems in practice, and
whether reform is necessary or
desirable. On the one hand, there is clear appellate authority that the inquiry
is a simple question
of fact. It may be that this is the best approach as it
allows for the relevant matters to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
On the
other hand, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Huritu (and the
Supreme Court’s subsequent refusal of leave) suggests that further
guidance from these courts on this issue is unlikely
to be forthcoming in the
near future. Legislative reform may therefore be considered necessary or
desirable if the lack of statutory
guidance is resulting in inconsistency in
approach or uncertainty as to what steps police should take to locate an
intended witness.
- 3.55 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, the Act could be amended to include
further guidance on the “reasonable
diligence” requirement. Such
guidance could take the form of a list of relevant factors a court should
consider when deciding
whether a person cannot, without reasonable diligence, be
found. Consideration would need to be given to the following matters:
(a) Whether the significance of the person’s evidence to the proceeding
should be a relevant factor. The New Zealand courts’
current approach can
be contrasted with approaches in Australia and England and Wales, as discussed
above. The New Zealand courts’
current approach is also inconsistent with
the approach to assessing whether a witness’ attendance would cause undue
expense
or delay under an alternative limb of the hearsay provisions (section
18(1)(b)(ii)).[210]
(b) Whether the Act should prescribe certain steps as a precondition (or
presumptive requirement) to finding that reasonable diligence
has been
satisfied. This could include consideration of whether there should be an
obligation to provide a potential witness with
certain information, to maintain
a level of contact with that person, and/or to take certain steps if the person
indicates they are
reluctant to give evidence. We note, however, that in
Huritu the Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion that there should be a
general expectation or positive obligation on police to maintain
contact with
witnesses to identify whether an arrest warrant will be necessary to secure
their attendance at trial, citing the significant
resourcing implications of
doing so.[211]
(c) Whether the guidance would best be contained in a non-statutory instrument.
This might be more appropriate if it is considered
that the guidance should be
more detailed in nature, for example, if it should address the steps that should
be considered or taken
in different situations.
(d) Whether there should be an expectation that evidence should be offered in
support of an application to offer a hearsay statement
in reliance on section
16(2)(d), rather than relying on counsel’s submissions. This would require
the relevant police officer(s)
to give evidence on the steps taken to facilitate
the witness’ attendance and to be available for cross-examination if
appropriate.[212] Such an
expectation could increase scrutiny on the steps that had been taken and could
be justified given the potential significance
of admitting hearsay statements.
- 3.56 The
language of “reasonable diligence” used in section 16(2)(d), which
can be traced back to a 1967 report on hearsay
evidence,[213] may also warrant
updating. There may be merit in adopting the language of “all reasonable
steps” as used in Australia and England and Wales. This may assist
in focusing the inquiry more directly on which steps were (and were not)
taken
to find the witness or, in the words of the Australian legislation, to
“secure [their] attendance”.
QUESTION
Q7
Is the operation of section 16(2)(d) causing problems in practice? If so,
should it be amended to:
- prescribe
factors that are relevant to determining whether the section 16(2)(d) threshold
is satisfied; and/or
- amend
the language used in section 16(2)(d) so that it requires “all reasonable
steps” to be taken to find the person
and/or secure their attendance at
court?
HEARSAY IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
- 3.57 The
Act determines the admissibility of evidence in both civil and criminal
proceedings. In civil proceedings, the Act must also
be read alongside the
relevant rules of court, including the High Court Rules 2016 (HCRs), which
regulate practice and
procedure.[214]
- 3.58 Under the
HCRs, evidence in chief is usually given by the witness reading a brief of
evidence[215] that is prepared in
advance and served upon all other parties before
trial.[216] Documents are normally
received in evidence by their inclusion in the “common bundle”. The
common bundle is prepared
in advance of trial and contains all the documents
each party intends to rely
on.[217] HCR 9.5(4) provides that
a document in the common bundle is “automatically received into evidence
(subject to the resolution
of any objection to admissibility)” when a
witness refers to it in evidence or when counsel refer to it in submissions
(other
than closing submissions).
- 3.59 The rule
against hearsay applies in civil proceedings. If a witness’ evidence or a
document in the common bundle contains
a statement made by someone who is not a
witness, and that statement is relied on for the truth of its contents, it will
be a hearsay
statement and inadmissible unless one of the exceptions in the Act
applies.
What are the issues?
- 3.60 A
review of the operation of the hearsay provisions in civil proceedings has
identified apparent inconsistencies between the
Act and the HCRs in relation to:
(a) the process for challenging the admissibility of hearsay statements in civil
proceedings; and
(b) the admissibility of hearsay statements that are not challenged by any
party.
Process for challenging hearsay statements in civil
proceedings
- 3.61 The
HCRs prescribe clear procedures for challenging the admissibility of evidence,
including hearsay statements. In relation
to briefs of evidence, HCR 9.11 states
that any admissibility challenge must be notified to the party or parties
concerned within
20 working days after receipt of the brief by the challenging
party. If the issue is not resolved within 10 working days, notice
that there is
an admissibility issue must be given to the court by the challenging party.
- 3.62 In relation
to documents in the common bundle, HCR 9.5(2) states that if a party objects to
the admissibility of a document the
objection “must, if practicable, be
recorded in the common bundle, and must be determined by the court at the
hearing or at
any prior time that the court directs”.
- 3.63 These
requirements are designed to ensure that any evidentiary issues are identified
before trial.[218] It gives the
party offering the evidence an opportunity to remedy any accepted deficiencies
in the evidence and prevents the challenging
party from seeking to obtain some
form of strategic advantage by delaying a challenge until
trial.[219]
- 3.64 The Act
does not prescribe the process for challenging the admissibility of hearsay
statements. This has led to disagreement
among parties in civil proceedings as
to whether a hearsay statement can be challenged at trial, outside the
procedures prescribed
in the HCRs. In Zespri Group Ltd v Gao, for
example, the admissibility of hearsay statements contained in witness briefs was
not challenged under the
HCRs.[220] It was only in response
to a query from the Judge on the second day of trial that the respondent advised
that they were intending
to advance a hearsay challenge but were reserving this
for closing argument.[221] The
Court considered what non-compliance with the HCRs meant in terms of the
admissibility of hearsay statements under the Act and
concluded:[222]
- The failure to
adhere to rule 9.11 does not displace the mandatory statutory criteria of ss
17–18 of the Evidence Act. Nor
does the absence of a r 9.11 objection
displace the plaintiff’s own obligation to comply with the Evidence Act.
Rule 9.14 expressly
provides that nothing in part 9 subpart 1 of the Rules
changes inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence. Issues of hearsay
can be
raised subsequent to the timeframe outlined in r 9.11.
- 3.65 This
creates a conflict between the Act and the procedures set out in the HCRs. A
hearsay objection does not need to be made
in advance of trial, despite the
clear obligation in the HCRs to raise admissibility challenges before trial. It
has been suggested
that this interpretation of the Act “appears to run
contrary to the intention of the legislative
provisions”.[223] It also
appears inconsistent with the approach taken prior to the Act, when a failure to
object to documents in the common bundle
pre-trial could mean that party was
estopped from raising objections at
trial.[224]
- 3.66 Late
challenges to hearsay statements have the potential to increase cost and delay,
especially if an adjournment is needed to
address admissibility
issues.[225]
- 3.67 The
consequences for a party seeking to rely on hearsay statements can also be
significant. Evidence may be ruled inadmissible
at trial, despite the pre-trial
silence of any other party.
Admissibility of unchallenged hearsay statements
- 3.68 The
second inconsistency between the Act and the HCRs relates to the admissibility
of hearsay statements that are not challenged
by any party.
- 3.69 HCR 9.5(1)
provides that each document in the common bundle, unless the court otherwise
directs, is to be considered admissible.
This does not, however, mean that
hearsay statements in the common bundle are admissible to prove the truth of
their contents. This
is because the hearsay rules in the Act are described in
absolute terms. A hearsay statement must meet one of the exceptions in the
Act
in order to be admissible. The Court of Appeal in Taylor v Asteron Life
Ltd explained the relationship between the Act and the HCRs as
follows:[226]
- Rule 9.5(1)(a)
read together with s 132 of the Evidence Act resulted in the document being
received in evidence, and benefiting from
the presumptions set out in r
9.5(1)(b) to (f). But the mere fact that the document has been received in
evidence does not mean that
it is received as evidence of the truth of its
contents. That is a different proposition altogether. The document would be
received
as evidence of the truth of its contents only if it qualified as
admissible hearsay evidence under s 18 of the Evidence Act ...
- 3.70 The status
of an unchallenged hearsay statement is, therefore, unclear. Different outcomes
are possible. On a strict interpretation
of the Act, the court might exclude any
hearsay statements it identifies on the basis that no argument has been made as
to its admissibility
under the statutory exceptions to the rule against
hearsay.[227]
- 3.71 An
alternative approach would be to treat the parties, by failing to challenge the
hearsay statement, as having agreed to to
its admission. In Matvin Group Ltd
v Crown Finance Ltd, a decision was made not to call Mr C, whose brief had
been served on the other parties prior to
trial.[228] This meant that some
of the evidence before the Court was hearsay. The High Court
explained:[229]
- ... no-one at
the hearing addressed how the decision not to call [Mr C] affected the admission
of evidence in the trial. Written
documents prepared by [Mr C] are in the bundle
of documents. Witnesses for both Matvin and Crown and CAPGL gave evidence in
chief
and under cross-examination that recounted what [Mr C] had said and done.
Such evidence would not be hearsay if [Mr C] had been called
to give evidence.
However because he ultimately was not called to give evidence much, if not all,
of what other witnesses have said
about him in their evidence, and the documents
he prepared, are now hearsay. Since no-one at trial raised any objection to the
affected
evidence based on this change of status, I am proceeding on the basis
the evidence remains admissible. However, the fact I have not
heard explanations
[Mr C] could offer for his conduct necessarily affects the weight I can place on
what other witnesses have said
about him or what the parties might have me
understand from the documents he has prepared.
- 3.72 The Court
in Matvin appeared to proceed on the basis that a lack of objection to
hearsay evidence can amount to implied agreement to admit evidence. Section
9 of
the Act does provide for evidence that may otherwise be inadmissible to be
admitted with the agreement of the parties. However,
section 9 was not discussed
directly in Matvin, and in any event section 9 contemplates the
existence of a written or oral agreement of the parties. It is debatable whether
it was
intended to apply when the parties simply do not turn their minds to the
issue.[230]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 3.73 The
inconsistencies between how the Act operates and provisions in the HCRs is
undesirable. It creates uncertainty and may increase
cost and delay in civil
proceedings when objections are not made in accordance with the HCRs or when
hearsay statements remain unchallenged.
- 3.74 We
therefore seek submissions on whether the Act should be amended to clarify the
relationship between the Act and the HCRs and/or
promote greater compliance with
the hearsay rules in civil proceedings.
Options for reform
- 3.75 We
have identified two possible options for reform. Either Option 1 alone or both
options could be adopted (adopting Option 2
alone would not resolve the issue
relating to admissibility of unchallenged hearsay statements).
Option 1: Limit the operation of section 17 in civil
proceedings
- 3.76 Option
1 is to amend the Act to limit the operation of section 17 (the rule against
hearsay) to apply in civil proceedings only if a party challenges the
admissibility of a hearsay statement in accordance with the relevant rules of
court (unless the judge dispenses
with this requirement).
- 3.77 The effect
of this option would be to adopt a presumption or starting point that a hearsay
statement is admissible to prove the
truth of its contents in civil proceedings.
That presumption would be rebutted whenever a party challenges the admissibility
of the
hearsay statement. The court would then determine admissibility under the
Act’s hearsay rules. If admissibility is not challenged,
the reliability
of the hearsay statement would be treated as a matter of weight by the
fact-finder.
- 3.78 This option
would avoid the need for the court to address admissibility issues with hearsay
statements when no challenge has
been made. We do not anticipate that this would
result in any significant change in civil litigation practice. As noted above,
this
appears to be consistent with what the HCRs already envisage.
- 3.79 This option
would also encourage objections to hearsay to be made in accordance with the
HCRs, responding to the problem of late
objections discussed above. The court
should, however, be able to dispense with the requirement that any objection
comply with the
relevant rules of court. There will be situations where evidence
is not known to be hearsay until the trial (for example, if a late
decision is
made not to call a witness), or where the significance of a hearsay statement is
not clear until the trial. A discretion
to hear a late challenge would also
address the concern that requiring objections to comply with the rules of court
could unintentionally
increase cost and delay in the pre-trial stage, by
incentivising parties to make unnecessary challenges in order to protect their
position. Grounds for dispensing with this requirement could be similar to those
in section 22(5), which prescribes the permitted
reasons for dispensing with the
requirement to give notice of hearsay in criminal proceedings.
- 3.80 This option
could be limited to documents in the common bundle (section 132). This would
recognise the significance of documentary
evidence in civil
proceedings[231] and reflect the
fact that documents in the common bundle are potentially more at risk of
infringing the hearsay rules because they
do not need to be produced by a
witness.[232] Te Komiti Mō
Ngā Tikanga Kooti | The Rules Committee (Rules Committee) made a similar
recommendation in its report, Improving Access to Civil
Justice.[233] It
recommended that the Act and the HCRs be amended to allow documents in the
common bundle to be admissible as to the truth of their
contents.[234] It explained that
this would “remove the artificial recitation of documents in the briefs of
evidence” to avoid infringing the rule against
hearsay.[235] It further explained
that “presumptive admissibility of documentary evidence” would not
mean its truth cannot be challenged,
or that admissible documents will be given
any weight by a trial judge.[236]
Rather, “it merely puts the onus on a party seeking to dispute the
narrative of events that emerges from contemporaneous documents
to identify the
documents it wishes to challenge, so that this can be addressed in the course of
the trial itself if it becomes relevant
to do
so”.[237]
- 3.81 For the
same reasons, we think a presumptive admissibility approach can be extended to
briefs and oral evidence. Several of the
cases identified above
(Zespri, Matvin and Apollo) involved hearsay
statements in witness briefs. Limiting a presumption of admissibility to
documents in the common bundle would not,
therefore, wholly address the issue of
unchallenged hearsay statements.
- 3.82 This
option, regardless of whether it is limited to documentary evidence, would
result in different approaches to hearsay in
criminal and civil proceedings.
However, we think there are good reasons to distinguish civil and criminal
proceedings in this context.
The consideration of protecting a defendant’s
fair trial rights does not arise in civil proceedings. In addition, civil
proceedings
are typically heard by a judge rather than a jury, so the concern
about a jury’s “supposed inability to make a proper
assessment of
evidence which has not been tested by cross-examination” does not
arise.[238] Rather, judges
“are expected to have the skills to sift the wheat from the chaff and
assess whatever evidence is available
in accordance with its true
significance”.[239] For
these reasons, there has long been debate about applying the same strict
approach to hearsay in civil
proceedings.[240]
- 3.83 This option
does not go as far as to exclude the operation of the rule against hearsay in
civil proceedings. Some comparable
jurisdictions, including England and Wales,
Scotland and Australia, have moved to limit or abolish the rule against hearsay
in civil
proceedings.[241] Such
fundamental change is beyond the scope of this operational review. Parliament
clearly intended, when passing the Act, to continue
to apply the rule against
hearsay to all proceedings in Aotearoa New Zealand. We are instead focused on
improving the operation of
the hearsay provisions in civil proceedings to better
achieve the objectives in section 6 of the Act, which include avoiding
unjustifiable
expense and
delay.[242]
Option 2: Introduce a notice procedure for hearsay in civil
proceedings
- 3.84 Unlike
in criminal proceedings,[243]
there is no requirement on a party seeking to offer a hearsay statement in
evidence in a civil proceeding to give notice of their
intention to do so. In
criminal proceedings, this information enables the other party to decide whether
to object and assists the
judge in determining whether to admit the
evidence.[244] Similar notice
procedures apply to civil proceedings in England and
Wales.[245]
- 3.85 When
developing the Evidence Code, the Commission did not consider that notice was
necessary in civil proceedings,
explaining:[246]
- After
evaluating the experience in other jurisdictions, the Commission remains of the
view that an informal notice procedure will
evolve as part of the discovery
process in civil proceedings and there is no need for legislative intervention.
It will be in the
parties’ best interest to give notice of their intention
to call hearsay evidence so that any objections may be dealt with
pre-trial.
Cost sanctions would be likely to follow if a proceeding has to be adjourned to
allow rebuttal evidence to be called,
or abandoned and
recommenced.
- 3.86 The cases
discussed above call into question whether the Commission’s expectations
have been realised in practice.
- 3.87 Introducing
a notice procedure would be consistent with the existing “substantial
pre-trial obligation” on each party
to ensure that evidence they intend to
produce in court is
admissible.[247] It would
encourage the parties to focus, in advance, on hearsay matters. It could also
mitigate the risk that Option 1 has the undesired
effect of incentivising
undisciplined filing practices, such as including large numbers of inadmissible
documents in the common bundle,
thereby placing a significant burden on the
opposing parties (and the court).
- 3.88 This option
would, however, increase the cost of pre-trial procedures, especially in complex
cases with voluminous briefs and
common bundles. The party proposing to offer
hearsay statements in evidence would need to identify those statements and the
reasons
why they are admissible under the Act, in advance of knowing whether a
challenge to that evidence will be made. This might also increase
the risk of
tactical challenges to the proposed admission of what may be reliable and
uncontroversial hearsay.
- 3.89 Such a
requirement may also be unnecessary if the Act is amended to address the status
of unchallenged hearsay and require objections
to be made in accordance with the
relevant rules of court. Further, it has been noted that cases including
Zespri “demonstrate the increased readiness of the courts to
enforce the rules of evidence”, which “in turn will encourage
greater discipline on the part of lawyers in preparing
briefs”.[248]
QUESTION
Q8
Should the Act be amended to address inconsistencies between the hearsay
provisions in the Act and the High Court Rules? If so, should
the Act be amended
to:
- limit
the operation of section 17 in civil proceedings so that it only applies where a
party challenges the admissibility of a hearsay
statement in accordance with the
relevant rules of court (with the court retaining a residual discretion to
dispense with this requirement);
and/or
- require
a party to give notice of their intention to offer a hearsay statement in
evidence in a civil proceeding?
Do the issues discussed above have broader
application?
QUESTION
Q9
The discussion above is focused on hearsay statements. These issues, however,
may arise in other contexts where inadmissible evidence
is offered in civil
proceedings, such as opinion evidence (inadmissible under section 23) and
irrelevant evidence (inadmissible under
section 7). We have focused only on
hearsay statements given the cases and commentary discussed above suggest the
issues relate primarily
to hearsay. We invite submissions, however, on whether
these issues arise in other contexts.
Do the inconsistencies between the Act and the High Court Rules create
problems in respect of the operation of other admissibility
rules in civil
proceedings (such as sections 7 and 23)?
CHAPTER 4
4 Defendants’ and co-defendants’ statements
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on issues relating to:
- defendants’
exculpatory statements (sections 21 and 27);
- defendants’
statements that are contained within a hearsay statement (section 27(3));
and
- co-defendants’
non-hearsay statements (sections 27 and 22A).
DEFENDANTS’ EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS
- 4.1 In
a criminal proceeding, if a defendant elects not to give evidence, section 21 of
the Evidence Act 2006 prevents them from offering
their own hearsay
statement.[249] The prosecution
can, however, offer a defendant’s statement “against” that
defendant under section 27.[250]
Case law establishes that “against” does not mean the statement must
be wholly inculpatory to be admitted by the prosecution.
Statements that contain
both inculpatory and exculpatory statements (mixed statements) can be offrered
in their entirety.[251]
- 4.2 The Act does
not require the prosecution to offer defendants’ statements. However, the
courts have nevertheless held (based
on the inherent powers of judges to control
criminal proceedings) that the prosecution may be required to offer
evidence of a defendant’s exculpatory statement where it is necessary to
ensure trial fairness.[252] Te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal has recently suggested this will only
occur in “exceptional
cases”.[253] As we discuss
below, this has mainly occurred where the prosecution wishes to rely on part of
a mixed statement. In such cases the
court may require the prosecution to admit
the entirety of the statement, including any exculpatory parts. In other
instances, whether
a defendant’s exculpatory statement is offered in
evidence is a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
What are the issues?
- 4.3 Our
initial research and preliminary feedback identified dissatisfaction with the
current approach among some defence counsel
and a
commentator.[254] They raised two
separate but related issues:
(a) First, there may be inconsistency regarding when prosecutors offer evidence
of a defendant’s mixed or exculpatory statement.
Defence counsel told us
that the approach taken by prosecutors varies between regions, with some
choosing to offer wholly exculpatory
statements and others not. We also note
that, while the case law on mixed statements appears reasonably settled, it
continues to
be argued in court, which may suggest continued uncertainty among
counsel.
(b) Second, there is some concern about the underlying policy reflected in
section 21. Defence counsel from whom we received feedback
and a
commentator[255] suggested that
formal statements made by defendants (for example, to police) are relevant
evidence that should be placed before the
fact-finder as a matter of course.
Otherwise, the fact-finder may assume the defendant has made no statement and
draw adverse inferences
from that, resulting in unfairness.
- 4.4 To
facilitate feedback on these issues, it is necessary to briefly explain the
background to sections 21 and 27 and how the case
law has developed.
History of sections 21 and 27
- 4.5 At
common law, a defendant’s out-of-court statement was treated as hearsay
and was therefore inadmissible if it was relied
on to prove the truth of its
contents.[256] However, statements
against the defendant’s interests such as a confession or admission were
admissible (either as an exception
to the rule against hearsay or on the basis
that they fell outside it).[257]
Where the prosecution wished to rely on such a statement, the whole statement
had to be offered, including any exculpatory
parts.[258] Wholly exculpatory
hearsay statements were
inadmissible.[259]
- 4.6 Section 27
is based on Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s Evidence Code. The
Evidence Code sought to largely codify
the existing law on admissions and
confessions but extended the rules to all statements made by the defendants,
including exculpatory
ones.[260]
- 4.7 Section 21
(preventing a defendant who does not give evidence from offering their own
statement) did not appear in the Commission’s
Evidence Code. The
Commission intended that, where a defendant elected not to give evidence, they
could rely on evidence of their
own out-of-court statements if they satisfied
the exception to the rule against
hearsay.[261] This requires the
judge to be satisfied that the circumstances relating to the hearsay statement
provide reasonable assurance that
the statement is reliable (section 18).
Because a defendant is not compellable, they would be “unavailable”
as a witness
for the purposes of the hearsay rules. This would have been a
departure from the common law position under which defendants could
not offer
evidence of their own hearsay statements. Cabinet disagreed with the
Commission’s proposed approach and inserted
section 21 into the Evidence
Bill on the basis that defendants are not, in reality, “unavailable”
to themselves.[262]
How have sections 21 and 27 been interpreted?
- 4.8 In
R v King, the Court of Appeal considered section 21 and said that,
while it “means what it
says”,[263] it was
nonetheless open to the court to require the prosecutor to offer evidence of a
defendant’s statement where it would
be unfair not to do so (based on the
powers of trial judges to control the criminal
proceedings).[264] Te Kōti
Matua | High Court reached a similar conclusion in R v
Felise.[265] In that
case, the Court permitted defence counsel to cross-examine two witnesses about
statements made to them by one of the defendants.
Because the prosecution had
chosen to question the witnesses about some aspects of the discussion but not
others, fairness required
that the defendants be allowed to elicit the full
import of the discussion.
- 4.9 The
Commission considered these cases in its 2013 Review of the Act, in response to
a concern these cases may have confused the
application of section
21.[266] The Commission concluded
that, while the Act should be the “first port of call” in
determining admissibility issues,
trial judges retained their ability to control
the criminal proceedings.[267] The
Act also needed to be interpreted consistently with the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 where possible. However, the Commission
indicated that the
approach in King and Felise “will only be appropriate in
rare circumstances where the resulting unfairness to the defendant impacts on
his or her right
to a fair
trial”.[268] The Commission
considered it unnecessary to amend section 21, because the concerns expressed by
submitters were not about the drafting
of that section but rather the use of
other powers of the
court.[269]
- 4.10 The courts
have been reluctant to find that the interests of fairness override the
statutory purpose of section 21 in relation
to wholly exculpatory
statements.[270] Since
Felise, four High Court decisions have considered whether the prosecution
was required to admit a defendant’s wholly exculpatory statement
to
police.[271] In all instances the
Judge declined to make such an order, finding that the fairness rationale for
the exception in Felise was not engaged. Rather, admitting the evidence
would simply allow the defendant to put forward their version of events without
being
subject to
cross-examination.[272]
- 4.11 In 2021,
the issue was raised in an application to te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court
for leave to appeal in Foster v
R.[273] At trial, defence
counsel sought leave to question a Crown witness about an exculpatory statement
allegedly made to him by the defendant.
The prosecution had not asked the
witness any questions about the exchange. The defence argued, relying on
King, that it would be unfair to apply section 21. The trial judge and
the Court of Appeal rejected that argument, finding that section
21 prevented
the defence from questioning the witness about the defendant’s
statement.
- 4.12 The Supreme
Court declined leave to appeal. The Judges who considered the leave application
agreed with the Court of Appeal that
there was a distinction between the
evidence the defendant sought to offer, which was of a wholly exculpatory
character, and mixed inculpatory and exculpatory exchanges between the defendant
and other Crown witnesses, about which
the prosecution had examined the
witnesses. In the latter case, fairness required the prosecution to offer both
the inculpatory and
exculpatory aspects of the witness’
accounts.[274] The same argument
did not apply to the wholly exculpatory statement. The Court
said:[275]
- As the Court of
Appeal pointed out, the obvious solution for the applicant if he wanted to give
evidence of the alleged exchange
... was to give evidence
himself.
- 4.13 Foster
(although only a leave decision) tends to suggest that, where the
prosecution wishes to offer evidence of inculpatory parts of a mixed
statement,
the interests of fairness will generally require that exculpatory parts of the
statement are also offered. On the other
hand, the prosecution usually will
not be required to offer evidence of wholly exculpatory statements by the
defendant. This approach has been taken in subsequent
cases.[276] However, the fact that
the prosecution in one recent case sought to “cherry pick” the
inculpatory parts of a “mixed”
statement suggests some confusion may
remain among counsel.[277]
- 4.14 The higher
courts have not determined whether the prosecution would be required to offer a
mixed statement where it does not
wish to rely on any part of it. Foster
tends to suggest it would not. In one pre-Foster case, R v
Singh, te Kōti-ā-Rohe | District Court ordered the
prosecution to offer evidence of a mixed statement relevant to the issue of
self-defence, even though the prosecution did not intend to rely on any part of
the statement.[278] The Judge
reasoned that:[279]
- ... the
conclusion I am inevitably led to is that the Crown does not wish the statement
in because it contains some material which
might be of assistance to the
defence, while adding nothing material to the Crown case. I do not accept that
in the present circumstances,
is an appropriate tactic. The result of allowing
that would, in my view, provide unfairness to the accused, and would not be in
the
interests of justice.
- 4.15 Similar
reasoning was later relied on by the High Court of Australia in Nguyen v
R,[280] which we discuss
below.
Developments in Australia: Nguyen v R
- 4.16 The
admissibility of defendants’ mixed statements was addressed by the High
Court of Australia in Nguyen v R. The case concerned the admissibility of
the defendant’s police interview, which raised the issue of self-defence.
The prosecutor
decided not to offer any part of the statement in evidence for
tactical reasons. The Northern Territory legislation at issue permitted
the
admission of mixed statements but did not address whether the prosecution was
required to admit
them.[281]
- 4.17 The
majority considered that a prosecutor’s failure to offer a mixed statement
in evidence could create unfairness by encouraging
the fact-finder to speculate
about whether the defendant had provided an account of their actions when
challenged by police.[282] They
therefore found that statements to investigating officers containing both
inculpatory and exculpatory aspects should be tendered
in evidence unless there
is good reason not to do so (for example, where the defendant has refused to
comment[283] or in rare cases
where the reliability or credibility of the evidence is demonstrably
lacking[284]). They said it was
inappropriate for prosecutors to decline to admit such statements for tactical
reasons, such as to force the defendant
to give
evidence.[285] The lower
Court’s decision that the prosecutor did not need to tender the statement
was set aside.
- 4.18 Nguyen
only addressed mixed statements in police interviews because of the factual
and statutory context. However, it is notable that the
prosecutor was not
seeking to rely on any part of the statement (unlike in Felise). The
majority’s reasoning did not turn on unfairness associated with allowing
the prosecution to offer parts of the statement
and not others. Rather, it
reflected a general concern to ensure that all available, cogent and admissible
evidence is placed before
the
fact-finder[286] and to avoid
unfairness to the defendant.[287]
Similar reasoning could arguably apply to wholly exculpatory statements,
although the Court did not consider that point.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 4.19 We
seek feedback on whether sections 21 and 27, combined with the case law
requiring prosecutors to offer defendants’ statements
in certain
circumstances, are causing problems in practice. We are particularly interested
in views on:
(a) whether there are inconsistent approaches by prosecutors and/or uncertainty
among counsel regarding when defendants’ mixed
or exculpatory statements
should be offered; and
(b) whether (and in what circumstances) failure to offer such statements may be
causing unfairness to defendants or contributing
to miscarriages of justice.
- 4.20 If the
current approach is causing problems in practice, we invite submissions on how
that should be addressed.
Inconsistency in prosecution practices
- 4.21 Case
law establishes that, if the prosecution wishes to rely on parts of a mixed
statement, the statement should generally be
offered in its entirety. Despite
this, the matter continues to be argued in court. This may suggest there is
uncertainty among counsel.
The courts have not generally required the
prosecution to offer wholly exculpatory statements, but we were told prosecutors
sometimes
choose to do so as a matter of discretion. This may be resulting in
inconsistent approaches and regional variation.
- 4.22 If the law
is considered sufficiently clear but there is an issue with inconsistency in
prosecution practice, legislative reform
may not be necessary to address this.
For example, prosecution guidelines could specify when prosecutors should offer
in evidence
(or consider offering) mixed or wholly exculpatory statements. Since
prosecutors are not generally required to offer wholly exculpatory
statements,
guidelines may be more appropriate than legislative amendment to ensure a
consistent approach.[288]
- 4.23 Alternatively,
or in addition, the Act could be amended to require mixed statements relied on
by the prosecution to be offered
in their entirety to avoid further unnecessary
litigation on this issue. This would reflect the well-settled approach in the
case
law.
Unfairness to defendants
- 4.24 Commentator
Bernard Robertson has argued in support of the reasoning in
Nguyen.[289] He suggests
prosecutors should be required to offer defendants’ statements to police
as a matter of course unless there is
good reason not to or the parties agree
otherwise. Defence counsel made similar comments to us through preliminary
feedback, emphasising
the relevance of formal statements to the matters in issue
and the risk that the fact-finder will draw adverse inferences if they
believe
the defendant has not made a statement.
- 4.25 The policy
behind section 21 is that defendants should not be able to rely on hearsay to
place a factual scenario before the
fact-finder rather than giving evidence at
trial and facing
cross-examination.[290] The
contrary argument is that, as the majority of the High Court of Australia found
in Nguyen, failure to place all relevant evidence before a fact-finder
(including exculpatory statements) may result in unfairness. For example,
the
fact-finder may presume the defendant has not made a statement maintaining their
innocence and draw adverse inferences from
that,[291] or the defendant may be
unable to present an effective defence unless they give evidence at trial (which
they may elect not to do
for a variety of reasons).
- 4.26 If there is
widespread concern that the policy approach in New Zealand is causing
unfairness, legislative reform could be considered.
For example, the Act could
be amended to:
(a) give the court discretion to admit a defendant’s statement where it is
necessary to avoid unfairness; and/or
(b) make defendants’ statements in response to official questioning
admissible as a matter of course.
- 4.27 Any such
amendment would, however, allow a defendant (in certain circumstances) to put
their own version of events before the
fact-finder without having to submit to
cross-examination. That may be considered unfair to complainants and other
prosecution witnesses
who are subject to cross-examination and contrary to the
overall interests of justice. It could also, potentially, act as a disincentive
for defendants to give evidence. These considerations must be balanced against
any potential unfairness to defendants when deciding
whether a policy change is
justified.
- 4.28 Allowing
more defendants’ statements to be admitted could also increase the number
of cases where defendants put their
veracity in issue or challenge the veracity
of a prosecution witness (through an out-of-court statement) without opening the
door
to challenges to their own
veracity.[292] We discuss that
issue and possible amendments to address it in Chapter
9.
QUESTION
Q10
We note that, if the Act was amended in the manner described above, amendments
to section 35 (previous consistent statements rule)
may be required to reflect
the same policy approach when the defendant gives evidence at trial.
Is the current approach to defendants’ mixed or exculpatory statements
causing problems in practice? If so, how should this
be addressed?
DEFENDANTS’ STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN HEARSAY
- 4.30 Section
27(3) states that the hearsay rules do not apply to defendants’ statements
offered by the prosecution in a criminal
proceeding. This allows the prosecution
to offer evidence of statements made by the defendant out-of-court (such as a
written or
video statement made to police or a statement allegedly made by the
defendant to a prosecution witness) without having to establish
that the
exception to the rule against hearsay in section 18 applies. Under section 18,
hearsay statements are only admissible if
the circumstances relating to the
statement “provide reasonable assurance that the statement is
reliable”.[293]
What is the issue?
- 4.31 It
is unclear how section 27(3) was intended to operate when a defendant’s
statement is contained within a hearsay statement.
This is sometimes referred to
as “double hearsay” or “second-hand hearsay” because
both the maker of the
statement (the defendant) and the person with first-hand
knowledge of that statement are unavailable as witnesses.
- 4.32 This issue
arose in the Red Fox Tavern case, with the High Court and Court of Appeal
reaching different views. In 1987, the Red
Fox Tavern was robbed at gun point
and its publican was shot dead. Thirty years later, two people were charged with
the robbery and
murder. Several evidential issues had to be resolved pre-trial,
including the admissibility of statements given by two people to
police that
recounted various admissions by, or conversations with, the defendants around
the time of the robbery.[294]
These two people had died since the robbery, so the statements were
hearsay.[295]
- 4.33 The High
Court determined that the portions of the hearsay statements that contained
statements made by the defendants were exempt
from the hearsay rules by virtue
of section 27(3).[296]
- 4.34 The Court
of Appeal in R v Hoggart reached a different view, that section 27 does
not apply to a defendant’s statement contained in a statement that is
itself
hearsay, and in such cases admissibility should be determined under the
general exception to the rule against hearsay in section
18.[297] The Court observed
that:[298]
- [A’s]
statement is itself hearsay, being a statement intended to be offered in
evidence as proof of its contents, including
that W and Mr Hoggart made these
statements to him. Because the safeguard of cross-examination is removed, the
reliability threshold
for the admission of the hearsay statement of [A] (as
distinct from the defendants) under s 18 must be met.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 4.35 Hoggart
provides appellate authority on how section 27 is to be interpreted in
relation to defendants’ statements contained within hearsay
statements.
The problem that commentators observe, however, is that this interpretation is
difficult to reconcile with the plain
words of section 27, which state clearly
that the hearsay provisions (other than section 22A) do not apply to evidence of
a defendant’s
statement offered by the
prosecution.[299]
- 4.36 There are
good policy reasons for not preferring a literal interpretation of section 27
and instead requiring defendants’
statements within hearsay statements to
be subject to the hearsay provisions in the Act. It is generally recognised that
more specific
guarantees of reliability may be needed to justify admitting
second-hand hearsay evidence.[300]
In cases of multiple hearsay generally, the courts have observed that they must
be concerned with the reliability of each statement
in the
chain.[301] This is because of the
special significance accorded to
cross-examination[302] and the
reliance the adversarial system places on cross-examination as a way of testing
the truth of the evidence.[303] If
the person with first-hand knowledge of what the defendant said to them is
unavailable, then the
defendant:[304]
- ... is denied
the opportunity of exposing imperfections of perception, memory, communication
and sincerity and challenging the person’s
testimonial qualification of
first-hand knowledge ...
- 4.37 In light of
this, two concerns arise with a literal interpretation of section 27:
(a) First, if the person who has first-hand knowledge of the defendant’s
statement is not available for cross-examination,
it is important that the
reliability of that statement is assessed. Section 18 provides for this. Section
27 does not. While reliability
issues can be considered under section 8 (general
exclusion), section 18 has been designed specifically to respond to the inherent
concerns with hearsay statements.
(b) Second, if section 27 is interpreted as providing an independent route to
admit a defendant’s statement contained within
a hearsay statement, then
the prosecution could offer evidence of a defendant’s statement made to a
third party without ever
calling that third party to give evidence in court,
regardless of whether that witness is
unavailable.[305] This
interpretation is clearly at odds with the fair trial rights of the defendant
and the principle of orality, upon which the Act
is
based.[306]
- 4.38 Commentator
Bernard Robertson says that this issue seems to have been overlooked and that,
if that is the case, it should be
corrected by
Parliament.[307] Our review of the
policy and legislative history of the Act has not identified any basis for
believing the intention was to exempt
defendants’ statements within
hearsay statements from the hearsay
provisions.[308]
- 4.39 We seek
submissions on whether section 27 should be amended to clarify that, when a
statement made by a defendant is contained
within a hearsay statement, Subpart 1
(hearsay evidence) applies, consistent with the Court of Appeal’s
interpretation in Hoggart.
QUESTION
Q11
Should section 27 be amended to clarify that a defendant’s statement
contained within a hearsay statement is subject to the
Act’s hearsay
provisions?
ADMISSIBILITY OF CO-DEFENDANTS’ NON-HEARSAY
STATEMENTS
- 4.40 Section
27(1) states that a defendant’s statement offered by the prosecution is
admissible against a co-defendant only
if it is admitted under section
22A.
- 4.41 Section 22A
preserves the common law “co-conspirators’ rule”, which
provides an exception to the rule against
hearsay for statements made in
furtherance of a conspiracy or joint criminal enterprise. Section 22A therefore
only applies to hearsay
statements.
- 4.42 A hearsay
statement is defined in the Act as a statement made by a person “other
than a witness” that is “offered in evidence to prove the
truth of its
contents”.[309]
A statement is not a hearsay statement if the person who made the statement
gives evidence in court, or if the statement is offered
for a purpose other than
proving the truth of its contents (for example, to establish that the statement
was made, or to provide
context).
What is the issue?
- 4.43 The
Act does not address the admissibility of co-defendants’ non-hearsay
statements. As the Supreme Court observed in Winter v R, given the
wording of section 27(1), non-hearsay statements “would arguably not be
admissible at all”.[310]
This issue has a long and complex history and was considered in the
Commission’s Second Review of the
Act.[311] Our initial research and
preliminary feedback from stakeholders has, however, identified a need to
revisit the matter.
The Commission’s Second Review
- 4.44 In
its Second Review, the Commission identified that the combined effect of
sections 27(1) and 22A is to impose greater restrictions
on the admissibility of
co-defendants’ statements than existed at common
law.[312]
- 4.45 That is
because, even if the criteria in section 22A are satisfied, section 22A only
applies to hearsay statements. Therefore,
a defendant’s out-of-court
statement will not be admissible against a co-defendant
if:[313]
(a) the defendant elects to give evidence at trial (and does not adopt the
statement in their
testimony);[314] or
(b) the prosecution intends to rely on the statement for a purpose other than
proving the truth of its contents.
- 4.46 In
contrast, at common law the co-conspirators’ rule would have
allowed the prosecution to admit a defendant’s statement against a
co-defendant regardless of whether the defendant gave
evidence at
trial.[315] Further, there was
nothing at common law to prevent the prosecution from admitting a
defendant’s statement against a co-defendant
for purposes other than
proving the truth of its
contents.[316] In other words,
there was no general rule against admitting defendants’ non-hearsay
statements against a co-defendant, even
if the co-conspirators’ rule did
not apply.
- 4.47 The
Commission concluded there was no principled basis for limiting section 22A to
hearsay statements and recommended replacing
section 22A with a new section 27AA
that would provide as
follows:[317]
- 27AA
Admissibility of statement against co-defendant
- In a criminal
proceeding, a statement made by a defendant is admissible against a co-defendant
if—
- (a) there is
reasonable evidence of a conspiracy or joint enterprise; and
- (b) there is
reasonable evidence that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy or joint
enterprise; and
- (c) the
statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy or joint
enterprise.
- 4.48 The
Commission briefly considered the suggestion of one submitter for a broader
amendment to make all defendants’ non-hearsay
statements admissible
against a co-defendant.[318] It
concluded that this would be a significant change in policy and that there was
insufficient justification for recommending such
a change at that
time.
Developments since the Commission’s Second Review
- 4.49 The
Supreme Court briefly commented on the operation of sections 27(1) and 22A and
the Commission’s proposed section 27AA
in Winter v
R.[319] The Court
observed that, while section 22A was intended to codify the common law,
“the intention of codifying the common law
was only partly
achieved”.[320]
- 4.50 The Supreme
Court noted the Commission’s proposed section 27AA but observed that
“[o]n the face of it, however, that
would still not replicate the common
law as explained in
Messenger”.[321] The
Court set out the following extract from Messenger, a Court of
Appeal decision that articulated the common law co-conspirators’ rule on
which section 22A is
based:[322]
- ... the
existence of the conspiracy or joint enterprise must be shown to the requisite
standard without the use of hearsay evidence.
Statements made by other persons
about what they are intending to do, against the background of their statements
about what they
have done, however, can be led as evidence of the state of mind
of those other persons at the time of speaking. Such statements are
led not to
prove the truth of the participation of a person who is not a party to the
conversation, but as facts from which the existence
of the agreement or
combination to engage in an illegal common enterprise may be inferred. The
existence of a conspiracy can thus
be shown by the statements of all alleged
participants, including what they have said about the accused ...
- 4.51 The concern
the Supreme Court identified in Winter appears to be that, while the
current law fails to reflect the common law position in relation to
co-defendants’ statements
offered for a purpose other than to prove the
truth of their contents, so too does the Commission’s proposed section
27AA.
This is because, as the passage from Messenger recognises, the
common law provided for the admission of such statements without the need to
satisfy the threshold criteria for the
co-conspirators’ rule. At common
law, the co-conspirators’ rule operated as an exception to the rule
against hearsay.
When a statement was not hearsay (because it wasn’t
relied on to prove the truth of its contents), the rule against hearsay
didn’t apply and, by extension, there was no need to engage the
co-conspirators’
rule.[323]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 4.52 We
endorse the conclusion reached in the Second Review that legislative reform is
desirable to address the admissibility of co-defendants’
non-hearsay
statements. However, given subsequent observations in preliminary feedback, case
law and commentary, we consider there
are good reasons to revisit how this
problem should be resolved. This is for several reasons:
(a) First, it does not appear to have been Parliament’s intention when
passing the Act (or when making subsequent amendments)
to depart from the common
law position on co-defendants’ statements. As the Commission has
previously observed, in amending
what would become section 27, “the Select
Committee mistakenly believed it was maintaining the common law
position”.[324]
(b) Second, the proposed section 27AA would not restore the law to the common
law position for the reasons discussed above. Instead,
it would universally
apply the same high threshold for co-conspirators’ statements to all
co-defendants’ statements,
whether or not the statement is hearsay.
(c) Third, while there are good policy reasons for adopting a cautious approach
to the admission of co-defendants’ hearsay
statements,[325] these reasons are
not applicable (or at least not to the same extent) to non-hearsay statements.
The concern underlying the rule
against the admissibility of
co-defendants’ statements is the inherent unreliability of a statement
blaming a co-defendant
that was not made on oath and that is unable to be tested
under cross-examination.[326]
However, as the Commission identified in its Second
Review:[327]
(i) If a co-defendant’s statement is not hearsay because the co-defendant
elects to give evidence at trial, the defendant will
be able to test the
reliability of the statement by cross-examining the co-defendant.
(ii) If a co-defendant’s statement is not hearsay because the prosecution
intends to rely on it for a purpose other than proving
the truth of its
contents, unreliability is less likely to be a significant concern. We add that
it is not clear to us that, just
because a non-hearsay statement is made by a
co-defendant, it should be subject to stricter rules than other non-hearsay
statements.
(d) Fourth, there is some evidence that the current law is not consistent with
expectations or practice. In some cases, a co-defendant’s
non-hearsay
statement is simply admitted without addressing the basis for doing so under the
Act.[328] Other cases have relied
on “fine linguistic
distinctions”,[329]
suggesting a co-defendant’s non-hearsay statement is a “verbal
act” rather than a “statement” that
would be captured by
section 27(1).[330] It has been
suggested that these cases indicate that the current wording of the Act
“doesn’t let the legal system take
an approach to the law that they
thought was
permitted”.[331]
(e) Fifth, it is unclear how the section 22A assessment would work in practice
if all co-defendants’ statements required the
same treatment. As the
Supreme Court pointed out in Winter, the court currently looks to
non-hearsay co-defendants’ statements when determining whether the
threshold criteria are met to
allow the prosecution to admit a
co-defendant’s statement to prove the truth of its contents. How would
this test operate if
all co-defendants’ statements had to go through the
same assessment?
- 4.53 We seek
submissions on whether it would be preferable to retain section 22A in its
current form and amend section 27 to clarify
that a defendant’s
non-hearsay statement is admissible against a co-defendant, but that if the
statement is hearsay, it is
only admissible against a co-defendant if it is
admitted under section 22A.
QUESTION
Q12
Should section 27 be amended to clarify that a defendant’s non-hearsay
statement is admissible against a co-defendant, but that
if the statement is
hearsay it is only admissible against a co-defendant if it is admitted under
section 22A?
CHAPTER 5
5 Unreliable statements
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we consider section 28 (the exclusion of unreliable
statements) and seek feedback on issues relating to:
- the purpose and
effect of section 28; and
- the standard of
proof for admitting a statement under section 28.
BACKGROUND
- 5.1 Sections
27–30 of the Evidence Act 2006 govern the admissibility in criminal
proceedings of defendants’ statements
offered by the prosecution. Section
27 (discussed in Chapter 4) establishes the general rule that the prosecution
may offer evidence
of a defendant’s statement unless the statement is
excluded by the operation of section 28 (unreliable statements), section
29
(statements influenced by oppression) or section 30 (improperly obtained
evidence).
- 5.2 Sections
28–30 were intended to operate alongside each other to perform the roles
previously fulfilled by the common law
voluntariness rule and fairness
discretion. As a scheme, sections 28–30 were designed to ensure
defendants’ statements
are sufficiently reliable to be considered by the
fact-finder and to control the methods used to obtain evidence against
defendants.
We discuss the background to sections 29 and 30 further in Chapters
6 and 7.
- 5.3 The focus of
this chapter is on section 28, which provides for the exclusion of unreliable
statements. Reliability of evidence
is generally a matter for the fact-finder.
However, the Act recognises that certain types of evidence should be screened
for a threshold
level of reliability before they are considered by the
fact-finder.
- 5.4 Section 28
is one example.[332] It recognises
the risk of wrongful convictions based on false
confessions.[333] It applies if
the defendant or a co-defendant raises the issue of reliability on “the
basis of an evidential
foundation”,[334] or
if the judge raises the issue of
reliability.[335] The judge must
exclude the statement unless satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the
circumstances in which the statement
was made were not likely to have adversely
affected its reliability.[336]
THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF SECTION 28
- 5.5 A
key question is whether section 28 is concerned only with the circumstances in
which the statement was made or whether the actual
reliability (or truth) of the
statement can also be considered. This has long been
debated.[337] In R v
Wichman, however, the majority of te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court held
that indications of actual reliability are relevant to the section
28
assessment.[338] This raises an
issue with the wording of section 28, which reflects earlier expectations as to
how the section should operate. We
invite submissions on whether amendment is
desirable to clarify the purpose and effect of section 28 to make it simpler to
apply.
Policy and legislative history
- 5.6 Section
28 largely reflects, with some amendments, Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission’s proposed Evidence Code
provision.[339] This provision
encompassed aspects of the common law voluntariness rule as well as the fairness
discretion.
- 5.7 Under the
common law voluntariness rule, confessions obtained by a promise, threat or any
other inducement by a person in authority
were considered involuntary and were
generally inadmissible.[340] Such
confessions could only be admitted if the judge was satisfied that the means by
which the confession was obtained were not likely
to cause a false
confession.[341] Under this test,
the actual truth of a confession was irrelevant. The focus was on the tendency
of the inducement to affect the reliability
of the statement rather than on the
actual result.[342]
- 5.8 While the
voluntariness rule was focused on the actions of
others,[343] at common law,
factors internal to the defendant (such as fatigue, their psychological state or
the influence of drugs or alcohol)
could be taken into account under a separate
discretion to exclude evidence that was obtained unfairly (the fairness
discretion).[344] The fairness
discretion is now primarily reflected in section
30.[345] Nevertheless, the
Commission also incorporated aspects of the fairness discretion into its
proposed Code provision on unreliability,
by including factors internal to the
defendant that might impact reliability (such as a mental disability or
intoxication) as well
as external factors (such as police
conduct).[346]
- 5.9 The
Commission therefore originally intended that what became section 28 would serve
dual purposes, depending on whether police
conduct was a factor. While its
primary purpose was to ensure statements were only admitted if they were
sufficiently reliable to
be considered by the fact-finder (threshold
reliability),[347] it was also
intended to deter unacceptable police questioning practices that created a risk
of unreliability.[348] The
Commission explained that the actual truth of the statement was not intended to
be relevant, because “[t]o require truth
to be established at this
preliminary stage would usurp the function of the
jury”.[349] Accordingly, the
Evidence Code included a separate provision requiring that the truth or falsity
of a defendant’s statement
be
disregarded.[350]
- 5.10 The
Ministry of Justice appears to have taken a different view on the intended
purpose of the unreliable statements provision
in the Evidence Bill. The
Departmental Report emphasised that the provision was concerned with the nature
and reliability of the
statement rather than the manner in which it was
obtained.[351] Contrary to the
Commission’s recommendations, the Bill as introduced also provided for the
admission of a statement under what
became section 28 if the judge was satisfied
that it was actually true.[352]
That provision was removed on the recommendation of the select committee, which
considered the truth of a statement should not be
used to justify its
admissibility.[353] The Bill was
not, however, amended to expressly require evidence of the truth of a statement
to be disregarded under section 28,
as the Law Commission had
recommended.[354]
Previous Law Commission reviews
- 5.11 In
its 2013 Review of the Act, the Commission recommended that section 28 be
amended to provide that the actual truth of a statement
is
irrelevant.[355] This
recommendation was rejected on the basis that a blanket rule would be too
restrictive.[356] The Ministry of
Justice’s advice noted that the apparent truth of the statement may be the
only way to assess its reliability,
for example, where it contains information
only the offender could have
known.[357]
- 5.12 In its
Second Review of the Act, the Commission considered the relevance of truth,
again following the Supreme Court’s
decision in R v
Wichman.[358] As noted above,
the majority in Wichman found that indications of actual reliability
— such as the degree of congruence between what is asserted in the
statement and
the known facts, and the general plausibility of the statement
— are relevant to the section 28
assessment.[359] The Commission
endorsed the majority’s
approach.[360] The Commission
reasoned that:[361]
(g) the policy underlying the section is to prevent a fact-finder from relying
on a defendant’s statement where it would be
unsafe to do so; and
(h) the section covers unreliability stemming from internal factors (such as the
defendant’s mental condition) as well as external
factors.
- 5.13 The
Commission suggested it may be undesirable to require the courts to ignore
indications of the actual truth or falsity of
a statement, particularly where
the potential unreliability stems from internal
factors.[362] However, the
Commission concluded it was unnecessary to amend section 28 to clarify that
indications of actual truth can be considered.
While submitters had mixed views
on whether such an amendment was
desirable,[363] the Commission
found that the guidance in Wichman was sufficiently
clear.[364]
Is the wording of section 28 sufficiently clear?
- 5.14 The
way in which the courts now interpret and apply section 28 differs from how the
Commission (and arguably the select committee)
intended it to function and may
be out of step with the wording of the section. We raise this issue for
consideration again given
that some time has now passed since Wichman and
submitters may have new observations about how section 28 is applying in
practice.
- 5.15 Section 28
contains a two-step process:
(a) The defendant or the judge must raise “the issue of the reliability of
the statement” (section 28(1)).
(b) Once the issue of reliability has been raised, the judge must exclude the
statement “unless satisfied on the balance of
probabilities that the
circumstances in which the statement was made were not likely to
have adversely affected its reliability” (section 28(2)).
- 5.16 On the face
of the statute, it is arguably unclear whether the “issue of
reliability” in section 28(1) must be raised
by reference to the
circumstances in which the statement was made (as the section 28(2) assessment
requires), or whether it is concerned
with actual reliability or a mixture of
both.
- 5.17 Section
28(2) can also be interpreted in various ways. Commentator Bernard Robertson has
suggested that the approach in Wichman is inconsistent with the wording
of section 28.[365] The majority
in Wichman itself acknowledged that section 28(2) “is not an
entirely easy provision and its language gives rise to a range of possible
interpretations”.[366] This
indicates there may be a lack of clarity about how the section is intended to
function.
- 5.18 As
discussed above, the Commission originally intended the provision to serve two
purposes. In addition to ensuring threshold
reliability, the provision was
intended to have a secondary purpose of deterring unacceptable police
questioning practices. This
is arguably reflected in the wording of section 28,
which largely adopted the Commission’s Evidence Code provision. Consistent
with the approach under the common law voluntariness rule, the plain wording of
section 28(2) appears to focus on the tendency of
the circumstances to affect
the reliability of the statement rather on the actual
result.[367] Indications of the
actual truth or falsity of the statement such as other available evidence or
general plausibility, are arguably
not part of the “circumstances in which
the statement was made” and may therefore be considered irrelevant.
- 5.19 The
majority in Wichman, however, reached a different view. They interpreted
the “circumstances in which the statement was made” as encompassing
“the nature and content of the statement and the extent to which those
circumstances affected the
defendant”.[368] On this
approach, if there are clear indications that the statement is in fact true, a
court may conclude that the circumstances
are not “likely” to
have affected its reliability. In reaching this view, the majority noted the
position was complicated by the fact that section
28 combined aspects of two
separate common law rules: the voluntariness rule and the fairness
discretion.[369] The section
addresses unreliability caused by factors internal to the defendant (such
as mental impairment) as well as external factors (such as police
conduct).
- 5.20 It appears
that this combining of both internal and external factors in section 28 may have
led to a lack of clarity about the
intent of the provision, as different policy
considerations apply to each. A deterrent approach is only relevant where the
reliability
concerns arise from the conduct of law enforcement officers. Where
that is the case, it may make sense to disregard the actual reliability
of the
statement to avoid endorsing an “ends justifies the means” approach
(as the select committee appeared to recognise).
Where the reliability concerns
stem from internal factors, the sole issue is whether the statement is
sufficiently reliable to be
considered by the fact-finder. In that situation,
there may be a better argument for considering indications of actual reliability
(such as consistency with other evidence) to avoid depriving the fact-finder of
relevant evidence if there is a reasonable assurance
that it is reliable in
fact.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 5.21 The
majority decision in Wichman suggests that section 28 is now solely
concerned with threshold reliability (assessed by considering both the
circumstances in which
the statement was made and indications of actual
reliability). Evidence will not be excluded for deterrent purposes if it is
likely to be reliable in fact.
- 5.22 This means
that the purpose of section 28 (as it is now understood) is narrower than
that of the common law voluntariness rule
and, to some degree, the
Commission’s original intention. In Chapter 6, we suggest this may be
addressed in part by ensuring
that concerns about the investigatory techniques
used to obtain a defendant’s statement can be addressed under section
30.[370] We note, however, that
exclusion under section 30 depends on the application of a balancing test. By
contrast, under section 28 exclusion
is required unless the circumstances in
which the statement was made were not likely to have adversely affected its
reliability.
This means section 30 should not be used as a substitute for
section 28. Caution should be exercised before declining to exclude
evidence under section 28 based on indications of actual reliability.
- 5.23 We
identified four cases applying the approach in
Wichman.[371] These cases
indicate that, despite now considering indications of actual reliability, the
courts are continuing to take a relatively
cautious approach to admitting
defendants’ statements when reliability concerns are raised. They also
demonstrate that the
approach in Wichman does not necessarily favour
admission of the evidence — it may also favour exclusion where other
evidence or the content of
the statement suggest it is in fact
unreliable.[372]
- 5.24 It is
arguable, however, that the case law does not reflect the wording of
section 28. We seek feedback on whether this is causing
confusion in
practice and whether amendment is desirable to make the section easier to
understand and apply. Reform could also help
to ensure that only clear
indications of actual reliability are taken into account. On the other hand,
reform may be unnecessary if submitters consider the
decision in Wichman
and subsequent case law provide sufficient guidance.
Options for reform
- 5.25 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, we have identified three options
for reform. These could be implemented in
combination or alone. They would
retain the current focus of section 28 on the circumstances in which the
statement was made, while
making it clear that any obvious indications of actual
reliability can also be considered. We see this approach as consistent with
Wichman.[373] We
suggest it remains appropriate to focus on the circumstances in which the
statement was made, rather than referring solely to actual
reliability. That is
because:
(a) Given the difficulties in accurately assessing the truth of confession
evidence, which we discuss later in this chapter, if the
circumstances indicate
that the reliability of a statement is likely to have been compromised, then
exclusion should be presumed
unless there are clear indications that the
statement is likely to be true.
(b) The fact that aspects of a statement are untrue should not always engage
section 28. The defendant may, for example, be mistaken
about something or
choose to lie of their own
volition.[374] Juries are
routinely trusted to assess such evidence. If the defendant makes a free and
informed choice about whether to make a statement
and what to say, but it proves
to be incorrect, we do not think this engages the policy concerns underlying
section 28.
Option 1: Clarify the meaning of “reliability” in
section 28(1)
- 5.26 Section
28(1) could be amended to provide that the section applies where the defendant
(on the basis of an evidential foundation)
or the judge raises the issue of
whether the circumstances in which the statement was made may have adversely
affected its reliability.
- 5.27 This would
clarify that the circumstances in which the statement was made are the primary
concern under section 28(1), as they
are under section 28(2). We suggest that,
when raising an evidential foundation, it should be sufficient for the defendant
to point
to circumstances that, objectively assessed, may tend to affect the
reliability of a statement. It should not be necessary to point
to evidence that
the statement in question is (in whole or part) untrue. Equally, the fact that a
statement is implausible or inconsistent
with other evidence should not be
enough on its own to engage section 28 in the absence of any relevant
surrounding circumstances
(for the reasons noted above).
Option 2: Clarify the relevance of actual reliability under
section 28(2)
- 5.28 Section
28(2) could be amended to provide that the judge may admit the statement if
satisfied that the circumstances in which
the statement was made were not likely
to have, or did not in fact, adversely affect the reliability of the
statement.
- 5.29 This
amendment could occur alongside Option 1 or separately. It would confirm that
the judge may have regard to whether the circumstances
actually
affected the reliability of the statement when determining whether to
admit it, consistent with the approach in Wichman. However, it would also
retain the reference to likelihood given that there will not always be clear
evidence of actual reliability
or unreliability. In such cases, the section
28(2) assessment would be based on an objective assessment of the circumstances
alone.
- 5.30 There is a
risk that this approach may over-emphasise actual reliability, with the result
that insufficient weight is given to
the circumstances in which the statement
was made. However, the cautious approach taken by the courts since Wichman
tends to suggest that is unlikely. We also note this risk would be reduced
if the standard for admitting evidence under section 28(2)
is raised to beyond a
reasonable doubt, which we discuss below.
Option 3: Insert a new provision specifying optional
considerations
- 5.31 A
new subsection could be inserted providing that, in applying section 28(2), the
judge may have regard to:
(a) the contents of the statement; and/or
(b) the extent to which the statement is clearly consistent or inconsistent with
other evidence.
- 5.32 This option
would specifically permit the judge to consider the contents of the statement
(for example, if it is inherently implausible
or internally inconsistent) and
any clear consistencies or inconsistencies with other available evidence.
- 5.33 If a new
provision along these lines was inserted without Option 2, it could
clarify that clear indications of actual reliability or unreliability may be
considered while potentially reducing
the risk that these considerations would
be given undue weight (as section 28(2) would still focus on whether the
circumstances were
likely to have affected the reliability of the
statement). However, this approach would not directly resolve the issues with
the language
of section 28(2).
- 5.34 If Option 2
were implemented, this additional provision may still provide useful guidance on
how actual reliability is to be
assessed. It would also emphasise that
consistencies or inconsistencies with other evidence should only be considered
where they
are clear, in recognition of the difficulties in accurately assessing
the truth of confession evidence.
- 5.35 The risk of
including such a provision is that it may encourage close analysis of the other
evidence in the case, lengthening
pre-trial hearings. We note this already
occurs under the approach in
Wichman.[375] It
could also (like Option 2) result in too much emphasis being placed on these
factors.
QUESTION
Q13
Should section 28 be amended to clarify its purpose and the relevance of
actual reliability in light of Wichman? If so, should it be amended
to:
- clarify
that the “the issue of the reliability of a defendant’s
statement” must be raised under section 28(1) by
reference to the
circumstances in which the statement was made; and/or
- provide
that the judge may admit the statement under section 28(2) if satisfied that the
circumstances in which the statement was
made were not likely to have, or did
not in fact, adversely affect the reliability of the statement; and/or
- insert
a new subsection providing that, in applying section 28(2), the judge may have
regard to:
- the
contents of the statement; and/or
- the
extent to which the statement is clearly consistent or inconsistent with other
available evidence?
THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR ADMISSIBILITY
- 5.36 As
noted above, section 28 provides for a reliability assessment in relation to
defendants’ statements in recognition of
the risk of wrongful convictions
based on false confessions.[376]
Once the issue of the reliability of a statement is raised, the judge must
exclude the evidence unless satisfied on the “balance
of
probabilities” that its reliability is not likely to have been
affected.[377]
Does the “balance of probabilities” standard
provide adequate protection against the risk of conviction based on false
confessions?
- 5.37 The
Commission in its Evidence Code had originally proposed a “beyond
reasonable doubt” standard for establishing
the reliability of a
defendant’s statement.[378]
This is the standard that applied under the common law voluntariness
rule[379] and still applies under
section 29 (statements influenced by oppression). When the Evidence Bill was
introduced, clause 24 (now section
28) contained the lower “balance of
probabilities” standard. This appears to have been preferred on the basis
that the
evidence would still need to be assessed by the fact-finder if
admitted.[380]
- 5.38 Preliminary
feedback identified concerns among defence counsel that section 28 may provide
inadequate protection against the
risk of false confessions being admitted in
evidence. Concerns related principally to the relatively recent adoption in New
Zealand
of “Mr Big” undercover
operations[381] and the Complex
Investigation Phased Engagement Model (CIPEM) for questioning
suspects.[382] These techniques
have been the subject of considerable media
scrutiny[383] and have been found
by the courts to have produced unreliable statements in two
cases.[384] The Independent Police
Conduct Authority is currently investigating two complaints related to the use
of CIPEM.[385]
- 5.39 In Chapter
6 we suggest that concerns about the propriety of these techniques could be
addressed in part under section 30 (improperly
obtained evidence). However,
where the primary issue is the reliability of the defendant’s statement,
section 28 will apply.
We invite submissions on whether the “balance of
probabilities” standard for admitting evidence under section 28 remains
appropriate.
- 5.40 We have not
yet formed a preliminary view on this issue. On the one hand, te Kōti
Pīra | Court of Appeal has allowed
appeals on the basis that
defendants’ statements should not have been admitted under section 28 in
Lyttle v R[386] (a Mr Big
case) and Gebhardt v
R.[387] This may suggest that
section 28 is functioning as intended. On the other hand, in both Lyttle
and Gebhardt, the Court of Appeal found clear indications that the
statements were in fact
unreliable.[388] In cases where
the other available evidence is less clear, there may be a higher risk of a
false confession being admitted under
section 28.
- 5.41 Whether the
current standard is resulting in the admission of false confessions in practice
is difficult to assess on the case
law. While there are instances where
convictions based in part on a defendant’s statement have been overturned
due to reliability
concerns, these either involved events
pre-Act[389] or challenges to the
reliability of the statement based on new information obtained after the
original trial.[390] The absence
of case examples to date does not, however, mean that false confessions have not
been admitted under section 28 (as there
may be no way to prove this on appeal)
or that this will not occur in future.
- 5.42 There have
been several developments since the Act was enacted that may affect the
assessment of whether the “balance of
probabilities” standard is
appropriate.
(a) First, there is increasing recognition of the reliability risks associated
with confessions and a growing body of evidence indicating
they may be given
undue weight by the
fact-finder.[391] The prevalence
of false confessions has been established by overseas case studies (including
cases involving DNA exonerations) and
scientific
studies.[392] There have been
recent cases in New Zealand where people who confessed to a crime later had
their convictions overturned.[393]
False confessions may be influenced by a variety of factors, including
situational factors (such as interrogation techniques) and
dispositional factors
(such as youth, poor mental health or cognitive
impairment).[394] Research
suggests false confessions can be convincing, containing details that it seems
only the offender would know.[395]
These details may be inadvertently disclosed to a suspect by law enforcement
officers during an investigation (sometimes referred
to as
contamination).[396] Because of
this, it can be difficult to accurately assess whether confessions are
true.[397] They are, however,
likely to be given significant weight by the
fact-finder.[398]
(b) Second, the relatively recent use of techniques such as Mr Big undercover
operations and the CIPEM for questioning suspects may
make it more difficult to
accurately assess the reliability of confessions. These techniques can involve
significant interaction
between investigators and suspects over an extended
period of time, some of which may be informal and/or not
recorded.[399]
(c) Third, as discussed above, the courts now consider indications of actual
reliability when deciding whether to admit evidence
under section 28. This does
not appear to have been the intent at the time section 28 was enacted. In light
of this, there may be
a stronger argument for applying a higher standard for
admission under section 28. Given the difficulties in accurately assessing
the
truth of confessions, indications of actual reliability may be misleading. For
example, a confession may be consistent with other
evidence due to contamination
during the investigation or because the defendant knows the offender. It may
therefore be appropriate
to require more convincing evidence of actual
reliability before admitting a confession on that basis.
- 5.43 In
Wichman, which concerned the admissibility of a confession made during a
Mr Big operation, all members of the Court accepted that an innocent
person in the defendant’s position may have thought it worthwhile to
confess.[400] Nonetheless, the
evidence was admitted based on indications of actual reliability. In that type
of situation, there is an argument
that the balance of probabilities standard is
inadequate to protect against the risk of conviction based on a false confession
in
light of the considerations discussed above. The counter-argument is that the
case law to date does not show clear evidence of false
confessions having been
admitted following a challenge under section 28. The difficulty is that, if this
has occurred, it would not
necessarily be detected (in the absence of a later
exoneration based on new evidence).
Should the standard be changed to “beyond reasonable
doubt”?
- 5.44 Should
reform be necessary or desirable to address the concerns discussed above,
section 28 could be amended to adopt a standard
of “beyond reasonable
doubt”. This could occur in conjunction with the potential amendments
discussed above in relation
to the purpose of section 28 or alone.
- 5.45 Raising the
standard of proof for admissibility could provide greater protection against the
risk of wrongful conviction based
on false confession evidence. It may not
change the outcome in the majority of cases, but it would signal to the courts
that they
should err on the side of exclusion where there is limited evidence of
reliability. If the court had any doubt that the circumstances
surrounding a
defendant’s statement may have made it unreliable, the statement would be
excluded.
- 5.46 It is
arguable that requiring the court to be satisfied “beyond reasonable
doubt” at the pre-trial stage may be too
high a hurdle since it will not
have all the evidence before it (particularly where other relevant evidence will
be given by prosecution
witnesses). This could lead to relevant and probative
evidence being withheld from the fact-finder in circumstances where they might
be better placed to assess it accurately at trial (with appropriate reliability
warnings). That may, however, be considered an appropriate
trade-off to protect
against the risk of a miscarriage of justice.
- 5.47 We note
there is precedent in the Act for applying a “beyond reasonable
doubt” standard when assessing reliability
at the admissibility stage.
Where visual identification evidence was obtained without using a formal
procedure and there was no good
reason for not using one, it is only admissible
if “the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the circumstances
in
which the identification was made have produced a reliable
identification”.[401] We
welcome feedback on whether that standard has caused difficulties in practice.
QUESTION
Q14
Should the “balance of probabilities” standard in section 28(2)
be raised to “beyond reasonable doubt”?
CHAPTER 6
6 Investigatory techniques and risks of unreliability
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on whether sections
28–30 of the Act adequately respond to the risk that investigatory
techniques used by law enforcement officers could produce unreliable
evidence.
BACKGROUND
- 6.1 As
we explain in Chapter 5, sections 28–30 of the Evidence Act 2006 were
intended to operate alongside each other to perform
the roles previously
fulfilled by the common law voluntariness rule and the jurisdiction to exclude
improperly obtained evidence
based on trial fairness
considerations.[402] Section 30
also fulfils an additional role of providing for exclusion of evidence obtained
in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 (NZBORA) and other
legislation. As a scheme, sections 28–30 were designed to ensure
defendants’ statements are
sufficiently reliable to be considered by the
fact-finder and to control the techniques used to obtain evidence against
defendants.
- 6.2 Section 28
is principally concerned with whether a defendant’s statement is
sufficiently reliable to be considered by the
fact-finder. As we discuss in
Chapter 5, since te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court’s decision in R
v Wichman the courts now consider indications of actual reliability (such as
consistency with other evidence) when deciding whether to admit
a statement
under section 28.[403] This means
a statement that is likely to be true may be admitted irrespective of the
techniques used to obtain it (subject to sections
29 and 30).
- 6.3 Sections 29
and 30 are more directly concerned with the conduct of law enforcement officers.
Section 29 (statements influenced
by oppression) was intended to protect people
from coerced
self-incrimination.[404] It
excludes defendants’ statements that are influenced by conduct or
treatment that must always be regarded as
reprehensible.[405] Specifically,
it protects the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading or
inhuman treatment or
punishment.[406] Accordingly, the
threshold for “oppression” is
high,[407] and once it is
established the statement is automatically excluded. As far as we have been able
to determine, only one statement
has been excluded under section 29 since it was
enacted.[408]
- 6.4 Section 30
(improperly obtained evidence) has the broader aim of maintaining an effective
and credible system of
justice.[409] It is based on the
balancing test adopted by te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal in R v
Shaheed, which was used to determine the admissibility of evidence obtained
in breach of the NZBORA.[410]
However, section 30 is triggered by a wider range of improper conduct. Evidence
is deemed to be improperly obtained, so as to engage
the section 30 balancing
test, if it is
obtained:[411]
(a) in consequence of a breach of any enactment or rule of law by a person to
whom section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990
applies;[412]
(b) in consequence of a defendant’s statement that would be inadmissible
if offered by the prosecution; or
(c) unfairly.
- 6.5 The final
limb — unfairly obtained evidence — is most often engaged where
defendants’ statements are obtained
in breach of the Chief Justice’s
Practice Note on Police Questioning (which restated the earlier Judges’
Rules, with
some developments, for the purposes of section 30 of the
Act).[413] But the categories of
unfairness are not closed[414] and
may encompass any unfair conduct by state
officials[415] or private
individuals.[416]
- 6.6 A finding
that evidence has been improperly obtained does not result in automatic
exclusion, as a finding of oppression
does.[417] Rather, the section 30
test seeks to balance competing public interests and maintain the integrity of
the criminal justice system,
as we discuss further in Chapter 7. The section
permits judges to consider a range of factors, including the nature of the
impropriety,
the seriousness of the offence and the nature and quality of the
evidence, when deciding whether to admit the
evidence.[418] Section 30 can also
apply to any type of evidence, whereas sections 28 and 29 are limited to
defendants’ statements.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wichman
- 6.7 R
v Wichman is the leading authority on the application of sections
28–30 to investigatory techniques used to obtain
confessions.[419] It
concerned the admissibility of a statement the defendant made to an undercover
police officer during a Mr Big undercover
operation.[420] All members of the
Supreme Court accepted that the nature of the Mr Big operation had the potential
to produce a false
confession.[421] They reached
different views, however, on whether and how this was relevant under section 30.
The decision raises a question whether
the courts can exclude evidence under
section 30 due to the risk that the investigative technique used could
produce unreliable evidence, regardless of whether that risk has
crystallised in that particular case. We describe the courts’
application
of sections 28–30 in Wichman in some detail below, as we later seek
feedback on whether the approach adopted by the majority of the Supreme Court is
likely to
cause problems in practice.
- 6.8 The Court of
Appeal in Wichman had excluded the defendant’s statement under
section 30.[422] The Court took
into account the risk of unreliability associated with the Mr Big technique at
both stages of the section 30 assessment:
first, when determining that the
evidence was obtained unfairly and therefore improperly (the unfairness
assessment);[423] and second, when
deciding that exclusion was proportionate to the impropriety (the balancing
test).[424] In particular, in the
context of the unfairness assessment, the Court emphasised that the defendant
was incentivised to lie and was
put under substantial psychological pressure to
confess.[425] The Court considered
the use of the Mr Big technique was “apt to induce a false confession in
this case”.[426] In reaching
that view, the Court did not consider indications of the actual reliability of
the statement but rather based its decision
on the risk of unreliability
given the circumstances in which the statement was
made.[427]
- 6.9 On appeal,
the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of the statement under both
section 28 and section 30 (section 28 had
not been the subject of appeal in the
Court of Appeal). The Court was split on the question of how the risk of
unreliability associated
with the Mr Big technique should be addressed. The
majority held that indications of actual reliability could be taken into
account under
section 28.[428] They found
it was open to the trial judge to decline to exclude the evidence under section
28 based on indications of that kind,
including the tone of the discussion and
the broad correlation between the admissions and other
evidence.[429]
- 6.10 As to the
respective roles of sections 28–30, the majority
said:[430]
- Sections 8, 28,
29 and 30 must be interpreted in a coherent way. Considering the application of
ss 28, 29 and 30 to Mr Big operations,
we see s 29 as addressing impropriety by
undercover officers acting in role as criminals involving threats (actual or
implicit) of
violence to obtain confessions, s 28 as addressing the risk of
unreliable confessions and s 30 as dealing with other matters (such
as
police impropriety, including possible non-adherence to, or circumvention of,
the Practice Note). Section 30 should not be treated as conferring a broad
discretion to exclude defendants’ statements for reasons addressed in
ss
28 and 29. It follows that we consider the Court of Appeal ought to have
addressed its concerns about the reliability of the respondent’s
statements under s 28 rather than s 30. We accept, of course, that concerns
as to reliability, and thus the cogency or otherwise, of the evidence in
question may be relevant
to the application of s 30, and particularly s 30(4)
and that aspects of the operation that are relevant to the reliability
assessment
may also be relevant to the fairness assessment. ...
- ... Sections 28
and 8, in the context of the Act as a whole, proceed on the basis that
residual risks of unreliability (which do not warrant exclusion under s
28(2)) ... should be addressed by the Judge in the course of the
management of the trial, with warnings as to possible unreliability and
directions as to illegitimate reasoning and the burden and standard of proof. In
this context, it is difficult to see how such issues are material to the
logically distinct question whether the police acted unfairly and thus
improperly.
- (Emphasis
added.)
- 6.11 This
passage must be read in the context of the Court of Appeal decision under
consideration. That decision treated the risk
the Mr Big technique may have
produced an unreliable statement as relevant to the unfairness assessment in
section 30. The majority
of the Supreme Court, in the passage above, appears to
suggest that approach was incorrect. Risks of unreliability not resulting
in
exclusion under section 28 (for example, because there are indications that the
statement was actually true) should not be taken
into account when determining
whether the evidence is obtained unfairly so as to engage the section 30
balancing test.
- 6.12 The
Wichman majority’s acceptance that “concerns as to
reliability, and thus the cogency or otherwise, of the evidence in question
may
be relevant to the application of s 30, and particularly s 30(4)”
indicates they saw actual reliability as being potentially
relevant to the
application of the section 30 balancing test (a point that is not
controversial).[431] This,
however, is separate from the prior question of whether risks of
unreliability associated with the investigatory method are relevant to whether
the evidence is unfairly obtained so as to engage
the balancing test in the
first place.
- 6.13 Given its
view, the majority did not consider reliability risks under section 30. The
majority’s section 30 analysis was
limited to whether the operation
involved improper circumvention of the constraints on police interrogation or
was unfair due to
the use of deception and participation in apparent criminal
activity by police.[432] They
concluded that the statement was not improperly obtained and was admissible at
trial.
- 6.14 Elias CJ
and Glazebrook J took a different approach in their separate dissenting
judgments. Elias CJ would have excluded the
defendant’s statement under
both sections 28 and 30.[433]
Glazebrook J agreed with the majority on the application of section 28, finding
that the reliability of the statement had not in fact been adversely
affected.[434] But she would still
have excluded the evidence under section
30.[435] The two dissenting judges
treated the risk of unreliability associated with the Mr Big technique as
relevant to both the section
30 unfairness
assessment[436] and the balancing
test.[437] Glazebrook J reasoned
that:[438]
- The Crown
submits that the Court of Appeal should not have considered reliability under
s 30(5)(c) as all reliability issues are
dealt with under s 28. I do not
accept that submission. Section 28 is concerned with the risk of unreliability
and whether (as a
threshold issue) this risk has eventuated so that the evidence
should not go before the jury. Thus, while I accept that the Court
of Appeal
should have considered the threshold question of reliability under s 28 rather
than under s 30, it does not follow that
all reliability issues are dealt with
under s 28.
- As noted above,
s 28 is not directly concerned with issues of police conduct. Where the police
use a technique such as the Mr Big
scenario technique there is, because of
material inducements and promises of fixing charges, a significant risk of
unreliability.
The Courts cannot ignore the risks inherent in the technique,
just because on the particular case the confession is reliable enough
to go
before the jury. That would be to sanction an “ends always justifies the
means” analysis.
- ... I agree
with the Court of Appeal that the substantial risk of unreliability inherent in
the technique is one factor to be considered
in deciding whether statements
obtained through the Mr Big technique are obtained unfairly. The police should
avoid techniques that
create a real risk of false confessions (even if they
increase the number of true confessions).
IS WICHMAN LIKELY TO CAUSE PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE?
- 6.15 As
explained in Chapter 5, we received preliminary feedback expressing concern that
sections 28–30 (as they are currently
applied by the courts) do not
adequately control the use of certain investigatory techniques to obtain
statements from defendants
— in particular Mr Big undercover operations
and the Complex Investigation Phased Engagement Model (CIPEM) for questioning
suspects. We discussed whether the standard of proof for admitting statements
under section 28 should be raised to “beyond
reasonable doubt” to
respond to the risk of false confessions being admitted in evidence.
- 6.16 This
feedback has also led us to consider whether sections 28–30 together, as
interpreted by the courts, provide a coherent
scheme for controlling the
techniques used to obtain evidence where they give rise to a risk of
unreliability. We have identified
a possible gap in the operation of these
sections resulting from the decision in
Wichman.[439]
- 6.17 As
explained in Chapter 5, the majority’s finding in Wichman that
indications of actual reliability can be considered under section 28 represents
a significant departure from the common law position.
Under the voluntariness
rule, confessions obtained by a promise, threat or other inducement by a person
in authority were considered
involuntary and were
inadmissible[440] unless the judge
was satisfied that the means by which the confession was obtained were not
likely to cause a false
confession.[441] The actual truth
of a confession was irrelevant - the focus was on the tendency of the inducement
rather than the actual
result.[442] Accordingly, if the
court considered that the investigatory techniques used by law enforcement
officers involved an unacceptable
risk of causing a false confession, the
statement would have been excluded. A range of policies underpinned the
voluntariness rule,
including reliability, protecting against coerced
self-incrimination, deterring unacceptable conduct in the gathering of evidence
and protecting the integrity of the justice
system.[443] The rule required
that suspects be given a meaningful choice about whether to speak to
police.[444]
- 6.18 Following
Wichman, section 28 may not require exclusion in circumstances
that would have resulted in exclusion under the voluntariness rule. This may
lead to results that were not anticipated when section 28 was enacted unless
other provisions (such as section 30) can fill the gap.
- 6.19 As we
interpret the majority judgment in Wichman, it suggests that residual
risks of unreliability not resulting in exclusion under section 28 are not
relevant to the section 30
unfairness assessment. If that is correct, it
may mean there are circumstances where the courts consider the investigatory
techniques
used carried an unacceptable risk of producing unreliable evidence,
yet they cannot exclude the evidence under any of sections 28–30.
This may
be the case where:
(a) the court considers the statement in question is sufficiently reliable in
fact to go before the fact-finder (so the statement is not excluded under
section 28); and
(b) the investigatory conduct concerned does not meet the high threshold for
“oppression” under section 29; and
(c) there is no separate basis for finding that the statement was improperly
obtained for so as to engage section 30 (such as a breach
of the NZBORA or the
Practice Note on Police Questioning).
- 6.20 This could
occur, for example, in a Mr Big case if the court had serious concerns about the
tendency of the techniques used in
the operation to affect the reliability of
any confession made, but could not exclude the statement under section 28 due to
indications
it was in fact
reliable.[445]
- 6.21 This
potential gap has not yet been confronted in the case law since Wichman.
While several subsequent cases have involved arguments that the investigatory
techniques used carried an unacceptable risk of producing
a false confession, in
each case the court excluded the evidence on other grounds. In
Lyttle v R (another Mr Big case), the defendant’s statement
was excluded under section 28 because other available evidence supported
the
court’s view that it was unreliable in
fact.[446] In R v X, the
use of CIPEM to question the defendant involved breaches of the Practice Note on
Police Questioning.[447] Section
30 was engaged on that basis and the Court went on to determine that exclusion
of the evidence was proportionate to the impropriety.
In R v Fawcett,
te Kōti Matua | High Court considered an argument by defence counsel
that police conduct during Mr Fawcett’s interviews
contributed to his
statement being unreliable.[448]
However, the Court excluded the statement under section 28 on the basis of
internal factors (the influence of foetal alcohol spectrum
disorder) and did not
consider how the impact of police conduct should be addressed under the
Act.[449]
IS LEGISLATIVE REFORM NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE?
- 6.22 We
seek submissions on whether the potential gap identified above is causing
concern or problems in practice. We are interested
to know, for example, if
there is confusion around whether or how the risk an investigatory technique
could produce unreliable evidence
can be addressed under the Act.
- 6.23 We also
seek submissions on whether legislative reform is desirable to stipulate that
the courts can have regard to the risk
that an investigatory technique would
produce unreliable evidence at both stages of the section 30 inquiry (that is,
when determining
whether the evidence was improperly obtained and when applying
the balancing test). This would ensure that sections 28–30 together
cover
the same ground as the voluntariness rule at common law, as appears to have been
the legislative intent.
- 6.24 Given the
lack of case law since Wichman on the relevance of reliability risks
under section 30, it is not yet clear what impact the decision will have.
Reform may therefore
be considered premature at this stage. There is potential,
however, for this issue to have a significant impact in practice if our
assessment of the current law is correct. Since this is our final statutory
review and we are seeking submissions on other amendments
to sections 28 and 30,
this may be the best opportunity to clarify the intent of the sections if that
is required.
- 6.25 Our
preliminary view is that the courts should be able to consider the risk that an
investigatory technique could produce unreliable
evidence when assessing
unfairness under section 30. This approach is already available on the current
wording of section 30, but
the decision in Wichman may prevent the courts
from adopting it. If so, we suggest that would be undesirable. The
administration of justice may be brought
into disrepute if the courts are unable
to exclude evidence they consider carries an unacceptable risk of producing
unreliable evidence.
It may encourage the use of similar techniques in future,
increasing the risk of unreliable evidence in general. This may have a
detrimental effect on public trust and confidence in the justice system, as is
already evident from public criticism of Mr Big operations
and CIPEM. These are
the types of concerns that section 30 is designed to address.
- 6.26 While trial
judges can warn juries about residual risks that evidence may be
unreliable,[450] such warnings
only address concerns about actual unreliability - and hence the safety of
conviction based on the evidence. Where
the primary concern relates to the means
used to obtain the evidence, reliability warnings are of little relevance.
- 6.27 In some
cases, section 30 will be engaged on a separate basis. For example, the
investigatory techniques used might also involve
breaches of the Practice Note
on Police Questioning.[451] In
that situation, the courts have already shown a willingness to treat the
evidence as unfairly obtained under section
30.[452] However, the Practice
Note on Police Questioning is limited in scope. Most of its requirements only
apply when the person being questioned
is in custody or there is sufficient
evidence to lay a charge against them. The Practice Note does not apply to
undercover officers[453] or
investigating agencies other than Police on Police Questioning. Nor does it
cover every type of police conduct during questioning
that may result in
unfairness.[454]
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
- 6.28 We
set out below three options for amending section 30, which could be implemented
together or separately. These options would
all involve clarifying that the risk
an investigatory technique would produce unreliable evidence can be considered
under that section.
- 6.29 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, amending section 30 may be an
appropriate approach since it was specifically
designed to address improper
conduct in the obtaining of evidence that may have a detrimental impact on the
integrity of the justice
system. Section 30 also applies to any type of evidence
(compared to section 28, which is limited to defendants’ statements).
While the cases we have discussed related to defendants’ statements,
concerns about risks of unreliability associated with
investigatory techniques
may arise in relation to other evidence. It is conceivable, for example, that
techniques used to gather
physical evidence may risk compromising the quality of
that evidence. The options for reform discussed below would therefore enable
risks of unreliability to be taken into account in relation to any type of
evidence (although we expect defendants’ statements
would be the most
common application).
- 6.30 We have not
suggested amending section 29 to include a wider range of investigatory conduct
that could be considered “oppressive”.
While section 29 sets a high
bar,[455] its purpose is to
protect the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading or
inhuman treatment or
punishment.[456] We would expect
it to apply rarely. Our preliminary view is that it is appropriate for
oppression to be defined in a narrow way,
since statements influenced by it are
automatically excluded, and for section 30 to apply to a broader range of
conduct.
- 6.31 We also
considered whether a specific admissibility rule should be introduced to deal
with Mr Big operations or other specified
investigatory techniques. However, we
suggest it would be preferable to amend the existing provisions in the Act to
ensure they address
the underlying concerns that may arise from these
techniques. This would help to maintain a consistent approach and ensure that
any
new investigatory techniques developed in future (which raise similar
concerns) can be accommodated.
Option 1: Amend section 30(6) to clarify that reliability
risks are relevant to the unfairness assessment
- 6.32 Section
30(6) could be amended to provide that, in assessing whether evidence was
unfairly obtained under section 30(5)(c), the
judge may take into account the
risk that the investigatory techniques used would produce unreliable evidence.
- 6.33 This
amendment would clarify that, even if risks of unreliability do not result in
exclusion under section 28 (for example, because
there are sufficient
indications that a defendant’s statement is reliable in fact), they can
still be considered when deciding
whether the evidence was unfairly obtained so
as to engage the section 30 balancing test. This would align with the approach
of the
Court of Appeal[457] and
the minority of the Supreme
Court[458] in
Wichman.
Option 2: Amend section 30(6) to specify additional matters
relevant to the unfairness assessment
- 6.34 We
also invite feedback on whether any or all of the factors in sections 28(4) and
29(4) (which are relevant to the reliability
and oppression tests) should be
specified in section 30(6) as relevant when assessing whether a
defendant’s statement was unfairly
obtained under section 30(5)(c) (the
unfairness assessment). Those factors are:
(a) any pertinent physical, mental or psychological condition of the defendant
when the statement was made (whether apparent or not);
(b) any pertinent characteristics of the defendant including any mental,
intellectual or physical disability to which the defendant
is subject (whether
apparent or not);
(c) the nature of any questions put to the defendant and the manner and
circumstances in which they were put; and
(d) the nature of any threat, promise or representation made to the defendant or
any other person.
- 6.35 It may be
argued that introducing these factors into section 30 would risk confusing its
scope. However, we note that in practice
the courts already take similar
considerations into account under the unfairness
assessment.[459] Expressly
referring to these factors in section 30 could help to clarify that
circumstances not resulting in exclusion under sections
28 or 29 can still be
considered under section 30.
- 6.36 While the
first two factors may appear more relevant to threshold reliability (under
section 28), they also appear in section
29 (oppression). Like section 30,
section 29 is concerned with the conduct of investigators. The key difference is
that section 29
requires automatic exclusion because of the seriousness of
the conduct involved, while exclusion under section 30 depends on the
outcome of
a balancing test. Whether conduct is considered unfair under section 30 may well
depend on the circumstances in which
it occurs (for example, the vulnerabilities
of a suspect being interviewed).
- 6.37 If there is
support for this approach, we are particularly interested in views on whether
the condition or characteristics of
the defendant should only be relevant to the
section 30 analysis to the extent that they were apparent (or ought to have been
apparent)
to investigators. Given that section 30 is concerned with impropriety
in obtaining evidence, it may be argued that matters purely
internal to the
defendant and not outwardly apparent should be irrelevant, with exclusion
instead occurring under section 28 where
appropriate. The contrary argument is
that reliance on evidence obtained through exploitation of a person’s
vulnerabilities,
whether known or not, may undermine the privilege against
self-incrimination (and, consequently, the credibility of the justice system).
This may explain why this factor appears in section 29(4).
Option 3: Add reliability risks as a factor in the section
30 balancing test
- 6.38 Lastly,
we seek submissions on the option of amending section 30(3) to provide that,
when applying the section 30 balancing test,
the court may take into account the
extent of any risk that the investigatory techniques used would produce
unreliable evidence.
- 6.39 The
actual reliability of the evidence is already relevant to the balancing
exercise (under “the nature and quality of the improperly obtained
evidence” in section
30(3)(c)).[460] However, it is
currently unclear whether the risk of unreliability associated with an
investigatory technique, which is relevant to the seriousness of the impropriety
rather than the nature and quality of the evidence
itself, can be
considered.[461] Although the list
of factors in section 30(3) is non-exhaustive, our review of case law suggests
the courts largely confine their
analysis to the listed factors.
- 6.40 Particularly
if Option 1 is adopted, it may be desirable to clarify that the risk the conduct
in question would produce unreliable
evidence is relevant to the balancing test
as well as to the assessment of whether evidence was obtained unfairly. Again,
this is
consistent with the approach taken by the Court of
Appeal[462] and the minority of
the Supreme Court[463] in
Wichman.
QUESTION
Q15
Should the Act be amended to clarify that the risk that an investigatory
technique could produce unreliable evidence can be considered
under section 30?
If so, should the Act be amended to:
- provide,
in section 30(6) that, in assessing whether evidence was unfairly obtained under
section 30(5)(c):
- the
judge may take into account the risk that the investigatory techniques used
would produce unreliable evidence; and/or
- the
judge must, in relation to a defendant’s statement, take into account the
factors listed in sections 28(4) and 29(4); and/or
- provide,
in section 30(3) that, when applying the section 30 balancing test, the court
may take into account the extent of any risk
that the investigatory techniques
used could produce unreliable evidence?
CHAPTER 7
7 Improperly obtained evidence
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider section 30 (improperly obtained evidence) and
seek feedback on issues relating to:
- the operation of
the section 30 balancing test;
- the wording of
the balancing test;
- the application
of the factors in section 30(3); and
- the role of
causation in determining whether evidence is improperly obtained under section
30(5).
BACKGROUND
- 7.1 Section
30 of the Evidence Act 2006 governs the admissibility of improperly obtained
evidence in criminal cases. There are two
steps under section 30. The first step
is to determine whether the evidence was improperly
obtained.[464]
Evidence is “improperly obtained” if it
is obtained:[465]
(a) in consequence of a breach of any enactment or rule of law by a person to
whom section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990
applies;[466]
(b) in consequence of a defendant’s statement that would be inadmissible
if offered by the prosecution; or
(c) unfairly.
- 7.2 If the
evidence was improperly obtained, the second step is to determine whether the
exclusion of evidence is proportionate to
the
impropriety.[467] This is to be
determined by means of a balancing process that gives appropriate weight to the
impropriety and takes proper account
of the need for an effective and credible
system of justice. Section 30(3) contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that
may be
taken into account in undertaking the balancing exercise. If the judge
finds that exclusion of the evidence is proportionate to the
impropriety, they
must exclude the evidence.[468]
- 7.3 We have
identified a number of potential issues with the operation of section 30, which
we explore later in this chapter. To facilitate
submitter engagement with these
issues, we first discuss the history and policy behind the section and explain
how it has been applied
by the courts.
History of section 30
- 7.4 Improperly
obtained evidence was generally admissible at common law, subject to a
discretion to exclude it on the ground of unfairness
(the fairness
discretion).[469] After the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) was enacted, the courts developed a
prima facie exclusionary rule for evidence
obtained in breach of NZBORA
rights.[470] Other improperly
obtained evidence continued to be admissible subject to the fairness discretion.
(Statements made by children or
young people were - and still are - subject to a
separate statutory exclusionary
rule).[471]
- 7.5 Te Aka Matua
o te Ture | Law Commission’s Evidence Code proposed an improperly obtained
evidence provision that was based
on the prima facie exclusionary
rule.[472] The provision was not,
however, limited to NZBORA breaches. It would have applied to a broader range of
improperly obtained evidence,
including evidence that was obtained
unfairly.[473]
- 7.6 After the
Evidence Code was published but before the Evidence Bill was drafted, te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal in R v Shaheed overturned the prima
facie exclusionary rule.[474] The
majority considered that, contrary to the Court’s original intention, the
rule had led to an unduly rigid approach by the
courts, with exclusion following
almost automatically from a finding that NZBORA rights had been
breached.[475] In practice, this
had led the courts to shift the focus of their analysis to whether a breach had
occurred. In particular, in search
and seizure
cases:[476]
- The decision to
exclude or not has often been effectively determined by the prior conclusion
that what occurred was not reasonable
and therefore in breach of s 21 or vice
versa. Our perception is that frequently a balancing exercise is being carried
out in the
fact finding process or in the determination of what is reasonable in
the factual circumstances. This may have led to some distortion
–
situations in which it would have been preferable to acknowledge that the search
and seizure was unreasonable and then to
determine by means of a balancing
exercise whether the evidence ought nevertheless to be admitted. Where the
police have without
practical justification departed from the standards required
by the law, it is better that the breach be marked by a statement from
the Court
that their behaviour was unreasonable; and that the decision whether or not to
exclude the resulting evidence is then made
on a principled basis in light of
that conclusion.
- 7.7 The majority
therefore concluded that a more flexible approach was appropriate when
determining whether to admit improperly obtained
evidence, with the breach of a
right being “a very important but not necessarily determinative
factor”.[477] They adopted a
balancing test to determine whether exclusion of the evidence was proportionate
to the breach of rights.[478]
Blanchard J (whose approach was endorsed by the majority)
explained:[479]
- To be sure,
there are some good arguments favouring a rule expressed in prima facie terms:
it recognises the importance of a guaranteed
right; exclusion may be the only
effective means of vindicating a breach; it diminishes any appearance that the
Courts are deciding
cases on the basis of ends rather than means; and it makes
it clear to the police that there is no utility in obtaining evidence
via a
breach of rights.
- There is much
force in these arguments, although the last of them is of greater relevance to a
deterrence-centred regime. But a balancing
test in which, as a starting point,
appropriate and significant weight is given to the fact that there has been a
breach of a quasi-constitutional
right, can accommodate and meet them.
Importantly, a prima facie rule does not have the appearance of adequately
addressing the interest
of the community that those who are guilty of serious
crimes should not go unpunished. That societal interest, in which any
victim’s
interest is subsumed, rather than being treated as a separate
interest, will not normally outweigh an egregious breach of
rights – particularly
one which is deliberate or reckless on
the part of law enforcement officers. But where the disputed evidence is
strongly probative
of guilt of a serious crime, that factor too must be given
due weight. A system of justice will not command the respect of the community
if
each and every substantial breach of an accused’s rights leads almost
inevitably to the exclusion of crucial evidence which
is reliable and probative
of a serious crime. ...
- 7.8 Section 30
is based on the test set out in
Shaheed.[480] However, while
Shaheed only applied to NZBORA breaches, section 30 applies to a broader
class of improperly obtained evidence (as proposed in the Commission’s
Evidence Code).[481]
Rationales for exclusion of improperly obtained
evidence
- 7.9 There
are three main types of rationale typically advanced for excluding improperly
obtained evidence: rights-based, deterrence-based
and
integrity-based.[482] Which of
these rationales a legal system subscribes to influences the design of its
exclusionary rules. These rationales are not,
however, mutually exclusive. In
practice, exclusionary rules often reflect a combination of these rationales,
alongside notions such
as fairness and procedural
efficiency.[483]
- 7.10 Rights-based
rationales treat exclusion of evidence obtained in breach of a person’s
rights as necessary either to compensate
the affected individual for the breach
or vindicate the right.[484] Only
exclusion of the evidence can put the person back in the position they would
have been in had their rights not been breached
(on a compensatory approach) or
give proper meaning to the right (under a vindication of rights
approach).[485] Rights-based
rationales may require exclusion where fundamental or constitutional rights have
been breached while potentially permitting
admission of evidence obtained
through lesser improprieties.
- 7.11 Under a
deterrence-based rationale, improperly obtained evidence is excluded to
discourage future misconduct, both at individual
and organisational levels. It
is intended to prompt law enforcement agencies to take steps to ensure that
officers comply with their
obligations.[486] Over time, this
is thought to improve practice and increase respect for the rights of suspects.
A deterrence-based approach generally
requires exclusion of improperly obtained
evidence, although exceptions might be recognised where, for example, the
misconduct was
inadvertent or in good faith.
- 7.12 The third
type of rationale focuses on preserving the integrity or moral legitimacy of the
justice system. It reflects the view
that for a criminal justice system to
command the moral legitimacy and public respect necessary to justify punishing
those who breach
its norms, it must set an example by rejecting the use of
illegal or unfair techniques to obtain
evidence.[487] Further, if the
justice system condones breaches of the law, this may invite general disrespect
for the law so the public will be
less inclined to follow it. The integrity
rationale does not necessarily require automatic exclusion. In some
circumstances, such
as where the impropriety is trivial and the offence serious,
the exclusion of the evidence may be seen as bringing the criminal justice
system into greater disrepute than would its
admission.[488]
- 7.13 The
integrity rationale may be viewed as encompassing both rights protection and
deterrence considerations to an extent. Arguably,
a justice system can only
maintain its integrity and retain public confidence by providing a remedy for
breaches of legally recognised
rights and taking steps to deter future breaches
by law enforcement
agencies.[489]
- 7.14 Exclusionary
rules may also attempt to balance public interest considerations that tell
against exclusion of improperly obtained
evidence. These include concerns that
public respect for the administration of justice will be diminished and public
safety put at
risk if those who commit serious crimes escape
conviction.[490]
New Zealand’s approach
- 7.15 The
integrity rationale is the primary basis for the balancing test adopted in
Shaheed and reflected in section
30.[491] Blanchard J, writing for
the majority in Shaheed,
explained:[492]
- Exclusion will
often be the only appropriate response where a serious breach has been committed
deliberately or in reckless disregard
of the accused’s rights or where the
police conduct in relation to that breach has been grossly careless. A system of
justice
which readily condones such conduct on the part of law enforcement
officers will not command the respect of the community. A guilty
verdict based
on evidence obtained in this manner may lack moral authority. Society’s
longer term interests will be better
served by ruling out such
evidence.
- 7.16 As noted
above, however, the majority also suggested the balancing test would address
concerns about the protection of rights
and deterrence of future
misconduct.[493]
- 7.17 The text of
section 30 is, on its face, consistent with this broad approach. Section
30(2)(b) emphasises “the need for
an effective and credible system of
justice”, while the factors set out to guide the balancing test include
(among other things)
the importance of the right breached and the nature of the
impropriety.[494] The courts have
made it clear that an effective and credible system of justice will not lightly
condone the reliance by police on
evidence obtained in abrogation of a
person’s rights.[495]
- 7.18 Section 30
does not adopt a strict exclusionary approach. Rather, it attempts to balance
the competing public interests in excluding
improperly obtained evidence (in
recognition of the seriousness of the impropriety) and in admitting it (to
ensure people suspected
of committing crimes are tried and, where appropriate,
convicted on the basis of all relevant evidence). Accordingly, section 30(2)(b)
requires the court to determine whether exclusion of the evidence is
“proportionate to the impropriety”. The factors
that may be taken
into account when undertaking that balancing test include considerations
pointing against exclusion such as the
seriousness of the offence and the nature
and quality of the evidence (section 30(3)).
- 7.19 New
Zealand’s balancing test may therefore be seen as an attempt to address a
variety of concerns, including maintaining
the integrity of the justice system,
protecting rights and deterring future improprieties while at the same time
recognising legitimate
public interest considerations that weigh in favour of
admitting improperly obtained
evidence.[496]
- 7.20 In some
cases, the Court of Appeal has rejected suggestions that particular evidence
should be excluded under section 30 for
deterrence purposes (or, to put it
another way, to provide incentives to avoid future
impropriety).[497] This may,
however, simply mean that such considerations should not be the sole determining
factor in the section 30 analysis. Other
cases have suggested that deterrence is
relevant under section 30.[498]
The latter approach seems to us to be correct. An effective and credible system
of justice is not one that permits repeated improprieties
by law enforcement
officers. To maintain the integrity of the justice system, it may be necessary
to provide organisational incentives
(through exclusion of evidence) to improve
practices, thereby reducing the risk of future improprieties. This approach was
recently
confirmed by the Court of
Appeal.[499]
- 7.21 For the
avoidance of doubt, we do not suggest section 30 should be used to punish law
enforcement officers involved in an impropriety.
That is a role better fulfilled
through the relevant disciplinary regime or separate proceedings, where
appropriate.
HOW IS SECTION 30 OPERATING IN PRACTICE?
A flexible approach to the balancing test
- 7.22 After
section 30 was enacted but before it came into force, the majority of the Court
of Appeal in R v Williams “attempted ... to lay down a structured
approach to the Shaheed test that should lead to more consistent
results”.[500] The majority
anticipated its approach would continue to be relevant under section
30.[501] The majority described
the Shaheed test as balancing the seriousness of the breach against
public interest factors favouring admission of the
evidence.[502] It separated the
various factors identified in Shaheed into factors relevant to the
seriousness of the breach (which were further separated into
aggravating[503] and mitigating
factors[504]) and factors relevant
to the public interest in admitting the
evidence.[505]
- 7.23 In its
first major decision on section 30, Hamed v
R,[506] te Kōti Mana Nui
| Supreme Court departed from this prescriptive approach to the balancing test,
appearing to favour a more
flexible approach to whether a factor supported
admission or exclusion in a particular
case.[507] Gault J acknowledged
this would lead to variable decisions, observing that “[a]ll of the
factors specified in s 30(3) call
for value judgments that may well depend
on inclinations of particular judges, as will the comparative weighting to be
accorded those
factors”.[508]
- 7.24 The Supreme
Court in Hamed was split on the admissibility of various types of
improperly obtained evidence in relation to different appellants, with
differently
constituted majorities determining the result in relation to each.
All of the disputed evidence was found to be admissible against
the defendants
charged with more serious
offending,[509] despite most
members of the Court acknowledging that police had committed serious
improprieties.[510]
- 7.25 Hamed
formed the foundation for the development of section 30 jurisprudence. Since
then, the courts have not attempted to provide a framework
for the application
of the balancing test or endorsed the approach set out in
Williams.[511] Perhaps
reflecting the uncertainty created by the balancing test, there are many appeals
relating to section 30[512] and
frequent split decisions in the appellate
courts.[513]
Application of section 30 in recent case law – a
snapshot case study
- 7.26 We
have not reviewed all section 30 cases given their large number, the limited
timeframe for this review and the potential lack
of utility in doing so since
the section 30 analysis is often
brief.[514] We have, however,
undertaken a snapshot case study, reviewing High Court, Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court decisions between 1 January
2019 and 31 December 2022 to gain a
general sense of how section 30 is being
applied.[515] The results of this
case study should be treated with some caution, as it does not present a full
picture of all section 30 cases
during the relevant period. In particular, many
te Kōti-ā-Rohe | District Court decisions are not included due to the
limitations
of the databases we searched.
- 7.27 The case
study identified 70 decisions in which evidence was found to be improperly
obtained.[516] The evidence was
admitted in 38 cases, admitted in part in two cases and excluded in 30 cases.
- 7.28 It appears
the courts are considerably more likely to exclude improperly obtained
defendants’ statements compared to other
evidence. Of the 17 decisions
relating to defendants’ statements, the evidence was only admitted in full
in three cases and
in part in one case. When the cases relating to
defendants’ statements are put to one aside, the remaining 54
cases[517] also present a
different picture. The evidence was admitted in full in 35 cases, admitted in
part in one case and excluded in 18
cases. This may suggest a general tendency
to admit improperly obtained physical evidence under section 30 but
to exclude defendants’ statements.
- 7.29 We analysed
the key factors relied on in each decision (to the extent this was evident) and
how those factors affected the outcome
(for example, whether they were treated
as favouring admission or exclusion of the evidence). Unsurprisingly, there was
significant
variation in how the different factors were weighted depending on
the facts of each case, but our analysis highlights some general
trends. Of the
40 cases in which improperly obtained evidence was admitted in full or in part,
the following factors were most often
relied on as favouring admission:
(a) The evidence was important to the prosecution
case[518] (29 cases);
(b) The offence was serious (24 cases);
(c) The impropriety was of low seriousness or in good faith (15 cases);
(d) There was urgency in obtaining the evidence (9 cases).
- 7.30 In the 30
cases where the evidence was excluded, the following factors were most often
relied on as favouring exclusion:
(a) There was a significant breach of an important right (27 cases);
(b) The impropriety was serious (19 cases);
(c) There were concerns about the reliability or probative value of the evidence
(7 cases); and
(d) Other investigatory techniques were available and not used (6 cases).
- 7.31 As noted
above, of those 30 cases in which evidence was excluded, 13 related to
improperly obtained defendants’ statements.
In most of those cases (11)
the breach was of the requirements in the Practice Note on Police Questioning.
The courts usually (in
11 cases) emphasised the importance of the rights
breached and the significance of the intrusion on them. Concerns about the
reliability
of the statement were identified in five cases, and in all those
cases the evidence was excluded.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
- 7.32 Below
we consider a range of issues with section 30 that relate to:
(a) the operation of the section 30 balancing test;
(b) the wording of the balancing test;
(c) the application of the factors in section 30(3); and
(d) the role of causation in determining whether evidence is improperly obtained
under section 30(5).
- 7.33 We set out
in the Appendix to this chapter a model provision that illustrates how some of
the options for reform discussed in
this chapter could be incorporated into
section 30. This model provision has been prepared to assist with consultation
on section
30 given the many different issues and options for reform discussed
in this chapter.
OPERATION OF THE BALANCING TEST
- 7.34 The
Minister of Justice’s letter referring this review to the Commission
suggested we may wish to consider “whether
the process for determining
whether improperly obtained evidence is admissible in criminal proceedings
(s.30) gives sufficient weight
to the
impropriety”.[519]
- 7.35 Preliminary
feedback we received identified concern that the balancing test, as applied by
the courts, may:
(a) mean that decisions about whether to exclude improperly obtained evidence
are too unpredictable and inconsistent; and/or
(b) unduly favour admission of improperly obtained evidence.
- 7.36 Commentators
have also critiqued the balancing test (and the lack of judicial guidance on its
application) as leading to inconsistency
and
unpredictability.[520]
- 7.37 These
concerns are long-standing. The Commission observed criticisms of the balancing
test in its 2013 Review of the
Act.[521] It considered that
“[t]he evaluative nature of the s 30 balancing process means that
different judges may come to different
conclusions on the same
evidence”.[522] The
Commission declined to recommend any significant amendments to section 30 at
that point, predicting that further general principles
would emerge over time to
assist the courts with the balancing
exercise.[523]
- 7.38 The
Commission’s Second Review of the Act again identified uncertainty around
the application of section
30.[524] The Commission ultimately
did not recommend any amendment but suggested there “may be merit in
conducting a broader review
of the policy underlying section 30, in response to
concerns expressed by submitters that the section is skewed too heavily in
favour
of admitting improperly obtained
evidence”.[525]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 7.39 We
seek submissions on whether the balancing test is operating appropriately and
whether it should be retained. In determining
whether reform is necessary or
desirable, we will consider whether the section 30 balancing test adequately
fulfils the purposes
of the Act. These include providing rules of evidence that
recognise the importance of the rights affirmed by
NZBORA[526] and promoting fairness
to parties and witnesses.[527]
- 7.40 Our
analysis of recent case law (discussed above) suggests section 30 decisions more
often lead to admission of improperly obtained
evidence, particularly where
physical evidence is involved (as opposed to defendants’ statements). The
importance of the evidence
to the prosecution case and the seriousness of the
offence are often treated as significant - and sometimes determinative -
factors.
- 7.41 This does
not necessarily mean the section 30 test is resulting in unfair outcomes or
giving inadequate recognition to NZBORA
rights. Ultimately it is a question of
policy whether the section 30 test appropriately balances the various public
interest considerations
at play. More fundamentally, we acknowledge submitters
will hold different views on whether it is appropriate to balance these
interests
at all.
- 7.42 We
question, however, whether the current application of section 30 is inconsistent
with Shaheed (and hence with the original policy intent of section 30).
While the majority in Shaheed clearly anticipated some rebalancing, they
also indicated that the new balancing test should not lead, in most cases, to
results
different from those reached under the earlier prima facie exclusionary
rule.[528] Although a breach of
rights might be “outweighed by the accumulation of other
factors”,[529] the public
interest in convicting those guilty of serious crimes would “not normally
outweigh an egregious breach of
rights”.[530]
- 7.43 We also
note, that despite the Commission’s predictions in the 2013 Review, case
law has not provided significant additional
clarity on the application of
section 30 in the intervening years. The appellate courts have generally avoided
giving specific guidance.
Some judgments explicitly acknowledge that the
balancing test means different judges may reach different conclusions on the
same
facts. While some uncertainty is implicit in any balancing test, we
question whether the current approach to section 30 is unpredictable
to an
unnecessary degree. It is a rule of law principle that the law be consistently
applied, with like cases being treated
alike.[531]
- 7.44 To some
extent, it may be possible to address concerns about inconsistent
decision-making and (to a lesser degree) insufficient
weight being given to
improprieties while retaining the overarching balancing test in its current
form. Later in this chapter, we
discuss options for reform to help clarify the
effect of the test and the application of the section 30(3) factors. If the
balancing
test is thought to be operating inconsistently or unfairly, these
reforms may be considered adequate to address that.
- 7.45 We are,
however, interested in views on whether the current balancing test, which places
no onus on the prosecution to establish
the case for admission of the evidence,
is flawed. There is an argument that it gives no guidance to judges on what to
do if they
are unsure[532] and
accords insufficient weight to a finding of impropriety. It may be considered
inconsistent with the view expressed by the Court
in Shaheed that, as a
starting point, a breach of a constitutional right should be given significant
weight.[533] Arguably, once a
finding of impropriety has been made, the prosecution should be required to
satisfy the court that it is appropriate
to admit the evidence. Otherwise, the
courts may be seen as endorsing an “ends justifies the means”
approach. This may
have a detrimental effect on public confidence in the justice
system and increase the likelihood of future improprieties.
Option for reform
- 7.46 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, an alternative approach would be to
provide that, although section 30 involves
a balancing exercise, the onus is on
the prosecution to satisfy the judge that the public interest favours admission
of the evidence.
For example, section 30 could require the judge to exclude
improperly obtained evidence unless satisfied that the public interest
in
admitting the evidence outweighs the public interest in exclusion. The
model provision set out in the Appendix to this chapter illustrates how this
could be implemented.
- 7.47 Placing an
onus on the prosecution could encourage the courts to give “appropriate
and significant weight” to the
impropriety, as Shaheed
envisaged.[534] It could also,
to some extent, promote greater consistency in the application of the balancing
test by providing a common starting
point for judges and emphasising the need
for clear justification to admit improperly obtained evidence.
- 7.48 Our
preliminary view is that an amendment of this kind would not mean a return to
the pre-Shaheed prima facie exclusionary rule. Blanchard J in Shaheed
explained the majority’s concerns about the prima facie rule in this
way:
- ... in practice
the exclusion of evidence has followed almost automatically once it
has been established that there has been a breach
which is more than trivial and
that there is a sufficient connection between that breach and the availability
of the challenged evidence.
The use of the terminology of
“rule”, “prima facie” and “exceptions” (to
the rule) has often
led, in our opinion, to a relatively narrow and almost
mechanical approach by Judges, without going through a balancing of the relevant
considerations, once they have determined that a breach of a right has occurred
which was more than trivial and that the circumstances
did not demand urgency.
There has been a tendency to go no further than looking for a category of
exception to the “rule”,
rather than seeking to ascertain whether
exclusion of the evidence would be a truly proportionate response to
the breach.
- 7.49 The courts
are now used to a much more flexible approach and to accommodating a broad range
of factors in deciding whether to
admit improperly obtained evidence. Under our
option for reform, the list of relevant factors set out in section 30(3) would
continue
to apply (potentially with some amendments, as we discuss below). As is
currently the case, the court would weigh these factors against
each other and
assess the overall public interest. Further, after two decades of relevant case
law, the courts would have more guidance
on when it might be appropriate to
admit improperly obtained evidence than was the case pre-Shaheed.
- 7.50 For these
reasons, we think it is unlikely that adopting such an onus would result in a
return to the rigidity of the prima facie
exclusionary rule. We also doubt it
would lead to the pre-Shaheed problem (discussed above) of judges
compensating for the rigidity of the exclusionary rule by introducing
variability into the meaning
of “unreasonable” search and seizure.
Provided any reform retains sufficient flexibility for judges to admit evidence
where the public interest requires it, there is no reason that should eventuate.
- 7.51 Australian
legislation places an onus on the prosecution very similar to the one in our
option for reform.[535] It
provides that improperly obtained evidence “is not to be admitted unless
the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs
the undesirability of
admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was
obtained”.[536] In Victoria,
this approach is used to determine the admissibility of evidence obtained in
breach of the Victorian Charter of Human
Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.[537] Placing an onus on
the prosecution reflected a change from the common law approach of discretionary
exclusion.[538] The Australian Law
Reform Commission justified it on the basis
that:[539]
- After all, the
evidence has been procured in breach of the law or some established standard of
conduct. Those who infringe the law
should be required to justify their actions
and thus bear the onus of persuading the judge not to exclude the evidence so
obtained.
- 7.52 The
introduction of an onus on the prosecution does not appear to have tipped the
balance significantly in favour of exclusion
in Australia. Indeed, a 2001 study
found that improperly obtained evidence continued to be admitted in most
cases.[540] The Australian Law
Reform Commissions considered section 138 in 2005 and recommended no changes,
noting their view that “the
onus of proof in s 138 helps to provide an
appropriate balance between the public interest in crime control and the rights
of accused
persons”.[541]
Only one submitter was recorded as suggesting a change to the
onus.[542]
- 7.53 If
anything, the Australian experience might therefore cause us to question whether
shifting the onus in the manner discussed
above would make any difference in
practice. We are, however, interested in submitters’ views on whether, in
New Zealand’s
rather different constitutional context, it may result in a
modest re-balancing of the current approach.
QUESTIONS
Q16
The other main argument against placing an onus on the prosecution is that it
would accord less weight to the public interest in
the investigation and
prosecution of crime. This interest would still be considered, but it would need
to be shown to outweigh the countervailing public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the impropriety for the evidence to be admitted. It may be
thought
that this would result in too much evidence being excluded and crimes
going unpunished.
Is the section 30 balancing test operating in a
manner that:
- usually
leads to admission of improperly obtained evidence?
- results
in inconsistent or unpredictable judicial decision-making?
- gives
greater weight to some of the s 30(3) factors than others?
If so, is
this problematic?
Q17
Should the section 30 test be amended to place an onus on the prosecution to
satisfy the judge that the public interest favours admission
of the evidence
(for example, by requiring exclusion of improperly obtained evidence unless the
public interest in its admission
outweighs the public interest in its
exclusion)?
WORDING OF THE BALANCING TEST
- 7.55 When
section 30 was enacted, section 30(2)(b) originally required a balancing process
that “gives appropriate weight to
the impropriety but takes proper
account of the need for an effective and credible system of justice”
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Hamed noted that the use of the
word “but” seemed to suggest - incorrectly - that an effective and
credible system of justice
was a counterpoint to the impropriety that pointed
towards admissibility.[543] The
Commission in its 2013 Review agreed this was a drafting
issue.[544] Following its
recommendation, section 30(2)(b) was amended to change the word
“but” to “and”. This was intended
to clarify that the
need for an effective and credible system of justice is not a
counterbalance to the impropriety and may favour exclusion or admission of
improperly obtained evidence depending on the circumstances.
- 7.56 Some
commentators, however, have suggested the wording of the test remains unclear:
(a) Associate Professor Scott Optican points out that the judgments in Hamed
do not indicate when an effective and credible system of justice favours
exclusion of the evidence and when it favours
admission.[545]
(b) Tania Singh suggests that, despite the amendment, section 30(2)(b) still
gives the impression that the impropriety is being weighed
against an
effective and credible system of justice, with the result that the need for an
effective and credible system of justice is often
equated with the need to
preserve the public interest in
prosecution.[546]
(c) Bernard Robertson states “it would be better to spell out what the aim
is, rather than use general and allusive
language”.[547]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 7.57 We
agree with the observations in Hamed that an effective and credible
system of justice encompasses
both:[548]
(a) the public interest in bringing offenders to justice; and
(b) the public interest in ensuring that the justice system does not condone
improprieties in gathering evidence and gives substantive
effect to human rights
and the rule of law.
- 7.58 The
reference in section 30(2)(b) to a balancing test that takes proper
account of both the impropriety and the need for an effective and
credible system of justice may still imply (despite the amendment) that these
are the two considerations
being “balanced” against each other. That
is not the legislative intention. The reference to an effective and credible
system of justice instead reflects the underlying rationale identified in
Shaheed for the test as a whole. The “balancing” is
rather between the public interest factors that favour excluding the evidence
and those that favour
admitting it, including those set out in section
30(3).
- 7.59 We seek
submissions on the desirability of amending section 30(2)(b) to clarify this
point. The alternative view might be that
there is now clear appellate authority
on the meaning of an effective and credible system of
justice.[549] There is a risk that
attempting to further refine the wording of the balancing test would create more
uncertainty than it would solve.
Option for reform
- 7.60 If
reform is considered desirable, one option would be to amend section 30(2)(b) to
provide that the judge must:
- ... determine
whether exclusion is proportionate to the impropriety by balancing the public
interest in recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety against the public
interest in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder at
trial.
- 7.61 Similar
wording could be adopted alongside an onus on the prosecution to establish the
case for admitting the evidence (the option
explored above). For example,
section 30(2) could require the judge to exclude the evidence unless satisfied
that the public interest
in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder at
trial outweighs the public interest in recognising the seriousness of the
impropriety.
- 7.62 Our
proposed wording draws on Williams to identify the two public interests
that are being balanced in section 30
as:[550]
(a) the public interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety;
and
(b) the public interest in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder at
trial.
- 7.63 We think
framing the first public interest in terms of “the seriousness of the
impropriety” is consistent with the
various rationales for exclusion
discussed earlier in this chapter and contemplated by Shaheed. The public
interest may require exclusion of evidence obtained through serious
improprieties to give proper recognition to any rights
infringed, to maintain
the integrity of the justice system by rejecting the use of improper methods to
obtain evidence and/or to
discourage the use of such methods in future.
- 7.64 The
language of “impropriety” is consistent with the current drafting of
section 30 (which already uses the word
on six occasions). The factors
relevant to an assessment of the seriousness of the impropriety are discussed in
further detail in
the next section but would include the importance of the right
breached, the extent of the breach, whether the impropriety was deliberate,
reckless or in bad faith, the availability of other investigatory techniques and
any urgency in obtaining the evidence.
- 7.65 On the
other side of the equation, the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial reflects
the concern that excluding
improperly obtained evidence may allow those who commit crimes to escape
conviction. This, in turn, may
diminish respect for the administration of
justice and put public safety at risk. Factors affecting this public interest
are, again,
discussed in the next section but would include the seriousness of
the offence and the nature and quality of the evidence.
- 7.66 The
formulations we have set out above seek to encapsulate with some specificity the
competing public interests at stake. Our
preliminary view is that this is
desirable because it would give trial judges a better sense of the nature of the
assessment that
is required of them. The alternative view might be that there is
a danger this approach may turn out to be unduly restrictive and
may fail to
capture all of the relevant public interests. We invite feedback on whether
other public interest concerns may be relevant
for which the approach we set out
above would not provide.
- 7.67 An
alternative approach that might meet this concern would be simply to refer to
“the public interest in exclusion of the
evidence” and “the
public interest in the admission of the evidence”. This would be similar
to Australian legislation,
which refers to whether the desirability of admitting
the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting the evidence, but would
offer less guidance to trial judges as to the nature of the public interest
concerns.[551]
- 7.68 We note
that neither formulation set out above refers to the need for an effective and
credible system of justice. While that
phrase captures the primary rationale for
the exclusion of evidence identified in Shaheed, we received preliminary
feedback that its inclusion in section 30(2)(b) is unhelpful. It is unclear how
it should influence the
balancing exercise.
QUESTIONS
Q18
One view might be that there is nevertheless a risk that removing the reference
to the need for an effective and credible system
of justice would create
confusion about the purpose of the section. An alternative approach would be to
insert a separate subsection
stating that the purpose of section 30 is to
maintain an effective and credible system of justice. That approach would affirm
that
the need for an effective and credible system of justice remains a guiding
principle underlying the statutory test.
Should
section 30(2)(b) be amended to clarify what is being “balanced”
against what? If so, should section 30(2)(b) provide
that the judge must
determine whether exclusion is proportionate to the impropriety by balancing the
public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the impropriety against the
public interest in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial
(or
similar if an onus is placed on the prosecution to establish the case for
admitting the evidence)?
Q19
Should the current reference in section 30(2)(b) to the need for an effective
and credible system of justice be removed? If so, should
section 30 be amended
to introduce a new subsection stating that the purpose of the section is to
maintain an effective and credible
system of justice?
APPLICATION OF THE SECTION 30(3) FACTORS IN THE BALANCING
TEST
- 7.70 As
mentioned, section 30(3) contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be
taken into account in undertaking the balancing
exercise. In this section, we
first discuss the general approach to section 30(3) and whether it should
provide greater clarity as
to the relevance of the different factors. We then go
on to address each section 30(3) factor in turn to identify any particular
issues with the factor and to discuss how the factor should influence the
balancing test. Some of the options for reform discussed
below are reflected in
the model provision in the Appendix to this chapter.
General approach to section 30(3)
- 7.71 In
its Second Review, the Commission considered whether the application of the
section 30(3) factors should be clarified but
decided against
amendment.[552] This was primarily
on the basis that some uncertainty is implicit in the balancing test and the
Commission did not wish to limit
the ability of the courts to take a
fact-specific approach.
- 7.72 Subsequent
case law, however, suggests the application of some factors is less settled than
the Commission understood to be the
case at that time. As we discuss below,
there remains significant confusion over the relevance of certain factors and
inconsistency
in how they are applied.
- 7.73 Currently,
each factor is worded in an open way that does not indicate whether it favours
admission or exclusion or whether the
absence of a factor is relevant. We
invite submissions on whether section 30(3) should be amended to clarify where
each factor fits in the
balancing exercise. This could help to ensure the
factors are applied in a principled and consistent way, making the application
of section 30 more predictable. On the other hand, it would reduce the
flexibility of the provision and may constrain the ability
of the courts to have
regard to the particular facts before them.
Option for reform
- 7.74 If
clarification is considered desirable, different approaches may be appropriate
depending on whether other changes (investigated
above) are made to the section
30 balancing test. If the option for reform discussed in relation to section
30(2)(b) above is adopted,
section 30(3) could be amended to list which
factors are relevant to the public interest in recognising the seriousness of
the impropriety
and which are relevant to the public interest in having the
evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial.
- 7.75 A further
option would be to separate the factors relevant to the first public interest
(in recognising the seriousness of the
impropriety) into factors that may
increase or reduce this interest. This draws on the approach taken by the Court
of Appeal in Williams of identifying aggravating and mitigating factors.
It would clarify that not all of the factors relevant to that first public
interest
favour exclusion of the evidence. Specifically, the factors in section
30(3)(g) and (h) (apprehended physical danger and urgency)
would reduce
the seriousness of the impropriety, making it more likely the evidence would
be admitted.
- 7.76 We
question, however, whether this further reform option is necessary as it is
likely to be clear to judges from the nature of
sections 30(3)(g) and (h) that
they do not support exclusion. Further, we are concerned that it would create
additional complexity
and result in unnecessary artificiality in what is
ultimately a fact-dependent evaluative exercise. For example, it may be
appropriate
for some factors (such as the nature and quality of the evidence) to
either increase or reduce the relevant public interest depending
on the
circumstances. We therefore do not consider this option further in this Issues
Paper, although we welcome submissions on it.
- 7.77 If the
wording of section 30(2)(b) remains in its current form but it is considered
desirable to clarify the relevance of the
factors, section 30(3) could be
amended to specify which factors may favour admission of the evidence and which
factors may favour
exclusion. We think this option may be harder to achieve,
however, as the extent to which (if at all) a particular factor supports
or
reduces the case for admission/exclusion on the particular facts is an
evaluative one.
- 7.78 Any of
these options for reform would require resolution of some outstanding questions
about how particular factors should affect
the balancing test. We discuss these
issues further below.
QUESTION
Q20
We do not suggest making the list of factors exhaustive. While that would
promote greater consistency and avoid reliance on inappropriate
considerations,
it may also be unduly restrictive. Our review of case law suggests the courts
refer mainly to the factors identified
in section 30(3) but that other factors
are treated as relevant on occasion. The courts have considered, for example,
the fact that
there was a limited causative relationship between the breach and
the obtaining of the evidence[553]
and the fact that the evidence would only be used in rebuttal if
required.[554] Attempting to
specify every potentially relevant factor may result in unintended gaps.
Should section 30(3) be amended to clarify the relevance of each factor? If
so, how should this be done? For example, should section
30(3) be amended to
specify:
- which
factors are relevant to the public interest in recognising the seriousness of
the impropriety and which are relevant to the
public interest in having the
evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial; or
- which
factors may favour admission of the evidence and which factors may favour
exclusion of the evidence?
The importance of any right breached and the seriousness of
the intrusion on it
- 7.80 Section
30(3)(a) refers to the “the importance of any right breached by the
impropriety and the seriousness of the intrusion
on it”. It is arguably
unclear from that wording whether the importance of any statutory requirements,
rules of law or other
procedural protections breached, and the extent of that
breach, can be considered if they do not amount to a breach of rights under
NZBORA. By “procedural protections” we refer to non-statutory
guidelines such as the Chief Justice’s Practice Note
on Police
Questioning.
- 7.81 This
factor, like the others in section 30(3), was adopted from Shaheed,
which addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of NZBORA.
However, section 30 is not only concerned with breaches
of “rights”
in this narrow sense. It also applies to evidence obtained in breach of
enactments or rules of law aside
from NZBORA (although sometimes such breaches
will also result in NZBORA
breaches[555]) or obtained
unfairly (including through breaches of the Practice Note on Police
Questioning).
- 7.82 We consider
the importance of any enactment, rule of law or procedural protection breached,
and the extent of that breach, are
relevant considerations whether or not NZBORA
rights are engaged. These factors always need to be evaluated and weighed, even
if
it is to conclude the rule of law at issue in the particular case is one to
which the courts attach comparatively less significance.
- 7.83 The courts
have recognised that any breach of NZBORA will make exclusion more
likely.[556] We do not disagree
with that approach. In our view, however, it is also open to the courts to
attach particular importance to other
relevant rules of law where appropriate.
For example, the Practice Note on Police Questioning provides important
procedural protections
during interrogations, some of which are long standing
and arguably of constitutional significance. The fact that police questioning
has been conducted in breach of those protections is significant, regardless of
whether there is also a breach of an NZBORA
right.[557]
- 7.84 In
practice, the courts have considered the importance of the protections in the
Practice Note on Police Questioning and the
extent to which they were breached
under section 30(3)(a).[558]
Amendment may therefore be considered unnecessary. However, the approach of the
courts is not necessarily reflected in the wording
of section 30(3)(a) (which
refers to “any right”). It may be desirable to clarify the position
for the avoidance of doubt,
particularly if other changes to section 30(3) are
progressed.
- 7.85 Finally, we
note that section 30(3)(a) refers both to the “the importance of any right
breached by the impropriety”
and “the seriousness of the intrusion
on it”. These are distinct considerations. For example, in NZBORA cases,
the courts
will often state that the right that has been breached is an
important one. That does not detract from the fact that, even in NZBORA
cases,
the seriousness of the particular intrusion can vary widely from case to case
(consider, for example, the difference between
a strip search and a perimeter
search of a farm property). This distinction between the importance of the right
and the seriousness
of the intrusion would also apply in cases involving
breaches of other (non-NZBORA) statutory requirements, rules or law or
procedural
protections.
Option for reform
- 7.86 If
reform is considered desirable, section 30(3)(a) could be amended to refer to
the importance of any right, statutory requirement,
rule of law or procedural
protection breached and the extent of that breach. “Procedural
protection” would include the
requirements of the Practice Note on Police
Questioning.
- 7.87 If section
30(3) is amended to specify which public interest each factor is relevant to
(or, alternatively, whether particular
factors may favour admission or
exclusion), this factor could be listed as relevant to the public interest in
recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety (or as a factor that may favour
exclusion of the evidence). We would expect this factor to be applied in an
evaluative
way, for example, if a breach was minor or technical it may be given
reduced weight, meaning the public interest in exclusion is
assessed as lower
overall.
QUESTIONS
Q21
Should section 30(3)(a) be amended to refer to the importance of any right,
statutory requirement, rule of law or procedural protection
breached and the
extent of that breach?
Q22
Should section 30(3)(a) be listed as relevant to the public interest in
recognising the seriousness of the impropriety (or as a factor
that may favour
exclusion of the evidence)?
Nature of the impropriety
- 7.88 Section
30(3)(b) refers to “the nature of the impropriety, in particular, whether
it was deliberate, reckless, or done
in bad faith”. We have identified
three possible issues with this factor and seek submissions on whether amendment
is necessary
or desirable to address them. The first two issues relate to the
wording of section 30(3)(b). The third is whether the relevance
of good faith or
inadvertence should be clarified. We invite submissions on whether these issues
are causing confusion or problems
in practice.
Wording of section 30(3)(b)
- 7.89 The
first potential issue is that the phrase at the start of section 30(3)(b) -
“the nature of the impropriety” -
may cause confusion. As discussed
above, the public interest in recognising the “seriousness of the
impropriety” may
be viewed as one side of the balancing equation, with
many of the factors currently set out in section 30(3) being relevant to that
assessment. Given the similarity in language, it is arguably unclear how an
inquiry into “the nature of the impropriety”
might differ from this
overarching public interest assessment.
- 7.90 While the
phrase “nature of the impropriety” in section 30(3)(b) is wide, the
examples given in the second part of
the paragraph suggest it has a narrower on
the knowledge and intent of the people or agency that acted improperly - in
particular,
whether their conduct was deliberate, reckless or in bad faith. This
is how case law on section 30 generally approaches the factor.
It is not clear
what other types of considerations section 30(3)(b) would capture that are not
already captured elsewhere.
- 7.91 The second
potential issue is that, according to some of the preliminary feedback we
received, the courts may be reluctant to
make findings that law enforcement
officers acted in bad faith, and this, in turn, may mean section 30(3)(b) is
given insufficient
weight. We invite feedback on whether this is the case. Our
snapshot case study did not identify any findings of bad faith. That
is not
necessarily surprising - it may simply reflect that intentional misconduct in
the obtaining of evidence is relatively rare.
If, however, there is a widespread
concern that bad faith is rarely engaged, reframing the section 30(3)(b) factor
to remove that
language and shift the focus to the knowledge of the person or
agency obtaining the evidence may assist. It may help to emphasise
that
knowingly acting improperly is always a serious matter and should be given
significant weight in the balancing test.
Option for reform
- 7.92 If
reform is considered desirable to address these issues, an option would be to
amend section 30(3)(b) to refer to “the
extent to which the investigatory
techniques used were known, or ought to have been known, to be improper”.
This would remove
the potentially confusing or problematic references to
“the nature of the impropriety” and “bad faith”, instead
directing attention to the knowledge of the people or agency obtaining the
evidence.
- 7.93 This
wording could include conduct that is deliberate or reckless, as well as
capturing carelessness and negligence (which are
not currently mentioned). Our
preliminary view is that carelessness or negligence may also favour exclusion,
if to a lesser degree.
This conclusion is supported by case law on section 30,
which regularly refers to carelessness and negligence as favouring
exclusion.[559] There is arguably
a public interest in ensuring that carelessness or negligence in obtaining
evidence is not condoned by the criminal
justice system. Exclusion in such cases
could also encourage training and procedural changes to prevent future breaches
of a similar
kind.
Relevance of good faith or inadvertence
- 7.94 Case
law suggests there is uncertainty about whether and how the courts should have
regard to the fact that an impropriety occurred
in good faith or was
inadvertent. In both Shaheed and Williams, the Court of Appeal
indicated that good faith will usually be a neutral factor because “the
good faith of law enforcement
agencies is to be expected at all times and is not
something which, if present, should then add weight to argument for the
admissibility
of
evidence”.[560] This
approach has been confirmed more recently by the Court of
Appeal.[561] Notwithstanding this,
some recent section 30 decisions, including in the Court of Appeal, treat good
faith on the part of police
(or the absence of bad faith) as favouring admission
of the evidence.[562]
- 7.95 We are
interested in views on whether the approach in Shaheed and
Williams is correct. One view is that the public is entitled to assume
that law enforcement officers will not deliberately breach the law
or act
unfairly. Good faith or inadvertence is simply the absence of an aggravating
factor (which will affect the overall assessment
of the seriousness of the
impropriety). On this view, treating good faith or inadvertence as positively
favouring admission could
be seen as undermining the rule of law (by signalling
that strict compliance by law enforcement officers is not required) and failing
to deter future improprieties (by suggesting to law enforcement agencies that
they do not need to improve their processes or educate
officers about their
responsibilities).
- 7.96 On the
other hand, it is possible that variance in the case law on this point simply
reflects the different factual scenarios
at issue. There is a risk that
legislative reform may reduce the flexibility of the courts to respond to the
facts before them.
Option for reform
QUESTIONS
Q23
If section 30(3) is amended to specify which public interest each factor is
relevant to (or, alternatively, whether particular factors
may favour admission
or exclusion), this factor could be listed as relevant to the public interest in
recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety (or as a factor that may favour
exclusion of the evidence).
Should section 30(3)(b) be amended to refer to “the extent to which the
investigatory techniques used were known, or ought to
have been known, to be
improper”?
Q24
Should section 30(3)(b) be listed as relevant to the public interest in
recognising the seriousness of the impropriety (or as a factor
that may favour
exclusion of the evidence)?
Nature and quality of the evidence
- 7.98 Section
30(3)(c) refers to “the nature and quality of the improperly obtained
evidence”. We are interested in views
on whether case law is placing too
much weight on the centrality of the evidence to the prosecution case when
considering this factor
at the expense of a proper consideration of the
probative value of the evidence.
- 7.99 The history
of the balancing test indicates this factor was intended to focus on the
probative value of the evidence, including
its
reliability.[563] The reasoning
was that, if the evidence is highly probative and reliable, there is a greater
public interest in having it considered
at
trial.[564] For example, physical
evidence is less likely to be tainted by impropriety than defendants’
statements, so its reliability
is often not in
issue.[565]
- 7.100 In
Shaheed, the Court had also indicated that the centrality of the evidence
to the prosecution case was a relevant
factor.[566] When the Evidence
Bill was introduced, section 30(3)(c) originally included the words “in
particular whether it is central
to the case of the prosecution”. However,
these words were deleted on the recommendation of the select
committee.[567] The select
committee found it difficult to envisage a circumstance where that would be a
relevant factor since the seriousness of
the offence was already listed as a
separate factor.[568] Nandor
Tanczos MP, one of the members of the committee, explained that the factor was
removed because:[569]
- ...the fact
that the prosecution relies on that evidence to get the conviction makes it even
more important that we exclude it, otherwise
we create this enormous temptation
for the investigating agencies to deliberately breach rights because that is the
only evidence
they will get.
- 7.101 Notwithstanding
this, two members of the Supreme Court in Hamed considered that the
importance of the evidence to the prosecution case could be taken into account
under section 30 (in the context
of discussing the nature and quality of the
evidence).[570]
- 7.102 In its
Second Review, the Commission said the centrality of the evidence to the
prosecution case is best understood as a separate
factor, as the “nature
and quality of the evidence” is primarily aimed at its
reliability.[571] The Commission
did not recommend specifically referring to the centrality of the evidence in
section 30(3) as this would risk over-emphasising
its
importance.[572]
- 7.103 Since
then, some cases have continued to equate section 30(3)(c) with the centrality
of the evidence to the prosecution case
and treat this as a significant, if not
determinative, factor.[573] In our
snapshot case study, the centrality of the evidence was the single most often
relied on factor in admitting improperly obtained
evidence (cited in 29 out of
40 cases), despite not being identified as a factor in section 30(3). While
specific concerns about
reliability were taken into account where relevant,
usually in cases involving defendants’ statements, the probative value
of
the evidence was rarely referred to as favouring admission (although the
tendency of the courts to admit physical evidence far
more often than confession
evidence suggests it may possibly be an unstated factor in some cases).
- 7.104 The
current wording of section 30(3)(c) is arguably ambiguous. The “nature and
quality of the evidence” can be interpreted
as including its importance to
the prosecution case (as, indeed, the courts have found) notwithstanding the
amendment to the Evidence
Bill. We are interested in views on whether it would
be preferable for the courts to focus on the probative value of the evidence,
including its reliability. Emphasising the centrality of the evidence to the
prosecution case may be considered undesirable because:
(a) Frequent admission of evidence on the basis that it is central to the
prosecution case could encourage recklessness or laxity
on the part of Police or
other investigating agencies attempting to obtain evidence in situations where
they have little other evidence
against a suspect. It may be seen as condoning
an “ends justifies the means” approach.
(b) If the evidence is of relatively low probative value or questionable
reliability, it may be inappropriate to treat its centrality
to the prosecution
case as favouring its admission. It may therefore be preferable in the usual
course to focus on the probative
value of the particular evidence in question
and its tendency to establish guilt.
(c) Evidence that is highly probative will often be central to the prosecution
case. If the probative value of the evidence is considered
as favouring its
admission (consistent with the intent behind section 30(3)(c)), then also
factoring in its centrality to the prosecution
case may mean the significance of
the evidence is given too much weight overall.
Option for reform
- 7.105 If
reform is considered desirable, section 30(3)(c) could be amended to refer to
the “probative value of the evidence,
including its reliability”
rather than “the nature and quality of the evidence”. This may help
to focus attention
on probative value rather than the centrality of the evidence
to the prosecution case. We invite feedback on whether this wording
would
encompass all aspects of the nature and quality of the evidence that the courts
ought to consider.
- 7.106 If section
30(3) is amended to specify which public interest each factor is relevant to
(or, alternatively, whether particular
factors may favour admission or
exclusion), this factor could be listed as relevant to the public interest in
having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial (or as a factor that
may favour admission of the
evidence).[574] This is in line
with the approach in Williams.
QUESTIONS
Q25
Should section 30(3)(c) be amended to refer to the “probative value of
the evidence, including its reliability” rather
than “the nature and
quality of the evidence”?
Q26
Should section 30(3)(c) be listed as a factor relevant to the public interest
in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder
at trial (or as a factor
that may favour admission of the evidence)?
Seriousness of the offence
- 7.107 Section
30(3)(d) refers to “the seriousness of the offence with which the
defendant is charged”. Case law discloses
some uncertainty about how the
seriousness of the offence is to be weighed, particularly where the reliability
of the evidence is
in question.
- 7.108 In
Hamed, two of the Judges suggested the seriousness of the offence could
favour admission or exclusion of the evidence depending on the
context.[575] The Commission noted
in its Second Review that there had been confusion about how the seriousness of
an offence was to be measured
and whether it favours admission or
exclusion.[576] The Commission
considered, however, that this uncertainty had been resolved by the Court of
Appeal’s decision in
Underwood.[577] In
Underwood, the Court said earlier suggestions that the seriousness of the
offence can “cut both ways” were misleading to the extent
they
suggested this factor can independently favour exclusion of the
evidence.[578] The Court said that
seriousness always favours admission, although it acknowledged that where
the offence is serious other factors favouring exclusion (such as the importance
of the right and the nature of the breach) may assume greater importance.
- 7.109 Case law
since 2016 indicates that Underwood may not have resolved matters. There
appears to be continued confusion over the significance of the seriousness of
the offence, in
particular where the reliability of the evidence is in
question.[579] Two Court of Appeal
cases decided in 2018 both involved breaches of the Practice Note on Police
Questioning giving rise to reliability
concerns. In one case, the seriousness of
the offence was treated as favouring admission of the evidence (although this
was outweighed
by other
factors)[580] and in the other as
favouring exclusion.[581] Neither
case discussed the reasons for their respective approaches.
- 7.110 We
agree that, where the reliability of the evidence is in issue, that may
impact how the seriousness of the offence should be weighed. The
rationale for
considering the seriousness of the offence is that it increases the public
interest in having the evidence considered
at trial. If, however, the
reliability of the evidence is in question, there is less reason to believe that
its admission will (or
should) result in conviction, which reduces that public
interest. As well, reliability concerns may be particularly compelling in
cases
involving serious offending because of the gravity of the consequences for the
alleged offender.
- 7.111 Our
preliminary view, however, is that the seriousness of the offence should not be
treated as favouring exclusion of the evidence. All suspects are entitled
to the same rights and procedural protections irrespective of the seriousness of
the offence.[582] Instead, where
there are reliability concerns, it may be more appropriate to treat the
seriousness of the offence as a neutral factor
or to give it reduced weight
(depending on the extent of the reliability concerns). The reliability concerns
themselves may also
be given greater weight. We invite feedback on this
approach.
Option for reform
- 7.112 If
there is support for clarifying to which public interest each section 30(3)
factor is relevant (or, alternatively, whether
particular factors favour
admission or exclusion), the seriousness of the offence could be listed as
relevant to the public interest
in having the evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial (or as a factor that may favour admission of the evidence).
This would
indicate that the seriousness of the offence does not favour
exclusion of the evidence. However, where there are concerns about the
reliability of the evidence, it may still be appropriate to give the seriousness
of the offence less weight or no weight, meaning
that it will be more easily
outweighed by the seriousness of the impropriety.
QUESTION
Q27
Should section 30(3)(d) be listed as a factor relevant to the public interest
in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder
at trial (or as a factor
that may favour admission of the evidence)?
Other investigatory techniques
- 7.113 Section
30(3)(e) directs attention to “whether there were any other investigatory
techniques not involving any breach
of the rights that were known to be
available but were not used”. Both the availability of and the
absence of other investigatory techniques have been treated variously as
favouring admission or exclusion of the evidence, or
as a neutral
factor.[583] For example, the
majority of the Supreme Court in both Hamed and Chetty treated the
absence of other techniques as favouring admission of the
evidence,[584] while some Court of
Appeal and High Court cases have treated the availability of other
techniques as favouring
admission.[585]
- 7.114 In its
Second Review, the Commission indicated that the availability of other
investigatory techniques will usually favour exclusion
of the evidence,
explaining:[586]
- Where police
knew of a legitimate way to obtain the evidence and chose not to use it,
admitting the evidence may bring the justice
system into
disrepute.
- 7.115 On the
other hand, the Commission considered that the absence of other known
techniques will generally be a neutral
factor.[587] It would be
inappropriate to justify improper conduct on the basis that there was no
legitimate way to obtain the evidence. It would
also be inappropriate to treat
the absence of alternatives as favouring exclusion, since the “nature of
the impropriety”
(including whether it was deliberate) is already
considered as a separate factor.
- 7.116 The
Commission did not recommend amending section 30 to clarify how the availability
or absence of other techniques should be
taken into account. This was largely
because it considered that, while the availability of other techniques will
usually favour exclusion,
it may sometimes be a neutral factor. For example, the
Commission suggested that where the “urgency” factor applies,
this
may “effectively cancel out the availability of alternative
techniques”.[588]
- 7.117 Since the
Second Review, some cases have taken a different approach to the views expressed
by the Commission. Two High Court
decisions have treated the availability
of alternative techniques as favouring admission of the
evidence.[589] In addition, in a
2019 case the Court of Appeal treated the absence of other techniques as
favouring exclusion of the
evidence.[590] In that case, the
type of evidence involved was governed by a specific statutory regime that only
permitted it to be obtained by
consent. Admitting the evidence would therefore
have gone against the intent of the statutory regime. If accepted, this
reasoning arguably applies more broadly — for example, in relation
to warrantless searches not falling within the scope of the specific
statutory
powers in the Search and Surveillance Act
2012.[591]
- 7.118 We can see
some attraction to this reasoning. However, if both the availability and
absence of other investigatory techniques can be treated as favouring exclusion
of the evidence, the policy basis for this factor
and its appropriate
application in any given case arguably becomes unclear.
- 7.119 In light
of these recent decisions, we seek submissions on whether it is desirable to
clarify whether and how the availability
or absence of alternative techniques is
relevant to the balancing exercise or whether it is better to leave the issue to
be clarified
through the evolving case law.
Options for reform
- 7.120 If
reform is considered desirable, we have identified two possible approaches:
(a) Option 1: Repeal section 30(3)(e), leaving the deliberateness of the
impropriety to be considered under section 30(3)(b); or
(b) Option 2: Amend section 30(3) to clarify the relevance of other
investigatory techniques.
Option 1: Repeal section 30(3)(e)
- 7.121 The
concern underlying this factor appears to be that investigators should not
deliberately stray outside the bounds of their
lawful authority. Either lawful
alternatives are improperly disregarded, or there are no lawful alternatives and
police proceed anyway,
knowing they are acting unlawfully. If the impropriety is
inadvertent then neither of these
apply.[592]
- 7.122 One
approach would therefore be to remove this factor altogether and focus instead
on whether the conduct was deliberate under
section 30(3)(b). The extent of
investigators’ knowledge about the bounds of their lawful authority and
the other options available
to them would be relevant to that
assessment.[593] We are interested
in feedback on whether section 30(3)(b) would adequately address the concerns
section 30(3)(e) is aimed at.
Option 2: Clarify the relevance of other investigatory
techniques
- 7.123 Alternatively,
section 30 could be amended to clarify which public interest section 30(3)(e) is
relevant to (or, alternatively,
whether it favours admission or exclusion). As
to the known availability of other techniques, our preliminary view is
that, as the Commission said previously, this will be relevant to the public
interest
in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety and will generally
favour exclusion of the evidence. We invite feedback on this
approach.
- 7.124 It will
still be up to the court to decide on the weight and significance to attach to
this factor in the circumstances of the
case. In our view, though, the
availability of other techniques will generally be aggravating. It is likely to
be rare that the presence
of other factors such as urgency or physical danger
would justify treating the known availability of alternatives as neutral. These
factors may reduce the overall seriousness of the impropriety so that it is more
readily outweighed by the public interest in admitting
the evidence. But to also
treat the known availability of alternatives as neutral may allow those factors
to dominate the assessment
of the
impropriety.[594] It may still be
appropriate to treat the availability of alternatives as neutral in certain
circumstances such as where the breach
was inadvertent so the officers involved
could not have been expected to pursue alternatives. The permissive wording of
section 30(3)
would allow for this.
- 7.125 As to the
absence of known alternative techniques, our preliminary view remains
that this should not be treated as favouring admission of the evidence.
To do so
would be contrary to the rule of law as it would encourage conduct that is
outside the bounds of what Parliament has determined
to be proper investigatory
conduct. Where there is a lack of clarity about what the law is, that may be
taken into account when assessing
whether the impropriety was deliberate under
section 30(3)(b) (and therefore how serious it was). Ordinarily, the absence of
known
alternative techniques will be a neutral consideration. In some
situations, the absence of any known lawful means of obtaining the
evidence may
favour exclusion if it signifies a deliberate choice by Parliament that evidence
should not be obtained in the circumstances
at issue. Our preliminary view is
that section 30(3) does not need to provide for this expressly, as it could be
considered under
section 30(3)(b) when assessing whether the impropriety was
deliberate or as an “other matter”.
- 7.126 Finally,
we note that the section currently refers to other techniques “not
involving any breach of rights”. However,
as we have discussed in relation
to section 30(3)(a), section 30 is not limited to breaches of rights in the
narrow sense. Nor do
we see any reason to limit the application of this factor
to cases involving breaches of rights. Accordingly, if section 30(3)(e)
is
retained, it may be desirable to clarify that it applies to other investigatory
techniques not involving any
impropriety.
QUESTIONS
Q28
Should section 30(3)(e) be repealed, leaving knowledge about the extent of
lawful authority and other investigatory techniques to
be examined as part of
the section 30(3)(b) assessment of whether the impropriety was
deliberate?
Q29
If section 30(3)(e) is retained, should it be:
- listed
as relevant to the public interest in recognising the seriousness of the
impropriety (or as a factor that may favour exclusion
of the evidence);
and/or
- amended
to clarify that it applies to other techniques not involving any
impropriety (as opposed to any breach of rights)?
Alternative remedies
- 7.127 Section
30(3)(f) directs attention to “whether there are alternative remedies to
exclusion of the evidence that can adequately
provide redress to the
defendant”.
- 7.128 In
Shaheed, the majority acknowledged that this factor would rarely
be relevant because other remedies, such as a declaration that a right has
been
breached or a reference to the relevant oversight body, are unlikely to provide
vindication of the right
breached.[595] An award of
compensation or a reduction in sentence would likely lead to a “perception
that the police could now breach the
rules and still secure ... a
result”.[596] Given these
observations, it is unclear why the availability of alternative remedies was
included in section 30.[597]
- 7.129 The courts
have frequently reinforced the view expressed in Shaheed that there will
rarely be any effective alternatives to
exclusion.[598] Our snapshot case
study identified just two cases (out of 70) in which the availability of
alternative remedies was treated as
relevant.[599] However, because
the availability of alternative remedies is identified as a relevant factor in
section 30(3), the courts routinely
address it by stating that there is no
adequate alternative remedy available.
- 7.130 We also
note there is a lack of clarity about how the absence of alternative
remedies is relevant to the section 30 assessment. It is sometimes treated as a
neutral factor or irrelevant[600]
and sometimes as a factor favouring exclusion of the
evidence.[601]
Option for reform
- 7.131 We
invite submissions on whether it would be preferable to repeal section 30(3)(f)
to simplify the application of the balancing
test. In the rare case where an
appropriate alternative remedy might be available, it could still be considered
given the list in
section 30(3) is non-exhaustive. Repealing section 30(3)(f)
may also help to clarify that the absence of alternative remedies is not
normally a factor that requires consideration. Our preliminary view is that this
is properly treated
as a neutral factor.
- 7.132 If this
factor is retained and section 30(3) is amended to specify which public interest
each factor is relevant to (or, alternatively,
whether particular factors may
favour admission or exclusion), the availability of alternative remedies could
be listed as relevant
to the public interest in having the evidence considered
by the fact-finder at trial (or as a factor that may favour admission of
the
evidence). This may help to clarify that the absence of alternative
remedies is not generally relevant.
QUESTION
Q30
Should section 30(3)(f) be repealed?
QUESTION
Q31
If section 30(3)(f) is retained, should it be listed as relevant to the
public interest in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder
at trial
(or as a factor that may favour admission of the evidence)?
Risk to safety or urgency
- 7.133 Section
30(3)(g) refers to “whether the impropriety was necessary to avoid
apprehended physical danger to the Police or
others”. Section 30(3)(h)
permits consideration of whether there was any urgency in obtaining the
improperly obtained evidence.
The Court of Appeal in Shaheed and
Williams saw urgency as reducing the seriousness of the breach of
rights.[602]
- 7.134 Prior to
Shaheed, urgency was recognised as a possible exception to the general
rule that an unlawful search is “unreasonable” for the
purposes of
section 21 of NZBORA.[603]
The Court of Appeal in Williams found that should no longer be the
case.[604] The Court considered it
more appropriate to take urgency into account when determining the admissibility
of the evidence under the
balancing test.
- 7.135 Six years
after the Act was enacted, the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 came into force.
Under that Act, constables have express
warrantless powers to address urgent
situations and risks to the safety of any person. These include:
(a) warrantless powers of entry and search to avoid the loss of an offender or
evidential material;[605]
(b) powers to take any action necessary to avert a risk to the life or safety of
any person that requires an emergency response,
or to prevent offending likely
to cause injury to any person or serious damage to
property;[606]
(c) warrantless powers of search and seizure relating to possession of
arms.[607]
- 7.136 Since
2012, there have been examples in case law of urgency or risks to safety being
relied on as favouring admission of the
evidence even though the impropriety
involved a search or seizure outside the scope of the warrantless powers in the
Search and Surveillance
Act.[608]
- 7.137 It has
been argued that urgency and apprehended physical danger should no longer affect
the section 30 analysis as the relevant
warrantless powers should be relied on.
The authors of Mahoney on Evidence suggest the balancing exercise should
not be used to legitimise illegal police conduct that does not fit within the
boundaries explicitly
set by the
legislature.[609] Parliament has
provided specific powers to address urgent situations to the extent it
considered appropriate. If evidence has been
found to be improperly obtained,
Police (or another relevant agency) have acted outside those powers. If there
are gaps in those
powers, it may be more appropriate to address those through
amendments to the empowering provisions rather than through the section
30
balancing test.
- 7.138 The
contrary argument is that sections 30(3)(g) and (h) are necessary to ensure
urgency and risks to safety can be considered
in a range of situations. The
operation of section 30 is not limited to cases involving entry, search and
other powers set out in
the Search and Surveillance Act. It is possible that
urgency or danger to a person may, for example, be a factor in a police
interview
being conducted improperly. The warrantless powers in the Search and
Surveillance Act also do not apply to law enforcement agencies
other than Police
- although they often have extensive warrantless powers under separate
legislation (which are not limited to urgent
situations).[610] Finally,
sometimes a warrantless power would have been available in the circumstances but
the officers involved failed to identify
and invoke
it.[611] Such a failure may be
more understandable in high risk or urgent situations and less likely to signal
systemic issues that should
be addressed to prevent future breaches.
Options for reform
- 7.139 In
light of the above, we seek submissions on whether sections 30(3)(g) and (h)
should be retained or repealed. Because section
30(3) is non-exhaustive, if
these factors were repealed, urgency or physical danger could still be
considered in exceptional cases.
However, repealing the factors would indicate
that they are not ordinarily relevant to the balancing test.
- 7.140 We invite
feedback on whether there are likely to be situations where evidence is obtained
in urgent situations not adequately
covered by warrantless powers (including by
law enforcement agencies other than police).
- 7.141 If section
30(3) is amended to specify which public interest each factor is relevant to,
sections 30(3)(g) and (h) (if retained)
could be listed as relevant to the
public interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety. Unlike the
other factors on
this side of the balancing equation, we would see these factors
as reducing the seriousness of the impropriety and hence reducing the
public interest in exclusion of the evidence. Alternatively, if the factors
are
simply divided into those that may favour admission or exclusion, sections
30(3)(g) and (h) could be listed as factors that may
favour admission of the
evidence.
QUESTIONS
Q32
Should sections 30(3)(g) and (h) be repealed?
Q33
If sections 30(3)(g) and (h) are retained, should they be listed as relevant
to the public interest in recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety (or as
a factor that may favour admission of the evidence)?
Practicalities of policing
- 7.142 New
Zealand Police provided preliminary feedback that it continues to have concerns
about how readily the courts turn to section
30 over relatively technical
breaches, given the practical realities of
policing.[612]
- 7.143 During the
Commission’s Second Review, Police submitted that section 30 should be
amended to enable consideration of the
“practical realities of
policing”. The Commission considered this submission but did not recommend
amendment, noting
these kinds of considerations are already taken into account
in assessing the nature of the impropriety and whether there was urgency
in
obtaining the evidence.[613]
- 7.144 Our
preliminary view remains the same. We also add that considering matters such as
resource constraints and the level of experience
of officers appears to assume
that section 30 is primarily concerned with the culpability of the individual
officers involved. That
is not the case. Section 30 is not punitive in
nature.[614] It is primarily aimed
at maintaining the integrity of the justice system. This may involve
incentivising systemic change to avoid
future improprieties, but it does not aim
to punish individuals.
- 7.145 It seems
likely that, in some cases, the “practical realities of policing”
will reflect systemic reasons for an
impropriety, such as inadequate resourcing
or training. The fact that an impropriety resulted from these types of systemic
issues
increases the likelihood that similar conduct will occur in future unless
changes are made. Admitting evidence in such situations
may indicate to the
public that the justice system does not take the rule of law seriously.
- 7.146 Accordingly,
our preliminary view is that no amendment to section 30 is required to enable
greater consideration of the practicalities
of policing. However, we invite
submissions on whether there are situations where the practicalities of policing
should be taken
into account but are not
currently.
QUESTION
Q34
Is any amendment to section 30 necessary or desirable to enable judges to
take account of the practicalities of policing?
Other factors
- 7.147 In
Chapter 6 we discuss the option of amending section 30(3) to clarify that the
risk the investigatory techniques used would
produce unreliable evidence can be
taken into account as a factor in the balancing exercise. If section 30 is
amended to specify
which factors favour admission or exclusion, this factor (if
adopted) could be listed as relevant to the public interest in recognising
the
seriousness of the impropriety (or as a factor that may favour exclusion of the
evidence). This is reflected in our model provision
in the Appendix to this
chapter.
- 7.148 This
consideration of reliability risks would be in addition to the court having
regard to the actual reliability of the evidence
in question when assessing its
probative value under section 30(3)(c). As discussed above, we suggest section
30(3)(c) is more relevant
to the second public interest (in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial).
- 7.149 Our review
of the case law did not identify any other factors that we think ought to be
included in section 30(3) (subject to
our discussion on causation below).
However, we welcome any feedback on that. We also invite feedback on any
additional amendments
that should be made to the factors.
- 7.150 It was
suggested to us in preliminary feedback from stakeholders that section 30(3)
should include a factor explicitly referencing
the need to deter future
improprieties. As noted above, we consider deterrence may be an appropriate
policy goal under section 30.
However, our preliminary view is that adding
deterrence as a factor is unnecessary. Consideration of the other factors (such
as those
in sections 30(3)(a), (b) and (e)) is already likely to result in
exclusion where the impropriety is sufficiently serious to warrant
a deterrent
approach. In particular, there is a risk that recognising the need for
deterrence as a separate factor would duplicate
the assessment under section
30(3)(b), which focuses on whether the impropriety was deliberate.
- 7.151 We also
think it would likely be difficult in most cases for a judge to know whether
deterrence is relevant and how it should
be weighed. For example, if a police
officer has conducted a warrantless search outside the scope of their
warrantless powers or
has omitted information from a search warrant application,
how is a judge to assess the likelihood that similar breaches might occur
in
future or whether exclusion would have a meaningful deterrent effect? In a rare
case where a judge does have information to suggest
that exclusion may be
necessary to create organisational incentives (for example, to correct
inadequate training of or guidance to
enforcement officers), that could already
be considered as an “other matter”. We invite feedback on this
approach.
- 7.152 Preliminary
feedback also raised the possibility of referring to the extent to which the
impropriety intrudes on expectations
of privacy. We agree that this will be
relevant to the seriousness of an impropriety where it involved a search (as
opposed to, for
example, improprieties during an interview process). Our
preliminary view, however, is that it is already captured by section 30(3)(a)
(the importance of any right breached and the extent of the breach). The courts
consider reasonable expectations of privacy when
determining whether there has
been a breach of section 21 of NZBORA (unreasonable search and
seizure).[615] Assessing the
extent of the breach under section 30(3)(a) of the Act will therefore involve
considering the privacy interests involved
and the extent of the intrusion on
them. Case law suggests this already
occurs.[616] Furthermore, adding a
separate factor relating to privacy interests may suggest that the right to be
secure against unreasonable
search and seizure has greater significance than
other rights, which QUESTION
Q35
is not necessarily the case. Again, we invite feedback on this approach.
Are any other amendments to the section 30(3) factors necessary or
desirable?
THE ROLE OF CAUSATION UNDER SECTION 30(5)
- 7.153 For
evidence to be “improperly obtained” under section 30(5)(a) or (b),
it must have been obtained “in consequence”
of the breach. While
there is no causative language in section 30(5)(c) in relation to the unfairness
limb, the Supreme Court in
Chetty held there must “almost
always” be a causative link between the unfairness and the obtaining of
the evidence.[617]
Is it unclear how causation should be assessed?
- 7.154 The
courts have applied various tests in deciding whether a causal link is
established. Stevens J, surveying the case law on
causation in W (CA226/2019)
v R, said:[618]
- This Court has,
understandably, described the “in consequence of” wording in s 30(5)
in different ways. These include
whether the connection between the breach and
the evidence is “sufficiently immediate to establish causation” or
whether
the link between the impropriety and the evidence is “too
attenuated” to be causative. Another variant is that evidence
cannot be
unfairly obtained “if it would have been obtained irrespective of the
unfairness relied upon”. In Boskell v R this Court spoke of the
need for the impropriety to have a “material or operative effect” on
the defendant’s decision
to speak to the police.
- 7.155 Another
often-cited formulation requires a “real and substantial connection”
between the breach and the obtaining
of the
evidence.[619]
- 7.156 Where a
sufficient causal connection is found, the Supreme Court has held that the
strength of that causal connection may be
taken into account as part of the
balancing process.[620] While the
point was not expressly addressed, presumably the strength of the causal
connection would be considered as an “other
matter” under section
30(3).
- 7.157 In some
cases, the courts have found a lack of causation in relation to a
defendant’s statement made following an impropriety
on the basis that the
statement would have been made
anyway.[621] This represents a
strict approach to causation, where the court considers what would have happened
“but for” the impropriety.
For example, in W (SC 38/2019) v
R, the defendant was detained but was not told of the reason for his
detention, his right to instruct a lawyer or his right to refrain
from making a
statement before being
questioned.[622] The majority of
the Court of Appeal found that a section 30 analysis was not required because,
despite these breaches, the defendant
in fact knew why police wanted to question
him and made the statement for his own
purposes.[623] Mallon J dissented
on the causation point, noting the need for caution in conducting hypothetical
assessments that potentially excuse
the
impropriety.[624]
- 7.158 In other
cases, the courts have taken a more generous approach to establishing causation.
In R v Perry, the majority of the Supreme Court found a
defendant’s statement to be improperly obtained and proceeded to the
balancing test
despite having “distinct reservations whether the
associated impropriety can be said to have been causative of the decision
made
by the respondent to resume the making of his statement to the
police”.[625] On this
approach, causation is essentially assumed unless there is clear evidence to the
contrary. The emphasis is placed on the
balancing test, in which the extent of
the causal connection may be taken into account as one relevant
factor.[626]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 7.159 The
approach taken to causation has a significant impact on the outcome of section
30 decisions. If the court finds no sufficient
causative link between the
impropriety and the obtaining of the evidence, then the evidence is not
“improperly obtained”
and the balancing test is not engaged. The
evidence will be admitted without further analysis under section 30,
irrespective of the
seriousness of the impropriety.
- 7.160 Given the
different approaches taken by the courts and the importance of the causation
assessment to the outcome in individual
cases, we seek submissions on whether it
is desirable to clarify the role of causation and, if so, what approach should
be preferred.
- 7.161 On one
view, a generous approach to causation (like that taken by the Supreme Court in
Perry) is appropriate at the threshold stage of determining whether the
evidence was improperly
obtained.[627] A stricter approach
that considers what would have occurred “but for” the breach
requires an assessment that is necessarily
speculative. In addition,
rationalising the admission of evidence solely on the basis that it would have
been obtained anyway may
be seen as inconsistent with the policy behind section
30. If evidence is obtained during a sequence of events associated with improper
conduct, its admission may detrimentally affect the credibility of the justice
system whether or not it might have been obtained
anyway. Taking a strict
approach to causation at this threshold stage risks disregarding breaches of
important rights and procedural
protections.
- 7.162 If a
generous view of causation were adopted at the point of determining whether
evidence has been “improperly obtained”,
any attenuation of
causation could still be taken into account in the balancing test (either as an
“other matter” under
section 30(3) or as a separate factor, as we
discuss below). This would allow the courts to have regard to the fact that the
causative
link is tenuous when deciding whether to admit the evidence. However,
engaging in the balancing test would mean there is a transparent
consideration
of the overall public interest before admitting evidence obtained in
circumstances that may be seen as tainted by improper
conduct.
- 7.163 If this
approach is favoured, possible amendments include:
(a) amending section 30(5)(a) and (b) to broaden the wording around the required
causal link (for example, “in consequence
of” could be replaced with
“in connection with”); and/or
(b) amending section 30(3) to provide that the extent of the causative
connection between the impropriety and the obtaining of the
evidence is a
relevant factor in the balancing test (consistently with the Supreme Court
decision in Chetty).[628]
- 7.164 Alternatively,
the current wording could be retained if it is considered desirable for the
courts to tailor their approach to
causation to the particular case. It is
arguable, for example, that a generous approach to causation is more appropriate
in relation
to defendants’ statements (given the danger of speculating
about what a defendant may have done but for the breach). A stricter
approach to
causation may be considered desirable where physical evidence is involved to
avoid unnecessary use of court time. The
current approach of the courts allows
different approaches to causation in different
circumstances.
QUESTION
Q36
Are any amendments to section 30 necessary or desirable to clarify the
approach to causation?
APPENDIX – A MODEL PROVISION
- 7.165 Most
of the issues discussed in this chapter relate to the application of the section
30 balancing test. To facilitate feedback
on our options for reform, we set out
below a model provision illustrating how some of these options could be
incorporated. This
model provision is not intended to indicate our preference
for a particular approach. It does not address all the options discussed
in this
chapter (where there is more than one) nor the issue of causation.
- 7.166 The model
provision includes subsections that could replace the current subsections
30(1)—30(3). Some existing provisions
that we do not propose changing are
included for context, with optional new text shown in italics.
- (1) The
purpose of this section is to maintain an effective and credible system of
justice.
- (2) This section
applies to a criminal proceeding in which the prosecution offers or proposes to
offer evidence if—
(a) the defendant or, if applicable, a co-defendant against whom the evidence is
offered raises, on the basis of an evidential foundation,
the issue of whether
the evidence was improperly obtained and informs the prosecution of the grounds
for raising the issue; or
(b) the judge raises the issue of whether the evidence was improperly obtained
and informs the prosecution of the grounds for raising
the issue.
- (3) The judge
must—
(a) find, on the balance of probabilities, whether or not the evidence was
improperly obtained; and
(b) if the judge finds that the evidence has been improperly obtained,
EITHER
determine whether exclusion is proportionate to the impropriety by
balancing the public interest in recognising the seriousness of
the impropriety
against the public interest in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder
at trial.
OR (if an onus is placed on the prosecution)
exclude the evidence unless satisfied that the public interest in having
the evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial outweighs
the public
interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety.
- (3) For the
purposes of subsection (2), when assessing the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the impropriety, the
court may, among any other matters, have
regard to the following factors:
(a) the importance of any right, statutory requirement, rule of law or
procedural protection breached and the extent of that breach;
(b) the extent to which the investigatory techniques used were known, or
ought to have been known, to be improper;
(c) the risk that the investigatory techniques used would produce unreliable
evidence;
(d) the extent to which the impropriety was necessary to avoid apprehended
physical danger to the Police or others;
(e) the extent to which the impropriety was influenced by urgency in
obtaining the improperly obtained evidence.
- (4) For the
purposes of subsection (2), when assessing the public interest in having the
evidence considered by the fact-finder at
trial, the court may, among any other
matters, have regard to the following factors:
(a) the probative value of the evidence, including its reliability;
(b) the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged.
...
|
CHAPTER 8
8 Prison informants and incentivised witnesses
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on whether the current
approach under the Act is sufficient to address the risks posed
by evidence from
prison informants and other incentivised witnesses. We seek feedback on issues
relating to:
- the
admissibility of prison informant evidence;
- the use of
judicial directions;
- the need for any
additional safeguards; and
- the scope of any
proposed amendments or additional safeguards.
BACKGROUND
- 8.1 Prison
informant evidence is evidence in a criminal proceeding of a defendant’s
statement purportedly made to another person
while they were detained and
offered by that other person (the prison
informant).[629] This type of
evidence is also sometimes referred to as “jailhouse snitch” or
“cellmate confession” evidence.
Such evidence is typically
inculpatory and offered by the prosecution, although sometimes the defendant
might seek to offer prison
informant evidence that is exculpatory in
nature.[630]
- 8.2 Prison
informants often give their evidence in return for, or in the expectation or
hope of, some advantage or benefit to
them.[631] These incentives can
take various forms, ranging from the relatively trivial (improved prison
conditions or preferential treatment
from authorities in the future) to the more
significant (early parole, reduced charges or sentence, or dismissal of
charges).[632]
- 8.3 Similar
incentives can exist in the criminal justice system beyond the prison
environment. Some witnesses may give evidence of
a defendant’s alleged
guilt in exchange for some advantage or benefit operating in the criminal
justice context, even if the
information they seek to share was not obtained in
a detention setting. At the end of this chapter, we consider the implications
of
extending any reform measures to this broader class of “incentivised
witnesses”.
The nature of prison informant evidence
- 8.4 Prison
informants can be the recipients of confessions or other inculpatory statements
that may otherwise not be disclosed by
the
defendant.[633] This type of
evidence can therefore be “highly probative” of the
defendant’s guilt and an important tool in the
prosecution’s
case.[634]
- 8.5 An emerging
body of social science evidence points to two key risks associated with the use
of prison informant evidence:[635]
(a) First, prison informant evidence is typically characterised as being
unreliable.[636] This is because,
as noted above, prison informants are often incentivised to give their evidence.
Many informants have a history
of dishonesty and may be capable of presenting a
convincing account of the details of a defendant’s alleged offending, even
under pressure in the trial setting.
[637] Additionally, they will
frequently have access to information about a high-profile case through other
sources (such as media coverage
or word of mouth) and so be able to create a
plausible account of a defendant’s alleged actions or
role.[638] As one commentor has
noted, “[t]he combination of having both a motivation and a ready
willingness to lie creates an abnormally
high risk of false evidence being
provided”.[639]
(b) Second, juries may give the evidence undue weight, even when warned that it
may be unreliable. Evidence suggests that juries
find prison informant evidence
highly persuasive.[640] This has
been attributed variously to the “fundamental attribution error” (a
psychological phenomenon whereby people
attribute the behaviour of others to
personal factors such as honesty or a desire to “do the right thing”
rather than
situational factors such as the promise of a
reward);[641] the fact that prison
informants may be capable of lying
convincingly;[642] and the lack of
proper records of incentives promised or received making it difficult to truly
assess the motivations of the
informant.[643]
- 8.6 While it is
difficult to measure these risks with absolute certainty, the use of prison
informant evidence has been linked to
miscarriages of justice. In W (SC
38/2019) v R, te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court referred to three
major studies from the United States that made a link between prison informant
evidence and wrongful convictions. Although they noted that such studies cannot
be directly extrapolated to Aotearoa New Zealand,
both the majority and the
minority concluded that they carry considerable
weight.[644]
- 8.7 In New
Zealand, there have been cases of wrongful conviction that have rested in part
on false prison informant evidence, including
the cases against Mauha Fawcett,
Teina Pora and Arthur Allan
Thomas.[645] These cases, and
others where prison informant evidence has featured, can be high-profile and
attract significant media and public
attention.[646] In November 2019,
a petition entitled “Stop Jailhouse Informants From Causing Wrongful
Convictions” was presented to
Parliament. It called for an amendment to
the Evidence Act 2006 to permit the use of prison informant evidence only where
the Solicitor-General
provides written approval. The petition is currently
before the Justice Select
Committee.[647]
The current law
- 8.8 The
Act does not specifically address the admissibility of prison informant
evidence. Instead, the general admissibility provisions
in sections 7 and 8
apply.[648] This means that, to be
admissible, prison informant evidence must be relevant, and its probative value
must outweigh the risk that
the evidence will have an unfairly prejudicial
effect on the proceeding.
- 8.9 This
reflects the position at common law, where prison informant evidence of a
confession made by the defendant was admissible
as an exception to the rule
against hearsay.[649] Prior to the
enactment of the Act, cellmate confessions were relied upon in a number of
high-profile cases,[650] with the
caveat that this type of evidence could still be excluded if it was of limited
probative value and would cause considerable
prejudice on the facts of a
particular case.[651]
- 8.10 Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission did not explicitly address prison informant
evidence in its preliminary paper or final
report on the Evidence Code. At
select committee stage, the Ministry of Justice advised, in response to a
submission raising concerns
about the absence of restrictions for prison
informant evidence, that sections 7 and 8 provided sufficient protection and
that more
specific safeguards were not
required.[652]
- 8.11 The Act
does, however, recognise the reliability concerns associated with prison
informant evidence that is admitted in court
by providing for judicial
directions under section 122. Section 122 requires a judge to consider giving a
reliability warning in
relation to certain types of evidence, including, at
section 122(2)(d) “evidence of a statement by the defendant to another
person made while both the defendant and the other person were detained in
prison, a Police station or another place of detention”.
This provision
was added to the Evidence Bill at select committee stage in response to specific
concerns about the reliability of
prison informant
evidence.[653]
- 8.12 Section
122(2)(c) also requires the judge to consider giving a warning in relation to
“evidence given by a witness who
may have a motive to give false evidence
that is prejudicial to a defendant”, potentially covering a wider class of
incentivised
witnesses.
Previous Law Commission reviews
- 8.13 Previous
Commission reviews only briefly touched on issues related to prison informant
evidence. The 2013 Review of the Act considered
whether section 122 should be
amended to provide further guidance as to when a warning should be given, or as
to the content of warnings.[654]
The Commission concluded that further legislative guidance would be unhelpful.
Section 122 covers a range of evidence, which makes
it difficult to prescribe
the circumstances in which a direction should be given, or the content therein.
This was properly a role
for the judge on a case-by-case
basis.[655]
- 8.14 The
Commission’s Second Review of the Act noted the issue of prison informant
evidence in response to two submissions arguing
for it to be subject to specific
controls in the Act.[656] The
Commission noted the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v R as the
leading authority on this issue at that point in time and agreed that this type
of evidence “may pose significant risks
and requires careful
scrutiny”.[657] In the
absence of problems in practice, however, it concluded that the issue of prison
informant evidence was beyond the scope of
an operational review.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
- 8.15 The
issues we consider in this chapter relate to whether the current law, including
the recent guidance from the Supreme
Court,[658] is sufficient to
address the risks posed by prison informant evidence. Below we consider:
(a) the admissibility of prison informant evidence:
(b) the use of judicial directions in relation to prison informant evidence that
is admitted at trial;
(c) whether additional safeguards are appropriate, either in addition to or as
an alternative to reform of the Act; and
(d) whether any proposed amendments or additional safeguards should also apply
to other incentivised witnesses.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRISON INFORMANT EVIDENCE
- 8.16 While
the Act does not specifically address the admissibility of prison informant
evidence, a body of case law has developed
on the topic. In Hudson v
R, the Supreme Court confirmed that there was no presumption that
prison informant evidence is
inadmissible.[659] Such a
presumption would be inconsistent with the Act’s intention that
“reliability decisions should be made by a properly
cautioned
jury”.[660] The Court
acknowledged the reliability risks of this type of evidence, however, and held
that this was a class of evidence requiring
“careful
scrutiny”.[661] The Court
recognised there may be scope for the exclusion of prison informant evidence
under sections 7 and 8 of the Act.
- 8.17 In W (SC
38/2019) v R and R v Roigard, heard by the Supreme Court
concurrently, the Court examined the extent to which reliability issues could be
considered in determining
whether prison informant evidence was relevant under
section 7 and whether its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice under section 8.[662]
The Court considered that the exclusion of evidence under section 7 on the basis
of unreliability will be rare and confined to cases
where “the evidence is
so unreliable that it could not be accepted or given any weight at all by a
reasonable judge or
jury”.[663] However, the
reliability of prison informant evidence could be considered under section 8,
under which the judge is undertaking a
gatekeeping
role.[664]
- 8.18 The Court
agreed with the decision in Hudson that prison informant evidence
required “careful scrutiny” under section 8 and outlined a framework
for assessing prison
informant evidence in the course of that balancing
exercise.[665] Here, the majority
and the minority differed in their approaches. The majority
stated:[666]
- (a) The concern
in undertaking this evaluation is to determine whether the connection between
the evidence and proof is worth the
price to be paid by admitting it in
evidence.
- (b) In
undertaking the gatekeeping role, reliability may be considered by the judge in
balancing, in the usual way, the probative
value of the proposed evidence
against the risk of illegitimate prejudice. That reliability assessment should
be made without applying
any artificial limits or presumptions such as taking
the evidence at its highest.
- (c) The
relevant factors will include consideration of the sorts of concerns about this
evidence as has been discussed and which
might include, for example, that the
credibility of the witness in an informant context has previously been doubted,
any incentives
or expectations of preferences at play (including the inability
of the prosecution to confirm whether incentives have been offered
or given),
and the likely weight to be attached to this evidence.
- (d) On the
other hand, the exercise is not that of a mini trial. The judge will be making
his or her assessment in the absence of
the full picture of the evidence as it
may emerge at trial.
- (e) Finally,
the constitutional role of the jury as fact-finder needs to be respected. As has
been indicated, the statutory scheme
and the authorities, particularly Hudson,
which we are not overruling, envisage that the court will utilise other
mechanisms such
as clear judicial directions to the jury to address the generic
risk of unfair prejudice.
- 8.19 The
minority agreed with that approach but went further, proposing a more detailed
framework to guide the scrutiny of prison
informant evidence under section 8,
based on what is known about the risks associated with this type of
evidence.[667] Summarised, the
considerations were as follows:
(a) Considerations relevant to probative value:
(i) the significance of the evidence to a matter at issue;
(ii) any indications the evidence is unreliable or untrue (such as its
plausibility and whether it is consistent with other evidence);
(iii) whether the evidence is incentivised (or any indications it might have
been, such as the timing of the evidence);
(iv) whether the witness had other motives to lie;
(v) whether the witness has a record of lying; and
(vi) other circumstances relevant to the collection of the evidence (such as
indications the witness could have obtained relevant
details from interactions
with the police).
(b) Considerations relevant to risk of unfair prejudice:
(i) collateral prejudice (if the evidence necessarily implies the defendant was
in prison on an unrelated charges); and
(ii) cumulative prejudice (the risk that if multiple witnesses in this category
are called, a fact-finder may see their evidence
as corroborating each other
when properly assessed it does not).
- 8.20 Applying
that framework, the minority reached different conclusions on
admissibility.[668] The majority
rejected this framework on the basis that the factors identified would cross the
threshold into matters properly reserved
for trial and
cross-examination.[669]
- 8.21 The Court
also considered that additional non-legislative safeguards were “important
and necessary”,[670]
including further guidance for prosecutors on the use of prison informant
evidence that the Solicitor-General was in the process
of
considering.[671] The
Solicitor-General subsequently published guidelines for prosecutors on the use
of prison informant evidence in August
2021.[672] They set out guiding
principles and a non-exhaustive list of factors affecting reliability that
should be considered by prosecutors
when deciding whether to offer prison
informant evidence in court. The factors address the prison informant’s
motive (including
whether the information was solicited or offered and any
offers or promises made to the informant), the circumstances of the alleged
interactions with the defendant (including the plausibility of the
informant’s account), the existence of confirmatory evidence,
opportunity
to concoct and the character and state of the informant (including their
conviction history and whether and how they
have given prison informant evidence
in the past).[673]
Is the current approach adequate to address the risks
associated with prison informant evidence?
- 8.22 As
discussed above, the risks associated with prison informant evidence are
considerable. This was acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in W (SC 38/2019) v
R, which represents an “important shift in emphasis” in
bolstering the role of the judicial gatekeeper with regard to
reliability.[674] The division
between the majority and minority, however, highlights disagreement as to how
this gatekeeping role should be approached.
Additionally, the Court itself
called for further safeguards to address the risks of prison informant evidence,
suggesting that it
did not consider the current legal framework, even with the
guidance set out in that decision, was sufficient to guard against these
risks.
- 8.23 It is
difficult to assess the extent of any continuing concerns in practice. Not
enough time has passed to be able to identify
the impact of the Court’s
decisions in W (SC 38/2019) v R and Roigard or the
Solicitor-General’s guidance, on admissibility decisions.
- 8.24 Preliminary
feedback from stakeholders, however, suggests that there is still concern about
this type of evidence and whether
the mechanisms and processes in place are
sufficient to protect against the risks it poses. Commentors have observed that
further
protections may be desirable, noting that the Supreme Court was
constrained in its approach by the
Act.[675]
QUESTION
Q37
Accordingly, we seek submissions on whether the current approach, including the
recent guidance from the Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General’s
guidelines for prosecutors, is sufficient to address the risks posed by prison
informant evidence.
Is the current approach to the admissibility of prison informant evidence
adequate to address the risks associated with this type
of evidence?
Options for reform
- 8.26 If
the current approach is considered inadequate to address the risks associated
with prison informant evidence, a new statutory
provision to control the
admissibility of prison informant evidence could be inserted into the Act.
- 8.27 Introducing
a new admissibility provision would run counter to the traditional common law
approach and guiding principle of the
Act that reliability is generally a matter
for a properly cautioned fact-finder. There is precedent, however, for the Act
to impose
specific reliability thresholds for other types of evidence that carry
significant reliability concerns, including section 28 (exclusion
of unreliable
statements), section 45 (visual identification evidence) and section 46 (voice
identification evidence). These types
of evidence, like prison informant
evidence, are frequently identified as the categories of evidence most often
associated with miscarriages
of
justice.[676] On the other hand,
the decision of the Supreme Court in W (SC 38/2019) v R clearly signals a
move to a more active gatekeeping role for judges in assessing reliability of
prison informant evidence under section
8. This may mean a separate
admissibility provision for this type of evidence is unnecessary.
- 8.28 There are
also drawbacks associated with introducing more statutory controls on the
admissibility of prison informant evidence.
Many of these are practical.
Requiring more intensive pre-trial consideration of admissibility would have
associated administrative
and logistical costs (although this may build on
existing processes for pre-trial admissibility hearings). Additionally, both the
courts and commentors have warned against turning the admissibility inquiry into
a “mini trial”, noting that it takes
place in the absence of the
full picture of evidence that may emerge at trial in the context of the evidence
as a whole, and through
examination and cross-examination of
witnesses.[677] Finally, there is
a general risk that codifying the factors to be taken into account will create
inflexibility of application.
- 8.29 If a new
provision to control the admissibility of prison informant evidence is
considered desirable, it could take the form
of any or all of the options
outlined below. We particularly welcome feedback on the factors outlined under
Option 3 as matters to
be taken into account when making a decision on
admissibility.
- 8.30 We do not
discuss the option of a complete exclusion of prison informant evidence, as has
been argued for in some overseas
jurisdictions.[678] We do not
consider this to be a feasible option for two reasons. First, it would be
incompatible with the scheme of the Act which
takes as one of its fundamental
principles that if evidence is relevant, it is admissible, with that assessment
to be carried out
on a case-by-case basis. Second, it would be a
disproportionate response to the nature of the problem in New Zealand (where
there
is no evidence of a widespread snitching “scam” that has been
identified in other
jurisdictions).[679]
Option 1: A reliability threshold
- 8.31 This
option would introduce a new reliability threshold for prison informant
evidence. The Act could provide that evidence of
a statement by the defendant to
another person made while both the defendant and the other person were detained
in prison, a police
station or another place of detention, is only admissible if
it meets a certain threshold of reliability. For example, the Act could
require
that the circumstances relating to the making of the defendant’s statement
provide reasonable assurance that the evidence
being offered is reliable. This
would adopt the same reliability threshold as for hearsay statements (section
18). Alternatively,
the reliability threshold could be more focused on ensuring
reasonable assurance that the statement was in fact made at all (reflecting
the
observations of the Supreme Court in
Hudson).[680]
Option 2: A presumption of exclusion and a reliability
threshold
- 8.32 This
option would create a presumption of exclusion of prison informant evidence that
could be displaced only if the judge is
satisfied, to a certain threshold of
reliability, that the circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable
assurance that
the statement is reliable. This would operate similarly to the
exclusion of unreliable statements (section 28).
- 8.33 The
creation of a presumption of exclusion would recognise the extent of the risk of
unreliability associated with this type
of evidence by making exclusion the
default position and requiring a clear justification for its use, thus aligning
it with the way
similarly risky and unreliable types of evidence are treated by
the Act.
- 8.34 We welcome
views on what standard should displace the presumption of exclusion under this
option – whether it should be
a test of “balance of
probabilities” or one of “beyond reasonable doubt”. Both are
used at various points
in the Act.
[681] A decision on this point would
turn on the desired stringency of approach by the judge. “Beyond
reasonable doubt” would
signal a higher threshold for admitting this type
of evidence, which may be justified on the basis of the risks it poses and the
need for judges to carry out a more thorough examination of reliability in light
of the problems fact-finders experience in weighing
it
appropriately.[682] “Balance
of probabilities” would signal that this type of evidence requires careful
consideration of whether the evidence
should be put to a fact-finders who will
make the final decision as to
reliability.[683]
Option 3: A statement of the factors to be taken into account
when determining admissibility
- 8.35 Option
3 is to include in the Act a statement of relevant factors the court should take
into account when determining whether
prison informant evidence should be
admitted in a proceeding. This option could be combined with Option 1 and/or
Option 2. This would
be similar to the approach taken in existing sections 28,
45 and 46, which all contain a subsection outlining a non-exhaustive list
of
matters for a judge to take into account when considering whether to admit or
exclude evidence.
- 8.36 The
differing approaches between the majority and the minority in W (SC 38/2019)
v R highlight some of the difficulties with determining what the relevant
factors should be under this option. The majority adopted a
more circumscribed
approach to the reliability assessment, and rejected the minority’s more
detailed approach on the basis
that the factors identified by them would cross
the threshold into matters properly reserved for trial and
cross-examination.[684]
- 8.37 Preliminary
research and feedback suggests, however, that the minority’s framework may
be a more helpful guide to the circumstances
that are relevant to the
admissibility of prison informant evidence. Associate Professor Scott Optican
notes that the minority approach
represents a “more granular and schematic
inquiry” that draws more directly on the social science evidence on the
risks
of prison informant evidence compared to the majority, which is more akin
to the “typical” section 8
exercise.[685] Associate Professor
Anna High, while not expressly accepting or rejecting either view, supports a
broad inquiry encompassing the
content of the evidence, the circumstances in
which the evidence was offered and the circumstances relating to the veracity of
the
witness. High notes that a broad approach would be similar to the approach
taken in other parts of the Act (for example, the hearsay
reliability
test).[686]
- 8.38 Should the
minority’s approach in W (SC 38/2019) v R be preferred, the list of
relevant factors could include the following (as far as they are relevant to the
case):
(a) the significance of the evidence to the facts at hand, including the
importance of those facts to the proceedings and the probative
nature of the
evidence presented;
(b) any indications that the evidence is unreliable or untrue, including whether
it is consistent with evidence that is already known
or whether it has led to
the discovery of other evidence;
(c) the circumstances in which the statement was allegedly obtained, including
whether it could have been constructed on the basis
of facts and information
gained from other sources;
(d) whether the witness has been incentivised to give their evidence, and the
nature of any such incentives offered or received;
(e) whether the witness has any other motives to offer unreliable evidence;
and
(f) whether the witness has a record of lying.
- 8.39 The factors
guiding the reliability test will depend on what information is available to
help assess reliability – and
this turns on the nature of record-keeping
(discussed in more detail under additional safeguards
below).
QUESTION
Q389
Should the Act be amended to include additional controls on the admissibility
of prison informant evidence? If so, should the Act
be amended to include:
- a
reliability threshold; and/or
- a
presumption of exclusion; and/or
- a
statement of the factors to be taken into account by a judge when assessing
reliability?
USE OF JUDICIAL DIRECTIONS
- 8.40 If
prison informant evidence is admitted, section 122(2)(d) requires a judge to
consider whether to warn the jury of the need
for caution in deciding whether to
accept prison informant evidence and the weight to be given to it. As with all
section 122 warnings,
the judge must only consider whether to give such a
warning. This was the result of a conscious decision at select committee stage
on the basis that the wording of the clause as originally drafted requiring a
judge to give a warning was “too restrictive”
and that
“leaving this matter to the judge’s discretion would be more
effective than making it
mandatory”.[687] The
Commission, in its 2013 Review, similarly concluded that it would not be helpful
to amend section 122 to provide more direction
as to when a warning should be
given or what it should contain. This was properly a role for the judge on a
case-by-case basis.[688]
- 8.41 The Supreme
Court in Hudson rejected the argument that there should be a standard
form direction to be given in cases involving prison informant evidence but
held
that a direction will normally be
required.[689]
- 8.42 This
approach was affirmed by te Kōti Pīra | the Court of Appeal in
Baillie v R, where it held that the considerations that justified
“careful scrutiny” of prison informant evidence at the admissibility
stage may also call for judicial directions if prison informants are called at
trial.[690] The Court stated that,
for such witnesses, judges should consider whether to direct the
jury:[691]
- (a) to consider
any promises or expectations of preference that may operate on the witness, and
how powerful any such incentive may
be in the witness’s circumstances;
- (b) to consider
whether any disclosure to the police by the witness was delayed or was connected
in time to an incentive;
- (c) to pay
attention to any identified weaknesses in the evidence, such as (by way of
example) inherent implausibility and inconsistency
with other evidence that the
jury accepts;
- (d) to be aware
of any risk that details in the informant’s evidence may have been
acquired not from the defendant but through
the informant’s involvement in
the police investigation or dealings with other witnesses. Where such risk
exists, it may be
appropriate to caution against treating the accounts of
several such witness as mutually supportive;
- (e) to be aware
of the risk that juries may mistakenly attribute the evidence of a prison
informant to a desire to tell the truth
rather than an incentive to give
evidence that may gain the witness some advantage within the criminal justice
system; and
- (f) that the
ultimate assessment of reliability is theirs to make, but they must exercise
caution when deciding whether to accept
the evidence. Consistent with W
(SC38/2019), it may be appropriate in some cases to warn the jury of a risk that
prison informant
evidence may lead to miscarriages of justice.
Is section 122(2)(d) sufficient to address the risks
associated with prison informant evidence?
- 8.43 Both
the courts and commentors have been critical of the ability of judicial
directions to address the risks of prison informant
evidence, drawing attention
to research that indicates that jury instructions (even when enhanced) have no
effect on verdicts.[692] Despite
these concerns, there appears to be little support to dispense with judicial
directions completely. The majority in W (SC 38/2019) v R said the
evidence “plainly provided support for the requirement in Hudson
for careful scrutiny of the evidence of prison
informants”.[693] The
minority were more explicit, concluding that the statutory scheme of the Act
proceeds on the basis that juries do listen to judicial
directions, meaning it
was not possible to “jettison” reliance upon those directions
– and neither did the available
studies make the case for doing
so.[694]
- 8.44 The
minority judgment in W (SC 38/2019) v R highlighted that studies on
judicial warnings had not fully explored the “form and timing” of
the direction and whether
that made a difference to juries’
reasoning.[695] We understand
that, in practice, some judges will provide a warning or direction to the jury
not just at summing up, but also before
the evidence has been heard, either in
opening remarks or immediately before the informant gives their evidence.
- 8.45 The case
law also now provides more detailed guidance on judicial directions, with the
Court of Appeal setting out in Baillie the factors that the judge should
consider when directing the jury.
- 8.46 Given these
developments, we seek submissions on whether section 122(2)(d) should be amended
so as to enhance judicial directions
to the jury or whether the current law,
including the Court’s guidance in Baillie, is sufficient to
guard against the risks of unreliability associated with prison informant
evidence when it is admitted at trial.
QUESTION
Q39
Is section 122(2)(d) sufficient to address the risks associated with this
type of evidence in practice?
Options for reform
- 8.47 If
reform is considered necessary or desirable, we have identified two possible
options, one or both of which could be adopted:
(a) Option 1: Amend the Act to require judges to provide a warning to the
jury on reliability in every case involving prison informant evidence;
and/or
(b) Option 2: Amend the Act to include the factors that a judge should
consider including, or must include, in their warning.
- 8.48 Option 1
(and Option 2, if drafted as an imperative) would be contrary to the original
policy intention of section 122. As noted
above, one of the concerns behind
section 122 appears to have been to ensure that judges have sufficient
discretion as to warnings.
- 8.49 There is,
however, precedent in the Act for more prescriptive judicial directions in
appropriate cases. Section 126 governs judicial
warnings about identification
evidence and states that the judge must warn the jury of the special need
for caution before convicting on the basis of visual or voice identification
evidence. It may be
that, given the emerging evidence on the risks of prison
informant evidence discussed above, a similar, more prescriptive direction
as
proposed in Option 1 would now be appropriate.
- 8.50 If not
drafted as an imperative, Option 2, on its own, would retain the original policy
intention of section 122 and would continue
to favour judicial discretion. It
would, however, provide further guidance for judges as to what juries should (or
must) be advised
to consider. This could take the form of the factors set out by
the Court of Appeal in Baillie. Option 2 could also include directing the
jury to consider not just what was allegedly said, but whether any conversation
occurred
at all.[696] There is
precedent in the Act for a more prescriptive approach, which may be justified on
the basis of the risks posed by prison
informant evidence. Section 126(2) on
identification evidence sets out (without providing any standard wording) the
considerations
that a warning under this section must cover, including
warning the jury that “a mistaken identification can result in a serious
miscarriage of justice”.
- 8.51 The Act
could be amended to state that the judicial warning need not be in any
particular words (as with judicial warnings on
identification evidence) and
should reflect the specific circumstances of the case (as per the guidance from
case law[697]) but should (or
must) do the following (based on Baillie and Hudson):
(a) ask the jury to consider any incentives that may have been offered, received
or expected by the witness, and the effect this
might have had on the witness;
(b) ask the jury to consider any identified weaknesses in the evidence,
including any implausibility or inconsistency with other
evidence the jury has
heard;
(c) alert the jury to the possibility that a witness may be convincing even when
providing falsified evidence;
(d) refer to the risk that details in the witness’ evidence may have been
acquired from other means;
(e) note the problems juries can experience in considering such evidence,
including the risk that juries may mistakenly attribute
the evidence of such a
witness to a desire to tell the truth, rather than the presence of an incentive;
and
(f) if the judge considers it appropriate, warn the jury of the risk that false
prison informant evidence can lead to a miscarriage
of justice.
QUESTION
Q40
Should section 122(2)(d) be amended to enhance judicial directions to juries
on the reliability of prison informant evidence? If
so, should it be amended
to:
- require
the trial judge to provide a warning to the jury on reliability in every case
involving prison informants; and/or
- set
out the factors that the judge should or, must include in their
warning?
ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS
- 8.52 In
W (SC 38/2019) v R, the Court considered that additional
safeguards for the use of prison informant evidence were “important and
necessary”.[698] It explored
some of the safeguards introduced in various overseas jurisdictions, including
the use of approval committees to review
and agree to the use of evidence,
record-keeping and disclosure requirements and policies restricting the use of
prison informant
evidence by
prosecutors.[699] It concluded
that further guidance for prosecutors and a central register of prison
informants were two safeguards that should be
developed
further.[700] Other recent
commentary has also noted the need, and expressed support, for additional
safeguards in this area.[701]
- 8.53 The
Solicitor-General has now produced guidance for prosecutors on the use of prison
informant evidence, and a central register
for prison informants has now been
set up and is being maintained by
Police.[702] We are interested in
views on how these existing safeguards are operating in practice, and whether
additional safeguards would be
appropriate to address the issues of
admissibility or the use of prison informant evidence at trial. Some possible
options include:
(a) Further changes to prosecutorial policies and guidance: It may be too
soon to assess what impact the existing prosecutorial guidelines have had in
practice. Similar prosecutorial policies
overseas, however, go further by
including restrictions on the number of informants who may be
called[703] or containing more
robust consequences for prison informants found to have given false
evidence.[704]
(b) Oversight and approval of decisions to use prison informant evidence:
Some jurisdictions have oversight committees that consider the reliability of
prison informant evidence and approve its use at
trial.[705] In New Zealand, the
petition on prison informants presented to Parliament and currently under
consideration by the Justice Select
Committee calls for a similar approach, in
requiring the Solicitor-General to provide written approval for the admission of
prison
informant testimony.[706]
High supports of the idea of establishing an office or committee to vet prison
informant evidence ahead of trial, noting that it
may also address some of the
administrative costs associated with pre-trial hearings. She emphasises the
importance of any such body
being
independent.[707]
(c) Record-keeping: More information about incentives offered or
received, the history of the person seeking to give evidence and the nature of
the interaction
between the potential informant and the police and
prosecution[708] would enable
greater scrutiny of reliability at admissibility stage and also assist the jury
in their assessment of
reliability.[709] We would welcome
views on how the Police register is operating in practice and whether additional
information or alternative arrangements
would assist. An approach based on
record-keeping has its shortcomings, as identified by the Court in W (SC
38/2019) v R.[710] There are
many incentives that are less easily observed or recorded, and it may be
difficult to convey to a jury the power that such
incentives might hold in the
prison system. It is also, obviously, more helpful in cases QUESTION
Q41
involving “repeat offenders” as opposed to one-off instances.
Are other safeguards necessary or desirable to address the risks associated
with prison informant evidence? If so, what should they
be?
OTHER INCENTIVISED WITNESSES
- 8.54 The
discussion above is focused on prison informant evidence. In W (SC 38/2019) v
R and Roigard, the Supreme Court acknowledged there is a
broader class of incentivised witnesses but was divided as to whether its
approach should
apply to that group. The majority limited their approach to
prison informants, leaving consideration of other incentivised witnesses
for
when those cases arise.[711] The
majority further noted concerns about the implications of extending their
approach to a broader class of incentivised witnesses
in the criminal justice
context, noting the need to recognise the value of informants in the criminal
investigation process more
generally.[712]
- 8.55 The
minority went further and would have applied its framework to what it described
as “incentivised secondary confession
evidence”, defined
as:[713]
- [W]itnesses the
Crown wishes to call who will give evidence alleging that the defendant has in
some way admitted guilt in return
for some advantage or benefit – an
advantage or benefit that operates within the criminal justice context. The
witnesses were
not involved in the offending and, typically, their only source
of knowledge for their evidence is the statements they claim the
defendant made
to them.
- 8.56 In
Baillie v R, the Court of Appeal declined to expand the class of
witnesses whose evidence “demands careful scrutiny”, holding
“that
issue should be reserved for another day and more extensive
argument”.[714] It made two
further points, however, of relevance to the issue of scope:
(a) First, there are definitional difficulties in identifying the class that
should be subject to the “careful scrutiny”
envisaged by the Supreme
Court in Hudson, W (SC 38/2019) v R and Roigard. Even the
definition of “prison informant” can be open to debate and
“the wider the class the more extensive the
range of incentives and more
debatable their
effects”.[715]
(b) Second, the considerations set out in W (SC 38/2019) v R and
Roigard may sometimes affect secondary admissions evidence given by
witnesses who are not prison informants. In these cases, the option to
issue a
reliability direction under section 122 remains open to judges on a case-by-case
basis.[716]
Should any reform or additional safeguards extend to other
incentivised witnesses?
- 8.57 Whether
other incentivised witness evidence should be subject to the same “careful
scrutiny” as prison informant
evidence is an open question that the courts
have yet to determine. In light of this ongoing uncertainty and given this is
our final
operational review, we are interested in views on whether section
122(2)(d) or any amendments to the Act or additional safeguards
that may be
progressed on the basis of the discussion above should apply to a broader class
of incentivised witnesses.
- 8.58 While we
have not reached any view on this issue or on how a class of incentivised
witnesses should be defined, we can demarcate
two classes of witnesses within
the criminal justice system that should be treated as distinct from prison
informants and incentivised
witnesses:
(a) Undercover police posing as prisoners: For example, in R v
Kumar, two undercover police officers were placed in a police cell with the
defendant and elicited an inculpatory statement from him. This
was dealt with by
the courts under section 30 (improperly obtained evidence) and we believe raises
a separate set of issues relating
to the circumstances in which the
defendant’s statement was obtained rather than the reliability of the
evidence given by the
informant. We address this in a different chapter.
(b) Co-defendants/accomplices: Co-defendants and accomplices will often
give evidence against a defendant to mitigate their own risk of criminal
liability. The
Act already addresses the statements of co-defendants under the
hearsay provisions.
- 8.59 The
material concern about prison informant evidence is that it is unreliable, and
that unreliability does not necessarily stem
from the fact that someone was in
detention at the time the statement was made and received, but from the fact an
incentive was in
play. These incentives may be as powerful and compelling in the
broader criminal justice system where similar power differentials
exist between
individuals and the authorities and where incentives can be advantageous (such
as preferential treatment from the police
or authorities for current or future
offending, leniency from the courts on charging and sentencing or the payment of
money in the
form of a reward).
- 8.60 As noted by
the majority in W (SC 38/2019) v R, many of the studies into the risks of
illegitimate prejudice and miscarriages of justice with this type of evidence
cover both classic
prison informant evidence and other type of informants and it
is not always clear which is the operating
factor.[717] This indicates that
this type of broader incentivised evidence may present similar concerns as
prison informant evidence.
- 8.61 However,
there may be reasons for limiting any approach to prison informants. There has
been far more discussion and research
into the risks posed by prison informant
evidence as opposed to other types of incentivised witnesses. The culture of
prison and
the power dynamics at play in those settings may also be so unique so
as to warrant particular and separate treatment. The Act already
contains
general mechanisms that can be used either to exclude or to issue a warning
about, unreliable evidence on a case-by-case
basis (sections 7, 8 and 122). As
noted above, the majority in W (SC 38/2019) v R were concerned about the
implications of extending their approach to a broader class of incentivised
witnesses and the impact this
may have on informants in the criminal
investigation process more generally.
- 8.62 Extending
section 122(2)(d) and any recommended amendments or safeguards beyond
“classic” prison informants also
raises definitional difficulties
about where the line should be drawn. We recognise that seeking to articulate an
exhaustive definition
or list of exceptions may introduce potential
inflexibility in the law compared with allowing it to develop on a case-by-case
basis.
QUESTION
Q42
Should any amendments to the Act or additional safeguards extend to a wider
class of incentivised witnesses beyond prison informants?
If so, who should this
class of incentivised witness cover?
CHAPTER 9
9 Veracity evidence
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on issues relating to:
- the scope of the
veracity provisions (section 37);
- the application
of section 38(2) when the defendant puts veracity in issue; and
- the use of the
term “veracity” in other parts of the Act.
SCOPE OF THE VERACITY PROVISIONS
- 9.1 The
admissibility of veracity evidence is governed by sections 37–39 of the
Evidence Act 2006. Section 37(1) sets out the
general rule that a party may
not offer evidence in a civil or criminal proceeding about a person’s
veracity (defined as “the
disposition of a person to refrain from
lying”[718]) unless the
evidence is “substantially helpful” in assessing that person’s
veracity.
- 9.2 The veracity
provisions are based on Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s Evidence
Code, but they differ in several
key respects. The Commission had proposed a
concept of “truthfulness” rather than
“veracity”.[719] It
defined truthfulness as being concerned with “a person’s intention
to tell the truth”.[720] It
recommended a general rule that evidence about a person’s truthfulness is
admissible only if it is substantially helpful
in assessing that person’s
truthfulness.[721] The intention
was to abolish the common law collateral issues rule, which prohibited a party
from offering evidence intended to challenge
a witness’ answers to
questions asked in cross-examination about their
truthfulness.[722]
- 9.3 At select
committee stage the term “truthfulness” was replaced with
“veracity” on the basis that “veracity”
places the
emphasis upon the intention to tell the truth whereas “truthfulness”
is more readily confused with factual
correctness.[723] This
necessitated the introduction of a new definition of “veracity” that
focused on a person’s disposition to
refrain from lying. Section 37(3),
which purports to provide a non-exhaustive list of matters relevant to deciding
whether the proposed
veracity evidence is substantially helpful, was also
inserted at select committee stage.
- 9.4 The changes
at select committee stage gave rise to some early uncertainty as to the scope of
the veracity provisions in the
Act.[724] Te Kōti Mana Nui |
Supreme Court clarified much of this uncertainty in Hannigan v
R.[725] In that case,
the majority of the Supreme Court confirmed that the veracity rules do not apply
to evidence that is of direct relevance
to the case, even if that evidence also
bears on the veracity of a
person.[726] The scope of the
veracity rules is therefore relatively narrow, only capturing evidence that
would not otherwise be relevant to the
facts in issue. The Court also said that
only evidence of previously told lies can establish a disposition to lie for the
purposes
of the veracity
rules.[727]
- 9.5 Preliminary
feedback from stakeholders identified that some questions remain as to:
(a) the application of the veracity provisions to evidence of a single lie told
on a previous occasion; and
(b) the relevance, if any, of some of the statutory factors deemed to be
relevant to an assessment of substantial helpfulness (sections
37(3)(c)–(e)).
- 9.6 We address
these issues below and then discuss whether it is desirable to provide more
complete guidance in the Act about the
matters relevant to assessing whether
veracity evidence meets the heightened relevance test of substantial
helpfulness.
The application of the veracity provisions to single
lies
- 9.7 Some
cases have suggested that the reference in the definition of veracity to a
person’s disposition to refrain from lying means that evidence that
a person lied on a single occasion may not be controlled by the veracity
provisions.
- 9.8 In R v
Tepu, te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal said that a single allegation
of lying does not, of itself, involve an allegation that
a person has a
“disposition to lie”, and that this “confuses lying on a
particular occasion with a tendency or
an inclination to lie more
generally”.[728]
- 9.9 The authors
of Mahoney on Evidence have raised concerns with the suggestion that
single lies are not controlled by the veracity
provisions:[729]
- ... it would be
problematic to take Tepu as deciding that veracity must always involve
multiple lies. The Act contains various provisions which appear to reflect the
legislature’s
view that a single incident can be a substantially helpful
indicator of a lack of veracity.
- 9.10 Several
provisions in the Act appear to contemplate that a single lie can be considered
under the veracity
provisions.[730] For example,
section 37(3)(a) refers to a “lack of veracity... when under a legal
obligation to tell the truth (for example,
in an earlier proceeding or in a
signed declaration)” and section 37(3)(b) refers to “1 or more
offences that indicate a propensity for a lack of veracity”.
- 9.11 This issue
appears to have particular significance in the context of sexual cases, where
the defence seeks to offer evidence
of a single false complaint or other lie
told by the complainant about their previous sexual experience. In Best v
R, the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of an allegedly
false complaint made previously by the complainant against another
person.[731] The Court proceeded
on the basis that a single lie (or alleged lie) is controlled by the veracity
provisions and that the number
of false (or allegedly false) prior complaints
was one factor to be considered, among others, in assessing whether the veracity
evidence
met the test of substantial
helpfulness.[732] The Court said
that, if the complainant had not accepted the prior complaint was false,
it was relevant that “the existence of one prior complaint is not...
equivalent to
a ‘habit’ of making false
complaints”.[733] The Court
noted, however, that if the complainant had accepted the prior complaint
was false, the evidence ought to have been admitted as substantially helpful
veracity evidence, even
though “there is only one prior false complaint
and therefore no evidence of a pattern of lying about sexual
activity”.[734]
- 9.12 The Court
of Appeal considered this matter again in 2022 and indicated that proof of a
single lie will seldom be capable of being
substantially helpful in assessing a
disposition to refrain from
lying.[735]
How should the Act treat single lies?
- 9.13 Our
preliminary view is that evidence of a single lie (that is not otherwise
directly relevant to the facts in issue) should
be treated as veracity evidence
so that it will only be admitted if the heightened relevance test of substantial
helpfulness is met.
This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach
in Best, reflects the Commission’s intention when developing
the Evidence Code[736] and is
consistent with the propensity provisions (under which evidence of a single act
or omission can constitute admissible propensity
evidence).
- 9.14 We agree
with the authors of Mahoney on Evidence that it would be problematic if
section 37 were interpreted as necessarily requiring multiple lies. Further, we
are concerned that
such an interpretation could result in an approach whereby
evidence of a single lie is not subject to the heightened relevance test
of
substantial helpfulness.[737] We
also agree with the Court of Appeal’s recent observation that evidence of
a single lie will seldom be capable of meeting
the substantially helpful
threshold. Nonetheless, there will be cases, for example, a single conviction
for perjury of a serious
nature, where this threshold is capable of being
reached.
- 9.15 It does not
necessarily follow that legislative amendment is the best way forward. One view
is that this is a matter that is
best left to the courts to consider and issue
guidance on a case-by-case
basis.[738]
QUESTION
Q43
We are therefore interested in views on whether the treatment of single lies
under the veracity provisions is creating confusion
or uncertainty in practice
and whether any legislative clarification to the operation of section 37 would
be desirable in this respect.
If legislative reform is considered necessary or
desirable, one option, which we consider below, would be to amend section 37(3)
to provide more guidance on the evaluative matters that are relevant to whether
veracity evidence is substantially helpful. This
could include, as a relevant
factor, the number of previous incidents or events, affirming the approach in
Best.
Is there uncertainty as to the application of the veracity provisions to
evidence of a single lie? If so, should the Act be amended
to address that
uncertainty?
Relevance of the matters listed in section
37(3)(c)–(e)
- 9.17 Section
37(3) of the Act purports to provide a non-exhaustive list of relevant
considerations in deciding whether proposed veracity
evidence is substantially
helpful. It provides:
- (3) In
deciding, for the purposes of subsection (1), whether or not evidence proposed
to be offered about the veracity of a person
is substantially helpful, the Judge
may consider, among any other matters, whether the proposed evidence tends to
show 1 or more
of the following matters:
- (a) lack of
veracity on the part of the person when under a legal obligation to tell the
truth (for example, in an earlier proceeding
or in a signed declaration):
- (b) that the
person has been convicted of 1 or more offences that indicate a propensity for a
lack of veracity:
- (c) any
previous inconsistent statements made by the person:
- (d) bias on the
part of the person:
- (e) a motive on
the part of the person to be untruthful.
- 9.18 These
matters reflect the common law exceptions to the collateral issues rule which
was abolished by section
37.[739]
- 9.19 It is
questionable whether subsections 37(3)(c)–(e) are necessary following the
Supreme Court’s clarification of
the scope of the veracity provisions in
Hannigan.
- 9.20 Subsection
37(3)(c) (previous inconsistent statements) was addressed by the Commission in
the Second Review of the Act.[740]
The Commission noted that the Supreme Court in Hannigan had
confirmed that a previous inconsistent statement will almost always have
some relevance to the facts in issue, and consequently will
be admissible
without having to satisfy the veracity provisions even if it also challenges a
person’s veracity.[741] The
Commission accordingly recommended that this subsection be
repealed.[742] The Government
accepted this recommendation[743]
but the subsection has not yet been removed from the Act.
- 9.21 Sections
37(3)(d) and (e) (bias and motive to be untruthful) were not considered by the
Commission in its Second Review. Preliminary
feedback in this review identified
a view that these subsections, which are rarely called upon in practice, are
also redundant following
Hannigan. There is a concern that their
inclusion in section 37(3) is creating confusion in practice.
- 9.22 As noted
above, the majority in Hannigan clarified that the veracity provisions do
not apply to evidence that is of direct relevance to the case (even if that
evidence bears
on veracity).[744]
Further, only evidence of previously told lies can establish a disposition to
lie for the purposes of the veracity
rules.[745] In other words,
section 37 “permits the introduction of otherwise potentially inadmissible
evidence to the effect a witness
is habitually truthful or
untruthful”.[746] Unlike
subsections 37(3)(a) and (b), which can be described as examples of the type
of veracity evidence that may be substantially helpful, subsections (d) and
(e) do not describe types of veracity evidence. Rather, evidence of a
person’s bias or motive to be untruthful in a proceeding is generally
considered to be directly relevant to assessing the reliability of their
evidence and does not, therefore, engage the veracity
provisions.[747]
- 9.23 It could be
possible to interpret sections 37(3)(d) and (e) as simply providing that, where
there is evidence that a person has
told lies, whether that evidence reveals a
bias or motive to lie will be relevant to assessing whether that evidence is
substantially
helpful.[748] But
this potentially confuses two concepts (a general disposition to lie
versus bias or motivation to lie in the proceeding). In any event, it
does not appear that subsections 37(3)(d) and (e) add anything, in practice, to
the guidance that has developed
through case law on the assessment of
substantial helpfulness, discussed
below.[749]
QUESTION
Q44
For these reasons, we seek feedback on whether subsections 37(3)(d) and (e)
should also be repealed, in addition to subsection 37(3)(c).
Do subsections 37(3)(d) and (e) perform any useful role in practice? If not,
should these subsections be repealed?
Should section 37(3) provide guidance on the factors
relevant to assessing substantial helpfulness?
- 9.25 The
issues identified above raise a broader question as to whether section 37(3)
provides adequate guidance on how to approach
the substantial helpfulness test.
This is a contextual exercise that involves careful evaluation of the
circumstances in each case.[750]
Subsections 37(3)(c)–(e) appear problematic for the reasons discussed
above. But if they are repealed, that would only leave
sections 37(3)(a) and
(b), which are best described as examples of the types of veracity
evidence that may (depending on the circumstances) be substantially helpful.
They are examples only, because as the Supreme
Court observed in Best v
R, it is “not necessarily the case that the evidence of a
type set out in s 37(3) will always be substantially
helpful”.[751] As the
Commission has previously observed, there is nothing to prevent a judge from
taking account of “ordinary lies”
that do not fall within section
37(3)(a) where the circumstances are such that the evidence reaches the
“substantially helpful”
threshold.[752]
- 9.26 Sections
37(3)(a) and (b) do not give guidance as to the evaluative matters the court
should consider when assessing whether
veracity evidence is substantially
helpful in a particular case. If section 37(3) is intended to fulfil that
function, the list of
relevant matters in section 37(3) is radically incomplete.
In Best, the Court set out a range of matters that will be
relevant when assessing substantial helpfulness in the context of a previous
allegedly
false complaint of sexual offending, none of which appear in the Act
itself:[753]
- Factors to be
considered in the assessment of substantial helpfulness may include any
remoteness in time, similarity (or lack thereof)
between allegations, the number
of allegedly false prior complaints, the reason a complaint did not proceed or
was withdrawn, whether
the complaint was taken to a person of authority and
whether the prior complaint was fraudulent or malicious.
- In line with
the policy behind s 37 ... the substantial helpfulness of a previous allegedly
false complaint will also depend on how
clear it is that the previous complaint
is false, how much evidence would need to be canvassed to decide on whether the
complaint
is false and the likely outcome of the assessment of that evidence.
The more evidence that would need to be called on the unrelated
prior allegation
and thus the extent of any ‘trial within a trial’ and the more
uncertain the outcome of the deliberations
on that evidence, the less likely the
evidence is to be substantially helpful in terms of s 37.
- 9.27 In a
different context, the Court of Appeal in Horton v R explained that, when
evaluating whether evidence of prior convictions (captured by section 37(3)(b))
is substantially helpful in assessing
veracity:[754]
- Relevant
factors include the nature and seriousness of the convictions (particularly if
any falsehood is disclosed), the age of the
convictions, any overall pattern of
offending, and the circumstances of the trial (that is, the particular way in
which issues of
veracity arise). Also relevant can be evidence of extenuating
circumstances related to the convictions (such as significant material
hardship
on the part of the complainant) as that bears on the extent to which the
conviction illustrates a wider propensity to lie.
- 9.28 Many of the
factors mentioned in these decisions (such as remoteness in time of the previous
acts or events, the number of previous
acts or events, the nature and
seriousness of those acts or events as well as the extent to which the acts or
events are accepted
by the person to whom the evidence relates) are arguably
generally applicable to any assessment of substantial
helpfulness.[755]
- 9.29 If the
purpose of section 37(3) is to provide guidance on matters to be considered in
assessing substantial helpfulness, it might
be desirable to consider including
matters relevant to that purpose. Section 37(3) can be contrasted with sections
43(3) and 43(4),
which provide guidance on the matters relevant to assessing the
probative value and prejudicial effect of propensity evidence. If
such guidance
is desirable, consideration would need to be given as to how to address the
current subsections 37(3)(a) and (b). These
subsections provide examples of
types of admissible veracity evidence, which would not fit neatly in a redrafted
section focusing
on guidance on relevant matters. It may, nonetheless, be
helpful to retain these provisions in another subsection.
- 9.30 If, in
contrast, the purpose of section 37(3) is to highlight the type of evidence that
might be admissible veracity evidence,
it might be desirable to rephrase
subsection 37(3) to make this clear, especially if subsections (c)–(e) are
repealed.
QUESTION
Q45
Should the Act be amended to provide guidance on the factors relevant to
assessing whether veracity evidence meets the threshold of
substantial
helpfulness? If so, what factors should be included in the Act?
APPLICATION OF SECTION 38(2) WHEN THE DEFENDANT PUTS VERACITY
IN ISSUE
- 9.31 Whereas
section 37 governs veracity evidence in both civil and criminal proceedings,
section 38 applies only to criminal proceedings.
Section 38(2)(a) defines the
limited situations in which the prosecution may offer evidence about a
defendant’s veracity. A
defendant will “open the door” to
evidence about their veracity being offered by the prosecution if:
- ... the
defendant has, in court, given oral evidence about his or her veracity or
challenged the veracity of a prosecution witness
by reference to matters other
than the facts in issue;
- 9.32 This means
that section 38(2) is only triggered if the defendant (a) gives oral evidence in
court and (b) puts veracity at issue
in that evidence. If these requirements are
met, the prosecution can offer veracity evidence about the defendant if the
judge permits
it[756] and it meets
the substantially helpful threshold in section 37.
- 9.33 Section
38(2) codified two common law
rules:[757]
(a) First, the rule that if the defendant offers good character evidence about
themselves, the prosecution can introduce bad character
evidence about the
defendant in rebuttal. This rule was justified on the basis that the prosecution
must have the right to correct
any false impression made by the defence, so that
the court is not misled and the policies of rational ascertainment of facts and
the need for fair procedures that underlie the trial process are not
subverted.[758]
(b) Second, the “tit for tat” rule which provided that, if the
defendant attacks the character of a prosecution witness,
then the prosecution
can “retaliate” by offering evidence of the defendant’s own
bad character.[759] The tit for
tat rule has two principal
rationales:[760]
(i) It protects witnesses from “gratuitous attacks” and therefore
encourages victims and other witnesses to come forward
and give evidence.
(ii) It “sets the record straight” and prevents distortions that
come from a one-sided view of character evidence.
What are the issues?
- 9.34 Concerns
with the operation of section 38(2)(a) are not new. Three separate Commission
reviews have identified and examined issues
with section
38(2)(a).[761] Preliminary
feedback from stakeholders identified that concerns with the current law
remain.
Section 38(2) applies only when the defendant gives evidence in
court
- 9.35 Section
38(2) is only triggered if the defendant elects to give evidence. Traditionally,
this restriction was justified on the
basis that, if the defendant does not give
evidence, the fact-finder is not being asked to assess the credibility of their
testimony,
so evidence relating to their veracity is not
relevant.[762] As a, general rule,
this meant that, prior to the Act, where the defendant’s case involved
imputations on the character of
prosecution witnesses, defendants with serious
prior convictions did not give evidence and in that way avoided the risk of
cross-examination
on those
convictions.[763]
- 9.36 It is
questionable whether this policy remains appropriate in light of modern trial
practices. It may be inaccurate to say that
the defendant’s credibility is
not “in issue” if they do not give evidence in court, given that,
for example, it
is now common for the prosecution to play the defendant’s
evidential video interview in court and invite the fact-finder to
draw
conclusions from it. If the defendant makes statements about their own veracity
in that interview, those statements cannot be
rebutted if the defendant does not
give evidence. Similarly, the defendant can attack the veracity of the
complainant in that interview
and face no consequences for doing so. The
approach taken under section 38 can be contrasted to the approach taken to
makers of hearsay
statements. While a person who makes a hearsay statement is
not a witness, their veracity can still be challenged under section 37,
unlike
defendants who do not give evidence.
- 9.37 The current
approach could, however, be justified on the basis that if the defendant does
not give evidence, it is only the prosecution
who can offer the
defendant’s statement in
evidence.[764] It might be
considered unfair if the prosecution could trigger section 38(2) by offering a
defendant’s statement in evidence
and then rely on assertions made in that
statement to offer veracity evidence about the
defendant.[765]
- 9.38 Nonetheless,
in its 1997 paper on character and credibility, the Commission questioned
whether it was anomalous to continue to
follow the common law approach, which
protects defendants who elect not to give evidence even if they attack the
character of a prosecution
witness.[766] It noted that this
question was also under review in England and Wales. As we discuss below,
subsequent reform has abolished the
common law rule there. While the
Commission’s final Evidence Report did not explicitly address the matter,
the Evidence Code
was broadly worded so that the prosecution would have been
able to offer veracity evidence about the defendant (other than evidence
of
prior convictions) regardless of whether the defendant gave
evidence.[767] This suggests the
Commission’s intention was to depart from the common law
approach.[768]
- 9.39 The
Commission’s proposal was not accepted at select committee stage, and the
Evidence Bill was amended to “reinstate
the existing law that limits the
opportunity for the prosecution to call evidence as to the defendant’s bad
character”.[769] Uncertainty
remained, however, because the Act, as enacted, simply provided that the
prosecution could offer evidence about the defendant’s
veracity if
“the defendant has offered evidence about his or her veracity or has
challenged the veracity of a prosecution witness...”.
This did not make it
clear whether the defendant had to give evidence in court for the section to be
triggered.
- 9.40 The
Commission considered the application of section 38 in a 2008 Report and
concluded that Parliament’s intention was
uncertain and, in light of that,
favoured a strict interpretation in line with the common law
approach.[770] On this basis, the
Commission recommended in its 2013 Review of the Act amending section 38 to
clarify that the defendant only “opens
the door” to evidence about
their veracity being introduced by the prosecution when they give evidence in
court.[771] The Act was amended
accordingly in 2016 to insert the words “the defendant has, in court,
given oral evidence ...”.
- 9.41 In the
Second Review the Commission questioned the policy underlying the 2016 amendment
but concluded that it should be given
time to ‘bed in’ and that it
was not appropriate, at that time, to recommend changing the underlying policy
reflected
in section
38(2)(a).[772]
Section 38(2) applies only when the defendant puts veracity in
issue in their oral evidence
- 9.42 The
wording of section 38(2)(a) indicates that it applies only where the defendant
puts veracity in issue in their oral evidence. This means it does not
apply where the defendant gives evidence however it is not their oral evidence,
but some other aspect of
the conduct of the defence case that puts veracity in
issue. In the Second Review, the Commission said that, since it did not
recommend
any change to the policy underlying section 38(2)(a), it would be
desirable to amend this aspect of section 38(2)(a) to clarify that
the challenge
to the veracity of a prosecution witness also needs to be given in oral
evidence.[773]
- 9.43 This
approach is, however, apparently inconsistent with the Commission’s
original policy intent.[774] It is
also narrower than the previous common law rule. At common law, if the defendant
gave evidence, the prosecution could give
evidence about the defendant’s
bad character if the defendant “personally or by his advocate” asked
questions of
prosecution witnesses with a view to establish the
defendant’s own good character or if “the nature or conduct of the
defence” was such as to involve imputations on the character of the
prosecution witnesses.[775]
- 9.44 The concern
is that a narrow construct fails to appreciate the different ways in which the
defendant can put veracity in issue.
If defence counsel challenges the veracity
of a prosecution witness during cross-examination, for example, the defendant
faces no
consequences because they have not themselves challenged the veracity
of a prosecution witness in oral evidence.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 9.45 The
gaps identified above suggest that the policies underpinning section 38 are not
being achieved in some situations. As we
have said, those policies are to allow
the prosecution to correct any false impressions made by the defence about the
defendant’s
veracity and to protect witnesses from gratuitous attacks on
their credibility.
- 9.46 As noted
above, section 38(2) is both narrower than the common law in some respects
(because section 38(2) requires the defendant
to put veracity in issue in their
oral evidence) and retains elements of the common law that have since been
abandoned elsewhere
(by requiring the defendant to give evidence before the
section is triggered).
- 9.47 In England
and Wales, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) allows the prosecution to offer
evidence of the defendant’s bad
character if “it is evidence to
correct a false impression given by the defendant” or “the defendant
has made an
attack on another person’s
character”.[776] The
Criminal Justice Act goes on to expressly define the circumstances that are
deemed to engage these rules. Specifically, the prosecution
can offer evidence
to correct a false impression if the defendant is responsible for the making of
an express or implied assertion
that is apt to give the court or jury a false or
misleading impression about the
defendant.[777] A defendant is
treated as being responsible for the making of an assertion
if:[778]
- (a) the
assertion is made by the defendant in the proceedings (whether or not in
evidence given by him),
- (b) the
assertion was made by the defendant—
- (i) on being
questioned under caution, before charge, about the offence with which he is
charged, or
- (ii) on being
charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for
it, and evidence of the assertion is
given in the proceedings,
- (c) the
assertion is made by a witness called by the defendant,
- (d) the
assertion is made by any witness in cross-examination in response to a question
asked by the defendant that is intended to
elicit it, or is likely to do so,
or
- (e) the
assertion was made by any person out of court, and the defendant adduces
evidence of it in the proceedings.
- 9.48 In relation
to attacks on another person’s character, the prosecution can offer
evidence of the defendant’s bad character
if:[779]
- (a) [the
defendant] adduces evidence attacking the other person’s character,
- (b) [the
defendant] (or any legal representative appointed ... to cross-examine a witness
in his interests) asks questions in cross-examination
that are intended to
elicit such evidence, or are likely to do so, or
- (c) evidence is
given of an imputation about the other person made by the defendant—
- (i) on being
questioned under caution, before charge, about the offence with which he is
charged, or
- (ii) on being
charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for
it.
- 9.49 We seek
submissions on whether the Act should be amended to extend the application of
section 38(2) to better achieve the policy
underpinning that section. We are
particularly interested in views on whether section 38(2) should be extended to
situations, whether
or not the defendant gives evidence, where the defendant
makes an assertion about their own veracity or attacks the veracity of the
complainant or another person:
(a) in their interview with Police (or other prosecuting agency) in relation to
the charge; or
(b) in the conduct of their defence, including in offering evidence from defence
witnesses and in cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses;
QUESTION
Q46
Should section 38(2) be amended to extend the circumstances in which the
prosecution can offer evidence about a defendant’s
veracity? If so, should
section 38(2) apply, whether or not the defendant gives evidence, when veracity
is put in issue by:
- assertions
made in the defendant’s statement to Police (or other prosecuting agency);
and/or
- the
conduct of their defence?
THE USE OF THE TERM “VERACITY” IN OTHER PARTS OF
THE ACT
- 9.50 The
term “veracity” is used in other sections of the Act outside the
veracity provisions, including in:
(a) the section 4(1) definition of a hostile witness, which refers to a witness
who “exhibits, or appears to exhibit, a lack
of veracity when giving
evidence unfavourable to the party who called the witness on a matter about
which the witness may reasonably
be supposed to have knowledge”;
(b) the section 16(1) definition of “circumstances” for the purposes
of the hearsay provisions, which includes “any
circumstances that relate
to the veracity of the person”; and
(c) section 35 on previous consistent statements, where section 35(2)(a)
provides that a previous consistent statement is admissible
if it
“responds to a challenge that will be or has been made to the
witness’s veracity or accuracy, based on a previous
inconsistent statement
of the witness or on a claim of invention on the part of the witness”.
- 9.51 Section
4(1) states that “unless the context otherwise
requires”,[780]
“veracity has the meaning given in section
37”.[781]
What is the issue?
- 9.52 Preliminary
feedback from stakeholders identified a concern that “veracity” as
defined in section 37 and used in
section 16(1) is concerned with evidence
extraneous to the facts in issue (that is, the general disposition of the person
to refrain
from lying), while in the section 4 definition of hostile witness and
section 35, it is the veracity or truthfulness, of a witness
in the particular
proceeding that is the more relevant consideration.
- 9.53 For
example, if the section 37 definition of veracity was applied to the section
4(1) definition of hostile witness, it would
mean that a witness could only be
declared hostile if they appeared to exhibit a general disposition to lie, or to
be habitually untruthful. It would not apply where a witness simply
showed a lack of truthfulness in the specific proceeding. This is inconsistent
with the Commission’s original policy
intent[782] and is unlikely to
have been the intention when the definition of veracity was amended in
2016.[783] Similarly, applying the
section 37 definition to section 35(2)(a) would also represent an unintended
narrowing of the provision by
only allowing previous consistent statement
evidence to be offered in response to a challenge involving an allegation of
lying generally.[784]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 9.54 It
appears to be generally accepted that veracity can have different meanings
across different provisions of the Act. In its
Second Review the Commission
declined to revisit this issue, on the basis that as a matter of statutory
interpretation the wording
of section 4 permitted the adoption of different
meanings of veracity and no practical problems had been identified with this
approach.[785]
- 9.55 A review of
cases and commentary since the Second Review has not identified any examples
where the use of the word veracity in
sections 4 and 35 is causing significant
problems in practice. Discussion in the case law has largely focused on the use
of “veracity”
in section 35, and it has generally been acknowledged
that “veracity” is to be understood differently in that
context.[786]
- 9.56 In the
absence of practical difficulties, the question of whether the Act should be
amended becomes one of whether it is desirable
to amend the Act to make explicit
the different meanings attached to “veracity” instead of having to
rely on case law.
This could help to improve the clarity and accessibility of
the law.[787]
- 9.57 If reform
is considered desirable, the Act could be amended to only use the term
“veracity” in relation to the veracity
rules in section
37.[788] References to
“veracity” in the section 4 definition of “hostile
witness” and section 35 could be changed
to refer instead to
“honesty” or “truthfulness”. As noted above, the
Commission’s proposed Evidence
Code used the term
“truthfulness”, but this was changed to “veracity” at
select committee stage. Changing
the language in sections 4 and 35 would have
the advantage of very clearly distinguishing section 37, making it clear that
the former
sections rely on a different approach from “veracity” as
understood in the veracity provisions. The drawback of such
an approach is that
it may open up further definitional issues by introducing new terms into the
Act, including those which were
explicitly rejected in its
development.
QUESTION
Q47
Is the different approach to veracity taken in sections outside of the
veracity rules causing problems in practice? If so, should
the Act be amended to
clarify the different meaning of “veracity” in relation to the
definition of hostile witness in
section 4(1) and the rules governing previous
consistent statements in section 35(2)(a)?
CHAPTER 10
10 Propensity evidence
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider section 43 (propensity evidence offered by the
prosecution about defendants) and seek feedback on issues
relating to:
- the general
operation of section 43(1);
- prior acquittal
evidence;
- the unusualness
factor in section 43(3); and
- the relevance of
reliability.
BACKGROUND
- 10.1 Propensity
evidence is defined as evidence that tends to show a person’s propensity
to act in a particular way or to have
a particular state of
mind.[789] As te Kōti Mana
Nui | Supreme Court has observed, the rationale for admitting propensity
evidence rests largely on the concepts
of linkage and coincidence: the greater
the linkage or coincidence provided by the propensity evidence, the greater the
probative
value that evidence is likely to
have.[790] This is often referred
to as “propensity reasoning”.
- 10.2 Section 43
of the Evidence Act 2006 controls the admissibility of propensity evidence
offered by the prosecution about defendants.
It provides that:
- 43 Propensity
evidence offered by prosecution about defendants
- (1) The
prosecution may offer propensity evidence about a defendant in a criminal
proceeding only if the evidence has a probative
value in relation to an issue in
dispute in the proceeding which outweighs the risk that the evidence may have an
unfairly prejudicial
effect on the defendant.
- (2) When
assessing the probative value of propensity evidence, the Judge must take into
account the nature of the issue in dispute.
- (3) When
assessing the probative value of propensity evidence, the Judge may consider,
among other matters, the following:
- (a) the
frequency with which the acts, omissions, events, or circumstances that are the
subject of the evidence have occurred:
- (b) the
connection in time between the acts, omissions, events, or circumstances that
are the subject of the evidence and the acts,
omissions, events, or
circumstances which constitute the offence for which the defendant is being
tried:
- (c) the extent
of the similarity between the acts, omissions, events, or circumstances that are
the subject of the evidence and the
acts, omissions, events, or circumstances
which constitute the offence for which the defendant is being tried:
- (d) the number
of persons making allegations against the defendant that are the same as, or are
similar to, the subject of the offence
for which the defendant is being
tried:
- (e) whether the
allegations described in paragraph (d) may be the result of collusion or
suggestibility:
- (f) the extent
to which the acts, omissions, events, or circumstances that are the subject of
the evidence and the acts, omissions,
events, or circumstances which constitute
the offence for which the defendant is being tried are unusual.
- (4) When
assessing the prejudicial effect of evidence on the defendant, the Judge must
consider, among any other matters,—
- (a) whether the
evidence is likely to unfairly predispose the fact-finder against the defendant;
and
- (b) whether the
fact-finder will tend to give disproportionate weight in reaching a verdict to
evidence of other acts or omissions.
THE GENERAL OPERATION OF SECTION 43(1)
- 10.3 Section
43 is one of the most frequently litigated provisions in the
Act.[791] This highlights not only
the significance of propensity evidence to both the prosecution and the
defence,[792] but also the
intensely fact-specific nature of the section 43(1) test.
What is the issue?
- 10.4 Preliminary
feedback identified concern among some defence lawyers that the
section 43(1) test, as applied by the courts, may:
(a) set the threshold for admitting propensity evidence too low, resulting in
propensity evidence about the defendant being admitted
too readily; and
(b) prevent the development of precedent, resulting in unpredictable and
inconsistent admissibility decisions under section 43.
- 10.5 While these
appear to be views shared by some
commentators,[793] they are not
universally held. It is generally accepted that section 43 provides for a wider
range of propensity evidence to be admitted
than was possible under the common
law similar fact evidence
rule,[794] and that the section
43(1) test is an intensely fact-specific exercise. There are mixed views,
however, on whether this is of itself
problematic, and whether further
elaboration of the legislative test would be helpful.
How do the courts approach the section 43(1) test?
- 10.6 Early
cases under the Act questioned how the section 43(1) test should be
applied.[795] In Vuletich v
R, Baragwanath J observed that the Act provides no guidance on how a judge
is to perform the weighing-up process required by section
43.[796] He suggested there was a
need to identify a clear standard or “objective measure”, without
which a ruling “will
depend on the fortuity of whoever among our many
trial judges happens to be called upon to make
it”.[797] Baragwanath
J’s tentative proposal was for a sliding scale approach, whereby the
greater the risk of improper prejudice, the
more compelling the probative value
needed to be, and the stronger the prosecution’s case in respect of the
issue, the higher
the prospect of securing admission of the
evidence.[798] The need for a
standard in applying the section 43(1) test was, however, rejected by the
majority in Vuletich as being inconsistent with earlier case law and
adding an unwarranted gloss to the statutory
language.[799]
- 10.7 The leading
case on the operation of section 43 is the Supreme Court’s split decision
in Mahomed v R.[800]
That case has been criticised for failing to provide any further guidance on
the operation of the section 43(1)
test.[801] The authors of
Mahoney on Evidence observe that “[w]e are still left with
the unpredictability over admissibility that was a feature of evidence law
before the Act”.[802]
Richard Mahoney writing separately said that “[t]here can be no clearer
demonstration of the inevitability of continuing litigation
involving propensity
evidence than the point of contention which led to the 3:2 split in the Supreme
Court in
Mahomed”.[803]
- 10.8 More recent
appellate decisions have not raised the same concerns as earlier cases. This
indicates that the courts are now reasonably
comfortable with applying the
section 43(1) test in the absence of any standard or more precise guidance. Te
Kōti Pīra
| Court of Appeal in Grigg v R, for example,
considered that the propensity provisions “are comprehensive and
admirably clear and
concise”.[804] There the
Court observed that, if a court applies the provisions to the case with which it
is dealing, there should seldom be a need
to refer to another case. The Court
explained that the reason other cases are unlikely to assist is that the outcome
in each case
turns on the weight to be given to the matters set out in sections
43(3) and (4) of the Act.[805] In
a more recent decision, the Court of Appeal, citing Grigg,
suggested that judges should avoid pointless attempts to reconcile one
propensity ruling with
another.[806]
- 10.9 This
underpins a central difficulty with attempting to analyse the operation of
section 43 through case comparisons. If each
case turns on its own facts, and
attempts at reconciling decisions in different cases are unhelpful, there is
little utility in attempting
to seek guidance from appellate case law. The
assumption seems to be that the intensely fact-specific assessment does result
in divergent
outcomes[807] but
that this is the nature of the test and not necessarily problematic. As Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission explained in
2008:[808]
- Assessment of
probative value, prejudice, and the ultimate weighing process to determine
unfairness, in the end involve value judgements
based on judicial knowledge and
experience. There will not be absolute uniformity. Nevertheless, unless all
previous convictions
were to be admissible, that is unavoidable: any precise
formula that did not involve the exercise of judgment would produce undue
rigidity and therefore injustice.
Is section 43(1) operating as intended?
- 10.10 It
is possible that the current approach under section 43 does not reflect the
original policy objectives of the section. Section
43 is based on the
Commission’s Evidence Code. In its 1997 Preliminary Paper, the Commission
explained that it was seeking
to codify the law relating to similar fact
evidence so that the defendant’s propensity to behave in the manner of the
offence
charged should in general be prohibited, except if its probative
value in relation to an issue in dispute sufficiently outweighs the
danger that it may have a prejudicial effect on the
defendant.[809] The intention was
that the admission of propensity evidence under the Evidence Code would be
“strictly
limited”.[810]
- 10.11 Accordingly,
the Commission’s original draft provision, published for consultation in
its 1997 Preliminary Paper, required
that probative value “substantially
outweigh” prejudicial
effect.[811] This wording was
changed to “clearly outweighs” in the Commission’s Evidence
Code.[812] That wording, the
Commission explained, “in largely codifying the common law, recognises the
prejudicial nature of propensity
evidence for defendants in criminal proceedings
by providing added
protection”.[813] The
Commission did not use the language of “clearly outweighs” for what
became section 8 of the Act (general exclusion).
That section provides that
evidence must be excluded if “its probative value is outweighed by”
the risk that the evidence
will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the
proceeding.[814] This may suggest
that some higher standard for propensity evidence was originally intended.
- 10.12 The word
“clearly” in the Commission’s proposed Evidence Code provision
was not included in the draft Evidence
Bill. This was in response to a concern
raised by the Solicitor-General that requiring that probative value
“clearly outweighs”
prejudicial effect would change the approach
(that is, make it harder to admit propensity evidence than under the common law)
rather
than codify it.[815] This
indicates that section 43 was not intended to result in a lower threshold for
admitting propensity evidence than existed at
common law.
- 10.13 Richard
Mahoney has observed that there was nothing obvious in the wording of the Act
that justified any dramatic change from
the position already reached by the
common law.[816] If anything,
Mahoney said, the Commission appeared to have thought section 43 strengthened
the position of defendants to resist negative
propensity evidence from the
prosecution (by providing added
protection).[817]
- 10.14 Despite
this, the passing of the Act and the subsequent interpretation of section
43[818] has resulted in a
“sea change” in the way that propensity evidence about a defendant
is assessed. As the Commission explained
in 2008, under the Act an assessment of
propensity evidence:[819]
- ... no longer
starts from a proposition that “mere propensity is not enough: there must
be the additional features of some
sort affording real probative value”
(or some other permutation of the added probative value approach). It starts
without common
law similar fact baggage. It provides a new, and this time
positive, starting point: propensity, per se, even “mere”,
is
enough, provided it can pass through a probative value/prejudicial effect
control. The non-prescriptive factors in section 43(3)
bearing on the question
whether the propensity concerned can so pass through that control, familiar in
similar fact cases, now apply
to the propensity evidence presumed from the
outset to be “in”, and not on top of propensity evidence presumed
from the
outset to be “out”. It no longer need be said propensity
evidence needs additional probative features beyond mere propensity.
The
“mere” propensity can suffice provided it has sufficient probative
force, after consideration of the necessary factors,
to outweigh
prejudice.
Is the wording of section 43(1) preventing the development of
precedent?
- 10.15 The
second concern we identified is that the absence of any standard in section 43
itself or in case law may be stifling the
development of a body of precedent,
which could then be applied to future cases to develop a more consistent and
predictable approach
under section 43. In R v Healy, an early case
considering the newly enacted Act, the Court of Appeal observed that
“[w]here the balance will ultimately lie
in terms of section 43 is a
matter that will be developed over
time”.[820] However, the
Court’s subsequent rejection of a standard in applying the section 43(1)
test in Vuletich and later statements in Grigg, discussed
above, suggest that the inherently fact-specific assessment required by section
43 is not amenable to such developments.
Associate Professor Scott Optican,
rejecting the “state of jurisprudential resignation” described in
Grigg, has argued
that:[821]
- ... fundamental
common law methodology - together with basic tenets of jurisprudential constancy
- demands some judicial effort at
ensuring consistent application of the s 43
balancing test. Indeed, the whole point of judgments giving statements of
principle as
to how s 43 should be approached is to create precisely that kind
of regularity. Accordingly, while every prosecution application
to adduce
propensity evidence about a criminal defendant will depend on specific
application of s 43 itself, judges should still
examine precedents to see how
elaborated principles of adjudication have played themselves out in the facts
and circumstances of
decided case law.
- 10.16 On this
issue too, there are different views. For example, the authors of Cross on
Evidence state:[822]
- The Act
provides no guidance on how the weighing-up process is to occur, but doubt
attaches to whether it could. The assessment of
probative value as against
unfairly prejudicial effect is a task familiar to courts and one, it is
respectfully suggested, best left
to them. Unsurprisingly then, a ‘sliding
scale’ approach to s 43 has been rejected. This means it is not correct to
regard
“powerfully probative” evidence as presumptively admissible
unless s 43(4) would make that course unfair.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 10.17 The
policy concern that section 43 sought to address was the need to balance the
competing interests of ensuring a fact-finder
has all the relevant evidence
before them, and guarding against the risk that the fact-finder might make
unwarranted and dangerous
assumptions about the defendant along the lines of
“once a thief, always a
thief”.[823]
- 10.18 It is
ultimately a policy question as to whether the issues identified above warrant
legislative reform. It depends on whether
section 43 is striking the right
balance between the competing interests discussed above. We do not express any
preliminary views
on these issues or on whether reform is necessary or
desirable, and we welcome submissions on these matters.
- 10.19 Should
reform be desirable, consideration will need to be given to the impact of any
reform on evidence that falls within the
definition of propensity evidence, but
is offered for a purpose other than propensity reasoning. This includes evidence
frequently
referred to as “background”, “relationship”
or “narrative” evidence. Such evidence is still subject
to section
43, even if it is not offered to support propensity
reasoning.[824] This does not
appear to create any significant problems in
practice,[825] which is due in
part to the fact that the courts do not rigidly apply the section 43(3) factors
to propensity evidence offered for
a non-propensity
purpose,[826] and that there is
“little or no practical difference” between the two balancing tests
in sections 8 and 43.[827]
- 10.20 If,
however, section 43 were amended to introduce a heightened test for admission of
propensity evidence, it may be necessary
or desirable to explicitly address the
application of that test to propensity evidence offered for a non-propensity
purpose. On one
view, section 43 is designed to address the risks inherent in
propensity reasoning, and arguably those risks do not arise to the
same extent
when propensity reasoning is not engaged or if the evidence is directly relevant
to the relationship between the defendant
and the
complainant.[828] On the other
hand, given that section 43 is intended to protect a defendant’s fair
trial rights, it may be appropriate to retain
a broad application for the
propensity provisions, regardless of whether the threshold should
change.
Options for reform
- 10.21 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, we have identified two possible
options. Both options are based on comparable
provisions in Australia and seek
to raise the threshold for the admission of propensity evidence and, in doing
so, facilitate the
development of appropriate precedent under section 43.
Option 1: Amend section 43(1) to require probative value to
“substantially” outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice
- 10.22 This
option more closely reflects the Commission’s original draft
provision.[829] We have suggested
“substantially” over “clearly” given the former is
already used in other provisions of
the Act and is consistent with the language
adopted in Australia.
- 10.23 In some
Australian jurisdictions, propensity evidence (referred to as
“tendency” and “coincidence” evidence)
cannot be used
against the defendant “unless the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect
it may have on the
defendant”.[830] This is
regarded as a more stringent test than simply requiring probative value to
outweigh prejudicial effect, skewing the test
towards exclusion of propensity
evidence.[831] We note that some
Australian jurisdictions have recently departed from this threshold in response
to concerns raised by the Australian
Royal Commission into Institutional
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. The Royal Commission found that tendency and
coincidence evidence
in child sexual offending cases was being excluded too
readily.[832] In order to
facilitate greater admissibility of propensity evidence in criminal proceedings
involving child sexual offending, some
states have replaced the phrase
“substantially outweighs” with
“outweighs”.[833]
- 10.24 The
Australian experience highlights the risks inherent in adopting a higher
threshold for propensity evidence. These risks
would need to be carefully
considered before recommending any reform measures. We note, however, that New
Zealand courts have not
encountered the same difficulties as in Australia in
relation to the admission of propensity evidence in cases involving sexual
offending
against children and young people. Instead, as we explore below, it is
now generally accepted that such offending is inherently unusual,
which supports
the admission of such evidence under section 43(3)(f). Adopting a higher
threshold for assessing probative value and
unfair prejudice may, therefore, be
unlikely to create the same problems that have been observed in
Australia.
Option 2: Require the propensity evidence to have
“significant” probative value
- 10.25 This
is a variation on the sliding scale approach suggested in early section 43 cases
and would require, in all cases, the court
to be satisfied that the proposed
propensity evidence has “significant probative value”.
- 10.26 Like
Option 1, this language arguably more closely reflects the original policy
objective of the propensity provisions. The
Commission explained in its 1997
Preliminary Paper its expectation that the courts should continue to approach
evidence of character
with considerable caution, admitting only such evidence
that is likely to be substantially probative or helpful and upon which they
can
rely.[834]
- 10.27 This
option is consistent with current approaches in
Australia.[835] There, the
requirement is that tendency or coincidence evidence has “significant
probative value” (in addition to the
requirement in some Australian
jurisdictions that the tendency or coincidence evidence substantially outweighs
any prejudicial effect).
The requirement for “significant probative
value” directs attention to the extent to which the evidence can
“rationally
affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a
fact in issue”.[836] The
Australian High Court has held that, in the context of tendency evidence, this
is a two-stage process. First, the evidence, by
itself or together with other
evidence, must strongly support proof of a tendency. Second, the tendency
strongly supports the proof
of a fact that makes up the offence charged (that
is, a fact in
issue).[837]
QUESTION
Q48
Is the current threshold for admitting propensity evidence about the
defendant under section 43(1) causing problems in practice? If
so, should
section 43(1) be amended to:
- require
probative value to “substantially” outweigh the risk of unfair
prejudice; and/or
- require
the propensity evidence to have “significant” probative
value?
PRIOR ACQUITTAL EVIDENCE
- 10.28 The
Act does not specifically address the status of evidence that has previously
been led at a trial against the defendant and
resulted in an acquittal (prior
acquittal evidence). In Fenemor v R, the Supreme Court confirmed that the
Act treats prior acquittal evidence the same as other propensity evidence about
a defendant.[838] The Court held,
however, that when assessing the prejudicial effect of prior acquittal evidence
on the defendant, the judge must
consider whether the fact that the propensity
evidence is prior acquittal evidence gives rise to any, or any additional,
unfair prejudice.
To the extent that it does, the judge should consider how this
additional dimension affects the overall balance between probative
value and
unfair prejudice.[839] The Court
explained:[840]
- In carrying out
that evaluation, the focus will be on whether it is unfair to expect the
defendant to respond again to the evidence
in question in light of the fact that
it was not regarded as sufficient to result in a conviction on the earlier
occasion.
- 10.29 The Court
drew a distinction between any prejudice and unfair prejudice,
noting that there will always be some prejudice to a defendant in having to
address the same allegations a second
time.[841] There must therefore be
something about the circumstances of, or leading to, the acquittal that gives
rise to prejudice that is
unfair.[842] The Court did not
seek to elaborate in the abstract on when it would be unfair to a defendant to
admit prior acquittal evidence,
observing that case law would likely provide
further guidance over
time.[843]
What is the issue?
- 10.30 Appellate
case law since the Supreme Court’s decision in Fenemor appears to
indicate that only in the rarest of cases will the acquittal dimension have a
meaningful impact on the assessment of the
prejudicial effect under section
43. This has led to calls for further guidance as to when and under
what circumstances acquittal evidence should be excluded under section
43.[844]
- 10.31 In the
years immediately following Fenemor, several Court of Appeal
decisions ruled prior acquittal evidence inadmissible given the unfair prejudice
posed by the acquittal
dimension.[845] These cases
suggested that relevant factors included the passage of time and the
completeness of the records from the previous investigation
and trial, as this
impacted on the defendant’s ability to respond to the prior acquittal
evidence at the present
trial.[846] Other relevant factors
included the risk of overwhelming the trial with the prior acquittal evidence
and the consequential impact
that this could have on jury
decision-making.[847]
- 10.32 More
recent cases, however, appear to take a different approach to assessing prior
acquittal evidence.[848] These
cases suggest that it will be rare for prior acquittal evidence that is
otherwise admissible under section 43 to be excluded
for reasons connected to
the acquittal dimension.
- 10.33 In
Brooks v R, the acquittal evidence related to a trial 23 years
earlier.[849] Most of the records
were lost – all that remained was the complainant’s original
statement to police and a police statement
from another witness in the form of
recent complaint evidence. It was argued that the combination of the lapse of
time and absence
of files rendered the evidence unfairly prejudicial. The Court
of Appeal was split, with the majority ruling in favour of admission.
- 10.34 The
majority observed that consideration of the acquittal dimension “extends
to the reasons for the acquittal, the nature
of the evidence and any
circumstances making it unfair to respond again to the
evidence”.[850] The majority
stated that “the unavailability of the prior record may lead to
unfair prejudice, but it is not sufficient in
itself”.[851] To support
this view, the majority noted that the jury’s reasons for acquitting the
defendant will frequently not be discernible
from the
record.[852] Further, while an
inference might be drawn from an acquittal that the jury did not find the
complainant’s account sufficiently
persuasive to prove the charge beyond
reasonable doubt, that inference is not sufficient in itself since it is merely
the opinion
of the previous
jury.[853] Ultimately, the
majority considered that:[854]
- ... a defendant
seeking to exclude prior acquittal evidence must point to something more than
the absence of a record. The court
will not assume that the missing record must
have been advantageous for the defendant at the new trial. To the extent that
Mead held otherwise, we respectfully disagree.
- 10.35 The
minority (Peters J) would have ruled the acquittal evidence inadmissible on the
basis of the delay and its adverse effects
on the accuracy of memory, including
on the defendant who could not recall details of the earlier trial, as well as
the fact that
almost all relevant contemporaneous information was
unavailable.[855] This meant that
defence counsel could not mount an effective response to the evidence, which
would put the defence at a distinct
disadvantage.[856] The suggestion
that it was “speculative” to suggest the missing material would have
benefited the defendant did not,
in the Judge’s view, withstand
scrutiny.[857]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 10.36 We
are interested in views on whether there are concerns about how prior acquittal
evidence is assessed under section 43 and,
if so, whether section 43 should be
amended to include specific guidance on assessing the prejudicial effect of
prior acquittal evidence.
Brooks appears to suggest that prior acquittal
evidence may be admitted even in situations where there is a significant lapse
in time between
the events that resulted in the acquittal and the present case
and even where much of the record of that earlier investigation and
trial are
lost. Something more is
required.[858]
- 10.37 Optican is
critical of the current approach and of the majority’s decision in
Brooks in particular, arguing that it establishes “an onerous and
overly granular standard of unfair prejudice that, in most cases,
the defence
will struggle to meet and judges (who are so inclined) will readily find
unsatisfied”.[859] The
Supreme Court declined leave to appeal the decision in Brooks,
considering that the application “attempts to reargue the application
of settled law to the facts of this
case”.[860]
Option for reform
- 10.38 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, section 43 could be amended to
require the judge, when assessing the prejudicial
effect of prior acquittal
evidence, to consider certain factors. For example, the Act could require a
judge to consider whether the
defendant is able to fairly respond to the
allegations in the present proceedings, having regard to the lapse of time since
the earlier
investigation and the present trial, the material available in
relation to them and any other relevant
matter.[861]
- 10.39 The
purpose of such an amendment would be to elevate the significance of these
matters in the court’s assessment of unfair
prejudice. This could better
recognise the unfairness that arises in situations where, when a full hearing of
the evidence has previously
resulted in an acquittal, defence counsel is unable
to rely on that same material to respond to the prior acquittal evidence. Where
the relevant records from a trial many years ago are largely absent, it should
be open to the court to find that the unfair prejudice
outweighs the probative
value of the evidence without requiring the defence to point to a specific piece
of information in the absent
records that had some material bearing on the
acquittal. This may, however, not go far enough, and we welcome views on this.
QUESTION
Q49
Further consideration would need to be given to what constitutes prior acquittal
evidence for such an amendment and whether it should
include, for example,
charges that are withdrawn prior to trial and charges that are dismissed.
Is the approach to prior acquittal evidence under section 43 causing problems
in practice? If so, should it be amended to provide
guidance on the factors that
should be considered when assessing the prejudicial effect of prior acquittal
evidence?
THE UNUSUALNESS FACTOR IN SECTION 43(3)
- 10.41 Section
43(3) lists factors the judge may consider, among other matters, when assessing
the probative value of propensity evidence.
One factor, in section 43(3)(f), is
the “unusualness factor”, that is:
- the extent to
which the acts, omissions, events, or circumstances that are the subject of the
evidence and the acts, omissions, events,
or circumstances which constitute the
offence for which the defendant is being tried are unusual.
What is the issue?
- 10.42 There
have long been questions about how “unusualness” should be
assessed.[862] There is no
guidance in the Act and there was little discussion of this factor in the
Commission’s early work on reforming
the law of evidence. As a result,
different approaches to determining unusualness have emerged in the case
law.
- 10.43 There
appear to be three different approaches to assessing
unusualness:[863]
(a) Some cases focus on whether the type of offending is unusual,
compared to other types of offending.
(b) Some cases focus on the characteristics of the offending (that is,
whether the characteristics that are common to both the propensity evidence and
the alleged offending disclose something
distinctive and different to the usual
run of cases of that nature).
(c) Other cases focus on the nature of the offending, compared to normal
standards of behaviour.
- 10.44 In its
Second Review of the Act, the Commission considered whether the approach to
assessing unusualness should be clarified.
It noted criticisms with the
approaches that focus on the type of offending and nature of offending but
observed a trend in that
the courts seemed to be focusing on the characteristics
of the offending. In light of this, the Commission concluded it was unnecessary
to amend section
43(3)(f).[864]
- 10.45 Cases
since the Second Review and preliminary feedback have, however, confirmed that
there remain multiple approaches to assessing
unusualness.[865] A series of
cases, for example, has established that sexual offending against children is
inherently unusual by focusing on the nature
of the offending compared to normal
standards of behaviour.[866] Other
recent cases have also assessed unusualness by reference to the type or nature
of the offending rather than by focusing on
distinctive characteristics common
to the propensity evidence and alleged offending. In R v Ahlawat,
the Court of Appeal accepted a submission that arson “is itself
conduct which is inherently
unusual”.[867] In Goel v
R, the defendants faced a number of charges relating to bribery and
corruption of officials.[868] The
Court of Appeal confirmed that the various charges were cross-admissible as
propensity evidence, observing that “[t]he
type of conduct alleged,
(bribery and corruption of public officials) is unusual in New
Zealand”.[869]
- 10.46 In
contrast, other cases have focused on the unusualness of the common
characteristics of the propensity evidence and the alleged
offending.[870] This approach
appears to be used when the alleged propensity is specific rather than general
in nature.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 10.47 We
seek submissions on whether the continued application of different ways to
assess unusualness under section 43(3)(f) is a
problem that warrants reform. On
the one hand, having different approaches can result in uncertainty as to how
the courts might approach
this factor. However, the different approaches appear
to be engaged in different situations. Where there is a general propensity,
the
courts will typically look at whether the nature or type of offending can be
considered unusual compared to normal standards
of behaviour or other types of
offending. Where a specific propensity is alleged, the courts will consider
whether the common characteristics
in the propensity evidence and alleged
offending are sufficiently distinctive or unusual.
- 10.48 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable to clarify the approach to
unusualness, the question then becomes how the
Act should be amended. Each
approach can be criticised for different reasons. An approach that focuses on
the type or nature of offending
has been criticised because of its lack of focus
on the circumstances of the offending and the risk that it may lead to findings
that are not based on empirical
evidence.[871] However, an
approach that focuses on the distinctiveness of the common characteristics is
criticised as reverting to the stricter,
common law similar fact
rule.[872] The courts have
observed on several occasions that the propensity rule “is not confined to
a similar way of achieving a particular
goal”.[873] Adopting this
approach over all others would, however, constitute a significant change in
practice. It may, therefore, be desirable
to leave this matter to the courts to
develop through case law in response to specific circumstances, rather than
through legislative
amendment.
- 10.49 Another
reform option could be to simply repeal the unusualness factor altogether. This
option may be appropriate if it is considered
that the concerns identified with
the approaches that focus on the type or nature of offending are insurmountable
and would leave
the distinctiveness of the common characteristics to be assessed
under section 43(3)(c), which relates to the extent of the similarity
between
the propensity evidence and the facts in issue. This would, however, constitute
a significant change in practice.
QUESTION
Q50
Is section 43(3)(f) causing problems in practice? If so, should it be:
- amended
to clarify how unusualness should be assessed; or
- repealed
altogether?
RELEVANCE OF RELIABILITY
What is the issue?
- 10.50 It
is unclear whether a judge who is determining the admissibility of propensity
evidence under section 43 should assess the
reliability of that
evidence.[874]
- 10.51 Under the
common law, the judge had to assume the truth of the propensity evidence where
the allegations were denied by the
defendant.[875] Section 43(3)(e)
of the Act now permits judges to consider whether the allegations made by a
propensity witness “may be the
result of collusion or
suggestibility”. The Court of Appeal has therefore treated the reliability
of the propensity evidence
as relevant to admissibility where collusion or
suggestibility is in
issue.[876]
- 10.52 The Act is
otherwise silent on the wider relevance of reliability to a judge’s
assessment under section 43. There has
been no general acceptance in case law of
the proposition that the judge must consider the reliability of the proposed
propensity
evidence.[877] To the
contrary, the Court of Appeal has observed
that:[878]
- The general
rule ... is that challenges to the credibility and reliability of propensity
witnesses are to be resolved at trial and
that the Court should not usurp the
jury’s role at a pre-trial stage.
- 10.53 In
George v R, the Court of Appeal explained the relevance of reliability to
an assessment under section 43 as
follows:[879]
- There may be
appropriate cases for hearing oral evidence on a contested propensity
application. As a general rule the briefs of proposed
evidence are accepted at
face value, given the Court’s pre-trial threshold or gate-keeping function
which is not to be confused
with the jury’s ultimate inquiry into
reliability or credibility. An example is when the evidence can be shown to be
inherently
improbable by reference to objectively provable facts. ... Otherwise
challenges to the reliability or credibility of propensity witnesses,
as with
any other class of witness, are to be resolved at trial. The issue for
determination before trial is solely one of the admissibility
of the proposed
propensity evidence to be measured according to the relevant statutory
criteria.
The Supreme Court’s decision in W (SC 38/2019) v
R
- 10.54 The
approach to reliability under section 43 established in the cases above is
called into question indirectly by the Supreme
Court’s decision in W
(SC 38/2019) v R.[880]
While that case considered the extent to which reliability may be considered
under section 8 (general exclusion), the test in section
43 is very similar.
Previously, the Supreme Court has observed that there is “little or no
practical difference” between
the section 43 and section 8 balancing
tests.[881]
- 10.55 In W
(SC 38/2019) v R, the Court observed “it is clear from the
statutory scheme that an evaluation of probative value may include
considerations of
reliability”.[882] The Court
went on to explain:[883]
- In undertaking
the gatekeeping role, reliability may be considered in assessing the probative
value of the evidence as part of weighing
that value as against the risk of the
unfairly prejudicial effect of the evidence. The reliability assessment should
be made without
adding any artificial limits such as a requirement to take the
evidence at its highest. Matters such as inconsistencies, difficulties
with the
chain of evidence, the circumstances in which the evidence arises, inherent
implausibility as well as incentives to lie
can all be
considered.
- 10.56 While W
(SC 38/2019) v R concerned the reliability of prison informant evidence, the
Supreme Court has since confirmed that, as a general point, a court may
have
regard to the evidence’s reliability when weighing the probative value of
evidence for the purposes of section
8.[884]
- 10.57 In the
context of section 43, the Supreme Court’s comments were referred to and
applied in R v Wallace, a te Kōti Matua | High Court decision
that considered an application to admit propensity evidence, which was
challenged on the
basis that the evidence was not reliable or
credible.[885] The Court explained
that:[886]
- My assessment
of the probative value of the evidence may include considerations of
reliability, but that reliability assessment should
be made without applying any
artificial limits or presumptions, while having regard to the division between
the roles of judge and
jury and the fact that the assessment is being undertaken
at a preliminary stage without the full context.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 10.58 In
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in W (SC 38/2019) v R, it
would be inconsistent to continue to apply a higher bar to the consideration of
reliability under section 43 compared to section
8. Applying the Supreme
Court’s approach to section 43 would also be consistent with the
Commission’s original recommendations
in the Evidence
Code.[887] It would address
concerns previously identified by the authors of Mahoney on Evidence, who
argue that:[888]
- ... it is
unreasonable to limit a judge’s enquiry to these topics [collusion and
suggestibility] alone. After all, the overriding
focus of s 43(3) is the
assessment of probative value, and reliability is surely a central part of any
such enquiry. Given that s
43(3)(e) has altered the common law by now requiring
a judge to consider the truth of the allegations made by the propensity
accusers,
there does not appear to be any reason to restrict that enquiry to the
possibility of collusion and suggestibility. Other factors,
such as the veracity
of the propensity accusers, should likewise be available for consideration. It
is suggested that when propensity
evidence consists of allegations which the
defendant denies, the judge determining admissibility should make an overall
assessment
of the reliability of these allegations.
- 10.59 As noted
above, we have identified one example of the Supreme Court’s approach in
W (SC 38/2019) v R being applied by the High Court in the context of
section 43. This indicates that reform may not be necessary to ensure the
courts
take a consistent approach under sections 8 and 43. We are, however,
aware of another Court of Appeal decision that took a different
approach to the
relevance of reliability under section 43 and was decided after these
decisions.[889] As a result, a
degree of uncertainty may remain. Another factor that may support reform of the
Act is that section 43(3) already
exclusively refers to two specific aspects of
reliability (collusion and suggestibility).
- 10.60 If
amendment is considered necessary or desirable, one option would be to amend
section 43(3)(e) to read: “the reliability
of the allegations described in
paragraph (d), including whether they may be the result of collusion or
suggestibility”.
QUESTION
Q51
Should section 43(3)(e) be amended to clarify that, when assessing the
probative value of propensity evidence, the judge may consider
the reliability
of the proposed propensity evidence?
CHAPTER 11
11 Identification evidence
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on issues relating to the
definition of visual identification evidence.
DEFINITION OF VISUAL IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
- 11.1 Section
4 of the Evidence Act 2006 defines “visual identification evidence”
as an assertion that a defendant “was
present at or near a place where an
act constituting direct or circumstantial evidence of the commission of an
offence was done at,
or about, the time the act was
done”.[890]
- 11.2 The Act
contains special provisions for visual identification evidence. These
provisions, based on Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission’s proposed
Evidence Code, reflect scientific research that highlights reliability concerns
with this type of evidence.[891]
- 11.3 Section 45
controls the admissibility of visual identification evidence. It requires a
formal procedure to be followed in obtaining
visual identification evidence of a
person alleged to have committed an offence unless there was a good reason for
not following
a formal procedure, for example, because it could not have been
reasonably anticipated that identification would be an issue at
trial.[892]
- 11.4 Section 126
requires the trial judge to warn the jury of the special need for caution when
the case against the defendant “depends
wholly or substantially on the
correctness of 1 or more visual or voice identifications of the defendant or any
other
person”.[893]
What is the issue?
- 11.5 There
is conflicting case law on whether the Act’s identification evidence
provisions apply if a defendant admits to being
present at the scene of an
offence but denies being the perpetrator. For example, the defendant might claim
that they were mistakenly
identified as the person seen holding the weapon or
commiting the assault.
- 11.6 In the
first five years after the Act was passed, two conflicting approaches emerged in
appellate case law. The source of this
conflict is the definition of
“visual identification evidence” in section 4, which is focused
solely on identifications
of a person who was at the scene, not
identifications of a person who was committing an
act.[894]
Uncertainty arose when the defendant admitted to being at the scene but not
to committing the relevant act.
- 11.7 On one line
of authority (the restrictive approach), the definition of visual identification
evidence is not engaged if the defendant
admits they were present at the scene
of an offence but disputes their role in the
offending.[895] This approach
makes a strict distinction between “visual identification evidence”
(identifications of a person who was
at the scene) and “observation
evidence” (identifications of the actions of a
person).[896]
- 11.8 Another
line of authority favours a more inclusive
approach.[897] In Peato v
R, te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal gave the definition of
“visual identification evidence” a purposive reading to
include
evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime, in
circumstances where the reliability of the identification
is at issue,
notwithstanding an admission or other evidence placing the accused at or near
the scene.[898] It considered this
to be consistent with the common law approach and the fact that the
Commission’s intention when developing
the Evidence Code had been
to replicate or extend, rather than restrict, this
approach.[899]
- 11.9 Later cases
attempted to reconcile these two approaches, suggesting that, on both lines of
authority, the question to be asked
in each case is “whether
identification was in issue, or whether it was merely the accused’s
actions”.[900]
- 11.10 The
Commission considered the conflicting case law in its 2013 Review of the
Act.[901] It considered the
position under the case law was that observation evidence does not come within
the definition of visual identification
evidence (following the restrictive
approach) but that a section 126 warning will be required for observation
evidence if identification
is still in
issue.[902] While it noted that
some doubt had been cast on this interpretation of the section 4 definition by
cases following the inclusive
approach, it was not aware of any problems in
practice and accordingly considered no legislative change was
required.[903]
Ongoing issues
- 11.11 Despite
attempts to reconcile the conflicting case law, problems have persisted.
- 11.12 In R v
Eruera, the prosecution argued that, because the defendant had admitted
their presence at the scene, the evidence of two eyewitnesses was
not
identification evidence but observation evidence and therefore section 45 was
irrelevant.[904] Te Kōti
Matua | High Court considered the conflicting case law and preferred the
inclusive approach. It reasoned that whether
evidence is subject to section 45
should depend not on a strict classification process but rather on whether the
concerns that are
traditionally raised by identification evidence are
present.[905]
- 11.13 In
contrast, the Court of Appeal in R v Howard applied the restrictive
approach.[906] On the
facts, however, the Court held that the evidence was visual
identification evidence because the defendant disputed that he was present at
the scene.[907]
- 11.14 In another
case where the defendant had admitted to being at the scene, te
Kōti-ā-Rohe | District Court applied the
restrictive approach in
determining that the prosecution could offer evidence that had not gone through
a formal identification process
from a witness who identified the defendant as a
person involved in a group assault. This was on the basis that the evidence was
observation evidence and not caught by the definition of visual identification
evidence and did not, therefore, have to comply with
section
45.[908] That decision was
appealed, but the Court of Appeal did not address the issue as it allowed the
appeal on a different
point.[909]
- 11.15 Commentators
have expressed concern about the conflicting case law and about the persistence
of the restrictive approach.[910]
The authors of Mahoney on Evidence argue the restrictive approach has
produced an “unsatisfactory” and “watered down”
interpretation of section
126.[911]
They suggest the inclusive approach “better promotes the purpose for
the statutory scheme in sections 45 and 126 more clearly,
and rightly
acknowledges the possibility that identification may be an issue even where the
defendant admits to being present at
the scene of the
offence”.[912]
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Pink v R
- 11.16 In
2021, this issue was again considered by the Court of Appeal in Pink v
R.[913] The Court commented
that cases where the defendant admits to being present in a group but denies any
personal wrongdoing cause difficulties
due to how the definition of visual
identification was drafted.[914]
After examining the earlier authorities, it observed
that:[915]
- ... it can be
safely concluded from the authorities that there is no bright line distinction
between visual identification evidence
in the strict sense and observation
evidence. That is to say, it is wrong to suggest that an identification warning
is only required
when the defendant denies being at the scene. A warning may
still be required where the defendant admits being present and it is
a live
issue as to whether he or someone else present was the
perpetrator.
- 11.17 The Court
then applied this approach to the facts. The witnesses said they had seen the
defendant swinging the axe and bringing
it down on the man lying on the ground.
The defendant admitted to being present at the scene and holding the axe used in
the attack
but claimed he was intervening to confiscate the axe and stop the
attack. The Court said that, if that was the extent of the dispute,
there was a
“very strong argument” for saying no identification warning was
required under section 126.[916]
That was because, on that version of events, the witnesses’ mistake was
not as to who the witnesses had seen with the axe,
but rather what they had seen
the defendant do with it. However, the Court found that in both
cross-examination and its closing address,
the defence had implicitly advanced
the possibility that the eyewitnesses may have come on the scene before the
defendant confiscated
the axe and therefore had seen someone else wielding it.
This meant that identification was a live issue. The Court therefore concluded
section 126 was
engaged.[917]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 11.18 Given
the conflicting case law and criticisms in the commentary described above, we
think that reform is desirable to clarify
the application of the identification
evidence provisions in situations where a defendant admits to being at the
scene.
- 11.19 Our
preliminary view is that the protections in the identification evidence
provisions should apply whenever the identity of
the perpetrator is in issue. We
agree with the Court of Appeal that, even when the accused admits their presence
at the scene, the
risk of mistaken identification can be just as
real.[918] While the Court of
Appeal in Pink provided guidance on the proper approach to section 126
directions, our view is that it would be preferable to clarify this in the
Act
in relation to both section 45 and section 126.
- 11.20 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, one option is to amend the
definition of “visual identification evidence”
to add a new
paragraph to address the following situation (based on existing wording of
subsection (a) of the definition with variations
on the language in
italics):
- evidence that
is an assertion by a person, based wholly or partly on what that person saw, to
the effect that a defendant was the person observed performing an act
constituting direct or circumstantial evidence of the commission of an
offence.
- 11.21 The effect
of this amendment would be two-fold. First, under section 45, a formal
identification procedure would need to be
followed when a witness says they saw
the defendant commit the offence, unless there is good reason not
to.[919] While this could risk
creating an undue burden on enforcement agencies, the existing guidance in the
Act and case law on the meaning
of “good reason” could accommodate
these concerns. A good reason for not following a formal procedure exists if no
officer
involved in the investigation or the prosecution could reasonably
anticipate that identification would be an issue at
trial.[920] It is already well
established that identification based on strong recognition evidence (for
example, when the witness is well acquainted
with the defendant) can satisfy
this ground.[921] Our view is that
there would arguably be a “good reason” for not following a formal
procedure if the defendant admits
to being at the scene and does not suggest the
witness was mistaken as to who they saw commit the offence. In this situation,
identity
is not in issue but rather the witness’ recollection of what they
saw the defendant do. If, however, the defendant claims the witness is
mistaken as to who they saw commit the offence, they will have put
identification
in issue. If there are concerns that the existing guidance on
“good reasons” is not sufficient to address these situations,
clearer guidance could be included in section 45(4). We welcome submissions on
this point.
- 11.22 Second,
the court would be required to direct the jury under section 126 when the case
depends “wholly or substantially”
on the correctness of witness
testimony identifying the defendant as the person who committed the offence. We
do not anticipate that
this would result in any significant change in practice,
in light of Pink, but we welcome submissions on this
point.
QUESTION
Q52
Should the definition of “visual identification evidence” be
amended to more explicitly include evidence of a person asserting
that they
observed the defendant act in the commission of an offence?
REQUIREMENTS FOR FORMAL VISUAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
- 11.23 Visual
identification evidence is admissible if a “formal procedure” is
followed unless the defendant proves on
the balance of probabilities that the
evidence is unreliable.[922]
Section 45(3) prescribes a range of requirements the formal procedure must
satisfy. In practice, a formal procedure can take the
form of an identification
parade or a photo
lineup.[923]
- 11.24 Preliminary
feedback has identified a general concern that the formal procedure requirements
in section 45(3) no longer reflect
best practice. A particular concern is that
the Act does not require the visual identification process to be video recorded.
While
a written record of the procedure carried out is required under section
45(3)(e), this may not be as comprehensive or accurate as
a video record. For
example, it may be difficult to ascertain the degree of confidence with which an
identification is made if there
is no video record of the process.
- 11.25 Te
Kāhui Tātari Ture | the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) is
undertaking consultation until 26 May 2023 concerning
best practice for visual
identification procedures, as part of its wider examination of issues concerning
eyewitness identification
evidence. The CCRC’s preliminary review suggests
eyewitness identification evidence is a risk factor in miscarriage of justice
cases.
- 11.26 In light
of the CCRC’s work, we do not explore further whether formal procedure
requirements for visual identification
evidence are causing concern or problems
in practice. Submitters are welcome, however, to provide information on the
current requirements
or best practice should they wish to do so, which we can
then assess as part of finalising our advice to the Minister.
CHAPTER 12
12 Medical privilege
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider section 59 (medical privilege) and seek feedback
on issues relating to:
- the scope of the
exception created by section 59(1)(b); and
- when somebody is
acting “on behalf of” a medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist under section 59(5).
BACKGROUND
- 12.1 A
privilege is an exception to the general rule that relevant and otherwise
admissible evidence can be compelled to be given
to a
court.[924]
- 12.2 Section 59
of the Evidence Act 2006 creates a privilege in criminal proceedings for
communications made to, and information obtained
by, medical practitioners and
clinical psychologists[925] in the
course of the examination, treatment or care of a person but only in relation to
drug dependency or other conditions or behaviour
that may manifest itself in
criminal conduct (medical
privilege).[926]
- 12.3 Medical
privilege also extends to people “acting in a professional capacity on
behalf of a medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist”.[927]
- 12.4 The
privilege contained in section 59 is intentionally narrowly defined. As the
privilege conferred is absolute, Te Aka Matua
o te Ture | Law Commission, when
developing the Evidence Code, considered that it was preferable to have clarity
and certainty as
to its
application.[928] Section 69 of
the Act confers a general discretion to exclude confidential information, which
provides “fall-back protection”
for information not captured by
section 59.[929]
Purpose and origins of medical privilege
- 12.5 Medical
privilege is justified on two
grounds:[930]
(a) First, society has an interest in encouraging people to seek medical
attention and to communicate openly and honestly with healthcare
professionals
in doing so. If patients were aware that their disclosures could be used as
evidence against them in court, it is argued,
this would prevent people from
seeking medical attention, or inhibit communication when they did so.
(b) Second, individuals prefer, and should expect, privacy when it comes to
intimate details of disease and illness.
- 12.6 When
developing the Evidence Code, the Commission identified a further policy reason
justifying the existence of a privilege
in the specific context of a person
seeking treatment for drug dependency or other behaviours that might manifest
themselves in criminal
conduct. In these cases, compliance with the law is more
likely to be achieved through medical treatment than through criminal
prosecution.[931]
- 12.7 As with all
privileges, the concern is with balancing these interests against the public
interests in securing the administration
of justice by placing all relevant
evidence in front of a court.[932]
- 12.8 Some form
of medical privilege has existed in statute since the late 19th
century.[933] The modern form of
medical privilege emerged from the Torts and General Law Reform
Committee’s policy review of professional
privilege in the law of evidence
in 1977.[934] The
Committee’s recommendations were taken forward in sections 32 and 33 of
the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980, under which
a privilege existed in
respect of communications to medical practitioners in both civil and criminal
proceedings. The scope of the
privilege in criminal proceedings was limited to
communications made in the course of examination or treatment for drug
dependency
or other condition or behaviour that might manifest itself in
criminal conduct.[935] The
privilege was broadened to include clinical psychologists in
1989.[936]
- 12.9 In its
development of the Evidence Code, the Commission took forward the existing
statutory privilege in criminal proceedings,
widening it to include all
information obtained in the course of examination and treatment for drug
dependency and other conditions
that might manifest itself in criminal
behaviour, and to cover disclosure in any criminal proceedings, not just
proceedings where
the person being treated was the
defendant.[937] It also removed
the existence of a medical privilege in civil
proceedings[938] and recommended
not extending the privilege to apply beyond medical practitioners, clinical
psychologists, and those acting in a
professional capacity on behalf of those
professions.[939] These
recommendations were enacted as section 59.
SCOPE OF THE SECTION 59(1)(B) EXCEPTION
- 12.10 Section
59(1)(b) creates an exception to medical privilege:
- [This section]
does not apply in the case of a person who has been required by an order of a
Judge, or by other lawful authority,
to submit himself or herself to the medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist for any examination, test, or for any
other purpose.
What is the issue?
- 12.11 We
have received preliminary feedback that it is not clear whether court-ordered
treatment (as opposed to court-ordered examination or test,
as set out in statute) is captured by section 59(1)(b). For example, it is not
clear whether the exception would apply to information
obtained during a
rehabilitative counselling programme that a person has been directed to attend
by the court as part of an extended
supervision order (ESO). This uncertainty
arises from the open-ended phrasing of “for any other purpose”,
which, on a
plain wording interpretation, could be taken to apply to any other
purpose as ordered by the court, including treatment.
- 12.12 A related
concern with the scope of section 59(1)(b) is that it appears to permit
information obtained for one purpose (for
example, an assessment in the context
of a preventive detention application) being used for another unconnected
purpose (for example,
to support criminal charges in unrelated
offending).[940] This issue was
identified in the Commission’s 2013 Review of the Act but not resolved due
to the lack of submissions addressing
this point and the lack of opportunity to
consult with healthcare
professionals.[941] The Commission
recommended the issue be considered in the context of a wider review of issues
arising in relation to the Criminal
Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act
2002 (CPMIP Act). We are not aware of any subsequent consideration of medical
privilege,
in the context of a review of the CPMIP Act or otherwise.
Policy and legislative background
- 12.13 The
exception’s original objective appears to have been to ensure that
relevant information obtained by a medical practitioner
during a court-ordered
assessment could not be withheld from the courts on the grounds of medical
privilege. The first mention of
such an exception was in section 9(2) of the
Evidence Further Amendment Act 1895, which granted a privilege “unless the
sanity
of the patient be the matter in dispute”. This language was carried
over to section 8 of the Evidence Act 1908.
- 12.14 Commenting
on medical privilege in civil proceedings in 1977, the Torts and General Law
Reform Committee observed that “public
policy undoubtedly requires that
such an important legal issue as testamentary capacity should not be hamstrung
by medical privilege”.[942]
The Committee did not explicitly discuss similar concerns in relation to
criminal proceedings, but section 33 of the Evidence Amendment
Act (No 2) 1980
introduced an exception for privilege in criminal proceedings using the wording
of “examination, test or other
purpose”.
- 12.15 In its
Evidence Code, the Commission proposed retaining such an exception, commenting
that this “excludes from protection
consultations that are ordered by a
court or other lawful
authority”.[943] The
Commission’s proposed Code provision mirrored the language of the 1980
Act,[944] with the change to
“any other purpose” being a drafting decision made when the
Evidence Bill was introduced to
Parliament.[945]
Subsequent developments
- 12.16 The
scope of section 59(1)(b) has not been discussed in any detail in the case
law.[946] In its 2013 review, the
Commission was made aware of variation in practice amongst psychiatrists arising
from uncertainty as to the
precise operation of section
59(1)(b).[947] Some psychiatrists
were taking the view that a literal reading of section 59(1)(b) meant that
privilege did not apply at all to any
person required to undergo assessment by a
court and therefore the person’s complete medical records could be freely
examined
and presented to the court. The Commission held
that:[948]
- The submitters
do not consider that any substantial change of this nature was intended when the
Evidence Act was passed. We agree
that the intention at the time was clearly to
maintain the substance of the privilege in criminal proceedings and to broaden
its
scope, rather than narrowing it in the dramatic way that the above
interpretation would do.
- 12.17 The
Commission recommended amending section 59 to make it clear that the section
59(1)(b) exception applies only to communications,
observations and information
collected or generated during a court-ordered assessment and does not affect the
privilege that attaches
to other medical records of the privilege-holder. This
was enacted as section 59(1A) through the Evidence Amendment Act 2016.
- 12.18 As noted
above, the 2013 Review also identified a concern that the possibility of
information imparted during a court-ordered
examination being disclosed in
subsequent proceedings was having a detrimental effect on those
examinations.[949] The concern was
that the broad nature of the exception might hamper free and frank discussion
because of a fear that any information
may be used in court against them. The
Commission did not reach a conclusion or make any recommendations on this point,
for the reasons
noted above.[950]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 12.19 It
is unlikely that the section 59(1)(b) exception was intended to apply so broadly
as to apply to all court-ordered examinations,
assessments or treatment. If, as
the early policy and legislative history suggests, the intention was to ensure
that information
gathered during a court-ordered medical assessment was not
shielded from view by a privilege, it seems unlikely that the section
59(1)(b)
exception was intended to apply to court-ordered treatment. In considering a
similar issue of interpretation as part of
the 2013 Review, the Commission was
clear that the intention at the time the Act was passed was to maintain the
substance of medical
privilege, and to broaden its scope – not to narrow
it.[951]
- 12.20 Interpreting
the section 59(1)(b) exception as including court-ordered treatment would also
be inconsistent with the policy
underlying medical privilege. The privilege is
clearly directed at encouraging people to seek medical attention, to be open and
truthful
with the healthcare professionals caring for them and to protect
privacy. The additional policy rationale identified by the Law Commission
– that, in some circumstances compliance with the law is more likely to be
achieved through treatment than censure applies
equally, or perhaps more so, if
a person’s drug dependency or other condition has already manifested in
criminal conduct and
led them to have contact with the criminal justice system
to the point that treatment has been court-ordered.
- 12.21 There is
also the risk of unintended consequences should the section 59(1)(b) exception
be interpreted as extending to court-ordered
treatment. For example, this could
mean that information obtained during compulsory examination, care and treatment
under the Mental
Health (Compulsory Treatment and Assessment) Act
1992[952] would not be privileged.
This would be a broad carve-out from medical privilege and is unlikely to have
been intended.
- 12.22 As to
whether the section 59(1)(b) exception should permit information obtained for
one purpose to be used for another, the
concern is that this unduly undercuts
the objectives of the privilege itself (aimed at ensuring candour between
doctors and patients)
and goes further than is necessary to achieve the
objectives of the exception (aimed at ensuring a court has access to the
information
it requires to reach a determination). There are mixed views on
whether the exception does, in fact, impact on what a patient chooses
to
disclose during a court-ordered
assessment.[953] Nonetheless, we
think it is arguable that the scope of the exception is not consistent with
reasonable expectations of privacy. Furthermore,
it has the potential to result
in inconsistent approaches. If an admission of unrelated offending is made in a
court-ordered examination,
for example, it could be used against the defendant
in separate proceedings, but the same admission made in an independently sought
examination would be privileged.
- 12.23 Our
preliminary view is, therefore, that it would be desirable to amend section
59(1)(b) to clarify the circumstances in which
the exception applies. We seek
views on how this would best be achieved.
Options for reform
- 12.24 We
have identified two possible options for reform:
(a) Option 1: Amend section 59(1)(b) to remove the words “or for
any other purpose”.
(b) Option 2: Amend section 59(1)(b) to remove the words “or for
any other purpose” and limit the exception by reference to
the purpose for which the information or communication is obtained.
- 12.25 Option 1
would clarify the existing uncertainty as to the status of court-ordered
treatment by expressly limiting the section
59(1)(b) exception to cases where a
person “has been required by an order of a judge, or by other lawful
authority, to submit
himself or herself to the medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist for any examination or test” (emphasis added). This
would be consistent with the policy intent of ensuring that relevant medical
obtained during a court-ordered
assessment is still able to be presented to and
heard by the court.
- 12.26 This
leaves open definitional issues as to what constitutes an examination or test
for the purposes of the Act. Our preliminary
view is that it is appropriate that
the courts are able to consider these issues on a case-by-case basis: it may not
be easy to clearly
delineate in legislation when a healthcare professional is
acting for the purposes of examination, or for the purposes of treatment.
- 12.27 Option 1
would, however, reduce the flexibility of the section, which may be undesirable
if there are other types of information
or communications that a court may need
to rely on to reach a determination and that do not fall within a definition of
examination
or test.
- 12.28 Option 2
would adopt the same change as Option 1 but go further to address the broader
concerns about information obtained for
one purpose being used for another.
Although it represents a more fundamental shift in the purpose and application
of the section
59(1)(b) exception, it could more closely reflect both the
intentions behind the creation of medical privilege (to create an absolute
privilege directed at not discouraging people from seeking medical attention and
to ensure open and honest communication with healthcare
professionals) and the
intentions behind the creation of an exception from privilege (to ensure that
relevant information obtained
during a court-ordered assessment is available to
the court and not shielded by privilege). It would also align with the general
professional and ethical obligations of medical professionals – that
disclosure of confidential information must be necessary
(the goal cannot be
achieved without it) and proportionate (only the information that is relevant to
the goal should be disclosed
and only as much as is necessary to achieve
it).[954]
- 12.29 Under this
option, section 59(1)(b) could be redrafted to state that privilege does not
apply to the use, in a proceeding, of any information
obtained or communications made in the course of an examination or test
ordered by a judge or other lawful authority for the purpose for which
that examination or test was ordered. Under this approach, only information
relevant to the purpose for which it is sought would
be exempt from privilege.
For example, in the context of an assessment of fitness to stand trial, only
information relevant to the
determination of fitness to stand trial would be
exempt from privilege and disclosable in subsequent proceedings. Any other
information
disclosed as part of that assessment would continue to be privileged
as long as the other requirements of section 59 were met. This
approach would
align with exceptions to other privileges in the Act that are more tightly
constrained and focused on the use of information
for a specific purpose in
proceedings, for example, section 57(3)(c) on privilege for settlement
negotiations, mediation or plea
discussions.[955]
- 12.30 An
alternative approach would be to redraft the section 59(1)(b) exception with
reference to specific statutory powers of the
court – for example, to
state that the privilege does not apply to information and communications made
in the course of a test
or assessment ordered under section 38 of the CPMIP Act,
section 88 of the Sentencing Act 2002, and section 107F of the Parole Act
2002.[956] The main difficulty
with this approach is that it would require an exhaustive definition of the
precise circumstances in which court-ordered
examinations and tests would not be
subject to privilege, which could result in unanticipated
gaps.
QUESTION
Q53
Should section 59(1)(b) be amended to clarify the scope of its application?
If so, should it be amended to:
- remove
the words “or for any other purpose”; or
- remove
the words “or for any other purpose” and limit the
exception by reference to the purpose for which the information or communication
is obtained?
ACTING “ON BEHALF OF” A MEDICAL PRACTITIONER OR
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST
- 12.31 Section
59(5) states that:
- A reference in
this section to a communication to, or information obtained by, a medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist is
to be taken to include a reference to a
communication to, or information obtained by, a person acting in a professional
capacity
on behalf of a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist in the
course of the examination or treatment of, or care for, the person
by that
medical practitioner or clinical psychologist.
What is the issue?
- 12.32 There
is uncertainty as to when a person is “acting on behalf of” a
medical practitioner or clinical psychologist
and therefore whether
communications to or information obtained by that person is privileged. The
courts have interpreted this provision
narrowly, and the issue has been raised
before te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court but not resolved.
Policy and legislative background
- 12.33 Section
59 is narrowly drafted with regard to the class of relationships to which
medical privilege attaches. Historically,
the privilege only attached to medical
practitioners.[957] It was
extended to clinical psychologists following the recommendation of the Torts and
General Law Reform Committee that “when
clinical psychologists are able to
register under an Act of Parliament, privilege should attach to the
communications made to them
by
patients”.[958] This was on
the basis that clinical psychologists were engaged in the same activities as
psychiatrists (“the treatment or diagnosis
of mental or emotional
problems”).[959]
- 12.34 The
Committee recognised that other “para-medical personnel” could be
involved in the care and treatment of patients
either acting in their own right
or in the capacity of assisting the medical practitioner in the performance of
their task. With
regard to the former category, the Committee considered some of
the various categories of para-medical personnel individually but
concluded the
privilege should only be extended to clinical psychologists (at the point they
became regulated under
statute).[960] With regard to the
latter category, those acting to assist the medical practitioner, it concluded
that the rationale behind privilege
was not reduced simply because it might be
another health professional fulfilling a particular part of a doctor’s
treatment
programme. Accordingly, it recommended an extension of privilege to
people in para-medical categories while “acting on behalf
of” a
medical practitioner (or clinical psychologist). This formula “envisaged
tasks both preliminary as well as following
actual examination or treatment by
the doctor and was intended to extend to the doctor’s
receptionist”.[961]
- 12.35 The
Commission also considered but rejected a wider and more functional definition
in its preliminary paper on privilege under
which it would be sufficient that
the person seeking assistance genuinely believed that the person consulted was
appropriately qualified
to offer professional
assistance.[962] It rejected that
approach as “entailing needless uncertainty” and ultimately
recommended retaining the existing
approach.[963]
- 12.36 In its
2013 Review, the Commission considered submissions that section 59 be amended to
extend the privilege to psychotherapists.
It concluded that disclosures to
psychotherapists were adequately protected by the general overriding discretion
as to confidential
information under section 69, noting that there was no
evidence to suggest that this arrangement had failed to protect information
shared in this way from
disclosure.[964] The Commission
restated the view that the nature of the absolute privilege favoured certainty
and clarity as to scope.
How have the courts approached section 59(5)?
- 12.37 The
courts have taken a narrow interpretation of “acting on behalf of”.
Under the equivalent section of the 1980
Act, this was held to include nurses
acting at the direction of a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist
employed at a hospital[965] but
not a counsellor working in a programme for sexual offenders to whom the
defendant had been referred by a
psychologist.[966]
- 12.38 Under the
2006 Act, it has been held that medical privilege can only be claimed by someone
acting on behalf of a medical practitioner
or clinical psychologist if the
practitioner or psychologist had already initiated an examination, treatment or
care regime.[967] This introduced
a requirement for a pre-existing relationship between a patient and a medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist
before someone can be said to be acting on
their behalf.[968]
- 12.39 In D v
R, D argued that the call-taker was acting in a professional capacity
“on behalf of” a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist
by
filtering and referring calls to the local Crisis Assessment Team (CAT) for that
team’s intervention.[969] Te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to provide a
definitive answer to that
question.[970] On an application
for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court accepted that the interpretation of
section 59 potentially gave rise to
a point of public importance, but declined
leave to appeal as it was not an appropriate case to consider the
issue.[971]
Relationship with section 69
- 12.40 Section
69 confers a general discretion on the court to require that any confidential
information not be disclosed in a proceeding.
It provides a fallback for
anything not captured by section 59. Even if someone is held to not have been
acting “on behalf
of” a medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist, disclosure of confidential information can still be prevented if
the judge
considers that the public interest in the disclosure is outweighed by
the public interest in preventing harm to the person by whom
or about whom the
confidential information was obtained, or to the particular relationship in the
course of which it was obtained.
In making this assessment, the judge must have
regard to a number of factors set out under section 69(3).
- 12.41 The courts
have tended to agree that information shared with healthcare professionals is
confidential information for the purposes
of section 69. There is greater
disagreement as to where the balance between the public interest in disclosure
and the prevention
of harm to individuals is to be struck. Typically, the courts
have ruled in favour of disclosure under section
69[972] – indeed, in R v
X, the majority held that “the weight of appellate authority in
this country and elsewhere favours the appropriateness of the disclosure
of
criminality”.[973] This is
largely on the basis of the significance of the communication to the issue at
hand (the disclosures often being key to the
prosecution
case)[974] and the lack of
empirical evidence as to harm caused by
disclosure,[975] but it is far
from settled. In a dissenting judgment in R v X, Ronald Young J
held that the balance “clearly” lay in protecting the confidential
communication between the nurses and
X:[976]
- If the
confidentiality of these discussions is not protected then counsel acting for
such persons are highly likely to advise their
client not to talk to a forensic
nurse ... Compromising the capacity of forensic nurses to undertake their task
will in turn potentially
compromise the immediate safety of defendants and
others involved in the criminal courts. This illustrates the powerful public
interest
in protecting free communication between the nurses and an
accused.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 12.42 There
is plainly some uncertainty as to the scope of section 59(5) and the status of
disclosures made to healthcare professionals
who are not medical practitioners
or clinical psychologists. The courts have taken a narrow approach as to who can
be said to be
acting “on behalf of” a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist, some of which appear inconsistent with the original
intention of the Torts and General Law Reform
Committee.[977] Neither the Court
of Appeal nor the Supreme Court has decided the issue.
- 12.43 There is
also a question as to whether the approach taken by the courts –
particularly in relation to the sequencing of
treatment and referral of patients
– is consistent with modern multi-disciplinary teams (MDTs) working in
healthcare or with
patients’ understandings of their interactions with the
various professionals who make up these teams. Patients are often reviewed
and
screened by other members of the team before being seen by a medical
practitioner, with care and treatment being provided autonomously
by individual
members of the team (that is, not on behalf of a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist).[978] Many
patients might make disclosures to these individuals on the basis that the
information they share is necessary to initiate or
direct their care and
treatment and might reasonably expect that information to remain confidential.
This is of note given the subjective
element of section 59(2) – that it
applies to communications “the person believes is necessary to
enable the medical practitioner to examine, treat or care for” them.
- 12.44 This issue
may be of more pressing concern in light of the recent proliferation of
telehealth and digital technologies in
healthcare,[979] much of which has
been accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This is particularly true in the area
of mental health, where a number
of non-medical professionals or digital tools
could be recipients of information analogous to the situation to the helpline
call-taker
in D v
R.[980] It is also
clear that the healthcare system is under increasing pressure. McQueen J
observed in a recent civil case regarding the
interpretation of the CPMIP Act
that “a shortage of psychiatrists and psychologists in New Zealand and
world-wide has developed
... exacerbated by the COVID-19
pandemic”.[981] This means
that more individuals, at least in the initial stages of seeking medical
attention, may find themselves under the assessment
or care and treatment of a
professional other than a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist.
- 12.45 The
existence of section 69 was critical in the conclusions of an earlier Commission
review not to broaden the scope of section
59. At that time, it was not aware of
“any situations where the discretion available under section 69 in
relation to confidential
information has failed to adequately protect
information disclosed in the course of consultation with a health professional
that
did not attract medical
privilege”.[982] If the
courts tend to favour disclosure under section 69, however, there is a very
tangible impact for confidential information if
it is not found to attract
privilege under section 59.
- 12.46 Our
preliminary view is that reform may be desirable to address the ongoing
uncertainties in relation to the status of disclosures
to professionals other
than medical practitioners and clinical psychologists and to reflect the reality
of modern healthcare provision
and systems. We seek views on whether this is the
case and, if so, how section 59 should be amended.
Options for reform
- 12.47 We
have identified two options for reform:
(a) Option 1: Amend section 59(5) to clarify the meaning of “on
behalf of”; or
(b) Option 2: Expand the section 59 privilege to apply to a broader range
of healthcare workers beyond just medical practitioners and clinical
psychologists.
- 12.48 Option 1
could be achieved by inserting new wording into section 59(5) to clarify the
meaning of “on behalf of”.
This could clarify that it applies to any
person with whom the patient communicates for the purpose of arranging or
facilitating
examination or treatment by, or at the request of, the medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist. This would retain the original
policy
behind the section by keeping the privilege strictly limited to medical
practitioners and clinical psychologists. It would
also clearly capture
situations where non-clinical staff are the recipients of relevant information,
for example, medical receptionists,
who the Torts and General Law Reform
Committee envisaged as falling within the scope of acting “on behalf
of”.[983]
- 12.49 The
drawback of Option 1 is that it may not totally resolve the uncertainty with
this section, and courts may still have to
engage in finer distinction as to who
falls within this category and in which circumstances. For example, it is
debateable whether
call-takers or helpline advisers would fall within this
category, as it would have to be determined whether their role is simply
directing calls or the individual to further advice or support, as opposed to
arranging or facilitating care or treatment by an identifiable
individual. It
would also not capture situations where healthcare professionals provide
examination or treatment autonomously (for
example, nurse practitioners) or
where an individual may not, or only infrequently, see a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist
in the course of their treatment.
- 12.50 Under
Option 2, section 59 could be amended to include a broader list of healthcare
professions. A profession could qualify
for inclusion on this list if it is
involved in the treatment of drug dependency or any other condition or behaviour
that may manifest
itself in criminal conduct. Alternatively, the reference to
“medical practitioners and clinical psychologists” could
be replaced
with a reference to “health practitioner (as defined by the Health
Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003)”.
- 12.51 This
option would eliminate the need to clarify when someone is said to be acting
“on behalf of” a medical practitioner
or clinical psychologist but
would require revisiting the original policy intention behind the narrow
drafting of the section 59
privilege: to ensure clarity and certainty as to the
application of an absolute privilege. Expanding the privilege to cover a far
greater number of healthcare professionals could make the section so broad so as
to lose the clarity and certainty desired by the
original drafters and diminish
the significance of the existence of an absolute medical privilege. It should be
noted, however, that
there are already various restrictions built in to section
59 that necessarily limit its application. For example, the privilege
applies
only in the context of examination or treatment for drug dependency or behaviour
that may manifest itself in criminal conduct
(under section 59(1)(a)) and only
to communications the patient believes is “necessary” to enable
examination or treatment
(under section 59(2)).
- 12.52 Additionally,
expanding the privilege to cover a wider range of healthcare professionals could
be seen to be giving true effect
to the underlying policy justifications for the
privilege – the public interest in encouraging individuals to seek medical
attention and to communicate openly in the expectation that information will be
kept private applies equally to communications made
to a broader range of
healthcare professionals. Patients may not see a distinction, and reasonably
expect the information they share
with a nurse or another healthcare
professional, to be treated in the same way as information they were to share
with a medical practitioner
or clinical psychologist.
- 12.53 Expanding
the privilege to cover a wider range of healthcare workers might also be more
closely aligned with modern approaches
to healthcare provision (particularly
whether other healthcare professionals are in fact acting on behalf of a doctor
or in their
own right) and patients’ perceptions of and relationships with
a range of different healthcare professionals. Additionally,
the scope of
medical privilege has never been completely static, as demonstrated by the
inclusion of clinical psychologists in 1989.
There may be other healthcare
professions that can be said to be closely analogous to clinical psychologists
in terms of the role
they undertake in relation to drug dependency and other
conditions that might manifest in criminal behaviour and in being similarly
statutorily registered and regulated.
- 12.54 There are
limitations to each approach under Option 2. An approach guided by the Health
Practitioners Competence Assurance Act
would be simpler, but it could exclude
health professions not regulated by the Act (notably, in this context, drug and
alcohol addiction
practitioners) or broader support staff who may be the
recipients of confidential information (such as receptionists, who as noted
above were envisaged as acting on behalf of the medical practitioner by the
Torts and General Law Reform Committee), should their
inclusion be considered
desirable. Such an approach could also include some professions who are
regulated under the Health Practitioners
Competence Assurance Act but who are
unlikely to be offering relevant treatment.
- 12.55 The
alternative approach of seeking to provide a definitive list of professionals
covered by the privilege, however, could introduce
unnecessary rigidity or
unintentional gaps by seeking to provide a definitive list. This is particularly
true in the context of an
ever-changing and expanding healthcare system and
models of MDT working. One possibility to address this would be to include a
provision
allowing for any additional professions to be included in scope in
future through regulations made under the Act.
QUESTION
Q54
Should section 59 be amended to clarify when communications to, or
information obtained by, healthcare professionals other than a
medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist are privileged? If so, should it be
amended to:
- clarify
when someone is acting “on behalf of” a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist under section 59(5); or
- extend
the privilege to attach to a wider range of healthcare professionals?
CHAPTER 13
13 Other privilege issues
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider the operation of the privilege provisions in the
Act (other than medical privilege, which is discussed
in Chapter 12) and seek
feedback on issues relating to:
- the application
of legal advice privilege (section 54) to documents prepared but not
communicated between clients and legal advisers;
- termination of
litigation privilege (section 57);
- litigation
privilege and confidentiality;
- settlement
privilege and the interests of justice exception; and
- successive
interests in privileged material (section 66(2)–(4)).
LEGAL ADVICE PRIVILEGE AND DOCUMENTS PREPARED BUT NOT
COMMUNICATED BETWEEN CLIENTS AND LEGAL ADVISERS
- 13.1 Section
54 of the Evidence Act 2006 is known as “legal advice privilege”. It
enshrines what was solicitor-client
privilege under the common law. Under
section 54, communications with legal advisers are privileged provided the
communication was
intended to be confidential and was made in the course of and
for the purpose of obtaining (or providing) professional legal
services.
What is the issue?
- 13.2 Section
54 only refers to “communications” with legal advisers. Under the
common law, however, solicitor-client privilege
extended to material brought
into existence for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal services even if
the material was not
in fact communicated. This included drafts and working
papers prepared by lawyers or notes prepared by a client for the purpose of
better communicating with a
lawyer.[984]
- 13.3 It is
unclear whether section 54 extends to documents prepared for the purpose of
obtaining or providing legal services but not
communicated. On a strict reading,
the use of the word “communication” in section 54 does not
accommodate such material.
This does not appear to have been Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission’s intention when developing the Evidence Code upon
which section 54 is based. The Commission explained that its proposed Code
provision “essentially re-enacts the current law
on privilege for
communications with legal
advisers”.[985]
- 13.4 There is
some te Kōti Matua | High Court authority for the proposition that legal
advice privilege extends to documents
not
communicated.[986] These
decisions, however, did not analyse how such an approach is available on the
wording of section 54.[987] As
some commentators have observed, such an interpretation is difficult to
reconcile with the plain words of section
54.[988] To date there has been no
te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal or te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme
Court consideration of this
issue.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 13.5 We
seek submissions on whether section 54 should be amended to clarify that legal
advice privilege applies to documents prepared
but not communicated for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice, consistent with the common law
and the decisions in
Huang and Bain. It does not appear that there
was any intention to depart from the previous common law approach when the Act
was passed. Further,
as the authors of Mahoney on Evidence have observed,
excluding documents prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice but not
actually communicated to a lawyer “is
arguably inconsistent with the
policy rationale for the privilege, namely to encourage full and frank
communication with
lawyers”.[989]
- 13.6 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, one option would be to amend
section 54(1) to clarify that the privilege
applies to communications and
related documents. The word “document” is broadly defined in the
Act to mean “any material, ... and information electronically recorded
or
stored”.[990] The
requirements in subsections 54(1)(a) and (b) would however still apply, which
means that the related document would need to have
been intended to be
confidential and made in the course of and for the purposes of obtaining or
providing legal services. This would
avoid the need to further define the
concept of “related document” as it would only capture documents
connected to the
request for or provision of legal advice. Documents that are
merely sent to a lawyer, but not prepared for the purpose of seeking
legal
advice, would not attract the QUESTION
Q55
privilege.[991] This option is
similar to approaches adopted in
Australia.[992]
Should section 54 be amended to clarify that the privilege applies to related
documents that meet the conditions described in subsections
54(1)(a) and (b) but
are not communicated between the person requesting or obtaining professional
legal services and the legal adviser?
TERMINATION OF LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
- 13.7 Section
56 establishes a privilege in relation to preparatory materials for proceedings
known as “litigation privilege”.
The purpose of litigation privilege
is to protect the adversarial
process.[993] The Act does not
address whether (and, if so, when) litigation privilege terminates.
What is the issue?
- 13.8 The
termination of litigation privilege is a long-standing issue that was considered
in both previous Commission reviews of the
Act.[994] Case law since the
Second Review of the Act demonstrates that the law remains unsettled on this
point, a fact that continues to attract
attention from
commentators.[995]
- 13.9 The same
issue does not appear to arise in relation to legal advice privilege (section
54) or privilege for settlement negotiations,
mediation or plea discussions
(settlement privilege) (section 57). While the Act does not address whether
these privileges terminate
either, the established position in respect of legal
advice privilege is that “once privileged, always
privileged”.[996] That is,
privileged documents remain privileged in all circumstances, unless that
privilege is waived.
- 13.10 In respect
of settlement privilege, the High Court has previously suggested that the
privilege does not terminate,[997]
and the Court of Appeal recently confirmed this in relation to plea
discussions.[998] The Court of
Appeal explained that the rationale for the privilege is to encourage frank
discussions between prosecution authorities
and defendants with the aim of
enhancing the prospect of agreement being
reached.[999] The Court
acknowledged that the rationale for the privilege may be “substantially
reduced” once a defendant pleads guilty
and is sentenced, but saw merit in
the submission that the general purpose for the privilege being extended to plea
negotiations
served a broader purpose relating to encouraging other defendants
to engage with prosecutors in frank negotiations to achieve appropriate
plea
agreements.[1000] While the
Court’s decision was focused on the application of section 57 in the
criminal context, we think its reasons are equally
applicable in the civil
context. As the Commission explained in its 2013
Review:[1001]
- The settlement
negotiation privilege ... is intended to encourage settlement and avoid
unnecessary trial. Things may be said and
positions taken in a free and frank
settlement exchange that a party may never want to be made public. Parties may
not make certain
offers or concessions if they thought there was a later chance
of publicity. The argument for an enduring privilege may therefore
be greater in
this area. ...
Should litigation privilege terminate?
- 13.11 There
are different views on whether litigation privilege should terminate. One view
is that litigation privilege should terminate
once the litigation that created
the privilege (and any related litigation) comes to an end. This was the
approach favoured by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Blank v Minister of
Justice.[1002] The
basis for this approach lies in the policy underlying the privilege. In the
words of Blank, its purpose is to create a “zone of
privacy” in relation to pending or apprehended
litigation.[1003] Once that need
has been exhausted and litigation has concluded, it is argued that there is no
need for the privilege to
endure.[1004] The decision in
Blank has been cited with approval in several New Zealand
cases.[1005] However, it
“does not have a firm
hold”,[1006] with neither
the Court of Appeal nor Supreme Court having considered the
matter.[1007]
- 13.12 Another
view is that litigation privilege should not terminate. This appears to be the
preferred approach in England and
Wales.[1008] This approach
treats litigation privilege the same as legal advice privilege and settlement
privilege, thereby promoting a more coherent
scheme. It might, for example, be
considered odd that privilege endures in relation to any concessions made during
without prejudice
discussions to settle a proceeding but not in relation to any
concessions recorded in confidential material that was prepared by
one party for
that same proceeding. This approach would also avoid the practical difficulties
that would inevitably arise in trying
to determine when litigation, including
any “related litigation”, is at an
end.[1009]
Previous Commission consideration
- 13.13 In
its 2013 Review, the Commission did not express a view on whether litigation
privilege should terminate but instead recommended
that any problems be
considered at the next periodic review. It noted, however, that it was not aware
of this issue causing problems
in practice and observed that it may be difficult
to neatly encapsulate the idea of “termination” in legislation given
this would likely be driven by the facts in any given
case.[1010]
- 13.14 In the
Second Review, the Commission noted that several cases had considered whether
litigation privilege should terminate without
reaching a definitive
conclusion.[1011] Few submitters
addressed the issue and the views of those who did were mixed on whether the Act
should be amended and, if so, whether
litigation privilege should
terminate.[1012]
- 13.15 The
Commission expressed a view that litigation privilege should terminate
once the litigation with which it is connected ends, but that there be an
exception for ongoing related
litigation.[1013] The Commission
did not, however, recommend amending the Act on the basis that determining when
related litigation is pending or anticipated
is likely to be a fact-specific
exercise and a matter best left to the courts to determine on a case-by-case
basis.
Developments since the Second Review
- 13.16 In
Minister of Education v James Hardie New Zealand, the High Court did not
have to decide whether litigation privilege had terminated but made some
observations.[1014] The Court
expressed “some sympathy” for the view that the conclusion reached
in Blank is not available under the
Act,[1015]
observing:[1016]
- In my view, the
proper interpretation and application of s 53 to this issue is likely to be key.
That section does not appear to
contemplate litigation privilege ceasing at the
conclusion of the proceedings in relation to which the relevant documents had
been
prepared. Rather, s 53(1) expressly provides that a person who has a
privilege conferred by any of ss 54 to 59 “has the right to
refuse” to disclose the document or communication “in a
proceeding ...” (emphasis added). Accordingly, s 53(1) does not
distinguish between any of the different forms of privilege for the purposes
of
the duration of that privilege. Nor is the type of proceeding in which a
privilege-holder has the “right” to refuse
to disclose a privileged
document limited, at least in the case of litigation privilege, to the related
proceedings contemplated
in Blank.
- 13.17 The Court
also expressed concern as to how the Blank approach might operate in
practice, querying whether subsequent related proceedings would
“re-attach” privilege to the
documents concerned and what this would
mean if the documents had lost their confidentiality in the intervening
period.[1017]
- 13.18 The matter
also attracted comment from the High Court in Metlifecare Retirement Villages
Ltd v James Hardie New Zealand
Ltd.[1018] The Court
noted that counsel “properly accepted that the principle once privileged,
always privileged, applied even if the privilege
was in relation to a different
legal
dispute”.[1019]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 13.19 We
seek submissions on whether the Act should be amended to clarify whether (and,
if so, when) litigation privilege terminates.
In previous reviews, the
Commission concluded that it was appropriate to leave this matter to be
determined by the courts. It may
be that this remains the most appropriate
approach. On the other hand, the absence of certainty may be causing problems in
practice.
In any event, the fact the law remains unsettled 16 years after the
Act came into force may suggest reform is desirable to promote
clarity and
certainty.
- 13.20 If reform
is considered necessary or desirable, a policy decision needs to be made on what
approach is to be preferred. There
does not appear to be consensus on this
issue. The position favoured by the Commission in its Second Review, that
litigation privilege
should terminate, has not been favoured in subsequent case
law. The authors of Mahoney on Evidence have similarly suggested that
“the better approach is for the rule of “once privileged always
privileged” to be
of universal application under the
Act”.[1020] Allison
Ferguson and Guy Tompkins also note that “arguably, if parliament had
intended for any particular type of privilege
to only subsist for a defined
period of time, it would have been expressly provided for in the relevant
position”.[1021] On the
other hand, a different interpretation is favoured by Sean McAnally, who argues
that sections 53 and 56 “are more consistent
with the Blank
approach than
not”.[1022]
QUESTION
Q56
Finally, we note that, if the preferred view is that litigation privilege should
not terminate, it may be desirable to amend the
Act by including a new provision
that also confirms the position with respect to legal advice privilege
and settlement privilege. While the position in respect of these privileges
is
more settled, it would be inconsistent to amend the Act to address the
termination status of one but not the other legal privileges.
Is the uncertainty as to whether and/or when litigation privilege terminates
causing any problems in practice? If so, should the Act
be amended to
clarify:
- that
litigation privilege terminates at the conclusion of the relevant proceeding and
any connected litigation; or
- that
litigation privilege, along with legal advice privilege and settlement
privilege, does not terminate except as provided for in
the
Act?
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY
- 13.22 Unlike
sections 54 and 57, section 56 does not include any reference to
confidentiality. This appears to be a drafting error
and there is clear Supreme
Court authority that confirms that, for litigation privilege to attach to a
communication or information,
it must have been intended to be
confidential.[1023]
- 13.23 While the
law is settled on this point, we seek submissions on whether the absence of a
reference to confidentiality in section
56 is creating confusion or otherwise
causing problems in practice. If so, it may be desirable to correct the drafting
issue by amending
section 56(1) so that it provides as follows (additions
underlined):
- (1) Subsection
(2) applies to a communication or information only if the communication or
information is:
- (a) intended
to be confidential; and
- (b)
made, received, compiled, or prepared for the dominant purpose of preparing for
a proceeding or an apprehended proceeding (the proceeding).
QUESTION
Q57
Is the lack of reference to a requirement for confidentiality in section 56
creating confusion or otherwise causing problems in practice?
If so, should
section 56(1) be amended to clarify that litigation privilege only applies to a
communication or information that is
intended to be confidential?
SETTLEMENT PRIVILEGE AND THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
EXCEPTION
- 13.24 Section
57 codified the common law “without prejudice” rule. It protects
from disclosure communications between
parties in civil proceedings that are
intended to be confidential and are made in connection with an attempt to settle
or mediate
the dispute (settlement
privilege).[1024]
- 13.25 The
rationale for settlement privilege is founded both on public policy (that
parties should be encouraged to settle disputes
out-of-court, secure in the
knowledge that whatever is said for that purpose will remain confidential and
will not be used against
them in later proceedings), and on the principle that
the law should respect the parties’ agreement to communicate on a without
prejudice basis.[1025]
- 13.26 At common
law, there were many exceptions to the without prejudice
rule,[1026] but not all these
exceptions were codified in the
Act.[1027] This resulted in
conflicting case law as to whether the common law exceptions not codified
continued to apply after the Act was
passed.[1028]
- 13.27 In
response to this concern, the Commission in its 2013 Review recommended amending
section 57 to accommodate the remaining
common law
exceptions.[1029] It identified
two options for doing so. It could either “attempt to spell out each of
the exceptions” in the Act or it
could make provision along the lines that
a court may order disclosure if it considers that, “in the interests of
justice,
the need for the communication to be disclosed in the proceeding
outweighs the need for the
privilege”.[1030] The
Commission recommended the latter option, although it recognised that this might
invite litigation in areas outside the pre-existing
recognised exceptions to the
privilege.[1031] Its view was
that there was a greater risk in seeking to spell out the exceptions and that it
would be better that the Act “acknowledge
the courts’ role in
setting the boundaries of the
privilege”.[1032]
- 13.28 In
accordance with the Commission’s recommendation, the Evidence Amendment
Act 2016 inserted section 57(3)(d) into the
Act, which provides the privilege
does not apply to:
- the use in a
proceeding of a communication or document made or prepared in connection with
any settlement negotiations or mediation
if the court considers that, in the
interests of justice, the need for the communication or document to be disclosed
in the proceeding
outweighs the need for the privilege, taking into account the
particular nature and benefit of the settlement negotiations or
mediation.
How is section 57(3)(d) operating in practice?
- 13.29 Several
High Court decisions have now considered the scope of section
57(3)(d).[1033] The cases
largely confirm that the common law exceptions inform the court’s exercise
of discretion under the new statutory
“interests of justice”
exception.[1034] Of particular
focus in the case law has been the ongoing relevance of the common law exception
for “unambiguous impropriety”.
This may be due to it being regarded
as an exception of general application that allows a court to prevent abuse of
settlement privilege.[1035]
- 13.30 However,
commentators have pointed to some cases that appear to suggest the scope of
section 57(3)(d) may be wider than the
common law
exceptions.[1036] In Smith v
Shaw, the Court had rejected an application to order disclosure of
privileged material under the interests of justice exception, finding
that the
case fell far short of the high threshold of “unambiguous
impropriety”.[1037] The
Court observed that “given the very clear policy reasons for and benefits
of settlement privilege, it is right that any
exceptions to it are
narrow”.[1038]
- 13.31 Several
months later, another application in the same proceedings was made to set aside
settlement privilege under the interests
of justice
exception.[1039] That
application was decided by a different High Court Judge who described the
exception in 57(3)(d) as
follows:[1040]
- This relatively
new subsection broadened the common law exceptions to settlement privilege. The
test is whether it is in the interests
of justice to set aside the privilege.
This involves an assessment of whether the specific facts before the Court
justify an exception
to the more general policy reasons for preserving the
privilege.
- 13.32 In that
interlocutory application it was not argued that the privileged material fell
within the common law exception for “unambiguous
impropriety”, but
rather the Court would otherwise be misled or deceived if the material was
excluded, which would not be in
the interests of
justice.[1041] The Court was not
satisfied that permitting the evidence to be produced would be in the interests
of justice and noted that the threshold
for what justifies excluding protection
in the “interests of justice” is necessarily
high.[1042] It has, however,
been suggested that this case leaves open the possibility that a broader
interests of justice exception is
available.[1043]
- 13.33 The High
Court again considered section 57(3)(d) in Gibbs v
Windmeyer.[1044] In that
case, it was argued that the common law exception to settlement privilege for
“unambiguous impropriety” remained
as a separate ground, but the
Court preferred the view that all common law exceptions were subsumed by the
statutory interests of
justice
exception.[1045] The Court
adopted the approach in Smith v Shaw to “unambiguous
impropriety” and concluded that the threshold had not been
met.[1046] It went on to
consider whether there were “any other “interests of justice”
considerations”.[1047]
While the Court concluded there were no grounds for setting aside settlement
privilege under section 57(3)(d), it appeared to accept
that other reasons, not
previously giving rise to an exception under the common law could potentially be
addressed under section
57(3)(d).
- 13.34 Finally,
in Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd, settlement privilege did
not protect parts of the plaintiff’s email exchanges that attempted to
settle the proceedings on the
basis that the need for disclosure outweighed the
need for the privilege to
apply.[1048] The need for
disclosure arose because the defendant had applied for a freezing order to
prevent the sale of the plaintiff’s
property and the email extracts
concerned the plaintiff’s financial situation and future plans for the
property. The Court
considered that, if the plaintiff was putting those factual
matters forward as a basis for negotiating the outcome she preferred,
it was in
the interests of justice that both parties be able to preserve their positions
by reference to what was
said.[1049] While analysis of
section 57(3)(d) in this case was limited, the decision does suggest a
“wider view” of the ambit of
the interests of justice exception than
the above cases.[1050]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 13.35 The
cases discussed above demonstrate that section 57(3)(d) is being used in
practice and that the boundaries of settlement
privilege are being tested as a
result.[1051] Some divergence in
the case law at this stage is, perhaps, to be expected, particularly given
neither the Court of Appeal nor the
Supreme Court have yet considered the scope
of the provision. We expect that clarity will develop over time and on a
case-by-case
basis.
- 13.36 We note,
however, that concerns have been expressed about any interpretation of the
interests of justice exception that would
see it applying to a broader range of
situations than at common law. It has been argued that any significant expansion
to the common
law exceptions to settlement privilege would inappropriately erode
the protections of the
privilege.[1052] We also note
the recent rejection in England and Wales of any broad “interests of
justice” exception on the basis that
this would be antithetical to the
otherwise narrow and principled existing common law
exceptions.[1053]
- 13.37 In light
of this, we seek submissions on how section 57(3)(d) is operating in practice
and whether legislative reform is desirable.
We are particularly interested in
understanding whether the present uncertainty is creating problems.
QUESTION
Q58
Is section 53(3)(d) causing problems in practice? If so, should the Act be
amended to clarify the scope of the exception?
SUCCESSIVE INTERESTS IN PRIVILEGED MATERIAL
- 13.38 Subsections
66(2)–(4) of the Act govern successive interests in material that attracts
privilege under sections 54–57
of the Act. They provide:
- 66. Joint
and successive interests in privileged material
- ...
- (2) On or after
the death of a person who has a privilege conferred by any of sections 54 to 57
in respect of a communication, information,
opinion, or document, the personal
representative of the deceased person or other successor in title to property of
the deceased
person—
- (a) is entitled
to assert the privilege against third parties; and
- (b) is not
restricted by any of sections 54 to 57 from having access or seeking access to
the privileged matter.
- (3) However,
subsection (2) applies only to the extent that a Judge is satisfied that the
personal representative or other successor
in title to property has a
justifiable interest in maintaining the privilege in respect of the
communication, information, opinion,
or document.
- (4) A personal
representative of a deceased person who has a privilege conferred by any of
sections 54 to 57 in respect of a communication,
information, opinion, or
document and any other successor in title to property of a person who has such a
privilege, may, on the
application of a person who has a legitimate interest in
maintaining the privilege (including another holder of the privilege), be
ordered by a Judge not to disclose the privileged matter in a
proceeding.
What is the issue?
- 13.39 A
potential drafting issue has been identified with section 66(2). This arises
from changes made to that section by the Evidence
Amendment Act 2016, in
response to a recommendation made by the Commission in the 2013 Review.
- 13.40 Sections
66(2)–(4) are based on the Commission’s proposed Evidence Code
provisions. Those provisions identified
two distinct categories of successive
privilege holders:[1054]
(a) a personal representative of a deceased person who has a privilege conferred
under what became sections 55 to 57; and
(b) a successor in title to property of a person who has such a privilege.
- 13.41 In
relation to successors in title, it is clear from the Commission’s
commentary that this category was intended to include
situations where the
privilege holder is living but is no longer the owner of the relevant property,
for example, where the Official
Assignee is successor in title to a
bankrupt’s property.[1055]
This was consistent with the existing common law
position.[1056]
- 13.42 The Act
largely adopted the Commission’s proposed Code provisions, but section
66(2) as enacted referred to “the
personal representative of the person or
other successor in title to property of a person”, while section 66(4)
referred to
“a personal representative of a deceased person ... and
any other successor in title to property of a person” (emphasis
added).
- 13.43 The
Commission noted the anomaly in the 2013 Review and concluded that the omission
in section 66(2) of the words “of
a deceased person” in relation to
personal representatives was a drafting
error.[1057] It recommended that
“deceased” be added after “personal representative of
the” in section
66(2).[1058]
- 13.44 The
Evidence Amendment Act made this change but it also inserted the term
“deceased” in the phrase “other
successor in title to property
of a deceased person”. The authors of Cross on Evidence note
that the effect of this change is that a successor in title can no longer claim
privilege while the prior owner of the property
survives and
that:[1059]
- This effects a
very significant change to the rights of access to documents recording legal
advice that were previously available
to liquidators and the Official Assignee,
and others who acquired property about which legal advice has been given. There
is no indication
that this significant change was intended. There appears to be
no rational basis on which this form of purely title-based succession
to
privilege should take effect only on the death of the prior privilege
holder.
- 13.45 It does
not appear that such a change was intended. The explanatory note to the Evidence
Amendment Bill explained that the changes
to section 66 were to ensure
“that the privilege can be asserted only by the personal representative of
the deceased person,
as recommended by the Law
Commission”.[1060] It does
not mention the separate category of successors in title, and neither does the
Ministry of Justice’s initial briefing
on the Bill, which similarly
explained that the Bill “ensures clarity and avoids future problems that
could arise from the
section being read to cover personal representatives
generally”.[1061] There is
nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the amendment intended to
change the law on successors in title in such
a way.
- 13.46 The
authors of Cross on Evidence note that, in practice, the Courts continue
to deal with the issue of succession to privilege in the context of company
liquidation
and receivership “as if s 66 had not been
amended”.[1062]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 13.47 Our
preliminary view is that the insertion of “deceased” in respect of
successors in title in section 66(2) was
a drafting error. The amendments were
intended to give effect to the Commission’s recommendation in the 2013
Review. That recommendation
and the Commission’s discussion of the issue
were focused solely on personal representatives. The Commission did not comment
on successors in title, which is a separate category of successive privilege
holders. Further, the Commission’s Evidence Code
made it clear that the
intention was always that this category, unlike personal representatives, would
not be limited to situations
where the original privilege holder has died. As
noted above, this was consistent with the common law position.
- 13.48 We
therefore seek submissions on whether section 66(2) should be amended to remove
the word “deceased” from the
phrase “successor in title to
property of the deceased person”.
QUESTION
Q59
Should section 66(2) be amended to remove the word “deceased”
from the phrase “successor in title to property of
the deceased
person”?
CHAPTER 14
14 Trial process
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider three provisions in the Act that deal with
aspects of the trial process and seek feedback on issues relating
to:
- restriction on
disclosure of complainant’s occupation in sexual cases (section 88);
- cross-examination
duties (section 92); and
- cross-examination
on behalf of a defendant or party who is precluded from personally
cross-examining a witness (section 95(5)).
RESTRICTION ON DISCLOSURE OF COMPLAINANT’S OCCUPATION IN
SEXUAL CASES
- 14.1 Section
88 of the Evidence Act 2006 prevents questioning about or comment on the
complainant’s occupation in a sexual case
except with the permission of
the judge.[1063] The judge must
only grant permission if the evidence “is of sufficient direct relevance
to the facts in issue that to exclude
it would be contrary to the interests of
justice”.[1064] Section 88
re-enacted an existing rule of
evidence,[1065] which was first
enacted in 1985 in response to complainants’ requests for further
protection of their identity and privacy
in sexual
cases.[1066]
What are the issues?
- 14.2 Research
published by Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald in 2020 identified two issues
in relation to section 88:
(a) Compliance with the section was
low.[1067] Complainants were
routinely asked or gave evidence about their occupation or whether they were
employed or studying without the judge
considering section 88.
(b) The scope of the section may be too narrow in that it only refers to
“occupation”.[1068]
It does not apply, for example, to evidence about the complainant’s status
as a student, mother or beneficiary, or evidence
about their education or
qualifications.[1069] It also
does not differentiate between the complainant’s occupation at the time of
the offending and at the time of the
trial.[1070] This may result in
the complainant being asked about both when only one is relevant.
- 14.3 McDonald
made a submission to the select committee considering the Sexual Violence
Legislation Bill in 2020 suggesting changes
to section 88 to broaden its
scope.[1071] No changes were
made to the Bill. The Departmental Report noted the proposed amendments to
section 88 may be better analysed following
more thorough consideration of the
research and case
law.[1072]
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
Low compliance with section 88
- 14.4 It
is clear from the research conducted by McDonald that complainants are routinely
asked and/or give evidence about their occupation
without the judge considering
admissibility under section 88. This is concerning, particularly given a
provision to this effect has
been in force since
1986.[1073]
- 14.5 A question
about a complainant’s occupation is often asked as an introductory
question by the prosecution as a way of “settling”
the complainant
at the start of
proceedings.[1074] Preliminary
feedback we have received has noted that judges may find it difficult to
intervene. They may be reluctant to interrupt
a complainant, particularly at an
early stage of their evidence, or to appear to be critical of a lawyer in front
of a jury. If the
question is general in nature (rather than asking for
specifics such as where the complainant works), it may not be considered to
raise serious privacy concerns.
- 14.6 Given the
requirement for judicial approval is already clear on the face of section 88 and
some of the low compliance stems from
procedural tendencies at trial, our
preliminary view is that statutory amendment is unlikely to improve compliance
with the provision.
However, we seek feedback on other measures that may help to
increase awareness and proper consideration of the requirements of the
section.
This could include, for example, guidance or education for judges and/or
prosecutors.
Scope of section 88
- 14.7 Section
88 is based on section 23AA of the Evidence Act 1908. That provision was
introduced in 1985 with the aim of preventing
further indignity to, or
traumatisation or intimidation of, victims of sexual
violence.[1075]
- 14.8 Information
about the complainant’s occupation, or lack thereof, can be irrelevant and
may cause unnecessary embarrassment,
shame or fear of
harassment.[1076] The same may
be true of other types of personal information about the complainant. For
instance, McDonald’s research referred
to cases in which the complainant
appeared to be in some distress after having to disclose they were not working
or were an 18-year-old
“stay at home mum” on a
benefit.[1077] However, the one
case we identified that directly addresses this issue found that
“occupation” in section 88 does not
include beneficiary status. This
suggests section 88 is likely to be interpreted in a relatively narrow way.
- 14.9 Requiring
the judge’s permission to offer evidence about a wider range of the
complainant’s personal information
may be seen as consistent with the
policy basis for the section. If so, there may be a case for amending section
88.
- 14.10 We invite
submissions on whether section 88 should be amended to broaden its scope and, if
so, what types of information should
be included. For example, McDonald’s
report recommended it should specifically
cover:[1078]
(a) the occupation the complainant had at the time of the alleged offence and/or
at the time of the trial;
(b) whether the complainant has (or had) no occupation or is (or was) unemployed
or is (or was) a student and in what course of study;
(c) whether the complainant is (or was) fully occupied caring for children or
family members;
(d) the complainant’s school or tertiary qualifications.
QUESTIONS
Q60
Is there an issue with low compliance with section 88? If so, how should this
be addressed?
Q61
Should section 88 be amended to protect a wider range of information? If so,
what should it include?
CROSS-EXAMINATION DUTIES
- 14.11 Section
92 establishes a duty to cross-examine witnesses. Section 92(1) states:
- In any
proceeding, a party must cross-examine a witness on significant matters that are
relevant and in issue and that contradict
the evidence of the witness, if the
witness could reasonably be expected to be in a position to give admissible
evidence on those
matters.
What is the issue?
- 14.12 Our
review of case law and commentary identified some uncertainty as to the purpose
of section 92 and what it requires of cross-examining
counsel. There is concern
that this may be resulting in mechanical and overcautious cross-examination in
civil proceedings and improper
or repetitive cross-examination in some criminal
proceedings.
Is the purpose and scope of section 92 uncertain?
- 14.13 Section
92 codified the long-standing common law rule first put forward by the House of
Lords in Browne v
Dunn.[1079] The rule is
concerned with fairness to the witness so that they have an opportunity to reply
to any criticism of their evidence based
on competing evidence that is to be
called later.[1080] It is there
to protect the interests of the party that called the witness, not the
interests of the party who is cross-examining the
witness.[1081] Additionally, the
rationale of accuracy in fact-finding is also said to underpin section
92.[1082] The fact-finder should
not be denied the opportunity to assess from all perspectives conflicting
recollections of
events.[1083]
- 14.14 The duty
to cross-examine is not absolute. The courts have confirmed that section 92
“need not be slavishly followed where
the witness is perfectly well aware
that his or her evidence is not accepted on a particular
point”.[1084] The courts
instead take a flexible and purposive approach when asked to determine whether a
breach of section 92 has occurred. There
are many examples of cases where one
party’s failure to cross-examine a witness on a material issue is deemed
not to breach the section 92 duty. This is on the basis that the witness
was aware their evidence was not accepted on a particular point
and, therefore,
had the opportunity to respond to the criticism (whether or not that opportunity
was taken).[1085]
- 14.15 The
problem, however, is that neither the purpose of section 92 nor the
courts’ general approach are apparent on the face
of the section. As the
authors of Mahoney on Evidence observe, a literal interpretation of
section 92 would require cross-examination of witnesses on every item of
evidence in a party’s
case that meets the requirements in section
92(1).[1086] They suggest that
such a mechanical approach could blunt the impact of cross-examination and
undermine a party’s control of
adversarial questioning at
trial.[1087] The authors of both
Adams on Criminal Law and Mahoney on Evidence also suggest that a
literal interpretation of section 92 could conflict with the focus in section
6(e) of the Act on avoiding unjustifiable
expense and
delay.[1088]
- 14.16 The
wording of section 92 may be generating some uncertainty as to what is required
to discharge the cross-examination duty,
leading lawyers to “err in the
direction of
excess”.[1089] As James
Farmer KC has
observed:[1090]
- It is a common
misconception that all evidence of a witness with which there is some
disagreement must be challenged by way of cross-examination.
If that were so,
trials would be needlessly protracted.
- 14.17 This
matter was considered by Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission when it
recommended codifying the rule in Browne v Dunn in the Evidence Code. The
Commission acknowledged concern that codification could unnecessarily lengthen
cross-examinations as counsel
seek to comply with the
duty.[1091] The Commission
sought to allay these concerns by recommending that the statutory duty be
expressly limited to situations where “the
witness or the party who called
the witness may be unaware that they are a part of the cross-examining
party’s case”,[1092]
explaining that:[1093]
- The Law
Commission expects that s 92 will result in fewer instances of the sort
of unnecessary, overcautious cross-examinations that occur at present to ensure
compliance with a common law
rule that is of uncertain scope and varying
application.
- 14.18 The
Commission’s proposed wording, however, did not appear in the Evidence
Bill introduced into Parliament in
2005.[1094]
Impact of section 92 in civil proceedings
- 14.19 If
the objectives of section 92 are fairness and accuracy in fact-finding, arguably
it has little utility in civil proceedings.
The parties’ positions in
civil proceedings are usually clear well in advance of trial because of
procedural requirements such
as exchange of pleadings and briefs of
evidence.[1095]
- 14.20 The issue,
however, is that uncertainty as to what section 92 requires may be resulting in
the very behaviour the Commission
sought to avoid with its Evidence Code –
that is, unnecessary and overcautious questioning in cross-examination to avoid
any
breach of section 92.[1096]
As Andrew Barker KC explained in a submission to the Rules Committee on its
Improving Access to Civil Justice
project:[1097]
- I find this
often to be a largely pro forma and meaningless obligation, given the filing of
substantive briefs of evidence and reply
evidence (whether in writing or as led
by counsel). Some counsel take a very broad approach to this obligation. Others
are very careful
and particular and devote a significant amount of time in
putting each aspect of their case to every witness. The same variability
in
approach to the obligation applies to the judiciary.
Impact of section 92 on witnesses
- 14.21 Another
concern is that section 92 is resulting in improper or unnecessarily repetitive
questioning of witnesses in some cases.
- 14.22 McDonald’s
examination of New Zealand trial processes in adult acquaintance rape cases
identified a “very apparent”
tension between the need to fairly
“put the case” in cross-examination and the judicial control of
improper or needlessly
repetitive
questioning.[1098] McDonald
found that some complainants were subjected to long periods of questioning in
reliance on the duty to put the defendant’s
case,[1099] sometimes even when
the defendant’s version of events had already been put to the complainant
during their
examination-in-chief.[1100]
McDonald concluded that better use could be made of the rules of evidence and
procedure that already
exist:[1101]
- We consider
that in the particular context of adult rape cases when the issue is consent,
what is in contention will be usually be
very clear pre-trial, and there could
be tighter controls placed on the challenges to the complainant’s version
of events (such
as reducing the need to put all of the details of the
defendant’s competing claims).
- 14.23 Further
research published by McDonald in 2022 found that repetitive questioning on the
basis of the section 92 duty occurred
in both jury and judge-alone rape
trials.[1102]
- 14.24 In
relation to the observed lack of judicial intervention in cross-examination,
McDonald suggested
that:[1103]
- ... this may be
because it is difficult for a judge, in adversarial proceedings, to intervene
about matters of content when the defendant
has a duty to put their case to the
complainant (see section 92 of the Evidence Act 2006). However, the extent of
the questioning
required in order to meet this duty is contestable – and
in both studies there were cases in which the judge queried the need
for the
questions and the response given that relied on section 92.
- 14.25 Also
relevant is Dr Isabel Randell’s research on cross-examination of child and
adolescent sexual violence complainants,
published in
2021.[1104] Randell identified
similar concerns with questioning that was intended to meet the section 92
duty:[1105]
- In the trials
analysed, the defence case was, for the most part, that the complainant’s
allegations were false. However, allegations
of lying may increase distress,
impede concentration, interfere with participation in questioning, and risk a
young complainant becoming
erroneously compliant and suggestible. Although
counsel may have a duty to address lying with the complainant, if indeed that is
the defence case, the extent to which accusations of lying are made by defence
counsel has been suggested to be unnecessary.
- 14.26 Randell
questioned whether “sustained or aggressive attacks on the witness’
honesty” is necessary to meet
the section 92
duty.[1106] Randell also
suggested a fear of appeal on the ground that the judge unfairly restricted the
defence counsel’s ability to put
questions to the witness may be acting as
a barrier to judicial
intervention.[1107]
- 14.27 The
Benchmark initiative has published a best-practice guideline that addresses the
section 92 duty in the context of vulnerable
witnesses.[1108] That guidance
notes the law does not require lawyers to put questions to vulnerable witnesses
in certain circumstances and pre-trial
directions can be sought on the extent to
which counsel must put the case in order to reduce unnecessary and overly
distressing questioning.
The findings of the McDonald and Randell studies,
however, suggest that varying understandings and practices in relation to
section
92 remain. While this research concerned adult and child
complainants in cases involving sexual violence, that does not necessarily
mean
that the issue is confined to these cases.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 14.28 The
issues identified above suggest that section 92 has the potential to cause
problems in practice in both civil and criminal
proceedings. It may be resulting
in unnecessarily lengthy cross-examination, which fails to promote the
Act’s objective of
avoiding unjustifiable expense and
delay.[1109] The wording of
section 92 may also be failing to provide trial judges with sufficient guidance
on when they can intervene in repetitive
questioning when it is said to be part
of trial counsel’s duty to put the case. If so, this also fails to promote
the Act’s
objective of promoting fairness to
witnesses.[1110]
- 14.29 We are,
therefore, interested in views on whether section 92 should be amended to
clarify the scope of the cross-examination
duty.
Preferred option for reform
- 14.30 Should
reform be considered necessary or desirable, our preferred option is to amend
section 92 to clarify that the duty to
cross-examine is only engaged when a
party or witness has not otherwise been put on notice of the cross-examining
party’s case.
This would be consistent with the policy objectives of the
duty (discussed above) and would reflect the language originally proposed
by the
Commission in the Evidence Code.
- 14.31 This
change would more clearly signal to cross-examining counsel what is required of
them under this duty. It would clarify
that they are under no duty to
cross-examine witnesses when their party’s case is clear and there is no
evidence to be led subsequently of which the witness
may be unaware. This would
give counsel greater freedom to treat cross-examination as a matter of trial
strategy. In criminal proceedings,
the trial judge would have clearer guidance
as to when they should intervene in cross-examination under section 85 to
disallow unacceptable
questioning.
- 14.32 In civil
proceedings, clarifying section 92 in this way could reduce the extent of
mechanical and overcautious cross-examination
(as was intended by the Commission
in proposing the Evidence Code).
QUESTION
Q62
Should section 92 be amended to clarify the extent of a party’s
cross-examination duties? If so, should section 92 be amended
to state that the
obligation to cross-examine only arises if the witness or the party who called
the witness may be unaware of the
basis on which their evidence is challenged?
CROSS-EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER
- 14.33 Defendants
in criminal proceedings and parties in civil proceedings are usually represented
by counsel. If a person is self-represented,
there are some limitations on their
ability to personally cross-examine witnesses. Section 95 of the Act provides
that, in cases
involving sexual offending, family violence or harassment, the
defendant is not entitled to personally cross-examine the complainant
and
certain witnesses.[1111] The
judge may also order that a party must not personally cross-examine a witness in
any civil or criminal
proceeding.[1112] When a party
is precluded from personally cross-examining a witness, they may have their
questions put to the witness by a person
appointed by the
judge.[1113]
What is the issue?
- 14.34 A
question has arisen in the case law as to the role of the person appointed to
put questions to the witness.
- 14.35 In 2020,
the Principal Family Court Judge issued guidance to te Kōti Whānau |
Family Court judges noting that there
were differing views on the role of
counsel appointed to put a party’s questions to a
witness.[1114] The guidance
indicated that counsel appointed under section 95 should conduct the
cross-examination on behalf of the defendant or other party. This
involved more than simply voicing the party’s questions – it also
required counsel
to comply with the section 92 duty to put the case.
- 14.36 The courts
have subsequently taken differing views on whether a person appointed under
section 95 is simply a “mouthpiece”
for the defendant or other
party, or whether they have broader duties. A broad interpretation in line with
the Principal Family Court
Judge’s guidance was adopted in the Family
Court case Finley v
Wiggins.[1115] Te Kōti
Pīra | Court of Appeal also appeared to adopt this approach, without
directly addressing the issue, in Millar v
R.[1116] One of the grounds
of appeal was that counsel appointed under section 95 had made errors in their
cross-examination and overlooked
lines of enquiry. The Court of Appeal agreed,
noting counsel was appointed to cross-examine the complainant and “was
required
to perform that task and any others he undertook
competently”.[1117]
- 14.37 On the
other hand, in Irving v Irving, te Kōti Matua | High Court found
that the role of a person appointed under section 95 is limited to putting the
questions of
the unrepresented
party.[1118] They are not
required to conduct their own cross-examination or comply with section 92
– it is the unrepresented party who
is subject to section 92
cross-examination duties.[1119]
This conclusion was based on the plain wording of section
95,[1120] the fact that lay
persons may be appointed to the
role[1121] and the purpose of
the provision (which is to protect vulnerable witnesses from being questioned by
their alleged abuser directly
rather than to ensure parties have legal
representation).[1122] This
approach was subsequently applied by the High Court in R v Family
Court[1123] and
impliedly endorsed by the Court of
Appeal.[1124] However, as noted
above, the Court of Appeal decision in Millar, which was released shortly
after Irving, took a different approach.
- 14.38 It may be
that Millar can be distinguished from Irving on the basis that, in
Millar, the person was appointed “pursuant to s 95 ... and
[to] assist the Court” (emphasis
added).[1125] That
interpretation has not, however, been confirmed in subsequent case law to
date.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 14.39 It
appears that there is uncertainty about the correct interpretation of
section 95, which has potentially significant implications
for people
appointed under section 95(5) and the unrepresented parties they are assisting.
We seek feedback on whether reform is
desirable to clarify the position or
whether this issue should be left to be resolved through case law.
- 14.40 Our
preliminary view is that the approach in Irving is correct. Section 95(5)
provides that the unrepresented party may have their questions put to the
witness by the appointed person. Section 95(6) sets out a process for judicial
oversight of the questions put, which would
seem unnecessary if counsel
appointed under section 95(5) were subject to broader cross-examination
duties.[1126] The fact that a
lay person can be appointed under section 95(5) provides further support for the
view that the role is limited to
stating questions prepared by the unrepresented
party.
- 14.41 The
legislative history of section 95, which is set out in Irving, also
supports a narrow
interpretation.[1127] The
predecessor to section 95, section 23F of the Evidence Act 1908, allowed a
defendant to put questions to the complainant “by
stating the questions to
a person, approved by the judge, who shall repeat the questions to the
complainant”. Section 95 was
intended to apply to a broader class of
witnesses than section 23F, but in other respects, it was intended to retain the
existing
approach of allowing the unrepresented party to put their questions to
a witness through another
person.[1128] The section was
intended to protect witnesses, not to assist unrepresented parties to properly
put their case.[1129]
- 14.42 If
clarification is considered desirable, this could be achieved by inserting a new
subsection into section 95 providing that:
(a) the role of a person appointed under section
95(5)(b) is limited to putting the unrepresented party’s questions to the
witness;
and
(b) a lawyer appointed under section 95(5)(b) to put the defendant’s or
party’s questions to the witness is not acting
as counsel for the
defendant or party.
QUESTION
Q63
Should section 95 be amended to clarify that:
- the
role of a person appointed under section 95(5)(b) is limited to putting the
unrepresented party’s questions to the witness;
and/or
- a
lawyer appointed under section 95(5)(b) to put the defendant’s or
party’s questions to the witness is not acting as
counsel for the
defendant or party?
CHAPTER 15
15 Other issues
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider and seek feedback on three stand-alone issues
relating to:
- the role of the
judge when determining whether to admit evidence by agreement under section
9;
- the test for
admitting novel scientific evidence; and
- the scope of
sections 108 and 109 (the giving of evidence by undercover police
officers).
SECTION 9 (ADMISSION BY AGREEMENT) AND THE ROLE OF THE
JUDGE
- 15.1 Section
9(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2006 permits a judge, in civil and criminal
proceedings, to admit evidence that is not otherwise
admissible with the written
or oral agreement of all parties.
Is the application of section 9 unclear?
- 15.2 We
received preliminary feedback suggesting section 9 is inconsistently applied and
that greater guidance is needed.
- 15.3 Section 9
is based on Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s proposed Evidence
Code provision.[1130] The
Commission explained the rationale for section 9 as
follows:[1131]
- Section
9(1)(a) codifies the convenient practice in both civil and criminal proceedings
which allows a judge, with the consent of
all parties, to admit evidence that
may otherwise not be admissible. For example, in the course of presenting their
cases, parties
sometimes introduce, without objection from the other side,
evidence that is not strictly relevant to determining the proceeding.
In the
end, it saves time to allow this sort of harmless evidence, rather than disrupt
its flow by constant rulings on admissibility.
- 15.4 The
Commission also noted the section was “in line with the objective of
avoiding unjustifiable expense and
delay”.[1132]
- 15.5 This
suggests that section 9 was primarily intended to avoid unnecessarily
lengthening proceedings by dispensing with the requirement
for admissibility
rulings on evidence that is relatively insignificant. However, the wording of
section 9(1)(a) is significantly
broader than the Commission’s discussion
would suggest. It simply states that the judge may, “with the written or
oral
agreement of all parties, admit evidence that is not otherwise
admissible”. It does not explain how the judge should determine
whether to
exercise that power or impose any limits on it.
- 15.6 Case law
suggests there are differing views on the extent to which section 9 permits
admission by agreement of evidence that
is otherwise inadmissible or subject to
exclusion.
(a) In Wilson v R[1133]
and Douglas v R,[1134] te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal found that evidence admitted by agreement
at trial should not have been admitted as it did
not meet the requirements of
the previous consistent statements rule and the propensity provisions
respectively. The Court in Wilson said the judge has a duty to ensure a
conviction is not based on material evidence that is
inadmissible.[1135]
(b) In R v Wellington, te Kōti Matua | High Court referred to the
decisions in Wilson and Douglas and observed it was not clear
whether they were consistent with the wording of section
9(1)(a).[1136] The Court
concluded otherwise inadmissible evidence could be admitted by agreement
provided its admission would not result in an
unfair trial and exclusion was not
required by section 8 (general
exclusion).[1137]
(c) In WM (CA714/18) v R, the Court of Appeal found that, while the judge
has a responsibility to ensure a fair trial, “it would be rare for a Judge
to refuse to permit the defence to put otherwise inadmissible evidence before a
jury, with the consent of the Crown, when the defence
has decided that this
would assist the
defence”.[1138] In that
case, evidence of prior convictions was admitted at trial by agreement despite
the evidence having been ruled inadmissible
propensity evidence. The Court
declined to find the trial judge was wrong to admit the evidence under section
9.
- 15.7 Based on
these cases, it appears unclear what approach the courts should take when the
parties agree to admit otherwise inadmissible
evidence. In particular, it is
unclear whether evidence should be admitted under section 9 if it:
(a) is material evidence that is otherwise inadmissible because of the operation
of a specific provision in the Act (for example,
the rules relating to hearsay,
opinion evidence or previous consistent statements); or
(b) would lead to an unfair trial or would otherwise be excluded under section 8
(general exclusion).
- 15.8 This could
cause uncertainty for parties and result in continued argument over the
propriety of admission under section 9. It
may therefore be desirable to clarify
the circumstances in which a judge may refuse to admit evidence by agreement
under section
9.
Options for reform
- 15.9 If
reform is considered desirable, we have identified two options for amending
section 9 that could be implemented together or
separately:
(a) Option 1: Amend section 9 to provide that, in determining whether to
admit evidence under section 9(1)(a), the judge must have regard to certain
factors. These could include, for example:
(i) the need to ensure fairness to parties and witnesses; and
(ii) the desirability of avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay.
(b) Option 2: Amend section 9 to provide that evidence may not be
admitted by agreement if exclusion is required by section 8(1)(a).
- 15.10 Option 1
would provide guidance to judges on the types of considerations that are
relevant in exercising their discretion under
section 9. It would not require
exclusion in any particular situation so would continue to allow the court to
have regard to all
the circumstances of the case.
- 15.11 In terms
of relevant factors, we suggest section 9 should be applied in a manner that
avoids unnecessary expense and delay,
consistent with the Act’s purpose
provision.[1139] It is clear
from the Commission’s Evidence Code that this was the intent of the
section. Avoiding unnecessary admissibility
rulings by admitting evidence by
agreement may save time and cost. It is also possible, however, that admitting
evidence under section
9 could unnecessarily lengthen the proceeding if the
parties agree to admit significant amounts of evidence that is of marginal
relevance
or probative value.
- 15.12 Ensuring
fairness to parties and witnesses could also be included as a relevant
consideration. For example, the admission of
hearsay evidence by agreement may
be considered unfair if cross-examination of the witness is likely to be
necessary for the defendant
to offer an effective defence. The contrary argument
is that “a defendant is entitled to run their defence as they choose,
even
if their choice seems
unwise”.[1140] On this
view, it would be inappropriate for the court to refuse to admit evidence under
section 9 on fairness grounds if the parties
have agreed to its
admission.[1141]
- 15.13 Option 2
would mean that section 9 could not be used to admit evidence where
section 8(1)(a) applies – that is, where
the probative value of the
evidence is outweighed by the risk that it will have an unfairly prejudicial
effect on the proceeding
(taking into account the right of the defendant to
offer an effective
defence).[1142] Section 8(1)(a)
creates a general exclusionary rule that applies to all
evidence.[1143] Allowing
defendants to agree to the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence may lead
(as the cases discussed above demonstrate)
to appeals on the basis of trial
counsel error. It may also be considered contrary to the original intent of the
section (which was
aimed at efficiency) and the Act’s purpose of promoting
fairness to parties.[1144] This
option would, however, more significantly circumscribe the ability of the
parties to run their case as they choose.
- 15.14 We do not
suggest making section 9 subject to other specific provisions in the Act dealing
with the admissibility or exclusion
of evidence. The wording of section 9
suggests it is intended to permit admission by agreement of any evidence that
would otherwise
be inadmissible under another provision in the Act. This may
promote expedience, for example, where the parties agree that hearsay
evidence
ought to be admitted as it is unnecessary for the witness to attend the trial
and be cross-examined. It may also assist
the defence. For example, a defendant
may decide that the admission of a potentially unreliable statement is in fact
helpful to the
defence
case.[1145] In this situation,
it may be consistent with the principle of promoting fairness to parties and
witnesses to admit the evidence.
Section 8(1)(a) would not necessarily require
exclusion of such evidence, depending on how its probative value and prejudicial
effect
are assessed.
- 15.15 We note
neither of these options would expressly state that evidence may be admitted
under section 9 despite the applicability
of any other provision that would
render it inadmissible. We consider that is already clear from the wording of
section 9(1)(a),
which refers to admitting “evidence that is not otherwise
admissible”. By providing guidance on when evidence should
not be admitted
under section 9 and omitting reference in this context to specific admissibility
rules, the options discussed above
may help to reinforce that these rules do not
constrain the application of section 9.
QUESTION
Q64
Should section 9 be amended to clarify when the court should admit evidence
by agreement? If so, should section 9 be amended to:
- require
the judge to have regard to certain factors when deciding whether to admit
evidence under section 9(1)(a) (such as the desirability
of ensuring fairness to
parties and witnesses and/or avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay);
and/or
- provide
that evidence may not be admitted by agreement if exclusion is required by
section 8(1)(a)?
NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
- 15.16 Through
preliminary feedback, a question was raised with us about the need for
additional guidance in the Act on the admissibility
in civil and criminal
proceedings of scientific evidence based on methodologies that are novel or that
are argued to lack scientific
validity (novel scientific evidence).
- 15.17 Expert
opinion evidence is admissible under section 25 if it is likely to be of
substantial help to the fact-finder. In applying
the substantial helpfulness
test to novel scientific evidence, the courts consider several non-statutory
factors identified by the
United States Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc.[1146] These factors
include the extent to which the evidence has been tested, peer reviewed and
generally accepted by the scientific
community.[1147]
- 15.18 In a 2018
article, Jack Oliver-Hood argued that, despite the Daubert factors having
been endorsed by the Privy Council, the courts were still allowing unreliable
scientific evidence to go before juries,
which were ill-equipped to determine
the scientific validity of
evidence.[1148]
- 15.19 Subsequently,
in Lundy v R, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the relevance of the
Daubert factors[1149] and
considered expert evidence must meet a reliability threshold before it will be
of assistance to the
fact-finder.[1150] Further, the
validity of a methodology must be established at the admissibility stage through
a track record of acceptance in a body
of scientific
opinion.[1151] Judges and juries
cannot be expected to resolve complex scientific debates of this
kind.[1152]
- 15.20 The
implication of Lundy appears to be that any questions about the
reliability of scientific evidence should be addressed when determining its
admissibility,
having regard to the Daubert factors. If the methodology
used is not shown to be generally accepted within the scientific community, it
is unlikely to be substantially
helpful for the purposes of section 25.
Oliver-Hood has discussed the approach in Lundy positively,
stating:[1153]
- Lundy
has expanded out what would have been considered inadmissible scientific
evidence from the obvious “junk science”, to
include scientific
evidence which has not been shown pre-trial to have demonstrable
scientific validity. That question is now one of admissibility for the judge
pre-trial, [and] not [for] the
jury.
Is legislative reform necessary or desirable?
- 15.21 While
Lundy has been cited with apparent approval in subsequent
cases,[1154] it is not yet clear
what impact it will have – in particular, whether it will lead to more
frequent pre-trial consideration
of the admissibility of scientific evidence
and/or a stricter approach to assessing reliability in the context of section
25.[1155] At this stage, we have
not identified evidence of a problem with the application of Lundy that
may require amendments to the Act. It may be preferable to observe how case law
develops.
- 15.22 Given
this, our preliminary view is that reform would be premature at this stage.
However, we invite feedback on whether problems
have been observed in practice
since Lundy that may indicate reform is needed.
- 15.23 There are
potential issues with attempting to codify the approach in Lundy
(including the Daubert factors). For example, in the absence of more
extensive judicial consideration, it may be difficult to define what class of
evidence
the test should apply to. It is not clear the Daubert factors
are equally applicable to all classes of scientific
evidence.[1156]
- 15.24 It was
suggested to us that section 25 could be amended to clarify that the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence should
be determined pre-trial
(without necessarily changing the statutory test). We are interested in views on
whether there is a problem
in practice with admissibility not being determined
pre-trial. We note that the Act does not generally specify when admissibility
decisions must be made. Additionally, this approach would still necessitate
defining when evidence must be dealt with in this way
(as section 25 applies to
all expert opinion evidence).
QUESTION
Q65
Are there problems in practice determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence since the decision in Lundy v R? If so, what
amendments to the Act, if any, are appropriate to address this?
UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICER EVIDENCE
- 15.25 Sections
108–109 of the Act permit undercover police officers to give evidence
without disclosing their identity in criminal
proceedings involving any offence
punishable by at least seven years’ imprisonment or certain other
offences.[1157]
- 15.26 Protection
of the identity of the undercover police officer is available once the
Commissioner of Police files a certificate
in the court in which the proceeding
is to be heard. The certificate must confirm that the witness was a member of
the Police and
acted as an undercover officer during the period in question and
they have not been convicted of any offence nor found to have been
in breach of
the Police Code of Conduct. The certificate must also confirm whether, to the
knowledge of the Police Commissioner,
the witness has been the subject of
“adverse comment by the judge” in giving evidence in any other
proceedings.[1158]
- 15.27 Once this
certificate is filed, the Act prohibits evidence being given or questions being
asked that could reveal the identity
of the undercover police officer except by
leave of the judge.[1159]
Are sections 108–109 causing problems in practice?
- 15.28 The
Minister of Justice’s letter referring this review to the Commission
suggested we may wish to consider whether the
provisions governing anonymous
evidence of undercover police officers require
amendment.[1160]
- 15.29 The
Commission did not consider the operation of sections 108–109 in its
Issues Paper for the Second Review of the
Act.[1161] During the
consultation period, however, Police submitted that various aspects of those
provisions should be amended. In its final
report, the Commission concluded that
all of the suggested amendments were
unnecessary.[1162] These issues
were raised by Police during the Second Review:
(a) Whether section 108 should be amended to provide anonymity for undercover
police officers in a wider range of offences. The Commission
considered that
section 108 should not be amended in this way. The threshold in section
108(1)(a) provides a way to balance the public
interest in allowing the
effective use of undercover policing with the defendant’s right to know
the identity of their accuser.
Parliament very clearly intended to limit the
scope of application to the most serious
offences.[1163]
(b) Whether sections 108 and 109 should be extended to apply to civil
proceedings. The Commission took the view that there was already
(pre-Act)
precedent permitting undercover police officers to give evidence anonymously in
civil proceedings, and that the types of
cases where this would be relevant
would be rare.[1164]
(c) Whether the requirement for the section 108(2) certificate to disclose any
breach of the Police Code of Conduct should be limited
to serious misconduct.
The Commission considered that this would be unduly
narrow.[1165] It would have the
effect of excluding minor matters that might be relevant to an assessment of the
officer’s integrity and
restricting the ability of the defendant to
challenge a section 108 order.
(d) Whether the definition of “undercover Police officer” (as
defined in section 108(5)) should be amended, particularly
to take account of
overseas law enforcement when undercover operations are undertaken in
partnership with other jurisdictions. The
Commission did not recommend amending
the definition as there was no evidence to suggest that it was causing problems
in practice.[1166]
- 15.30 Issue (a)
above had been considered by the Commission in its 2013 Review of the Act. The
Commission did not recommend reform,
noting the absence of evidence
demonstrating that cases were regularly falling over or that the Crown was not
proceeding with cases
because of undercover officers declining to give
evidence.[1167]
- 15.31 Since the
Second Review, section 108 has been amended as part of reforms to the Arms Act
1983 to include anonymity protections
for specific Arms Act offences punishable
by less than seven years’
imprisonment.[1168]
- 15.32 Our review
of case law and commentary did not identify any issues with sections
108–109 that may justify reform. We acknowledge,
however, that the nature
of the protections for undercover officers may make any issues with the
procedures in the Act difficult
to identify through such a review. The fact that
these provisions have been raised with us again suggests there may be ongoing
concern
with their operation. We therefore seek submissions on whether
sections 108–109 are causing problems in practice and, if so,
what
amendments may be appropriate. We emphasise that we would require specific
examples of problems caused by the current approach
in the Act to conclude that
reform is necessary or desirable.
QUESTION
Q66
Are sections 108–109 causing problems in practice? If so, how should
they be amended?
![A picture containing font, graphics, text, graphic designDescription automatically generated](2023_5003.png)
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is located at:
Level 9, Solnet House, 70 The Terrace, Wellington 6011
Postal address: PO Box 2590, Wellington 6140, Aotearoa New Zealand
Document Exchange Number: SP 23534
Telephone: 04 473 3453
Email: com@lawcom.govt.nz
[1] Some courts, including te
Kooti Whenua Māori | Māori Land Court, te Kōti Taiao |
Environment Court and te Kōti
Whānau | Family Court are not bound by
the Evidence Act 2006.
[2] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999); Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary
(NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999).
[3] Including, but not limited to,
the Evidence Act 1908: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission The 2013
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [1.2].
[4] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
xviii.
[5] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
xviii.
[6] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[7]–[8].
[7] Evidence Bill 2005 (256-2)
(select committee report) at 1.
[8] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127,
2013).
[9] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019).
[10] Letter from Hon Kris Faafoi
(Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (President of Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission) regarding
the third statutory review of the Evidence Act 2006
(23 February 2022).
[11] The Commission must report
to the Minister within two years of the date on which the reference occurs (that
is, within 2 years of
23 February 2022): Evidence Act 2006, s 202(2).
[12] The terms of reference are
available on the Commission’s website: www.lawcom.govt.nz.
[13] Pursuant to s 202(1)(a) of
the Evidence Act 2006, we focused our research on the five years since the
publication of the Issues
Paper in the Second Review in March 2018.
[14] Letter from Hon Kris Faafoi
(Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (President of Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission) regarding
the third statutory review of the Evidence Act 2006
(23 February 2022).
[15] We have also included one
technical drafting issue in this Issues Paper (relating to litigation privilege
and confidentiality, discussed
in Chapter 13). We have included this issue for
completeness on the basis that the drafting issue appears to be relatively
uncontroversial
and there is a clear legislative solution.
[16] In accordance with our
statutory obligation to take into account te ao Māori under s 5 of the Law
Commission Act 1985.
[17] Evidence Act 2006, s
202(1)(c); Letter from Hon Kris Faafoi (Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu
(President of Te Aka Matua
o te Ture | Law Commission) regarding the third
statutory review of the Evidence Act 2006 (23 February 2022).
[18] Evidence Act 2006, s 6. For
discussion of the purpose provision, see Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te
Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018) at [1.22]–[1.38].
[19] These and other issues were
discussed in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law Reform: Te
Ao Māori Consultation (unpublished consultation paper, 1997).
[20] See Te Aka Matua o te Ture
| Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018) at ch 2. The first review of
the Act was undertaken in a shorter timeframe and did not identify any issues of
particular
concern to Māori.
[21] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018) at [9].
[22] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018) at ch 2.
[23] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [2.11].
[24] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019), recommendation 2.
[25] Government Response to the
Law Commission Report: The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (September 2019) at 7.
[26] Including mātauranga
ā-iwi and tikanga ā-iwi.
[27] See discussion at [2.20]
below of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239.
[28] See discussion in Natalie
Coates “The Rise of Tikanga Māori and Te Tiriti o Waitangi
Jurisprudence” in John Burrows
and Jeremy Finn (ed) Challenge and
Change: Judging in Aotearoa New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2021) 65 at
86–87. For example, Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v
Attorney-General [2022] NZHC 843 considered “ground-breaking”
issues concerning history, tikanga, the Treaty settlement process, and the
extent to which
the court should intervene in those arenas (at [2]). In
Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General [2020]
NZHC 3120, Palmer J expressed a view that questions of tikanga are likely to
arise more frequently in the courts in future (at [36]).
[29] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239.
[30] Evidence Act 2006, s
7(1).
[31] Evidence Act 2006, s
7(3).
[32] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “hearsay statement”).
[33] Evidence Act 2006, s
17.
[34] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law Reform: Te Ao Māori Consultation
(unpublished consultation paper, 1997) at [5].
[35] Evidence Act 2006, ss 16(2)
and 18. See also s 20, which enables the hearsay rule to be varied by the High
Court Rules. Currently,
the High Court Rules provide an exception for
“statements of belief” in affidavits filed in relation to
interlocutory
applications if certain conditions are met: High Court Rules 2016,
r 7.30. Hearsay evidence was admitted under this rule in Witehira v Ram
[2020] NZHC 2326 at [24], an application for an interim injunction to
prevent disposal of the applicant’s daughter’s body following a
disagreement
on how the deceased’s body was to be dealt with.
[36] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [60].
[37] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [60]. We note
that in that paper the Commission proposed abolishing the hearsay rule in civil
proceedings, subject
to a general power to exclude evidence that is unfairly
prejudicial, misleading, confusing or time-wasting (at [3]). In its Evidence
Report, however, the Commission recommended retaining but liberalising the
hearsay rule for both criminal and civil proceedings,
noting there is a need for
judicial control over the admission of hearsay: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[64].
[38] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [60].
[39] Evidence Act 2006, s
23.
[40] Evidence Act 2006, s 25.
Section 24 also permits a witness to state an opinion in evidence if that
opinion is necessary to enable
the witness to communicate, or the fact-finder to
understand, what the witness saw, heard or otherwise perceived.
[41] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “expert”).
[42] Evidence Act 2006, s
25(1).
[43] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law Reform: Te Ao Māori Consultation
(unpublished consultation paper, 1997) at [34].
[44] See, for example,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries v Hakaria and Scott [1989] DCR 289
at 294.
[45] See discussion in Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law: Expert Evidence and Opinion
Evidence (NZLC PP18, 1991) at [36]; Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
Evidence Law Reform: Te Ao Māori Consultation (unpublished
consultation paper, 1997) at [34]–[35]; Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999)
at [C15].
[46] Evidence Act 2006, s 9.
[47] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [35]–[37]. See also discussion below of
Te Ara Rangatū o Te Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v
Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882.
[48] Evidence Act 2006, s
128(1).
[49] Evidence Act 2006, s
128(2).
[50] Tukaki v Commonwealth of
Australia [2018] NZCA 324, [2018] NZAR 1597 at [38].
[51] Evidence Act 2006, s
129.
[52] Winitana v
Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 381 at [7]–[8]. See also Te Runanga o
Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General [1990] NZCA 7; [1990] 2 NZLR 641 (CA) at 653; and Paki
v Attorney-General [2009] NZCA 584, [2011] 1 NZLR 125 at [45]. In Ellis v
R [2022] NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 Glazebrook J also suggested relevant Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission publications and widely available tikanga
compendiums
could be relied on in accordance with s 129 (at n 153).
[53] Winitana v
Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 381 at [9].
[54] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [125].
[55] Doney v Adlam [2023]
NZHC 363.
[56] Doney v Adlam [2023]
NZHC 363 at [81].
[57] Doney v Adlam [2023]
NZHC 363 at [81]–[107].
[58] High Court Rule 9.36,
discussed in Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General
[2020] NZHC 3120 at [36] where the Court observed that, “[e]ven if r
9.36 did not apply, appointment of pūkenga by the High Court would be
possible
under its inherent jurisdiction”. A power to apoint pūkenga
also exists under the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana)
Act 2011, s 99.
Pūkenga were appointed by the court in accordance with that provision in
Re Ngāti Pāhauwera [2021] NZHC 3599 (at [327]–[328]) and
in Re Edwards (No 2) [2021] NZHC 1025, [2022] 2 NZLR 772 (at
[309]–[310]).
[59] Ngāti Whātua
Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 3120.
[60] Ngāti Whātua
Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General [2022] NZHC 843 at [93].
[61] Te Ture Whenua Maori Act
1993, s 61.
[62] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [125]. See also comments from Winkelmann CJ at
[181].
[63] Statement of Tikanga at
[120], appended to Ellis v R [2022] NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239.
[64] In Takamore v Clarke
[2012] NZSC 116, [2013] 2 NZLR 733, Elias CJ had suggested that what constitutes
Māori custom or tikanga in the particular case “is a question of fact
for
expert evidence” (at [95]). In Ngāti Whātua
Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 3120, Palmer J
accepted a submission that “tikanga is law proved as a matter of
fact” (at [36]). These observations were repeated
in Ngawaka v
Ngāti Rehua-Ngātiwai ki Aotea Trust Board (no 2) [2021] NZHC 291,
[2021] 2 NZLR 1 at [47].
[65] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at n 151.
[66] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [273]. See also comments from Winkelmann CJ at
[181].
[67] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [273].
[68] R v Saxton DC
Christchurch CRI-2004-002-000741, 25 October 2007.
[69] R v Saxton DC
Christchurch CRI-2004-002-000741, 25 October 2007, n 41.
[70] R v Saxton [2009]
NZCA 498, [2012] 1 NZLR 331 at [78]. The Court of Appeal “appeared to
agree with counsel that evidence of custom would be admissible under the
Evidence Act 2006”:
Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law –
Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [EA18.03(1)].
[71] Proprietors of
Wakatū Inc v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 1461, [2012] BCL 396 at
[41].
[72] Proprietors of
Wakatū Inc v Attorney-General HC Nelson CIV-2010-442-181, 7 December
2010 at [45], set out in Proprietors of Wakatū Inc v
Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 1461, [2012] BCL 396 at [41], and confirmed at
[42].
[73] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882.
[74] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882 at
[15].
[75] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882 at
[142].
[76] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882 at
[15].
[77] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882 at
[18].
[78] Section 9 allows a judge to
admit evidence that is not otherwise admissible “with the written or oral
agreement of all parties”.
The legislative history of this provision
indicates that the language was intended to require express consent of the
parties rather
than implied consent. See discussion in Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act and Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV9.02].
[79] Not included in this list
are the claims recently considered under the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai
Moana) Act 2011. As we explain
below, claims under this Act are not subject to
the rules in the Evidence Act 2006. Nonetheless it is notable that these cases
involve
extensive evidence from pūkenga, given the centrality of tikanga to
the statutory tests. See, for example, Re Ngāti Pāhauwera
[2021] NZHC 3599 at [321] and [324]. See also Re Edwards (No 2)
[2021] NZHC 1025, [2022] 2 NZLR 772 at [131] and [308]; Re Reeder
[2021] NZHC 2726 at [46]; and Paul v Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 443
at [51].
[80] For example, Ngawaka v
Ngāti Rehua-Ngātiwai ki Aotea Trust Board (No 2) [2021] NZHC 291,
[2021] 2 NZLR 1 concerned a dispute between two groups of beneficiaries of the
Ngāti Rehua-Ngātiwai ki Aotea Trust about the whakapapa
of two people.
The Court was asked to determine whether the dispute should be resolved by
arbitration in accordance with a mediation
agreement previously entered by the
parties. The Court heard expert evidence from a pūkenga and hereditary
rangatira in Ngāti
Rehua-Ngātiwai ki Aotea tikanga (at [48]).
[81] For example, Cowan v
Cowan [2022] NZHC 1322 involved a dispute between whānau as to
the proposed sale of the family home. The Court ruled expert evidence from a
tikanga
expert was admissible on the basis that it was relevant to the
plaintiffs’ damages claim, as they argued that they had suffered
financial
damage and psychological loss because their customary rights to their
papakāinga had not been recognised by their
family (at [8]–[9]).
[82] For example, Te Pou
Matakana Ltd v Attorney-General [2021] NZHC 3319, [2022] 2 NZLR 178
was a judicial review of a decision by the Ministry of Health
declining to provide the applicant with personal details of Māori living in
Te
Ika-a-Māui | North Island who had not yet received any dose of the
COVID-19 vaccine. Expert evidence was given as to what tikanga
required in this
context (at [108]).
[83] For example, Urlich v
Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 38 concerned the ownership of land once gifted
by two brothers of Ngāti Kahu descent to the Crown for use as a Māori
school.
When the school closed, the land was offered back to
“successors” of the original owners in accordance with the Public
Works Act 1981. This meant the land was offered back to the grandson of one of
the original owners, but not the son of the other
original owner, because he was
not the residual beneficiary under his father’s will. Leave was granted to
offer expert evidence
that contended that these actions contravened Te
Whānau Moana and Ngāti Kahu tikanga (at [37] and [39]).
[84] Mercury NZ Ltd v
Waitangi Tribunal [2021] NZHC 654. It was argued that the Tribunal’s
determination was unlawful as it was inconsistent with tikanga and in breach of
the Treaty
(at [95]). Expert evidence on whether the Tribunal’s
preliminary determination breached tikanga was received by the Court and
was not
contested or challenged (at n 78).
[85] This case is subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[86] An upcoming case in which
tikanga Māori and evidence about historical events is likely to be central
to the issues in dispute
concerns Ngāi Tahu’s claim of rangatiratanga
and pūtake-mauka rights and entitlements in their takiwā in relation
to wai māori (freshwater): Tau v Attorney-General [2022] NZHC 2604.
Ngāi Tahu says wai māori is a taonga and the assertion of its rights
and entitlements is grounded in tikaka (tikanga in
the Ngāi Tahu dialect)
and riteka (ritenga in the Ngāi Tahu dialect). It contends these rights and
entitlements have been
constrained, encumbered, eroded, or removed by the
conduct of the Crown and seeks declarations to recognise, restore or accommodate
them (at [1]). The trial is unlikely to be before 2025 (at [72]).
[87] Te Ture Whenua Maori Act
1993, s 69(1) provides that the Māori Land Court and the Māori
Appellate Court may receive as
evidence any statement, document, information, or
matter that, in the opinion of the Court, may assist it to deal effectively with
the matters before it, whether or not that would be legally admissible in
evidence. Resource Management Act 1991, s 276 provides
that the Environment
Court may receive anything in evidence that it considers appropriate to receive.
The Marine and Coastal Area
(Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 105 provides that the
Court may receive as evidence any oral or written statement, document, matter or
information that the Court considers to be reliable, whether or not that
evidence would otherwise be admissible.
[88] Ngati Hokopu Ki
Hokowhitu v Whakatane District Council [2002] NZEnvC 421; (2002) 9 ELRNZ 111 at [56]. For an
example of the approach taken in the Māori Land Court, see Stone v Couch
– Rāpaki MR 875 39A (2020) 65 Te Waipounamu MB 61 (65 TWP
61) at [56]–[57]. In relation to claims under the Marine and Coastal Area
(Takutai Moana)
Act 2011, the High Court has acknowledged that the proper
authorities on tikanga are the living people who have retained the
mātauranga,
the knowledge and wisdom passed down to them by their
ancestors: Re Edwards (No 2) [2021] NZHC 1025, [2022] 2 NZLR 772 at
[308]; and Re Ngāti Pāhauwera [2021] NZHC 3599 at [325].
[89] Ngati Hokopu Ki
Hokowhitu v Whakatane District Council [2002] NZEnvC 421; (2002) 9 ELRNZ 111 at [57]. See also
Takamore Trustees v Kapiti Coast District Council [2003] 3 NZLR 496,
where the High Court rejected the Environment Court’s criticisms of
evidence given by kaumātua as to the presence of
kōiwi in the swamps
of Takamore on the basis that it was hearsay, general in nature, and lacked any
specificity by way of oral
tradition or historical foundation. The High Court
observed that it was “difficult to see, given we are concerned with an
oral
history which pre-dates European presence, more specificity is reasonably
possible”, and “[t]he fact no European was
present with pen and
paper to record such burials could hardly be grounds for rejecting the
evidence” (at [67]–[68]).
Further, reducing oral history to
“assertion rather than evidence” was “not at all the proper
approach to oral
history such as this” (at [78]).
[90] See discussion in
Australian Law Reform Commission and others Uniform Evidence Law: Report
(ALRC R102, NSWLRC R112, VLRC Final Report, December 2005), ch 19.
[91] See Evidence Act 1995
(Cth), s 72; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2008
(Vic); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); and Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act
2011 (NT).
[92] See Evidence Act 1995
(Cth), s 78A.
[93] The Act defines
“expert” as a person who has specialised knowledge or skill based on
training, study or experience:
Evidence Act 2006, s 4 (definition of
“expert”).
[94] Deng v Zheng [2022]
NZSC 76 at [78(a)].
[95] A similar option was
considered in the Second Review but was not progressed: Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [2.27]–[2.34].
[96] Resource Management Act
1991, s 269(3).
[97] Te Ture Whenua Maori Act
1993, s 66(1).
[98] Eugene Bingham, Felippe
Rodrigues and Chris McKeen “Unwarranted: The little-known, but widely-used
police tactic” (2020)
Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>.
[99] Ngā Pirihimana o
Aotearoa | New Zealand Police “Police embark on new phase of research into
Fair and Equitable policing”
(2 June 2022) <www.police.govt.nz>.
[100] Kearns v R [2017]
NZCA 51, [2017] 2 NZLR 835.
[101] Kearns v R [2017]
NZCA 51, [2017] 2 NZLR 835 at [38]–[42].
[102] This case is subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[103] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law Reform: Te ao
Māori Consultation (unpublished consultation paper, 1997)
at [106]–[107].
[104] Evidence Act 2006, s
126.
[105] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [2.35]–[2.63].
[106] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [2.40].
[107] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019), recommendation 2.
[108] Government Response to
the Law Commission Report: The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (September 2019) at 7.
[109] For example, in
Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General [2020]
NZHC 3120, some parties agreed among themselves that they would not
cross-examine each other’s witnesses on the basis that “[t]he
absence of cross-examination does not mean that the evidence is uncontested. Any
contest of evidence will be dealt with through submission
rather than
cross-examination” (at [11(a)]).
[110] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C323].
[111] Evidence Act 2006, s
85.
[112] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C323]. It suggested one way would be to encourage counsel to state a
possible position to which the kāumātua
is invited to respond, instead
of directly questioning a kāumātua.
[113] Evidence Act 2006, s
79(1).
[114] Bamber v Official
Assignee [2023] NZHC 260.
[115] Bamber v Official
Assignee [2023] NZHC 260 at [21].
[116] Bamber v Official
Assignee [2023] NZHC 260 at [43].
[117] Codified in s 83 of the
Evidence Act 2006.
[118] Taniwha v R
[2016] NZSC 123, [2017] 1 NZLR 116 at [1].
[119] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “witness”).
[120] These exceptions include
the Sovereign and other heads of state, judges, defendants and associated
defendants.
[121] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “hearsay statement”).
[122] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883.
[123] See Criminal Procedure
Act 2011, ss 159, 161 and 165.
[124] Criminal Procedure Act
2011, s 165(3)(a).
[125] Criminal Procedure Act
2011, s 165(2)(a). See also s 159, which provides that it is not an offence to
refuse to appear in court
in response to a witness summons if the person has a
“reasonable excuse”, and s 161, which provides that a judicial
officer
may issue a warrant to arrest a person who has failed to appear in
response to a summons if “no reasonable excuse is offered”
for that
failure.
[126] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [13].
[127] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [16].
[128] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [25].
[129] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [39].
[130] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [45].
[131] These cases are subject
to publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[132] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 44–55. As part of its work on evidence law reform, the Commission
had also published two preliminary
papers on hearsay: Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Hearsay Evidence (NZLC PP10, 1989) and Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991).
[133] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 1,
1999) at [58].
[134] Such as allowing
anonymity or the use of screens or closed-circuit television. Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 1, 1999) at [58]. The courts can and do give permission to give evidence
remotely when witnesses are fearful of retaliation.
See, for example, Rameka
v R [2019] NZCA 105 at [52].
[135] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[59].
[136] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[344]. See also Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law:
Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [229]–[231].
[137] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[344].
[138] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[345].
[139] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[345].
[140] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[346].
[141] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[347].
[142] Cabinet Paper
“Evidence Bill: Paper 5: Spousal Witness Immunity and Children’s
Evidence” (18 March 2003) at [12].
[143] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 9.
[144] See, for example,
discussion in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the
Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [61]. These competing interests are recognised
in s 6 of the Evidence Act 2006 which refers to the need
to provide rules of
evidence that recognise the importance of the rights affirmed by the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990, to
promote fairness to parties and witnesses, and to
protect other important public interests.
[145] New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990, s 25(f). See also s 27. The Commission observed in its 1999
Report that to a lesser degree
there may be analogous rights in civil
proceedings – for instance, the right not to be subjected to an adverse
judgment unless
a case has been made out, and the right to call and
cross-examine witnesses: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence:
Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [18].
[146] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [39].
[147] Evidence Act 2006, ss
103–105 (general provisions about alternative ways of giving evidence); ss
106AA–106B (relating
to family violence complainants); ss 106C–106J
(relating to sexual case complainants or propensity witnesses); ss
107AA–107B
(relating to child witnesses in criminal proceedings); ss 108
and 109 (relating to undercover police officers); and ss 110–118
(relating
to anonymous witnesses). In relation to family violence complainants, see
discussion in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
The Second Review of
the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006
(NZLC R142, 2019), ch 9.
[148] Cara Thorburn
“Compellability of Complainants in Family Violence Prosecutions:
“Just Excuse” and the Application
of the Hearsay Rules” [2019]
NZLJ 57 at 59.
[149] Cara Thorburn
“Compellability of Complainants in Family Violence Prosecutions:
“Just Excuse” and the Application
of the Hearsay Rules” [2019]
NZLJ 57 at 60.
[150] See, for example,
Evidence Bill 2005 (256-2) (select committee report) at 9.
[151] This was illustrated in
Huritu v New Zealand Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [7]. The complainant was
arrested on warrant to secure her attendance at the trial, and then bailed to
attend the retrial. A second warrant
was executed for her arrest when she failed
to appear, but she could not be found.
[152] See, for example,
Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson
Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 122–125.
[153] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [230].
[154] Evidence Act 2006, s
16(2)(d). See, for example, Rameka v R [2019] NZCA 105; Huritu v New
Zealand Police [2021] NZCA 15.
[155] See, for example,
Zespri Group Ltd v Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule - Hearsay Rulings at
[26]–[28]. In that case, genuine fears held by the makers of the hearsay
statements were not
sufficient to render them unavailable given the absence of
efforts by the party to try and allay their concerns. The Court noted
that
confidentiality orders and alternative ways of giving evidence could have been
explored, but in the absence of such efforts
having been made, the threshold in
s 16(2)(b) had not been met (at [28]).
[156] While a finding can be
made prior to trial that a person had a “reasonable excuse” for not
responding to a witness summons
under s 161 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011,
that decision is made by a judicial officer rather than a judge and, like
decisions
under s 165, is for a limited purpose (deciding whether to issue an
arrest warrant to obtain attendance of a summoned person before
the court).
[157] Discussed in Elisabeth
McDonald “Hearsay in domestic violence cases” [2003] NZLJ 174 at
176.
[158] Elisabeth McDonald
“Hearsay in domestic violence cases” [2003] NZLJ 174. McDonald
argued that in all cases where there is a justificable decision to excuse a
witness a finding of “unavailability”
for hearsay purposes must
follow (at 175). Scott Optican has also suggested consideration be given to such
a provision: Scott Optican
“Evidence” [2021] NZ L Rev 313 at 343 and
n 136; Scott Optican “Evidence” [2018] NZ L Rev 429 at 472.
[159] The approach in England
and Wales (discussed below) has also been implemented in South Australia:
Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 34KA. In Australia, the categories of unavailability
for hearsay purposes are similar to those in the Evidence Act 2006, but with
additional
categories that provide for situations where all reasonable steps
have been taken by the party seeking to prove the person is not
available to
either find the person or secure their attendance, or to compel them to give
evidence, but without success: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), pt 2 s 4. This provides
for situations where a witness makes it clear that they will resist attempts to
make them attend or give evidence,
and for situations where a person attends
court but then refuses to provide evidence, whatever threats are made concerning
the consequences
arising out of a contempt of court: Stephen Odgers Uniform
Evidence Law (17th ed, Thomson Reuters, Pyrmont, 2022) at 1793–1794.
In Canada, hearsay is admissible if it has sufficient reliability and,
in the
circumstances, admission is “reasonably necessary”, which has
allowed for greater use of hearsay evidence from
witnesses who are technically
“available”. See, for example, R v Khan [1990] 2 SCR 531 and
R v Rockey [1996] 3 SCR 829.
[160] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(2)(e), replacing Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK), 23(3)(b).
[161] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(3).
[162] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(4).
[163] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(4). The court can also have regard to “any other relevant
circumstances”: s 116(4)(d).
[164] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 114.
[165] The Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on
Human Rights) 213 UNTS 221 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into
force 3 September 1953), Art 6(1) and 6(3)(d).
[166] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber). This issue was also
considered by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in R v Horncastle
[2009] UKSC 14.
[167] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [119].
[168] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [122]–[125].
[169] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [122].
[170] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [123].
[171] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [123], discussing R
v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14.
[172] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [124].
[173] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [125].
[174] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [147].
[175] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [147].
[176] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [151]. The Grand
Chamber also noted at [150] the general safeguards of a discretion to exclude
evidence if its admission
would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of
the trial that it ought not be admitted (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,
s 78), and common law requirements in relation to jury directions on burden of
proof and reliance on hearsay statements.
[177] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 124.
[178] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 126.
[179] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 125. This safeguard had been recommended by the Law Commission of
England and Wales in 1997.
[180] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [22]. Elisabeth McDonald notes that extending the
definition of unavailability to cover witnesses who are fearful “is
probably unnecessary”.
However, that was on the assumption that a decision
to excuse a person from giving evidence triggers the hearsay provisions in the
Act: Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson
Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 149 and Appendix 1.
[181] For a discussion of the
different reasons why a complainant might be reluctant to give evidence against
an abusive partner, see
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law:
Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [229]–[231] and Elisabeth McDonald
“Hearsay in domestic violence cases” [2003] NZLJ 174 at 176.
[182] R v Manase [2001]
2 NZLR 197 (CA) at [30(b)].
[183] Elisabeth McDonald
“Hearsay in domestic violence cases” [2003] NZLJ 174 at 176.
[184] As Elisabeth McDonald
has said, “[t]hose who make sufficiently dire threats in order to decrease
the amount of prosecution
evidence are unlikely to be influenced by how the
evidence was offered”: Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in
Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 148–149.
[185] Evidence Act 2006, s
16(2)(c).
[186] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[58].
[187] R v Alovili HC
Auckland CRI-2007-404-000162, 27 June 2008 at [26].
[188] Downes v R [2022]
NZCA 639 at [37].
[189] Evidence Act 2006, ss
37(1) and 40(2).
[190] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(4).
[191] This would be in
addition to the power in s 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. See, for
example, Criminal Justice Act 2003
(UK), s 125 discussed above.
[192] Evidence Act 2006, s
18(1).
[193] The Evidence Act 2006,
part 3, subpart 5 provides for evidence to be offered by video record as an
alternative way of giving evidence
in chief at the trial. These records are
known as evidential video interviews or EVIs. They are often used in relation to
child witnesses
and adult complainants in sexual offending cases. The Evidence
Regulations 2007, part 4 also provides for mobile video records or
MVRs in
relation to family violence offending.
[194] Huritu v Police
[2019] NZHC 2560; Huritu v New Zealand Police [2021] NZCA 15, Huritu v
New Zealand Police [2021] NZSC 126 (dismissing application for leave to
appeal).
[195] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [7]–[8].
[196] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [16]–[17] and [37].
[197] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [21] and [37]–[38].
[198] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [37]–[38].
[199] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [39].
[200] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZSC 126 at [8].
[201] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZSC 126 at [11].
[202] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(2)(d).
[203] R v DT [2009]
EWCA Crim 1213 at [31]–[33] where the Court held that, if there was a
problem with the cost of finding and caring for and a reluctant witness, then
that needed to be shown with evidence. On the facts at hand, the Court found
that matters had proceeded so informally before the
Judge that no attempt had
been made, and no evidence called, to try and explore what steps had been taken
by the police to discover
the whereabouts of the witness.
[204] R v Jones [2015]
EWCA Crim 1317 at [18].
[205] Halsbury’s Laws
of England (5th ed, 2021, online ed) vol 28 Criminal Procedure at [627], n
12, citing R v McEvoy [2016] EWCA Crim 1654, R v Juskelis [2016]
EWCA Crim 1817, and R (on the Application of Rankin) v Ipswich Magistrates
Court [2016] EWHC 2851 (Admin).
[206] R v Juskelis
[2016] EWCA Crim 1817.
[207] See for example:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Part 2 – Other Expressions, cl 4; Evidence Act
1995 (NSW), Part 2 - Other expressions, cl 4; Evidence Act 2008 (VIC), Part
2—Other expressions, cl 4.
[208] Huang v Wei
[2022] NSWSC 222 at [41].
[209] Huang v Wei
[2022] NSWSC 222 at [42].
[210] See, for example:
Clout v Police [2013] NZHC 1364 at [17]–[18]; R v Leaitua
[2013] NZHC 2910 at [16]–[18].
[211] Huritu v New Zealand
Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [40].
[212] Formal statements are
admissible as evidence for the purpose of any pre-trial applications to the same
extent as if it were oral
evidence under s 86 of the Criminal Procedure Act
2011, but a party may apply for an order allowing the oral examination of a
potential
witness under s 90.
[213] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Hearsay Evidence (1967) at 9, which recommended
expanding the list of people who are unavailable to give evidence to include
people who “cannot
with reasonable diligence be found”.
[214] Rules of evidence are
prescribed in Part 9 of the High Court Rules 2016 and Part 9 of the District
Court Rules 2014. For simplicity,
in this chapter we refer to the High Court
Rules only.
[215] Pursuant to s 83(1)(c)
of the Evidence Act 2006 and r 9.12 of the High Court Rules 2016.
[216] High Court Rules 2016, r
9.7.
[217] High Court Rules 2016, r
9.4.
[218] Andrew Beck A to Z of
New Zealand Law (online ed, Thomson Reuters, 2012) at [13.10.8.4].
[219] Commissioner of
Police v Drake [2017] NZHC 2919 at [55].
[220] Zespri Group Ltd v
Gao [2020] NZHC 109.
[221] Zespri Group Ltd v
Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule - Hearsay Rulings at [7].
[222] Zespri Group Ltd v
Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule - Hearsay Rulings at [12]. This was also the
conclusion in Taylor v Asteron Life Ltd [2020] NZCA 354, [2021] 2 NZLR
561 at [66]–[68] (discussed below at paragraph 3.55); Brauninger v
Westend [2020] NZHC 2512 at [46]; Commissioner of Police v Drake
[2017] NZHC 2919 at [55]–[56]; Blanchett v Keshvara [2011] NZHC 1106; [2011] NZCCLR
34 (HC) at [13]; and Burrell Demolition Ltd v Wellington City Council HC
Wellington CIV-2006-485-1274, 12 March 2008 at [127] and [131].
[223] Andrew Beck A to Z of
New Zealand Law (online ed, Thomson Reuters, 2012) at [13.10.8.4].
[224] Commerce Commission v
Giltrap City Ltd [2001] BCL 1008 (HC) at [25]–[28].
[225] See, for example,
Zespri Group Ltd v Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule - Hearsay Rulings at
[14]. For a discussion of the courts’ approach to making pre-trial
admissibility rulings see
Gillian Coumbe “Just prove it: Lay witness
statements and admissibility in civil cases” (paper presented to Legalwise
“Evidence and Advocacy Masterclass” webinar, 2 June 2022) at
[94]–[108].
[226] Taylor v Asteron Life
Ltd [2020] NZCA 354, [2021] 2 NZLR 561 at [68].
[227] See, for example,
Apollo Bathroom and Kitchen Ltd (In liq) v Ling [2019] NZHC 237 at
[15]–[17]. In this case, the admissibility of hearsay statements was
challenged, but only at trial after the Court drew attention
to the hearsay
nature of the evidence (at [17]). However, because no foundation was provided to
support the admissibility of the
statements under s 18, the case is potentially
analogous to the situation where admissibility of hearsay statements is simply
not
addressed. See also comments in Brauninger v Westend [2020] NZHC 2512
at [45].
[228] Matvin Group Ltd v
Crown Finance Ltd [2022] NZHC 2239 at [14].
[229] Matvin Group Ltd v
Crown Finance Ltd [2022] NZHC 2239 at [15].
[230] See Lockhart v R
[2013] NZCA 549 at [60] and discussion in Elisabeth McDonald and Scott
Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act and Analysis (4th ed, Thomson
Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV9.02].
[231] See discussion in Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to
Civil Justice (November 2022) at [237]–[239].
[232] If a document in the
common bundle contains a statement made by someone who is not a witness, and
that statement is relied on for
the truth of its contents, it will be a hearsay
statement under the Evidence Act 2006 and inadmissible unless one of the
exceptions
in the Act applies.
[233] Te Komiti mō
ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice
(November 2022).
[234] Te Komiti Mō
Ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice
(November 2022), Recommendation 22(b).
[235] Te Komiti mō
ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice
(November 2022) at [239].
[236] Te Komiti mō
ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice
(November 2022) at [243].
[237] Te Komiti mō
ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice
(November 2022) at [243].
[238] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [7].
[239] Andrew Beck
“Evidence Rules in Civil Proceedings: A Renaissance?” [2021] NZLJ
263 at 263. See also Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law:
Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [7].
[240] The Commission
originally proposed, in a preliminary paper on hearsay, abolishing the hearsay
rule in civil proceedings, subject
to a general power to exclude evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial, misleading, confusing or time-wasting. It was of the
view that,
in a judge-alone civil case, “the judge, by reason of
experience and training, should be able to assess the risks pertaining
to
hearsay evidence”: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence
Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [3] and [19]. Ultimately, the Commission
did not adopt these proposals in its proposed Evidence Code and instead
recommended a common set of hearsay rules for all proceedings.
[241] See Civil Evidence Act
1995 (UK), s 1 (effectively abolishing the rule against hearsay); Evidence Act
1995 (Cth) ss 63 and 64, adopted in other uniform evidence act jurisdictions and
abolishing the rule in relation to first-hand hearsay; and Civil Evidence
(Scotland) Act 1988, s 2.
[242] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(e).
[243] Evidence Act 2006, s
22.
[244] Evidence Bill 2005
(256–2) (select committee report) at 3–4.
[245] Civil Evidence Act 1995
(UK), s 2 and Civil Procedure Rules (UK), r 33.2.
[246] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55, Vol 1. 1999) at
[68].
[247] Apollo Bathroom and
Kitchen Ltd (In liq) v Ling [2019] NZHC 237 at [19]. See also Zespri
Group Ltd v Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule - Hearsay Rulings at [12].
[248] Gillian Coumbe
“Just prove it: Lay witness statements and admissibility in civil
cases” (paper presented to Legalwise
“Evidence and Advocacy
Masterclass” webinar, 2 June 2022) at [111].
[249] A hearsay statement is a
statement made by a person other than a witness that is offered in
evidence to prove the truth of its contents: Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “hearsay statement”). A defendant’s
statement produced for non-hearsay purposes (for example, simply to prove that
the statement was made) may still
be admissible: Harwood v R [2010] NZCA
545 at [41]–[42].
[250] The previous consistent
statement rule and the rule against hearsay do not apply to defendants’
statements offered by the
prosecution against the defendant: Evidence Act 2006,
s 27(3).
[251] R v G [2009] NZCA
400 at [12]; Kendall v R [2012] NZCA 5 at [16]. See discussion in Te Aka
Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006
(NZLC R127, 2013) at [3.46].
[252] R v King [2009]
NZCA 607, (2009) 24 CRNZ 527 at [16]–[19].
[253] S (CA481/2018) v
R [2019] NZCA 169 at [21].
[254] Bernard Robertson
“Evidence section” [2020] NZLJ 360 at 363.
[255] Bernard Robertson
“Evidence section” [2020] NZLJ 360 at 363.
[256] See R v Sturgeon
[2005] 1 NZLR 767 (CA) at [23]; Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [4].
[257] R v Sturgeon
[2005] 1 NZLR 767 (CA) at [23] and [25]; Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [92].
[258] R v Tozer [2002]
1 NZLR 193, (2001) 19 CRNZ 269 (CA) at [23].
[259] See R v Sturgeon
[2005] 1 NZLR 767 (CA) at [23].
[260] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[94].
[261] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C90].
[262] Cabinet Paper "Evidence
Bill: Paper 2: Admissibility of Evidence" (4 December 2002) at [19]. We were
unable to find any other information
about the basis for inserting s 21.
[263] R v King [2009]
NZCA 607, (2009) 24 CRNZ 527 at [15].
[264] R v King [2009]
NZCA 607, (2009) 24 CRNZ 527 at [19] (referring to s 368(2) of the Crimes Act
1961 - now s 113 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011). In that case, the
interests of fairness
did not require that evidence of the statement be led, as
it was wholly exculpatory and consistent with other evidence.
[265] See also R v Felise
(No 1) HC Auckland CRI-2008-092-8864, 8 February 2010 at [14].
[266] Te Aka Matua o Te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [3.47].
[267] Te Aka Matua o Te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [3.52].
[268] Te Aka Matua o Te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [3.53].
[269] Te Aka Matua o Te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [3.53].
[270] See Boyd v Police
[2012] NZHC 713 at [16] and Paewhenua v Police [2015] NZHC 1831 at
[47].
[271] R v Boynton
[2013] NZHC 2415 (Judgment (No 2) of Toogood J [Defence application for
order under s 368(2) Crimes Act 1961]); Boyd v Police [2012] NZHC 713 at
[23]; Paewhenua v Police [2015] NZHC 1831 at [47]; Frew v Police
[2022] NZHC 1961 at [39].
[272] See Frew v Police
[2022] NZHC 1961 at [39].
[273] Foster v R [2021]
NZSC 90.
[274] Foster v R [2021]
NZSC 90 at [14].
[275] Foster v R [2021]
NZSC 90 at [16].
[276] Frew v Police
[2022] NZHC 1961 (relying on s 21 to disregard evidence about a
defendant’s wholly exculpatory statement) and R v Parata [2021]
NZHC 3573 at [48]–[50] (finding that “A defendant is entitled to
rely on the exculpatory portions of mixed statements”).
[277] R v Parata [2021]
NZHC 3573.
[278] R v Singh DC
Tauranga CRI-2012-070-4867, 7 August 2013.
[279] R v Singh DC
Tauranga CRI-2012-070-4867, 7 August 2013 at [47].
[280] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23.
[281] Evidence (National
Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 81 (under which “admissions”
and associated statements are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule);
Nguyen v R [2020] HCA 23 at [22], [25] and [42].
[282] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [39]–[40].
[283] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [41].
[284] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [44].
[285] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [45].
[286] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [36].
[287] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [39]–[40].
[288] Similarly, although the
issue has not been addressed by the higher courts, in principle, it appears to
us that mixed statements
the prosecution does not wish to rely on should be
treated the same as wholly exculpatory statements.
[289] Bernard Robertson
“Evidence section” [2020] NZLJ 360 at 363.
[290] See Foster v R
[2021] NZSC 90 at [16]; Frew v Police [2022] NZHC at [39]; R v Felise
(No 3) (2010) 24 CRNZ 533 (HC) at [13]; and Boyd v Police
[2012] NZHC 713 at [23].
[291] While s 32 of the
Evidence Act 2006 prevents any person from inviting the fact-finder to draw such
an inference and requires the
court to direct a jury not to do so, there remains
a risk that the jury’s perception will be affected in practice. We note
defence counsel may be able to ask the relevant police witness in
cross-examination whether the defendant made a statement (without
referring to
its content), which would mitigate the risk of adverse inferences being drawn
from the defendant’s presumed failure
to make a statement at all. The jury
would, however, remain unaware of the nature of the statement.
[292] Currently, the
prosecution can only offer evidence about the defendant’s veracity if
“the defendant has, in court, given
oral evidence about his or her
veracity or challenged the veracity of a prosecution witness by reference to
matters other than the
facts in issue”: Evidence Act 2006, s 38(2)(a).
[293] Evidence Act 2006, s
18(1)(a).
[294] R v W [2018] NZHC
2457 at [19].
[295] R v W [2018] NZHC
2457 at [21].
[296] R v W [2018] NZHC
2457 at [39], [48] and [67].
[297] R v Hoggart
[2019] NZCA 89 at [50].
[298] R v Hoggart
[2019] NZCA 89 at [50]. This issue was not revisited by the Supreme Court on
appeal. However, the Court did appear to endorse this approach when discussing
what future steps would need to be taken to establish the admissibility of
statements of two other potential witnesses (which included
statements allegedly
made by the defendant to them) who had died before the Court issued its
decision: W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [139],
[160], [327] and [386].
[299] Anna High “The Red
Fox Tavern trial and the Evidence Act” [2020] NZLJ 69 at 70 and Bernard
Robertson “Student Companion – Evidence” [2019] NZLJ 157 at
157.
[300] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Hearsay Evidence (NZLC PP10, 1989) at [61]. While some
jurisdictions distinguish between first-hand and second-hand hearsay, the
Commission’s
preferred approach was to make all hearsay statements subject
to the same rules, with the nature of the statement being relevant
instead to
the assessment of its reliability under s 18: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [69] and
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and
Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C21] and [C76].
[301] Zespri Group Ltd v
Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule - Hearsay Rulings at [24]; Key v R
[2010] NZCA 115 at [26].
[302] Including under the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(f).
[303] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Hearsay Evidence (NZLC PP10, 1989) at [7].
[304] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Hearsay Evidence (NZLC PP10, 1989) at [7] citing Law
Reform Commission of Canada Study Paper on Hearsay (Toronto, 1974).
[305] It is the hearsay
provisions that provide that statements made by a person who is not a witness
are generally inadmissible in court
(s 17), unless one of the exceptions applies
(such as s 18). If the hearsay provisions do not apply to a defendant’s
statement
contained within a third-party statement, then the rule against
hearsay would also not apply.
[306] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [18]
and [385]. See also discussion of the importance of cross-examination at [50]
and [61].
[307] Bernard Robertson
“Student Companion – Evidence” [2019] NZLJ 157 at 157.
[308] This issue is not
directly addressed in the Commission’s previous publications on hearsay or
confessions. In Te Aka Matua
o te Ture | Law Commission Criminal Evidence:
Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992) at 227, the Commission’s
commentary on the draft provision which stated that the hearsay provisions do
not
apply to defendants’ statements (subsequently included in what became
s 27(3)) explained that: “To dispel any possible
confusion that might
arise, s 2(2) declares that the hearsay provisions of the Evidence Code do not
apply to those defendants' statements
to which Division 3 applies. This means
that the rules in Division 3 will operate as a self-contained regime and not by
way of exception
to the hearsay rule. (Technically, this declaration may not be
necessary)”. This does not suggest that, when a defendant’s
statement is itself contained within a hearsay statement, the hearsay provisions
would not also apply to that statement.
[309] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “hearsay statement”).
[310] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98 at [62].
[311] For a discussion of the
legislative history to the current wording of ss 22A and 27(1), see Te Aka Matua
o te Ture | Law Commission
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018) at
[14.2]–[14.9].
[312] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.11].
[313] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.8].
[314] See the discussion in
Fa’avae v R [2012] NZCA 528, [2013] 1 NZLR 311 at [42].
[315] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.10]. This is because
the common law defined all out-of-court statements as hearsay regardless of
whether
the maker of the statement gave evidence. As a result, the
co-conspirators rule, which operated as an exception to the rule against
hearsay, would apply regardless of whether defendant gave evidence in court. See
discussion of the operation of the common law hearsay
rule in Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law: Principles for Reform (NZLC PP13,
1991) at [58] and Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Hearsay Evidence
(NZLC PP10, 1989) at [5]–[6].
[316] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.10]. This is because
a statement that is not admitted to prove the truth of its contents was not
hearsay
under the common law: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at 3; Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Hearsay Evidence (NZLC PP10, 1989) at [27]; and Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning
(NZLC PP21, 1992) at 75.
[317] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at R26, [15.18] and Appendix
1.
[318] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.4] and
[15.23]–[15.26].
[319] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98 at [60]–[63].
[320] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98 at [20].
[321] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98 at [63].
[322] R v Messenger
[2008] NZCA 13, [2011] 3 NZLR 779 at [13]. Section 22A was introduced following
the Commission’s recommendations in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013).
There, the Commission explained that its intention was to codify the threshold
issues for the common law co-conspirators’
rule as set out in Messenger
(at [3.111]–[3.112]).
[323] See also R v Liev
[2017] NZHC 830 at [14], where Palmer J suggested that the drafting of s 27(1)
was not consistent with the nature of the co-conspirators’ rule being
an
exception to inadmissibility only on the basis of hearsay.
[324] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [3.91]. See also Evidence Bill 2005 (256-2) (select committee report) at 4,
which states that the Committee’s
view was that the Act would
“maintain the current law relating to statements by
co-defendants”.
[325] As recognised in
Winter v R [2019] NZSC 98 at [40].
[326] R v Wellington
[2018] NZHC 2080 at [66] and R v Pearce [2007] NZCA 40 at [26]. See
also Evidence Bill 2005 (256-2) (select committee report) at 4.
[327] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.20].
[328] See, for example,
Singh v R [2017] NZCA 136 at [90]–[91]; and R v Ali [2016]
NZHC 2223 at [46]–[47].
[329] R v Wellington
[2018] NZHC 2080 at [64].
[330] Goffe v R [2011]
NZCA 186, [2011] 2 NZLR at [45]. See also McKenzie v R [2013] NZCA 378 at
[24]–[26].
[331] “On
co-defendants’ statements and admissibility” (23 December 2019)
Strictly Obiter <www.strictlyobiter.com>.
[332] Other examples include
hearsay evidence (Evidence Act 2006, s 18(1)(a)) and visual and voice
identification evidence (ss 45(2) and
46). The Supreme Court has recently
confirmed that indications of actual reliability can also be considered when
assessing the probative
value of evidence under s 8 (general exclusion): W
(SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [69]–[70]. The
Court found that reliability could affect the relevance assessment under s 7 as
well, but evidence would only fail
the relevance test due to reliability
concerns if it was “so unreliable that it could not be accepted or given
any weight at
all by a reasonable jury or a judge in a judge-alone trial”
(at [41] and fn 199).
[333] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [282].
[334] Evidence Act 2006, s
28(1)(a).
[335] Evidence Act 2006, s
28(1)(b).
[336] Evidence Act 2006, s
28(2). The section does not limit the factors that may be taken into account
when assessing the reliability
of a statement, but s 28(4) does list four
mandatory considerations. These include the defendants physical, mental or
psychological
condition, their characteristics (including any mental,
intellectual or physical disabilities), the nature of any questions put to
the
defendant and the nature of any threat, promise or representation made.
[337] In 2013, the Commission
recommended amendment to clarify that indications of actual reliability should
not be considered under s
28, due in part to concerns that this would divert the
court’s attention from questions of improper police conduct to large
volumes of corroborating evidence: Te Aka Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission
The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013), R5 and at
[3.85]–[3.87]. This recommendation was rejected on the basis that a
blanket rule would be too
restrictive: Nora Burghart Evidence Amendment Bill
– Initial briefing (Ministry of Justice, 8 September 2015) at
[11]–[12]. In the Second Review the Commission revisited the issue and
considered
whether a different approach was necessary to discourage improper
police practices but did not recommend reform: Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law
Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [6.7]–[6.23].
[338] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [79]–[84]. This case is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 6.
[339] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 78 and 80. See also Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Criminal
Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992), Part IV Proposals For Reform
at [120].
[340] Naniseni v The
Queen [1971] NZLR 269 (CA) at 271–274 and 276–277; Te Aka
Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning
(NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at
[21]–[22].
[341] This exception to the
voluntariness rule was codified in the Evidence Act 1908, s 20. A version of
this exception was first introduced
by the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1895,
s 17.
[342] R v Fatu [1989] NZCA 166; [1989] 3
NZLR 419 (CA) at 430. See also R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13 (CA) at
15.
[343] Factors internal to the
defendant could not render a confession involuntary: Naniseni v The Queen
[1971] NZLR 269 (CA) at 274–275.
[344] See the discussion in
Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at [65]–[70].
[345] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C144].
[346] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II: Confessions
and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [123], [130] and [134].
[347] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992),
Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [127].
[348] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992),
Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [131].
[349] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [109]. See also Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Criminal
Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II: Confessions and
Improperly Obtained Evidence at [127] and [136].
[350] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 88. See also at [C155]: “subsequently discovered real evidence
may not be offered at a hearing to
determine the admissibility of a
defendant’s statement, if the only purpose of that evidence is to confirm
the truth of the
statement”. Section 31 of the Evidence Code would also
have applied when determining the admissibility of a defendant’s
statement
under the oppression and improperly obtained evidence provisions.
[351] Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Group Evidence Bill: Part 2 – Admissibility Rules,
Privilege, and Confidentiality (Ministry of Justice, June 2006) at 14.
[352] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-1), cl 24(2)(b).
[353] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 4.
[354] This is in contrast to
Evidence Act 2006, s 29(3), which states “[f]or the purpose of applying
this section, it is irrelevant
whether or not the statement is true”.
[355] Te Aka Matua o Te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [3.87]–[3.89]. This was consistent with the select committee’s
recommendation and the approach in
Evidence Act 2006, s 29(3).
[356] Nora Burghart
Evidence Amendment Bill – Initial briefing (Ministry of Justice, 8
September 2015) at [11]–[12].
[357] Nora Burghart
Evidence Amendment Bill – Initial briefing (Ministry of Justice, 8
September 2015) at [12].
[358] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753.
[359] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [83]–[84] per Young, Arnold and
O’Regan JJ, and [433]–[438] per Glazebrook J.
[360] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua
i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [6.19].
[361] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua
i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [6.14] and [6.19].
[362] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua
i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [6.15].
[363] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua
i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [6.18].
[364] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua
i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [6.23].
[365] Bernard Robertson
“Evidence section” [2019] NZLJ 198 at 200; Bernard Robertson
“Student Companion - Criminal Justice/Evidence” [2021] NZLJ 166 at
166.
[366] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [82].
[367] We note the wording of s
28 draws on its predecessor, s 20 of the Evidence Act 1908, under which the
truth or otherwise of the statement
was disregarded (see R v Fatu [1989] NZCA 166; [1989]
3 NZLR 419 (CA) at 430 and R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13 (CA) at 15).
Section 20 operated alongside the voluntariness rule and allowed a confession to
be admitted if the means by which it was
obtained were not likely to cause a
false confession.
[368] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [84].
[369] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [80]. For further discussion, see Te Aka
Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning
(NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at
[130].
[370] Or Evidence Act 2006, s
29 (statements influenced by oppression) in the limited circumstances when it
applies.
[371] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 at [178]–[208]; R v Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 at [226] and
[291]–[293]; Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at [78]–[84]. The
fourth case remains subject to publication restrictions until final disposition
of trial.
[372] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 at [201]–[208]; R v Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 at
[290]–[293] and [298]; Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at [79]. The
courts treated inconsistencies with other evidence or the general implausibility
of the statement as indicative of unreliability.
[373] See, for example, R v
Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [84] per William Young J and
at [434]–[438] per Glazebrook J.
[374] See R v Fawcett
[2021] NZHC 2406 at [277], noting that the fact a statement contains lies will
not on its own engage s 28.
[375] See, for example, R v
Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 at [239] and [290]–[301].
[376] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [282].
[377] Evidence Act 2006, s
28(2).
[378] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 78.
[379] R v McCuin [1982]
1 NZLR 13 (CA) at 15.
[380] Cabinet Paper "Evidence
Bill: Paper 2: Admissibility of Evidence" (4 December 2002) at [27].
[381] A “Mr Big”
operation involves undercover officers inducting the suspect into a bogus
criminal organisation. In the New
Zealand examples, values such as honesty and
loyalty are emphasised throughout the operation as well as the benefits
(financial and
otherwise) that the suspect will obtain by securing admission as
a member. At the conclusion of the operation, the suspect is interviewed
by
“Mr Big” – the boss of the organisation – to determine
whether they will be allowed to join the organisation.
The suspect is encouraged
to confess to any previous wrongdoing that could be used against them. They may
be confronted with information
– allegedly from police contacts –
that they were involved in the crime police are investigating, and assured that,
if
they confess, any problems with police will be taken care of. Cases
discussing the use of this technique include R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198,
[2016] 1 NZLR 753 and Lyttle v R [2021] NZCA 46.
[382] CIPEM is an interview
technique that uses a relaxed, conversational style to build rapport with the
suspect or witness. The interviewers
seek to get the suspect or witness talking
by reframing the narrative, which can include introducing a “softer”
accusation
or rationalising, minimising and justifying the alleged offending.
The use of the technique was discussed in R v X [2021] NZHC 2444. In that
case there were multiple interactions with the suspect over several days and
some parts of the discussions were not recorded.
While the decision only
considered exclusion of the defendant’s statement under s 30, not s 28, it
found that the use of CIPEM
in that case involved “excessive manipulation
of the defendant” (at [121(d)]) and resulted in admissions that were
“very
flawed” and “not credible” (at [174]–[177]).
This suggests the use of the technique also has the potential
to raise s 28
issues in future.
[383] See, for example, Blair
Ensor and Mike White “Country's top cop becomes involved in controversy
over interviewing technique”
(7 April 2023) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>;
Mike White “Police guilty of manipulation, serious breaches, and
'nonsense' in
failed Lois Tolley investigation” (26 February 2022) Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>; Mike White “'An abomination of an
investigation':
How the Lois Tolley murder case collapsed” (19 March 2022) Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>; Blair Ensor and Mike
White “Top cop intimately
involved in interviews that led to false murder confession” (21 May 2022)
Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>;
Mike White “Framed for murder, part three:
The trouble with 'Mr Big'” (28 March 2022) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>;
Mike White “'I reckon we just f.....g lie': Cops caught planning to
deceive during murder investigation” (8 June 2022)
Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>; Mike White “The tragic and terrible case of Mauha
Fawcett's wrongful conviction” (11 June
2022) Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>; Ruth Hill “'Unfair' interview process forced
false confession, says judge” (5 September
2022) RNZ
<www.rnz.co.nz>; Emile Donovan “How a murder case was unravelled by
a police interview” (podcast, 30
October 2022) The Detail
<www.rnz.co.nz>; Mike White and Blair Ensor “The 'strategic
hunters', and the controversial
police approach to solving cold cases” (3
December 2022) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>.
[384] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 at [175]–[176] and [207]–[208]; R v X [2021] NZHC
2444 at [174]–[177], although the statement was excluded under s 30 rather
than s 28.
[385] Blair Ensor and Mike
White “Police watchdog launches investigation into complaints about
controversial interviewing method”
(6 December 2022) Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>.
[386] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46.
[387] Gebhardt v R
[2022] NZCA 54.
[388] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 at [203]–[207]; Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at [79].
[389] Pora v R [2015]
UKPC 9, [2016] 1 NZLR 277.
[390] Fawcett v R
[2017] NZCA 597 at [22]–[24] (evidence excluded at retrial in R v
Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 and charge dismissed in R v Fawcett [2021]
NZHC 2969).
[391] See, for example,
Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at [71]; R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198,
[2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [394]–[396] and [401] per Glazebrook J; Susan
Glazebrook “Mr Big Operations - Innovative Investigative Technique or
Threat
to Justice?” (paper presented to the Judicial Colloquium 2015, Hong
Kong, September 2015) at 11; Joshua Stewart and others
“The prevalence of
false confessions in experimental laboratory simulations: A meta-analysis”
(2018) 36 Behav Sci & L 12; Amelia Mindthoff and others “A Survey of
Potential Jurors' Perceptions of Interrogations and Confessions” (2018) 24
Psychol Pub Pol'y & L 430 at 442.
[392] See the discussion in
R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [394]–[402] per
Glazebrook J; Susan Glazebrook “Mr Big Operations - Innovative
Investigative Technique or Threat to Justice?”
(paper presented to the
Judicial Colloquium 2015, Hong Kong, September 2015) at 11; Joshua Stewart and
others “The prevalence
of false confessions in experimental laboratory
simulations: A meta-analysis” (2018) 36 Behav Sci & L 12.
[393] For example, Mahua
Fawcett and Teina Pora.
[394] Jennifer Lackey
“False Confessions and Testimonial Injustice” (2020) 110 J Crim L
& Criminology 43.
[395] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [28]–[29]; R v Wichman [2015] NZSC
198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [436] per Glazebrook J ; Saul Kassin “The Social
Psychology of False Confessions” (2015) 9 Social Issues and Policy Review
25 at 39.
[396] Fabiana Alceste, Kristyn
Jones, and Saul Kassin “Facts only the perpetrator could have known? A
study of contamination in
mock crime interrogations” (2020) 44 Law &
Hum Behav 128.
[397] See, for example, Saul
Kassin and others “’I'd Know a False Confession If I Saw One’:
A Comparative Study of College
Students and Police Investigators” (2005)
29 Law & Hum Behav 211.
[398] Gebhardt v R
[2022] NZCA 54 at [71]; R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753
at [401] per Glazebrook J; Amelia Mindthoff and others “A Survey of
Potential Jurors' Perceptions of Interrogations and Confessions”
(2018) 24
Psychol Pub Pol'y & L 430 at 442 (this study found that while potential
jurors were more accepting than they once were
of the idea that a person might
falsely confess, they continued to treat confessions as relatively strong
indicators of guilt).
[399] See, for example, R v
X [2021] NZHC 2444 at [59]–[75]. Failing to record interactions with a
suspect may amount to a breach of the Chief Justice’s Practice Note on
Police
Questioning so as to engage s 30 (Practice Note on Police
Questioning (s 30(6) Evidence Act 2006) [2007] 3 NZLR 297), but that will
not always be the case. The Practice Note does not apply, for example, to
undercover operations (R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at
[106]). Additionally, most of its requirements only apply when the person being
questioned is in custody or there is sufficient evidence
to lay a charge against
them.
[400] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [86] per William Young J for the majority,
[318] per Elias CJ and [451] per Glazebrook J.
[401] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(2).
[402] These rules are
discussed in Chapter 5. For a broader discussion of these common law rules see
Te Aka Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission
Criminal Evidence: Police
Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992) Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained
Evidence.
[403] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753. This case is discussed below.
[404] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992),
Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [142]; Te Aka Matua o
te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at [C138].
[405] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992),
Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [143].
[406] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C141].
[407] Field v R [2010]
NZCA 556, [2011] 1 NZLR 784 at [160].
[408] Tuigamala v R DC
Auckland CRI-2007-004-011451, 22 December 2008. In that case, immigration
officers threatened the interviewee with jail time and
told him to write a
statement that they dictated to him (and that was inconsistent with his
account). There was little discussion
of the s 29 test and the decision was not
appealed. In another case, R v H (CA 326-2008) [2008] NZCA 263, the Court
considered there was a “real issue” as to whether a confession made
by a woman with post traumatic stress
disorder had been obtained by oppression.
The case was remitted to the District Court to consider the application of s 29,
but we
found no record of the result.
[409] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(2)(b); R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [148] per Blanchard J for
the majority.
[410] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA). See Chapter 7 for further background on Shaheed
and the Evidence Act 2006, s 30 balancing test.
[411] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(5).
[412] That is: the
legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand;
or any person or body in the performance
of any public function, power, or duty
conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law.
[413] Practice Note on
Police Questioning (s 30(6) Evidence Act 2006) [2007] 3 NZLR 297. Evidence
Act 2006, s 30(6) provides that, in deciding whether a statement obtained by a
member of the Police has been obtained unfairly
for the purposes of s 30(5)(c),
the judge must take into account guidelines set out in practice notes on that
subject issued by the
Chief Justice.
[414] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [503] per Glazebrook J.
[415] For example, in R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26, the defendant’s statement was
found to be unfairly obtained in part because the interviewing detectives
led
him to believe that “unless he told the detectives what they wanted to
hear, he would face 20 years’ imprisonment”
(at [51]).
[416] See R v Reynolds
[2017] NZCA 611 at [48]–[53], where evidence obtained by a private
individual through blackmail was found to be unfairly obtained.
[417] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[101].
[418] A non-exhaustive list of
factors is set out in s 30(3).
[419] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753.
[420] For a summary of the
case, see Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Second Review of the
Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
IP42, 2018) at [6.20]–[6.33]. Broadly, a “Mr Big” operation
involves undercover officers inducting the suspect
into a bogus criminal
organisation. In the New Zealand examples, values such as honesty and loyalty
are emphasised throughout the
operation as well as the benefits (financial and
otherwise) that the suspect will obtain by securing admission as a member. At
the
conclusion of the operation, the suspect is interviewed by “Mr
Big” – the boss of the organisation – to determine
whether
they will be allowed to join the organisation. The suspect is encouraged to
confess to any previous wrongdoing that could
be used against them. They may be
confronted with information – allegedly from police contacts – that
they were involved
in the crime police are investigating and assured that, if
they confess any problems with police will be taken care of. In addition
to
Wichman, see Lyttle v R [2021] NZCA 46.
[421] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [86] per William Young J for the majority,
[318] per Elias CJ and [451] per Glazebrook J.
[422] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137.
[423] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [43] and [64]–[67].
[424] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [80]–[83].
[425] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [66]–[67].
[426] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [80].
[427] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [46] and [80]–[83].
[428] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [83]–[84]. See also at
[433]–[438] per Glazebrook J, who dissented but agreed with the majority
on this point.
[429] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [92].
[430] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [69]–[70].
[431] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(4) provides that “[t]he Judge must exclude any improperly obtained
evidence if, in accordance with
subsection (2), the judge determines that its
exclusion is proportionate to the impropriety”. In other words, it relates
to
the application of the balancing test. One of the factors that can be
considered when undertaking the balancing test is the “nature
and quality
of the improperly obtained evidence” (s 30(3)(c)). As we discuss in
Chapter 7, it is well settled that this encompasses
an assessment of the actual
reliability of the statement (although it is not clear whether it also includes
risks of unreliability
associated with the investigatory methods used, which is
more relevant to the nature of the impropriety rather than the nature and
quality of the evidence).
[432] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [98]–[130].
[433] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [345] and [347].
[434] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [457].
[435] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [523].
[436] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [326] and [332] per Elias CJ), and [510]
and [515] per Glazebrook J.
[437] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [326] and [345] per Elias CJ and [511] and
[522] per Glazebrook J.
[438] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [507]–[510] (citations omitted).
[439] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753.
[440] R v McCuin [1982]
1 NZLR 13 (CA) at 15; Naniseni v The Queen [1971] NZLR 269 (CA) at
271–274 and 276–277; Te Aka Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission
Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II:
Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [21]–[22].
[441] This exception to the
voluntariness rule was codified in the Evidence Act 1908, s 20. A version of
this exception was first introduced
by the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1895,
s 17.
[442] R v Fatu [1989] NZCA 166; [1989] 3
NZLR 419 (CA) at 430; R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13 (CA) at 15. We note
this remains the position in the United Kingdom: see s 76(2)(b) of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK)
and the discussion in Paul Roberts
Roberts & Zuckerman’s Criminal Evidence (3rd ed, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2022) at [12.3(D)].
[443] See discussion in Te Aka
Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning
(NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at
[79]–[96] and [123]. See also R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13 (CA) at
15, citing Lord Halisham in Wong Kam-ming v R [1980] AC 247. The policy
of the voluntariness rule has been recently commented on in Canada where the
rule still applies: see R v Beaver 2022 SCC, CSC 54 at [47] and R v
Tessier 2022 SCC, CSC 35 at [150] and [157]–[159].
[444] See the discussion in
R v Tessier 2022 SCC, CSC 35 at [150] and [157]–[159].
[445] Noting that the majority
in Wichman held the Chief Justice’s Practice Note on Police
Questioning does not apply to undercover officers: R v Wichman [2015]
NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [106].
[446] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46.
[447] R v X [2021] NZHC
2444 at [59]–[75] and [128]–[146].
[448] R v Fawcett
[2021] NZHC 2406 at [238].
[449] R v Fawcett
[2021] NZHC 2406 at [301]. Given that finding, the Court did not need to
consider the application of s 30. However, after referring to the
majority’s
approach in Wichman (at [304]), the Court noted:
“Had I not had fundamental concerns about the statements’
reliability because of Mr Fawcett’s
FASD, coupled with the lack of
evidence corroborating his involvement, I doubt that the statements could be
considered improperly
obtained under s 30” (at [305]).
[450] Evidence Act 2006, s
122.
[451] Any breach of the Chief
Justice’s Practice Note on Police Questioning is relevant to whether
evidence is improperly obtained
on the grounds that it was obtained unfairly: s
30(6). See, for example, R v X [2021] NZHC 2444. Questioning that
involves placing undue pressure on a suspect but falls short of oppression may
also amount to a breach of the Practice
Note, as in R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26.
[452] See, for example, R v
X [2021] NZHC 2444.
[453] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [106].
[454] For example, the Supreme
Court in Chetty found evidence to be unfairly obtained primarily because
police had placed pressure on the defendant to confess by telling him that
he
would be charged with rape unless he confessed and that rape carried a maximum
penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment: see R v Chetty [2016] NZSC 68,
[2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [51].
[455] See, for example,
Field v R [2010] NZCA 556, [2011] 1 NZLR 784 at [160].
[456] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C141].
[457] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [43] and [64]–[67].
[458] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [326] and [332] per Elias CJ, and [510]
and [515] per Glazebrook J.
[459] For example, in R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26, the defendant’s statement was
found to be unfairly obtained in part due to a representation the interviewing
detectives made to the defendant, which led him to believe he faced 20
years’ imprisonment unless he told them what they wanted
to hear (at
[51]). The condition and characteristics of the defendant have also been
considered by the courts when undertaking the
unfairness assessment (see, for
example, Gosset v R [2021] NZCA 187 at [74]–[76]; B v R
[2014] NZCA 85 at [30]–[40]).
[460] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [151]; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3
NZLR 207 at [140]. The third case remains subject to publication restrictions
until final disposition of trial.
[461] Section 30(3)(b) refers
to “the nature of the impropriety, in particular, whether it was
deliberate, reckless, or done in
bad faith”. As we discuss in Chapter 7,
however, the courts largely focus on whether the impropriety was deliberate,
reckless
or done in bad faith rather than undertaking a more general assessment
of the nature of the impropriety.
[462] M v R [2014] NZCA
339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [80]–[83].
[463] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [326] and [345] per Elias CJ and [511] and
[522] per Glazebrook J.
[464] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(2)(a).
[465] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(5).
[466] That is: the
legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand;
or any person or body in the performance
of any public function, power, or duty
conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. This
includes, for example,
police officers and other law enforcement officials.
[467] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(2)(b).
[468] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(4).
[469] The development of the
common law relating to improperly obtained evidence is summarised in Marwood
v Commissioner of Police [2016] NZSC 139, [2017] 1 NZLR 260 at
[20]–[22]. See also Te Aka Matua o Te Ture | Law Commission Criminal
Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II: Confessions and
Improperly Obtained Evidence at [56]–[58].
[470] R v Kirifi [1991] NZCA 111; [1992]
2 NZLR 8 (CA) at 12; R v Butcher [1991] NZCA 135; [1992] 2 NZLR 257 (CA); R v
Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 (CA) at 266. See also the discussion in Marwood
v Commissioner of Police [2016] NZSC 139, [2017] 1 NZLR 260 at
[23]–[27].
[471] Oranga Tamariki Act
1989, s 221. Under this provision, statements made by children or young people
who are suspected of an offence
or have been arrested or detained, are
inadmissible unless certain procedural protections are complied with.
[472] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at
84. The provision would
have required exclusion of improperly obtained evidence
unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice.
[473] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 86.
[474] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA).
[475] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [140] per Blanchard J (giving the judgment of
Richardson P, Blanchard and Tipping JJ). Blanchard J’s approach was also
endorsed
by Gault J (at [172]), McGrath J (at [192]) and Anderson J (at
[200]–[201]).
[476] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [141] per Blanchard J. See also Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [173] per Blanchard J.
[477] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [144] per Blanchard J.
[478] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [156] per Blanchard J (giving the judgment of
Richardson P, Blanchard and Tipping JJ). See also per Gault J (at [172]),
McGrath
J (at [192]) and Anderson J (at [200]–[201]). Elias CJ
dissented.
[479] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [142]–[143] per Blanchard J.
[480] Cabinet Paper "Evidence
Bill: Paper 2: Admissibility of Evidence" (4 December 2002) at [29]; Joanna
Davidson (Crown Counsel) to
the Attorney-General “Legal Advice –
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Evidence Bill”
(5
April 2005).
[481] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(5); Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and
Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at 86.
[482] For a general discussion
of these three rationales, see Paul Roberts Roberts & Zuckerman’s
Criminal Evidence (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022) at
[5.3(B)–(D)].
[483] Sabine Gless and
Thomas Richter (eds) Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial? A
Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules (Springer International
Publishing, 2019) at 279–280.
[484] A rights-based rationale
for exclusion was advanced by Andrew Ashworth “Excluding Evidence as
Protecting Rights” [1977] Crim L Rev 723. See more recently the discussion
in Dimitrios Giannoupolous Improperly obtained evidence in Anglo-American and
Continental Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019) at 211–223.
[485] The key difference
between these two approaches is that compensation focuses on the individual
affected, while vindication also
recognises the public interest in ensuring
rights are protected in a broader sense. See Mike Madden “A Model Rule for
Excluding
Improperly or Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence” (2015) 33:2
Berkeley Journal of International Law 442 at 453–455.
[486] See, for example, Andrew
Choo “Improperly Obtained Evidence: A Reconsideration” (1989) 9
Legal Stud 261 at 271–272.
[487] See the discussion in
Dimitrios Giannoupolous Improperly obtained evidence in Anglo-American and
Continental Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019) at 208–211.
[488] Andrew Choo
“Improperly Obtained Evidence: A Reconsideration” (1989) 9 Legal
Stud 261 at 278; R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[489] See, for example, R v
Grant [2009] SCC 32 at [76]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR
305 at [62] per Elias CJ.
[490] For further discussion
of arguments against exclusion, see Andrew Choo “Improperly Obtained
Evidence: A Reconsideration”
(1989) 9 Legal Stud 261 at 265–266;
Mike Madden “A Model Rule for Excluding Improperly or Unconstitutionally
Obtained Evidence” (2015) 33:2 Berkeley Journal of International Law 442
at 455–457; R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[491] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [148] per Blanchard J for the majority. See also
Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [187] per Blanchard J and
[230] per Tipping J. As noted above, the Government’s approach in drafting
s 30 was to generally reflect
the approach in Shaheed.
[492] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [148].
[493] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [142]–[143] per Blanchard J for the
majority.
[494] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(3)(a) and (b).
[495] R v Toki [2017]
NZCA 513, [2018] 2 NZLR 362 at [28]. See also Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101,
[2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [66] per Elias CJ and at [191] per Blanchard J.
[496] This is similar to the
approach in Australia, where the judicial integrity rationale is recognised as
the primary basis for the
exclusionary rule but deterrence and rights protection
remain relevant: see the Hon T F Bathurst, Chief Justice of New South Wales
“Illegally or improperly obtained evidence: in defence of
Australia’s discretionary approach” Evidence Act CPD
seminar,
University of New South Wales Law School, Sydney, 2 March 2016) at [62].
[497] See, for example,
Young v R [2016] NZCA 107 at [25] and Rihia v R [2016] NZCA 200 at
[31].
[498] See, for example, R v
Toki [2017] NZCA 513, [2018] 2 NZLR 362 at [26], citing R v Hoare
CA310/04, 21 April 2005 at [42] with apparent approval (“To allow evidence
to be given in circumstances where the rules are
broken will not encourage
adequate training of and appreciation by Police officers of the constraints on
them and of the rights of
suspects”).
[499] This case remains
subject to publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[500] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [147].
[501] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [150].
[502] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [134].
[503] Such as police
misconduct (including recklessness) (R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007]
3 NZLR 207 at [119]–[120]).
[504] Such as urgency (R v
Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [123]).
[505] For example, the
seriousness of the offence and the nature and quality of the evidence (R v
Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [134]).
[506] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305.
[507] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [59] per Elias CJ; at [189] per Blanchard J; at
[230] per Tipping J (suggesting the seriousness of the offence “is apt to
cut both
ways”); and at [282] per Gault J.
[508] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [282].
[509] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [207] per Blanchard J, at [280] per McGrath J and
at [286] per Gault J.
[510] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [72] per Elias CJ, at [203] per Blanchard J, at
[252] per Tipping J and at [278] per McGrath J.
[511] See the discussion in
Underwood v R [2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [15]–[18],
noting that the judgments in Hamed favoured discretion over a structured
approach.
[512] As at 14 February 2023,
a Lexis Advance search for appellate court cases citing s 30 returned 484
results in the Court of Appeal
and 57 results in the Supreme Court (including
decisions on applications for leave to appeal). The High Court also considers
appeals
from District Court decisions, but in a case search it is difficult to
separate these from first instance High Court decisions. A
search of High Court
decisions returned 506 results.
[513] For example, Hamed v
R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305, R v Chetty [2016] NZSC 68,
[2018] 1 NZLR 26; R v Perry [2016] NZSC 102; R v Alsford [2017]
NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710; Kalekale v R [2016] NZCA 259; W v R
[2019] NZCA 558. The Supreme Court was also split 3:2 on the admissibility of
improperly obtained evidence in another case from 2020 that remains
subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[514] As at 14 February 2023,
a Lexis Advance search for cases citing s 30 returned 1,225 results. These
results do not include many District
Court decisions.
[515] This review was limited
to cases available on LexisNexis, Westlaw and Capital Letter databases. First
instance and appeal decisions
were reviewed.
[516] In an additional 26
cases, the evidence was found not to be improperly obtained but the s 30
balancing exercise was conducted in
case that conclusion was wrong. In all of
those 26 cases, the evidence would have been admitted under s 30. We have not
included
those cases in our analysis of factors, since the fact that the
evidence was not considered to be improperly obtained is likely to
have affected
the analysis.
[517] One case (Elley v New
Zealand Police [2021] NZHC 2097) concerned the admissibility of both
confession evidence and real evidence, so is counted in both categories.
[518] This factor is not
specified in s 30(3) but is commonly relied upon either under s 30(3)(c) (the
nature and quality of the evidence)
or as a separate factor.
[519] Letter from Hon Kris
Faafoi (Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (Tumu Whakarae | President, Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission)
regarding the third statutory review of
the Evidence Act 2006 (23 February 2022).
[520] Scott Optican “The
Kiwi Way: New Zealand's Approach to the Exclusion in Criminal Trials of Evidence
Improperly Obtained by
the Police (2021) 24 New Crim L Rev 254 at 269; Bernard
Robertson “Student Companion – Evidence” [2020] NZLJ 99 at 99;
Kent Roach “Reclaiming Prima Facie Exclusionary Rules in Canada, Ireland,
New Zealand, and the United States: The Importance
of Compensation,
Proportionality, and Non-Repetition” (2020) 43(3) Manitoba Law Journal 1
at 26; Dimitrios Giannoupolous Improperly obtained evidence in Anglo-American
and Continental Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019) at 240–241;
Bernard Robertson “Evidence” [2018] NZLJ 210 at 211; Nikita
Mitskevitch and Tania Singh “W v R (CA597/2016) [2017] NZCA 522: A privacy
dichotomy within the context of New Zealand’s human rights obligations and
“seriousness” under s 30 of
the Evidence Act” [2018] NZLJ 240
at 243.
[521] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [4.6]–[4.7].
[522] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [4.10], citing Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [282]
per Gault J and noting that in that case “admissibility fell to be
determined by differently constituted majorities on the
different types of
evidence”.
[523] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [4.17].
[524] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018) at [145]–[147].
[525] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.5].
[526] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(b).
[527] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(c).
[528] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [156].
[529] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [144].
[530] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[531] See, for example, Karen
Steyn “Consistency – A Principle of Public Law” (1997) 2(1)
Judicial Review 22 at 22.
[532] R v Hanford HC
Auckland CRI-2007-057-1922, 24 July 2008 at [8]. See also the discussion in
Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online
looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [EA30.06(1)] and Kearns v R [2017]
NZCA 51, [2017] 2 NZLR 835 at [35].
[533] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[534] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[535] See the discussion in
Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and
Victorian Law Reform Commission
Review of the Uniform Evidence Acts (ALRC
DP 69/NSWLRC DP 47/VLRC DP, 2005) at [14.78].
[536] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
s 138(1); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 138(1); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138(1);
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 138(1); Evidence Act
2001 (Tas), s 138(1); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 138(1).
[537] Director of Public
Prosecutions v Kaba [2014] VSC 52 at [334] (referring the equivalent
Victorian provision, s 138 of the Evidence Act 2008 (VIC)).
[538] Bunning v Cross
[1978] HCA 22; (1978) 141 CLR 54. See the discussion in Australian Law Reform Commission, New
South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law Reform Commission,
Review
of the Uniform Evidence Acts (ALRC DP 69/NSWLRC DP 47/VLRC DP, 2005) at
[14.78].
[539] Australian Law Reform
Commission Evidence (Volume 1) (ALRC 26 (Interim) Vol 1 (1985) at
[964].
[540] Bram Presser
“Public policy, police interest: A re-evaluation of the judicial
discretion to exclude improperly or illegally
obtained evidence” (2001) 25
Melb Univ Law Rev 757 at 776.
[541] Australian Law Reform
Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law Reform
Commission Review of the Uniform Evidence Acts (ALRC DP 69/NSWLRC DP
47/VLRC DP, 2005) at [14.79]. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, New
South Wales Law Reform Commission
and Victorian Law Reform Commission Uniform
Evidence Law Report (ALRC FR 102/NSWLRC FR 122/VLRC FR, 2005) at
[16.92].
[542] Australian Law Reform
Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law Reform
Commission Review of the Uniform Evidence Acts (ALRC DP 69/NSWLRC DP
47/VLRC DP, 2005) at [14.76].
[543] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [58] and [60] per Elias CJ and [229]–[230]
per Tipping J.
[544] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [4.18]–[4.20].
[545] Scott Optican
“Hamed, Williams and the exclusionary rule” [2012] VUWLR 605
at 618.
[546] Tania Singh
“Criminal Practice Section: The exclusion of improperly obtained
evidence” [2021] NZLJ 59 at 59–60.
[547] Bernard Robertson
“Evidence” [2018] NZLJ 210 at 211.
[548] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 per Elias CJ at [60]–[63], Blanchard J at
[187]–[189], Tipping J at [229]–[230] and McGrath J at [258]. See
also
R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [148].
[549] See Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 per Elias CJ at [60]–[63], Blanchard J
at [187]–[189], Tipping J at [229]–[230] and McGrath J at [258],
affirmed
more recently in Underwood v R [2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR
433 at [37] and Butland v R [2019] NZCA 376 at [70]–[71] and
[74].
[550] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [245]–[247] and [250].
[551] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
s 138(1); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 138(1); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138(1);
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 138(1); Evidence Act
2001 (Tas), s 138(1); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 138(1).
[552] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.47]–[7.48].
[553] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [61] and [63].
[554] In a recent Court of
Appeal case that remains subject to publication restrictions until final
disposition of trial.
[555] For example, searches
that are unlawful (due to a failure to comply with the requirements of the
Search and Surveillance Act 2012
or for other reasons) will generally also be
“unreasonable” for the purposes of s 21 of NZBORA (see Hamed v
R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [49], [50], [172], [174], [226,
[263] and [281]; Hall v R [2018] NZCA 279, [2019] 2 NZLR 325 at
[50]).
[556] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [66] per Elias CJ and at [191] per Blanchard J;
R v Toki [2017] NZCA 513, [2018] 2 NZLR 362 at [28].
[557] See R v Chetty
[2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [49], citing R v JZH [2009] NZCA 363
at [30].
[558] See, for example, R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [53]–[55]; R v
X [2021] NZHC 2444 at [156]; Edmonds v R [2012] NZCA 472 at [77].
[559] See, for example, R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [161]; Murray v R [2016]
NZCA 221 at [174]–[176]; Ferens v R [2015] NZCA 564 at [61]; R v
Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [120]; Alexander v
Police [2019] NZHC 2920 at [49]–[50].
[560] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [149]. See also R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52,
[2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [130].
[561] Fenwick v R
[2017] NZCA 422 at [15].
[562] See, for example,
Roskam v R [2019] NZCA 53 at [42] and Kelly v Police [2017] NZHC
1611 at [44]. In total, 15 of the 40 cases we examined in our snapshot case
study in which improperly obtained evidence was admitted appeared
to treat good
faith or the fact that the impropriety was of low seriousness as a factor
favouring admission of the evidence.
[563] The Court in R v
Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) envisaged this factor would encompass both
the probative value of the evidence (including its reliability) and its
centrality to
the prosecution case (at [151]–[152]).
[564] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [151]; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3
NZLR 207 at [140].
[565] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [151]; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3
NZLR 207 at [140]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [276]
per McGrath J.
[566] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [152]. See also R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52,
[2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [141].
[567] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 4.
[568] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 4.
[569] (21 November 2006) 635
NZPD 6638 (in committee).
[570] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [201] per Blanchard J and [276] per McGrath J.
Tipping J disagreed (at [237]), suggesting it would be inconsistent with
Parliament’s
approach to consider the centrality of the evidence to the
prosecution case (whether under s 30(3)(c) or as a separate factor). Elias
CJ
and Gault J did not address the issue.
[571] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.24].
[572] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.23]).
[573] There are several recent
examples but these cases remain subject to publication restrictions until final
disposition of trial.
[574] We note that where there
are concerns about the reliability of the evidence, this may result in exclusion
under Evidence Act 2006,
s 28 and/or s 8. Any residual concerns about the
reliability of evidence that is being considered under s 30 could be taken into
account as reducing the public interest in having the evidence considered
by the fact-finder at trial. We also discuss in Chapter 6 and in the
“Other
factors” section below the option of introducing a separate
factor allowing the risk of unreliability associated with an investigatory
technique to be taken into account under s 30(3) (which would be relevant to the
seriousness of the impropriety).
[575] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [65] per Elias CJ and [230] per Tipping J. This
point was not directly addressed by the other members of the Court.
[576] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.25]–[7.28].
[577] Underwood v R
[2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433.
[578] Underwood v R
[2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [39]–[41].
[579] See the discussion in
Scott Optican “Evidence” [2018] NZ L Rev 429 at 492–494.
[580] Bowden v R [2018]
NZCA 618 at [28] (although the evidence was excluded after assessment of other
factors).
[581] D (CA104-2017) v
R [2018] NZCA 173 at [36]: “Where the nature of the breach is such as
to raise concerns about the reliability of the evidence, [the seriousness of the
offence] weighs against the admission of the evidence”.
[582] See R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [152]: “Weight is given to the seriousness of
the crime not because the infringed right is less valuable to an accused
murderer
than it would be to, say, an accused burglar, but in recognition of the
enhanced public interest in convicting and confining the
murderer”.
[583] See the discussion in Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 |
Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018) at
[7.38]–[7.41].
[584] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 per Blanchard J at [196], Tipping J at [246],
McGrath J at [274]; R v Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at
[68].
[585] For example,
McGarrett v R [2017] NZCA 204 at [38] and Cooper v Police [2020]
NZHC 2514 at [38] (although in the latter case the officer was not aware of the
availability of an alternative, so arguably s 30(3)(e) was not engaged).
[586] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.36].
[587] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.38]–[7.39].
[588] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.37].
[589] Cooper v Police
[2020] NZHC 2514 at [38]. The other case remains subject to publication
restrictions until final disposition of trial. In Cooper, the evidence
was obtained through a warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle in
circumstances where the relevant warrantless
power did not apply. The Court
considered, however, that a different warrantless power could have been relied
on, which favoured
admission of the evidence (we note that it is not clear this
should not have engaged s 30(3)(e) at all, because the judgment does
not suggest
the officer knew that the other warrantless power applied).
[590] This case remains
subject to publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[591] See similarly Elias
CJ’s dissenting judgment in Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2
NZLR 305 at [73].
[592] See, for example,
Cooper v Police [2020] NZHC 2514 at [31].
[593] This would also mean
that, where the breach is inadvertent, the availability or absence of other
techniques would not generally
be relevant. We suggest that may be the best
approach. For example, if investigators knew there were other investigatory
techniques
available but did not realise the technique they were using was
improper, we see no reason to treat the availability of alternatives
as
favouring exclusion.
[594] As discussed further
below, we note that where there is urgency or physical danger, a warrantless
power will often apply and should
be relied upon if the officers involved are
aware of it. If they are not aware of it, the “other investigatory
techniques”
factor will not apply in any event since it relates to other
techniques known to be available.
[595] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [153].
[596] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [154].
[597] See R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [152], noting the potential
inconsistency between the inclusion of this factor and the approach in
Shaheed. We found no indication in legislative materials that s 30 was
intended to take a different approach to Shaheed in this regard.
[598] See, for example,
Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR at [202] per Blanchard J and
[247] per Tipping J; R v Balsley [2013] NZCA 258 at [34]. This view
is also expressed in a recent case subject to publication restrictions until
final disposition of trial.
[599] In one case, the fact
that some evidence had already been excluded was treated as a meaningful
vindication of the defendant’s
rights (Baylis v R [2019] NZCA 141
at [36]). In the other case (which remains subject to publication restrictions
until final disposition of trial), the High Court suggested
it would be open to
a sentencing court to take the breach into account in sentencing. We note that
taking this into account as a
factor favouring admission would appear contrary
to the discussion in Shaheed referred to above.
[600] Ward v R [2016]
NZCA 580 at [58]–[59].
[601] R v
Balsley [2013] NZCA 258 at [34]; Ahuja v Police [2019] NZHC 2010
at [71] (reversed in Ahuja v Police [2019] NZCA 643 but without comment
on this point); Police v Fox [2017] NZDC 21454 at [31]; Cameron v
Police [2015] NZHC 2957 at [54].
[602] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [147]; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3
NZLR 207 at [123].
[603] R v Jefferies
[1993] NZCA 401; [1994] 1 NZLR 290, discussed in R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3
NZLR 207 at [12] and [19].
[604] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [20].
[605] Search and Surveillance
Act 2012, ss 8, 15 and 16.
[606] Search and Surveillance
Act 2012, s 14.
[607] Search and Surveillance
Act 2012, s 18.
[608] See, for example,
Waite v Police [2019] NZHC 213 at [49] and [54]; Smith v Police
[2019] NZHC 2371 at [67]–[68] and [89]; Grant v Police [2021] NZHC
2297 at [69]–[70] and [95].
[609] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed, Thomson
Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EA30.12(9)].
[610] Many regulatory statutes
contain warrantless entry, search and seizure powers. See, for example, the
Customs and Excise Act 2018,
part 4 and the Films, Videos, and Publications
Classification Act 1993, part 7.
[611] See, for example,
Cooper v Police [2020] NZHC 2514 at [40]–[41]. This is a separate
consideration from the “other investigatory techniques” factor
(Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(e)),
which relates to alternatives known to
be available but not used. In the situation we refer to here, other lawful
powers were available but were not known to be available (because the
urgent or high-risk nature of the situation limits the officers’ ability
to give proper consideration
to alternatives).
[612] Referring as an example
to Hall v R [2018] NZCA 279 at [49], [50] and [65].
[613] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[7.42].
[614] R v Bailey [2017]
NZCA 211 at [19]; Baylis v R [2019] NZCA 141 at [36].
[615] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [163] per Blanchard J, at [10]–[11] per
Elias CJ (who took a broader view of what amounts to a “search”
which would but
not be limited to intrusions on reasonable expectations of
privacy) at [263]–[265] per McGrath J and at [281] and [285] per
Gault J.
See also R v Alsford [2017] NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710 at
[48]–[50].
[616] See, for example,
Makaea v R [2018] NZCA 284 at [45]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101,
[2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [191] per Blanchard J.
[617] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [46]–[47]. The Court said “almost
always” because it recognised that, if the conduct in question has had
a material detrimental impact on the court’s task,
that might, in an
appropriate case be sufficient to result in exclusion. (This was in the context
of a breach of rule 5 of the Practice
Note on Police Questioning, which requires
video recording of interviews).
[618] W (CA226/2019) v
R [2019] NZCA 558 at [113] (citations omitted).
[619] Nichol v R [2017]
NZCA 140 at [25], citing R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207
at [79] and Elia v R [2012] NZCA 243, (2012) 29 FRNZ 27 at [35].
[620] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [61].
[621] See, for example, W
(CA226/2019) v R [2019] NZCA 558 at [132] (Mallon J dissenting at [139]) and
Swainbank v R [2021] NZCA 93 at [59].
[622] W (CA226/2019) v
R [2019] NZCA 558.
[623] W (CA226/2019) v
R [2019] NZCA 558 at [132].
[624] W (CA226/2019) v
R [2019] NZCA 558 at [139].
[625] R v Perry [2016]
NZSC 102 at [56]–[57].
[626] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [61].
[627] See, for example, Scott
Optican “Evidence” [2015] NZ L Rev 473 at 527–528.
[628] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [61].
[629] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at
217.
[630] See, for example,
Samuels v R [2021] NZCA 358, concerning an application by the defendant
to offer new evidence from a prison informant (based on conversations with the
defendant
while in prison, and with others who claimed to have information about
the crime) which would give “an added dimension to motive”
and
“could have provided another avenue to cross-examine and hence undermine
the reliability of the Crown’s key witness”
(at [25]). The Court
rejected the application, holding that the evidence was “far from cogent
or credible... It follows that
the information [the informant] says he
obtained... is double hearsay, inherently unreliable and inadmissible” (at
[28]–[29]).
[631] The presence of
incentives has been recognised by the courts as a key reason for concern about
prison informant evidence. See, for
example, the Supreme Court in Hudson v R
[2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289: “Prison informants are likely to
have motives to cooperate with the authorities, in terms of sentence, parole,
money (including
rewards) or perhaps just a slightly better relationship with
the police” (at [33]); and W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93,
[2020] 1 NZLR 382, where the Supreme Court acknowledged the “specific
concerns” with the evidence of prison informants that should form
part of
the assessment for reliability, which can include “any incentives or
expectations of preference at play” (at
n 104 and [88(c)]). Commentors
also note the role of incentives in prison informant evidence. See, for example,
Anna High “Anna
High “The exclusion of prison informant evidence for
unreliability in New Zealand” (2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at 219;
and
Patrick Anderson “Snitched on or stitched up? – a review of the law
in New Zealand in relation to jailhouse informant
evidence” [2021] NZLJ
119 at 121.
[632] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at
219.
[633] “Criminals who
later feel an overwhelming need to confess to or to boast about their unlawful
exploits are unlikely to choose
an upstanding, law-abiding stranger to hear the
tales of their criminal behaviour... [I]nformants are seen by the accused to be
‘one
of us’ and therefore trustworthy to hear a confession about
criminal exploits”: Marie Dyhrberg “Informants: finding
the truth
beneath self-interest” New Zealand Lawyer (New Zealand, 8 February
2001).
[634] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at n 104.
[635] This evidence was
acknowledged and extensively referenced by the Supreme Court in W (SC
38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [74]–[86] (majority)
and [221]–[247] (minority).
[636] As the Supreme Court has
observed: “The notion that prison informants are unreliable witnesses is
not new to the law. References
in judgments to the perils of convicting in
reliance on such evidence can be found in texts dating back to the 18th
century”:
W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at
[211] (footnotes omitted). Commentors also describe prison informant evidence as
unreliable in nature. See, for example, Anna High “The
exclusion of prison
informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand” (2021) 25 IJE & P
217 at 217: “This is a
notoriously unreliable class of evidence...”
and Patrick Anderson “Snitched on or stitched up? – a review of the
law in New Zealand in relation to jailhouse informant evidence” [2021]
NZLJ 119 at 121: “Jailhouse informant evidence is notoriously unreliable
and its use is by its very nature fraught with risk”.
[637] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [83] and [240]–[241].
[638] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [33].
[639] Patrick Anderson
“Snitched on or stitched up? – a review of the law in New Zealand in
relation to jailhouse informant
evidence” [2021] NZLJ 119 at 121.
[640] See the discussion of
the majority in W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at
[74]–[86].
[641] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [80], [237].
[642] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [83], [240].
[643] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [94]–[95], [242]–[243].
[644] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382. The majority described them as providing
“plainly scientific support” that the evidence of prison informants
has contributed
to miscarriages of justice (at [79], and discussion from
[76]–[78]). The minority held that they demonstrated the “extent
to
which the risk of associated miscarriages of justice, a risk identified in
numerous judgments, has been realised” (at [232]).
[645] Phil Taylor “The
murky world of jailhouse snitches” New Zealand Herald (online ed,
30 April 2018); Mike White “The tragic and terrible case of Mauha
Fawcett’s wrongful conviction” (11
June 2022) Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>.
[646] Prison informant
evidence also played crucial roles in the convictions of Scott Watson and David
Tamihere, both of whom have appeals
pending. Mike White “Scott
Watson’s appeal over murder conviction delayed till next year” (19
August 2022) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>.; Mike White “More DNA
testing delays David Tamihere murder appeal” (31 January 2023) Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>. Of particular significance in David
Tamihere’s case was the evidence given by “Witness C”,
later
revealed to be Robert Conchie Harris, who was convicted on eight counts of
perjury for the evidence he gave at Mr Tamihere’s
1990 trial: Taylor v
Witness C [2017] NZHC 2610. Prison informant evidence also featured in the
Palmiro MacDonald murder trial (which resulted in a hung jury after one prison
informant’s
evidence was shown to be false), and the collapse of the case
against three men accused of the murder of Lois Tolley. Jono Galuszka
“Jailhouse snitch gives untrue evidence under oath, breaches protection
deal” (9 August 2019) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>; Mike White
“’An abomination of an investigation’: How the Lois Tolley
murder case collapsed”
(19 March 2022) Stuff
<www.stuff.co.nz>.
[647] Petition of Lois
McGirr for Justice For All Inc and 190 others: Stop jail-house informant
testimony from causing wrongful convictions
(2017/434, 13 November 2019).
[648] Section 27 of the
Evidence Act 2006 is also relevant. It provides that the statement of a
defendant, offered by the prosecution,
is admissible. Admissibility under s 27
is subject to s 28 (exclusion of unreliable statements), s 29 (exclusion of
statements influence
by oppression) and s 30 (improperly obtained evidence), but
the Supreme Court has held that these are unlikely to apply to prison
informant
evidence. Section 28 addresses the circumstances in which a statement was made,
whereas the primary concern with prison
informant evidence is frequently whether
the statement was made at all (Hudson v R [2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR
289 at [36]); for prison informant evidence to be captured by s 30, it would
have to be accepted that the system of prison informant evidence
was inherently
operating unfairly – an argument that has been rejected by the Supreme
Court (W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382) at [101] and
n 161.
[649] Elisabeth McDonald
Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington,
2012) at 218.
[650] See, for example, R v
Cullen [1990] NZHC 167; (1990) 6 CRNZ 28 and R v Chignell [1991] 2 NZLR 257 (also
reported as R v Chignell and Walker (1990 6 CRNZ 103(CA)).
[651] Mathew Downs (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law: Archived Evidence Commentary pre-Evidence Act 2006
(online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [EC4.04(10)].
[652] Te Tāhu o te Ture |
Ministry of Justice Departmental Report for the Justice and Electoral
Committee: Evidence Bill: Part 2 – Admissibility Rules, Privilege and
Confidentiality
(June 2006) at 13.
[653] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 12.
[654] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [11.107]-[11.115].
[655] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [11.107].
[656] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.22]–[18.23].
[657] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.26], citing Hudson
v R [2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [36].
[658] In W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 and Roigard v R [2020] NZSC 94.
[659] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [35]–[36].
[660] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [36].
[661] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [33].
[662] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382; Roigard v R [2020] NZSC 94.
[663] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [41] and n 199.
[664] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [69]–[70], [88] [91] and
[191].
[665] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [86] and [192].
[666] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [88].
[667] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [191]. The framework is set out from
[254]–[270].
[668] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [87].
[669] “The application
of [the minority] framework in this case has resulted in an approach which
requires independent corroboration
of the evidence in issue and which places
emphasis on the need for the court in a case such as this one to ask whether the
evidence
of a confession has been constructed by the witness to cohere with
facts they have gained from other sources. We see these aspects
as matters for
trial and cross-examination”: Roigard v R [2020] NZSC 94 at
[54].
[670] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [91] and [218].
[671] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [93].
[672] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Use of Inmate
Admissions (August 2021).
[673] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Use of Inmate
Admissions (August 2021). at [3.17.1]–[3.17.5].
[674] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at
232.
[675] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at
232; Scott Optican “Evidence” (2021) NZ
L Rev 313 at 328.
[676] See Winkelmann CJ in
W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [227]:
“...many of these studies identify the same four leading categories of
evidence as most often associated with miscarriages
of justice: eyewitness
misidentification, flawed forensic evidence, false confessions and false
informant evidence. For each of these
categories of evidence, except the false
informant category, the Evidence Act provides either structured mechanisms to
promote the
collection of good quality evidence, or evidential thresholds that
protect against the admission of unreliable evidence. In some
cases it does
both”.
[677] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [71]; Anna High “The exclusion of
prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand” (2021) 25 IJE
& P 217 at
233.
[678] See, for example,
Russell D Covey “Abolishing jailhouse snitch testimony” (2014) 49
Wake Forest L Rev 101.
[679] Anna High
“Cellmate confessions” [2021] NZLJ 81 at 83.
[680] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [36].
[681] The Act adopts a
“balance of probabilities” threshold in ss 28 and 46 and one of
“beyond reasonable doubt”
in s 45. The Commission’s original
proposals adopted a test of “beyond reasonable doubt” for all three
sections.
When the Evidence Bill was introduced, the test was one of a
“balance of probabilities” across all three sections, and
the change
reverting to “beyond reasonable doubt” in s 45 was made at select
committee stage. The reasons for this were
not made clear, although in Hohipa
v R [2015] NZCA 73, the Court suggested that it may reflect the
“legislature’s estimation of the risks inherent in visual
identification
evidence” and that it was not incompatible to have two
separate approaches to visual and voice identification evidence (at
[67]).
[682] Outlined at [8.5] above.
[683] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at
233.
[684] Roigard v R
[2020] NZSC 94 at [54].
[685] Scott Optican
“Evidence” (2021) NZ L Rev 313 at 328.
[686] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at
233.
[687] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 12.
[688] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [11.07].
[689] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [40]–[41].
[690] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [58].
[691] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [59] (footnotes omitted).
[692] See, for example, W
(SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [84]–[85] and
[246]; Anna High “The exclusion of prison informant evidence for
unreliability in New Zealand” (2021)
25 IJE & P 217 at 232; Patrick
Anderson “Snitched on or stitched up? – a review of the law in New
Zealand in relation
to jailhouse informant evidence” [2021] NZLJ 119 at
123.
[693] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [86].
[694] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [246].
[695] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [246].
[696] In Hudson,
the Supreme Court noted that, unlike other types of unreliable evidence
where the primary controversy turns on the circumstances in
which the statements
were made, the issue with prison informant evidence is often whether the
statements were made at all: Hudson v R [2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289
at [36].
[697] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV122.06].
[698] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [91] and [218].
[699] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [92]. The Court noted that the
Solicitor-General was in the process of formulating such guidance at that time.
[700] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [93] and [218].
[701] See, for example, Scott
Optican “Evidence” (2021) NZ L Rev 313 at 328–329; Anna High
“The exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New
Zealand” (2021) 25 IJE
& P 217.
[702] Mike White “Law
Commission will examine ‘jailhouse snitches’” (1 October 2022)
Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>.
[703] Office of the Director
of Public Prosecutions Guide Book of Policies and Procedures for the Conduct
of Criminal Prosecutions in Newfoundland and Labrador (October 2007) at
22–5.
[704] The Manitoba Department
of Justice’s in-custody informer policy requires that any in-custody
informant found to have lied
will be “vigorously prosecuted by a counsel
independent of the prosecution”: see “Jailhouse Informants” in
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions Guide Book of Policies and
Procedures for the Conduct of Criminal Prosecutions in Newfoundland and Labrador
(October 2007) at 22–5.
[705] See, for example,
“In-Custody Informers” in Ministry of the Attorney General –
Criminal Law Division Ontario Crown Prosecution Manual (2017);
“In-Custody Informer Policy: Guideline No.2:INF:1” in Manitoba
Department of Justice Policy Handbook (5 November 2001).
[706] Petition of Lois
McGirr for Justice for All Inc and 190 others: Stop jail-house informant
testimony from causing wrongful convictions
(2017/434, 13 November
2019).
[707] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25 IJE & P 217 at
233.
[708] See, for example, Mike
White “High-profile Crown prosecutor concealed meeting with secret witness
in murder case” (27
March 2023) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>,
detailing a case where meetings between a prosecutor and a prison informant
witness were only discovered
through notes in a police officer’s notebook.
[709] By enabling the defence
(via disclosure) to more effectively challenge the witness in cross-examination
and to be able to more clearly
present to the jury what incentives have been
offered or received.
[710] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [94]–[95].
[711] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [87].
[712] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at n 139.
[713] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [201].
[714] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [69].
[715] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [69].
[716] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [69].
[717] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [79].
[718] Evidence Act 2006, s
37(5).
[719] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 102–113.
[720] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 24.
[721] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 108.
[722] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C177].
[723] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 5.
[724] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127,
2013), ch 6.
[725] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612.
[726] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [135] and [138].
[727] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [121]. The majority explained at n 46
that evidence indicative of a disposition to tell lies necessarily bears on the
disposition of the
person in question to refrain from lying, in terms of the
definition of veracity in s 37(5).
[728] R v Tepu [2008]
NZCA 460 at [19]. This decision concerned an allegation that the defendant lied
in their statement to police about the events that were the subject
of the
charges. As noted above, the Supreme Court has since clarified that the veracity
rules do not apply to evidence that is of
direct relevance to the case even if
that evidence bears on the veracity of a witness or defendant: Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [135].
[729] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV37.01(2)].
[730] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV37.01(2)]. See also Cross on
Evidence which notes in the context of s 37(3)(b), that “[i]t is clear
from the provision, which refers to “one or more offences”,
a single
relevant conviction is capable of constituting substantially helpful veracity
evidence”: Mathew Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf
ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA37.5].
[731] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186.
[732] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [73].
[733] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [88].
[734] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [97] and [107].
[735] This case is subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[736] As discussed above, the
Commission had proposed that any evidence about a person’s truthfulness
(their intention to tell the
truth) should be admissible only if it is
substantially helpful in assessing that person’s truthfulness: Te Aka
Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary
(NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at 24-25 and 108-109. The Commission’s
commentary makes it clear that evidence of single lies were intended
to be
captured (at [C180]). The concept of a “disposition” to lie was
introduced at select committee stage.
[737] We note, by way of
example, the case of Ilaoa, discussed in Elisabeth McDonald’s
research into intimate partner rape trials. In that case, it was suggested in
cross-examination
that the complainant had lied in her residency application, a
suggestion that she strongly denied. The admissibility and use of that
evidence
was, McDonald states, misguided. It should have been subject to s 37 but was
not: Elisabeth McDonald Prosecuting Intimate Partner Rape (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2023) at 235–237. McDonald also discusses
another case, Nguyen, involving a single lie that was not assessed for
admissibility under s 37 (at 146–149).
[738] Elisabeth McDonald has
noted that closer attention needs to be paid to identifying and considering the
admission of evidence of
the complainant’s veracity at the pre-trial stage
in sexual cases, but does not consider that there are any major issues with
regard to the drafting of the veracity provisions: Elisabeth McDonald
Prosecuting Intimate Partner Rape (Canterbury University Press,
Christchurch, 2023) at 247.
[739] Simon France (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online loose leaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [EA37.03(8)].
[740] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [14.9]–[14.17].
[741] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [119].
[742] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019), R24.
[743] Government Response to
Law Commission Report: The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006
(September 2019) at 6.
[744] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [135] and [138].
[745] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [121].
[746] R v Katipa [2017]
NZHC 2169 at [8].
[747] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV37.09]–[EV37.10]. See, for
example, M (CA438/2010) v R [2011] NZCA 84, where the Court of Appeal
held that evidence of alleged bias on the part of an expert witness (that the
witness lacked objectivity
by reason of previous associations) did not engage
the veracity provisions because it went to reliability of the witness’
testimony
(at [30]–[37]). See also McKay v R [2019] NZCA 393, where
the Court of Appeal observed at [30] that “challenging the truthfulness of
a complainant’s evidence by reference
to a possible motivation to
lie” would not amount to a challenge to their veracity (for the purposes
of s 38).
[748] For example, in R v
Alletson [2009] NZCA 205, the defence sought to offer as veracity evidence
details of lies told by the complainant on previous occasions, which allegedly
indicated a bias against the defendant (at [21]). The trial judge had described
the lies as “childhood tittle-tattle”
that did not show either a
bias on the part of the complainant or a motive for her to be untruthful (at
[22]). On appeal, the Court
of Appeal noted that the motive in the earlier lies
(to avoid getting into trouble) was different from what the defence said was
the
motive for the allegations that were the subject of the current charges
(attention seeking) and upheld the trial judge’s
assessment that the
evidence did not meet the substantial helpfulness test (at [25]).
[749] We have not identified
any cases where veracity evidence has met the substantial helpfulness threshold
because it revealed a bias
or motive to lie. See, for example, Harawira v R
[2019] NZCA 562, a sexual case in which the defendant sought to offer as
veracity evidence to the effect that the 18-year-old complainant, when aged
15,
had lied to her aunt about whether her mother had consented to her getting a
belly button piercing. The trial judge had explained
that, while this may have
been evidence of a motive on behalf of the complainant to be untruthful,
“if it is it is a motive
in the context of a youngish teenage girl trying
to get a belly-button piercing rather than a much more serious issue before the
jury” (at [14]). The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge’s
assessment (at [40] and [42]).
[750] See, for example, the
Supreme Court’s observations in Horton v R [2021] NZSC 99 at [11]
in the context of prior convictions as veracity evidence.
[751] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [72] (emphasis added).
[752] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [6.75].
[753] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [73]–[74].
[754] Horton v R [2021]
NZCA 82 at [30].
[755] In an early draft the
Commission suggested including a requirement to consider the length of time that
has elapsed since the acts
or events: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at cl 10(2).
This factor did not appear in the final Evidence Code.
[756] Evidence Act 2006, s
38(2)(b).
[757] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C188].
[758] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at [189]–[190].
[759] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at [196]–[197].
[760] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at [203]. See also Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of
the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [6.95]–[6.96].
[761] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions,
Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008); Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013); and Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of
the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006
(NZLC R142, 2019).
[762] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions,
Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [3.32] and
[3.37]–[3.38] discussing the rule in R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB
4, [1947] 2 All ER 415; affirmed in R v Kino and Mete [1997] 3 NZLR 24;
and Williams v R [2017] NZCA 329.
[763] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions,
Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [2.12].
[764] Evidence Act 2006, s
21.
[765] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions,
Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [3.38].
[766] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at [218].
[767] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 110 and [C188]. That provision made an exception in relation to
evidence that the defendant had committed
or been charged with an offence
relevant to truthfulness (such as perjury). Such evidence would only be able to
be offered if the
defendant “offered evidence about the defendant’s
truthfulness or challenging the truthfulness of a prosecution witness”,
and the judge gave permission. At select committee, the relevant provision in
the Evidence Bill was changed to limit the prosecution
offering any
veracity evidence about the defendant to where the defendant puts veracity
in issue: Evidence Bill 2005 (256-2), cl 34(2)(a).
[768] See discussion in Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’
Previous Convictions, Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008)
at [3.33]–[3.36].
[769] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-2) (select committee report) at 6.
[770] See discussion in Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’
Previous Convictions, Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008)
at [3.37]–[3.40] and [9.15].
[771] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [6.104]–[6.108] and R13.
[772] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [14.27].
[773] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019), R25 and [14.29]. This
recommendation was accepted by the Government: Government Response to Law
Commission Report: The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 Te Arotake Tuarua
i te Evidence Act 2006 (September 2019) at 7. At the time of writing, an
evidence amendment bill progressing this recommendation has not been introduced
to the House.
[774] See, for example, Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary
(NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C189], which discusses the possibility of either the
defendant or a defence witness impugning the truthfulness of a
prosecution witness.
[775] Criminal Evidence Act
1898 (UK), s 1(f), applied by R v Clark [1953] NZCA 18; [1953] NZLR 823 (CA) at 830. See
discussion in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence Law: Character
and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at [196]–[197]. The position in
England and Wales is now governed by ss 101 and 106 of the Criminal Justice
Act
2003 (UK).
[776] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 101(1)(f)–(g).
[777] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 105(1)(a).
[778] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 105(2).
[779] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 106(1). Paragraph (a) is interpreted to cover evidence given by any
witness called by the defendant
and, presumably, evidence given by the defendant
themselves: Ian Dennis The Law of Evidence (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 2020) at [19–042].
[780] Evidence Act 2006, s
4(1).
[781] Evidence Act 2006, s
4(1) (definition of “veracity”).
[782] The definition of
“hostile” in the Commission’s proposed Evidence Code referred
to a person who “exhibits,
or appears to exhibit, a lack of truthfulness
when giving evidence”, and “truthfulness” was defined as being
“concerned
with a person’s intention to tell the truth...”: Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary
(NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at 24.
[783] See Elisabeth McDonald
and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV4.21.02(1)] and Simon France (eds)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online loose leaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [EA94.01].
[784] See Elisabeth McDonald
and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington 2018) at [EV35.04(4)(a)] and Simon France (eds)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online loose leaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [EA35.11].
[785] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [14.44].
[786] See, for example,
Body v R [2019] NZCA 378 at n 4, where the Court of Appeal held that the
cross-examination of the complainant concerning the contents of a letter of
retraction
was a challenge to her veracity for the purposes of s 35(2),
explaining in a footnote: “As that phrase is understood in the
context of
s 35”.
[787] As per one of the stated
purposes of the Evidence Act 2006 “enhancing access to the law of
evidence” under s 6(f).
[788] This would include
retaining the reference to “veracity” under the definition of
veracity under s 4(1) of the Evidence
Act 2006, which refers to the veracity
having “the meaning given in section 37”. The term
“veracity” would
also remain in the s 16 guidance on the
interpretation of the hearsay rules.
[789] Evidence Act 2006, s
40(1)(a).
[790] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145 at [3] per Tipping J for the majority and at
[51] and [81] per William Young J for the minority; affirmed in Taniwha v R
[2016] NZSC 123 at [62].
[791] As at 14 October 2022, a
Lexis Advance search for cases citing s 43 of the Evidence Act 2006 returned 969
results. Most s 43 cases
deal with the appropriate application of the s 43(1)
test: Scott Optican “Evidence” [2019] 4 NZ L Rev 565 at 577.
[792] Decisions on the
admissibility of propensity evidence are usually highly significant in how a
trial is conducted: Ian Murray and
Anne Stevens KC Criminal Law: Evidence Act
Update (paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society Criminal Law:
Evidence Act Update Webinar, March 2022) at 7.
[793] For example, Bernard
Robertson has suggested that it seems to be becoming routine in trials for
sexual offending for the prosecution
to offer evidence of other sexual
offending, charged or uncharged: Bernard Robertson “Evidence” [2018]
NZLJ 314 at 316. Richard Mahoney wrote in 2011 that “what has become clear
is that a substantial sector of our judiciary no longer holds
the same concern
for the prejudicial effect of propensity evidence that was formerly deeply
ingrained in our law ... the change we
are living through seems to be inexorably
heading in one direction only”: Richard Mahoney “Evidence”
[2011] NZ L Rev 547 at 552.
[794] See for example, Bernard
Robertson “Evidence” [2018] NZLJ 314 at 316; Matthew Downs “A
Commentary on the Presentation by Justice Virginia Bell AC: Propensity Evidence
under the Evidence
Act 2006” (paper presented at the Legal Research
Foundation Conference – The Evidence Act 2006 10 Years On, Auckland,
September 2016) at [41]; and Richard Mahoney “Evidence” [2010] NZ L
Rev 433 at 434.
[795] See, for example, R v
Stewart [2008] NZCA 429, [2010] 1 NZLR 197 at [17]; Vuletich v R
[2010] NZCA 102 at [52]; and R v RM HC Napier CRI 2008-041-819, 14
July 2008 at [67], where Priestley J observed that “The statutory
prohibition on excluding propensity
evidence if the risk of its unfairly
prejudicial nature outweighs its probative value is clear. The route to that
conclusion, however,
is, as with similar fact cases, obscure”.
[796] Vuletich v R
[2010] NZCA 102 at [52].
[797] Vuletich v R
[2010] NZCA 102 at [61]–[62].
[798] Vuletich v R
[2010] NZCA 102 at [64]–[65].
[799] Vuletich v R
[2010] NZCA 102 at [27] per Glazebrook J and [96] per Randerson J.
[800] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145.
[801] Scott Optican “The
Supreme Court and the Law of Evidence” in Andrew Stockley and Michael
Littlewood (eds) The New Zealand Supreme Court: The First Ten Years
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) 409 at 414–418. See also Richard
Mahoney “Evidence” [2012] NZ L Rev 721 at 729.
[802] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV43.04(2)].
[803] Richard Mahoney
“Evidence” [2011] NZ L Rev 547 at 549.
[804] Grigg v R [2015]
NZCA 27 at [17].
[805] Grigg v R [2015]
NZCA 27 at [17].
[806] This case is subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[807] The authors of
Cross on Evidence observe that “admissibility determinations
of propensity evidence are intensely fact-specific, as divergent outcomes in
relation
to photographs of young children as legitimate propensity evidence
reveal”: Mathew Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed,
LexisNexis) at [EVA43.3], referring to SC v R [2015] NZCA 195 and B
(CA313/2010) v R [2010] NZCA 326, (2010) 25 CRNZ 6. Commentators have
sometimes noted how similar cases have resulted in different outcomes. See, for
example, Elisabeth McDonald and
others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial
Process: Comparing adult rape trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence
Court Pilot (Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 2020). McDonald
noted some inconsistencies in the application of s 43 in the cases analysed
(at
231) but did not make any reform recommendations given that the jurisprudence
under s 43 is still developing and the number of
cases analysed was small (at
243). See also Scott Optican “Evidence” [2015] NZ L Rev 473 at
482-486, describing case outcomes under the s 43 test as “highly
idiosyncratic”.
[808] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions,
Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [35].
[809] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at 9–10 and [249].
[810] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at [291].
[811] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at 134.
[812] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 120 (emphasis added).
[813] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at [C201].
[814] Evidence Act 2006, s
8(1)(a). This language largely reflected the Commission’s proposed
wording: Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and
Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at 32.
[815] Cabinet Minute
“Evidence Bill: Overview Paper” (8 October 2003) at 4.
[816] Richard Mahoney
“Evidence” [2010] NZ L Rev 433 at 435.
[817] Richard Mahoney
“Evidence” [2010] NZ L Rev 433 at 435.
[818] See, for example, R v
Healy [2007] NZCA 451 at [46].
[819] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions,
Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [3.71].
[820] R v Healy [2007]
NZCA 451 at [52].
[821] Scott Optican
“Evidence” [2015] NZ L Rev 473 at 485–486. See also discussion
in Richard Mahoney “Evidence” [2010] NZ L Rev 433 at 442 where he
observed “I find nothing in s 43(1) to help me understand just when
probative value outweighs prejudicial effect.
Does “very strong”
probative value outweigh “very serious” prejudicial effect? Perhaps
“fairly strong”
probative value outweighs “quite high”
prejudicial effect. Who can tell? We will never progress in our treatment of
evidence
about a defendant’s propensities until our appellate courts grasp
the nettle and articulate what the weighing up process really
involves”.
[822] Mathew Downs (ed)
Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA43.15].
[823] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[167] and [169].
[824] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145 at [60]–[61] per William Young J for the
minority. While the minority’s express comments on this matter are often
cited, as Bernard
Robertson notes, in fact the whole Court treated the evidence
as falling within the definition in s 40(1) despite it being what is
described
as “relationship” propensity evidence: Bernard Robertson
“Evidence” [2020] NZLJ 16 at 20.
[825] For example, Elisabeth
McDonald notes that the current approach does not prevent evidence of other
relevant behaviour by the defendant
towards the complainant from being admitted
as relationship propensity evidence in family violence cases even if that
propensity
evidence is different to the index offending: Elisabeth McDonald
Prosecuting Intimate Partner Rape (Canterbury University Press,
Christchurch, 2023) at 229.
[826] See Mathew Downs (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [EA40.02(1)].
[827] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145 at [66]–[67] per William Young J. See
also [5] per Tipping J.
[828] See, for example, P
(CA354/17) v R [2018] NZCA 361 at [34], citing Mahomed v R [2011]
NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145 at [90].
[829] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at 134.
[830] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
s 101(2). This requirement is based on the Uniform Evidence Law and has also
been adopted in Victoria: Evidence Act 2008 (VIC), s 101(2).
[831] Law Reform Commission of
Western Australia Admissibility of propensity and relationship evidence in WA
(Report 112, 2022) at 17.
[832] Royal Commission into
Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Criminal Justice Report
(August 2017) at VI.
[833] Evidence Act 2011 (ACT),
s 101(2); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 101(2); Evidence (National Uniform
Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 101(2); Evidence Act 2001 (TAS), s 101(2). Also
see recommendations in Law Reform Commission of Western Australia
Admissibility of propensity and relationship evidence in WA (Report 112,
2022).
[834] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997)
at [8].
[835] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
ss 97(1)(b) and 98(1)(b). This has also been adopted in New South Wales,
Victoria, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory: Evidence Act 1995
(NSW), ss 97(1)(b) and 98(1)(b); Evidence Act 2008 (VIC), ss 97(1)(b) and
98(1)(b); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), ss 97(1)(b) and 98(1)(b); Evidence (National
Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), ss 97(1) and 98(1)(b). See discussion in
Stephen Odgers Uniform Evidence Law (17th ed, Thomson Reuters, Pyrmont,
2022) at [EA.97.120] and [EA.98.120]. Some jurisdictions have introduced a
presumption that certain
tendency evidence has significant probative value in
proceedings involving child sexual offending in response to recommendations
made
by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse
Criminal Justice (August 2017): see Stephen Odgers Uniform Evidence
Law (17th ed, Thomson Reuters, Pyrmont, 2022) at [EA.97A.30] and
[EA.98.200].
[836] Hughes v The Queen
[2017] HCA 20 at [16].
[837] Hughes v The Queen
[2017] HCA 20 at [41].
[838] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [4].
[839] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [8].
[840] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [9].
[841] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [10].
[842] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [10].
[843] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [12].
[844] Scott Optican
“Evidence” [2019] NZ L Rev 565 at 582.
[845] Mead v R [2013]
NZCA 59; RPG v R [2015] NZCA 275; and Saumanaia v R [2017] NZCA
224.
[846] In Mead v R
[2013] NZCA 59, the prior acquittal evidence related to a 1990 acquittal for
rape. Neither the court file nor the police file was available, only
a statement
made by the complainant in relation to the incident in 2012. A risk of unfair
prejudice was said to arise from the non-availability
of earlier evidence for
the purposes of cross-examination in the present trial (at [19]).
[847] In RPG v R [2015]
NZCA 275, the prior acquittal evidence related to more serious offending than
the present charges and had already been the subject of three
earlier trials.
While the propensity evidence was highly probative, it created a risk that it
would overwhelm the present trial given
that all the evidence from the earlier
trials would need to be offered, and that it would be difficult for the jury not
to give that
disproportionate weight in their assessment of the present charges
(at [25]).
[848] In addition to Brooks
v R [2019] NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 discussed below, we are also aware of
several other Court of Appeal and Supreme Court cases that are subject to
publication restrictions
pending final disposition at trial.
[849] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161.
[850] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [28], citing Fenemor v R [2011] NZSC 127,
[2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [10].
[851] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [35].
[852] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [35(a)].
[853] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [35(b)].
[854] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [35(c)].
[855] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [58] and [75].
[856] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [60].
[857] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161 at [62]–[63].
[858] An example of where the
acquittal dimension has been found to result in unfair prejudice under the
current approach is R v F [2022] NZHC 2710. In that case, the prior
acquittal evidence was excluded in circumstances where it related to allegations
made over 10 years ago,
the court file could not be located and it
appeared that the defendant had called a witness at the trial who potentially
gave alibi evidence, or at least evidence relevant
to the acquittal, and that
witness had since died (at [44]). The Court said that was “a good example
of how unfair prejudice
can arise in relation to a prior acquittal” (at
[44]).
[859] Scott Optican
“Evidence” [2019] 4 NZ L Rev 565 at 582-583. Don Mathias suggests
this case “is an indication of how difficult this evaluative judgement can
be”: Don
Mathias “Probative value and prejudicial effect: when
weighing is not balancing” (08 October 2019) Criminal Law Casebook
–
Developments in Leading Appellate Courts
<www.donmathias.wordpress.com>.
[860] Brooks v R [2019]
NZSC 107 at [16].
[861] Another option,
suggested by Scott Optican, is a presumption of unfair prejudice where there are
significant gaps in, or the complete
absence of, records connected with the
earlier case: Scott Optican “Evidence” [2019] 4 NZ L Rev 565 at 582.
Our suggested reform would elevate this matter to a mandatory consideration,
which avoids altering the existing structure
of s 43.
[862] See, for example,
discussion in Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases
(Thompson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 195–197 and Preston v R
[2012] NZCA 542 at [52].
[863] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.29]. See also Mathew
Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at
[EVA43.14].
[864] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.33].
[865] Many cases we are aware
of are subject to publication restrictions until final disposition at trial.
Some of these cases are discussed
in Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law
– Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [EA43.07(5)].
[866] See, for example,
Rowell v R [2020] NZCA 9 at [13]–[16]; R v C [2021] NZHC
1715 at [46]–[48]. See also Armishaw v R [2019] NZCA 456 at [36];
Faaosofia v R [2020] NZCA 405 at [32]; R v Stevens [2020] NZHC
760 at [31]–[36]; T v R [2022] NZHC 189 at [19]; R v F
[2022] NZHC 1341 at [48]; and Kennedy v R [2022] NZHC 2977 at
[27].
[867] R v Ahlawat
[2021] NZCA 610 at [37].
[868] Goel v R [2022]
NZCA 263.
[869] Goel v R [2022]
NZCA 263 at [63].
[870] Cases we are aware of
that apply this approach are subject to publication restrictions until final
disposition of trial.
[871] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.30], citing concerns
identified in Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases
(Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 194-197.
[872] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.31].
[873] R v Vernon [2009]
NZCA 551 at [23] and R v Khan [2010] NZCA 510 at [24].
[874] Mathew Downs (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at EA43.07(1)(b); and Andrea Ewing “Disputed Propensity
Evidence” [2013] NZ L Rev 35.
[875] R v H [1995] 2 AC
596 (HL), discussed in Elisabeth McDonald and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on
Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington) at
EV43.04(7).
[876] R (CA458/2015) v
R [2015] NZCA 457 at [4] and [22]–[23].
[877] See discussion in Mathew
Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online looseleaf ed,
Thomson Reuters) at EA43.07(1)(b) and cases cited therein.
[878] Fraser v R [2019]
NZCA 662 at [27], citing Lyons v R [2015] NZCA 318 at [28]; and W
(CA290/2017) v R [2017] NZCA 405 at [19].
[879] George v R [2017]
NZCA 318 at [26].
[880] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382.
[881] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145 at [66]–[67].
[882] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [48] per Ellen France J for the
majority. At [191] Winkelmann CJ for the minority states “We agree with
the reasons of the majority
as to the extent to which reliability may be
considered in determining issues of admissibility under s 8 of the Evidence
Act”.
[883] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [70] (citations omitted).
[884] See, for example,
Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd [2021] NZSC 85,
[2021] 1 NZLR 696 at n 60. See also the reference to W (SC 38/2019) v R
in R v Opetaia [2021] NZHC 99 at [82] and n 90, in support of the
Court’s acceptance that the probative value of a hearsay statement under s
8 is affected by the
circumstances going to its reliability.
[885] R v Wallace
[2020] NZHC 2559 at [29]–[31]. On appeal the Court of Appeal upheld
the High Court’s decision and agreed that the evidence was sufficiently
reliable
and that no unfairness arose from it being offered as propensity
evidence: Wallace v R [2020] NZCA 678 at [25].
[886] R v Wallace
[2020] NZHC 2559 at [34].
[887] The Evidence Code
included a requirement, in relation to propensity evidence, that “there is
sufficient evidence for a fact-finder
acting reasonably to find that the
defendant was the person involved”: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999)
at 120. That requirement was not included in the Evidence Bill due to concerns
that it would exclude too much
propensity evidence rather than with the
reliability assessment the wording would have imposed: Cabinet Paper
“Evidence Bill:
Changes to Policy Decisions and Approval for
Introduction” (8 March 2005) at [9]–[12].
[888] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at [43.04(7)(b)]. For an opposing
view, see Andrea Ewing “Disputed Propensity Evidence” [2013] NZ L
Rev 35. Ewing argued that disputed propensity evidence should be subject to a
low minimum threshold of reliability rather than requiring
reliability be
assessed in every case as part of the judge’s assessment of the probative
weight of the propensity evidence
(at 39). However that article pre-dates the
Supreme Court’s decision in W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93,
[2020] 1 NZLR 382.
[889] This case is subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[890] Evidence Act 2006, s
4(1).
[891] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[188].
[892] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(4)(d).
[893] Evidence Act 2006, s
126(1).
[894] See, for example,
discussion in Peato v R [2009] NZCA 333, [2010] 1 NZLR 788 at
[26]–[27]; Pink v R [2022] NZCA 306 at [49]; Witehira v R
[2011] NZCA 658 at [46]–[47]; Elisabeth McDonald and Scott Optican (eds)
Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed, Thomson Reuters,
Wellington, 2018) at EA4.44.01((1)(c); and Nick Chisnall “Reducing the
risk of misidentification:
it starts with the Evidence Act 2006’s
definition of “Visual Identification Evidence”” [2015] NZLJ
299.
[895] R v Turaki [2009]
NZCA 310 at [65]–[73] and [92]–[93], and R v Edmonds [2009]
NZCA 303, [2010] 1 NZLR 762 at [42]. These cases were written by the same panel
of judges and published in the same month.
[896] However, the Court of
Appeal in Turaki and Edmonds went further than noting the
difference between contested identification and contested conduct. Rather, they
held that the scope
of excluded observation evidence also included an
offender’s alleged participation in a group attack once their presence is
admitted: R v Turaki [2009] NZCA 310 at [93]; R v Edmonds [2009]
NZCA 303 at [130]–[131].
[897] R v Uasi [2009]
NZCA 236, [2010] 1 NZLR 733; Peato v R [2009] NZCA 333, [2010] 1 NZLR
788.
[898] Peato v R [2009]
NZCA 333, [2010] 1 NZLR 788 at [29]–[31].
[899] Peato v R [2009]
NZCA 333, [2010] 1 NZLR 788 at [36]–[39].
[900] E (CA113/2009) (NO 2)
v R [2010] NZCA 280 at [65]; Witehira v R [2011] NZCA 658 at
[41]–[47].
[901] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [8.23]–[8.40].
[902] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [8.37].
[903] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [8.38]. The Commission declined to revisit this issue in the Second Review of
the Evidence Act because it deemed
there was no recent appellate controversy in
relation to the issues: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Second Review
of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
IP42, 2018) at [8.11].
[904] R v Eruera [2015]
NZHC 2655 at [59].
[905] R v Eruera [2015]
NZHC 2655 at [67].
[906] R v Howard [2017]
NZCA 159 at [26].
[907] R v Howard [2017]
NZCA 159 at [27].
[908] R v Ake DC
Tauranga CRI-2012-070-5921, 7 August 2014 at [15]–[16]. The decision is
discussed in Nick Chisnall “Reducing the risk
of misidentification: it
starts with the Evidence Act 2006’s definition of “Visual
Identification Evidence””
[2015] NZLJ 299 at 300.
[909] Ake v R [2015]
NZCA 334 at [4].
[910] See, for example, Nick
Chisnall “Reducing the risk of misidentification: it starts with the
Evidence Act 2006’s definition
of “Visual Identification
Evidence”” [2015] NZLJ 299 at 299. He also argues that until the
restrictive approach is unequivocally overturned the Act’s expanded formal
procedures
in s 45 will not be utilised in all cases carrying a risk of
misidentification (at 302).
[911] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at EV126.02(3).
[912] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at EA4.44.01((1)(c).
[913] Pink v R [2022]
NZCA 306.
[914] Pink v R [2022]
NZCA 306 at [49].
[915] Pink v R [2022]
NZCA 306 at [59].
[916] Pink v R [2022]
NZCA 306 at [62].
[917] Pink v R [2022]
NZCA 306 at [61]–[63]. As noted in Pink, a similar situation
involving an implicit misidentification argument by a defence counsel also
occurred in Witehira v R [2011] NZCA 658.
[918] Peato v R [2009]
NZCA 333, [2010] 1 NZLR 788 at [35], cited in Pink v R [2022] NZCA 306 at
[53].
[919] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(1).
[920] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(4)(d).
[921] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(4)(d). See R v Edmonds [2009] NZCA 303, [2010] 1 NZLR 762 at [73], and
Harney v Police [2011] NZSC 107, [2012] 1 NZLR 725 at [26]. See also
Howard, in which the defendant was found to be well acquainted with the
witness even though the defendant alleged mistaken identity: R v Howard
[2017] NZCA 159 at [35]–[39]. Another relevant section is s 45(4)(e):
“if an identification of a person alleged to have committed an offence
has
been made to an officer of an enforcement agency soon after the offence occurred
and in the course of that officer’s initial
investigation”. See R
v Carroll [2018] DCR 602, [2016] NZDC 15549 in which, as backup reasoning to
an argument founded on observation evidence, the District Court suggested that s
45(4)(e) could
apply to a situation in which a police officer witnessed an
assault on another person, followed the perpetrator and was subsequently
assaulted by the same person.
[922] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(1).
[923] An identification parade
involves the presence of at least eight similar looking persons, usually
including the suspect. The witness
views the lineup through one-way glass. A
photo lineup involves a witness viewing photographs of at least eight similar
looking persons
and also potentially includes the suspect. Photo lineups are
much more common in Aotearoa New Zealand than identification parades:
Elisabeth
McDonald and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis
(4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at 45.05(1).
[924] C v Complaints
Assessment Committee [2006] NZSC 48 at [13].
[925] Clinical psychologist is
defined in s 59(6) of the Evidence Act 2006 as someone registered with the
Psychologists Board (as per
the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act
2003) permitted to diagnose and treat persons suffering from mental and
emotional
problems. Medical practitioner is to be given its ordinary meaning
under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003.
[926] Evidence Act 2006, ss
59(1)(a) and 59(2)–(4). Where a patient is being examined or treated for a
number of conditions, s 59
can apply if an underlying cause is a
condition that may manifest itself in criminal conduct: R v Parkinson
[2017] NZCA 600.
[927] Evidence Act 2006, s
59(5).
[928] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [308].
[929] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.123].
[930] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at
[290]–[293].
[931] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [305].
[932] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [1].
[933] See s 7 of the Evidence
Further Amendment Act 1885 (No 14) for the first statutory medical privilege
provision. This section was
confined to civil proceedings 10 years later by s 9
of the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1895 (No 10) before being taken forward
as
s 8 in the Evidence Act 1908. Medical privilege in criminal proceedings was
subsequently re-enacted (following consideration of
the Torts and General Law
Reform Committee) in s 33 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980.
[934] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege”.
[935] Evidence Amendment Act
(No 2) 1980, s 33(3).
[936] Evidence Amendment Act
1989 (No 104), s 4.
[937] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [307].
[938] On the basis that
relevant cases would be better served by a proposed discretionary provision to
apply to confidential information
generally: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [302].
[939] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [308]. In
particular, the Commission considered the status of rongoā practitioners
and concluded that communications
with these practitioners would be protected by
the general discretion to protect confidential information: Te Aka Matua o te
Ture
| Law Commission Evidence: Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 157.
[940] See, for example, R v
King CA162/05 18 July 2005 where evidence of admissions of further offending
made to a psychiatrist and psychologist for the purpose of
an assessment for
preventive detention was admissible in the defendant’s retrial, where
additional charges were added based
on the information disclosed.
[941] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.111]–[10.119].
[942] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I, “Report on Medical Privilege” 13; Evidence
Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 s 32(2)(a) dealt with
medical privilege in civil
proceedings and held that it did not apply “in respect of any proceeding
in which the sanity, testamentary
capacity or other legal capacity of the
patient is the matter in dispute”.
[943] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[270] (emphasis added).
[944] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999) at 156.
[945] Evidence Bill 2005
(256-1) cl 55(1)(b).
[946] See, for example, the
limited reference to s 59(1)(b) in R v Tamati [2021] NZHC 1451 HC. This
did not comment on the meaning of “any other purpose”.
[947] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.107].
[948] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.109].
[949] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.111].
[950] At para [12.12].
[951] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.109].
[952] The Mental Health
(Compulsory Treatment and Assessment) Act 1992 governs the compulsory assessment
or treatment of individuals experiencing
a mental disorder. Applications for
compulsory treatment orders are heard by a Family Court or District Court Judge
(s 17) who will
then make a determination of whether or not a compulsory
treatment order is necessary (s 27) and if so, whether the order will be
for
community or inpatient treatment (s 28).
[953] In R v X (CA553/2009)
[2009] NZCA 531, [2010] 2 NZLR 181, the majority did not believe that there
was a firm enough evidential basis for the assertion that there was a
risk of
harm to the relationship between patients and forensic nurses such that it would
inhibit individuals from participating in
the examination. Ronald Young J
delivered a dissenting judgment where he took the view that any suggestion that
the process will
be used to obtain information “by the back door”
would compromise the assessment process. The Law Commission has also
noted
scepticism about the argument that the existence (or non-existence) of a
privilege makes a difference to people’s behaviour,
largely due to the
lack of empirical evidence to support it: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [291].
[954] See, for example, Rules
10 and 11 of the Health Information Privacy Code 2020.
[955] Evidence Act 2006, s
57(3)(c): “This section does not apply to... the use in a proceeding,
solely for the purposes of an award
of costs, of a written offer that (i) is
expressly stated to be without prejudice except as to costs; and (ii) relates to
an issue
in the proceeding”.
[956] These are the
circumstances in which court-ordered assessments will most frequently arise.
[957] See s 7 of the Evidence
Further Amendment Act 1885 (No 14); s 9 of the Evidence Amendment Act 1895 (No
10); and s 8 of the Evidence
Act 1908.
[958] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 16.
[959] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 15.
[960] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 14–17.
[961] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 15.
[962] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [308].
[963] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [308]; Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary
(NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at 157.
[964] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.125].
[965] R v Rapana [1994] NZHC 1927; [1995]
2 NZLR 381 (HC) at 383. In this case, the communications made by Mr Rapana were
not privileged as they had been made to a nurse who has “offered
to make a
preliminary assessment as to whether a formal psychiatric examination of Mr
Rapana was required”.
[966] R v Gulliver 9
June 2005 CA51/05 at [42]. This was on the basis that the section only
contemplated “vertical delegation or instruction where
the delegate or
person instructed is involved in carrying out the course of treatment, or part
of it, being undertaken by the clinical
psychologist” and not
“horizontal” delegation where services are provided independently of
the referrer.
[967]
R v Hodgson HC Timaru CRI-2008-076-001397,
30 March 2009.
[968] R v Hodgson HC
Timaru CRI-2008-076-001397, 30 March 2009 at [46]. This point was not challenged
on appeal to the Court of Appeal: R v X (CA553/2009) [2009] NZCA
531, [2010] 2 NZLR 181.
[969] D (SC 26/2019) v R
[2019] NZSC 72 at [7].
[970] D (CA54/2018) v R
[2019] NZCA 1. The Court concluded that privilege does not attach as D was
not seeking treatment for “drug dependency or any other condition
or
behaviour that might manifest itself in criminal conduct” under s
59(1)(a). His suicidal ideation was a result of the allegations
laid against him
and the subsequent police investigation rather than because of his sexual
attraction to young children.
[971] D (SC 26/2019) v R
[2019] NZSC 72 at [7].
[972] We have identified one
case where criminality disclosed in the context of being examined or treated was
withheld under s 69: R v Rapana [1994] NZHC 1927; [1995] 2 NZLR 381 (HC). The court held
that “the public interest in preserving the confidences of persons in the
position of Mr Rapana, and encouraging
free communication between such persons,
outweighs the public interest in having the evidence disclosed in Court”
(at 382).
[973] R v X (CA553/09)
[2009] NZCA 531, [2010] NZLR 181 at [79]. See also Scott Optican and
Peter Sankoff “Hearsay” (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society
Evidence Act 2006 Revisited
for Criminal Lawyers Seminar, February 2010) at 143:
“[A]dmission is likely to be favoured in most instances ... The court
will
effectively be tasked with deciding whether its own need in obtaining a correct
result is more important than that of preserving
confidence in a relationship
that is often external to the criminal justice system. In light of the balancing
test it is hardly surprising
that most cases of this type end with a judicial
decision under s 69 that confidence – while important – is less
critical
than the court’s need for the evidence in the proceeding at
hand”.
[974] See, for example, R v
Gulliver 9 June 2005 CA51/05 (defendant’s disclosure of past
offending to his counsellor was the only real evidence of the offending and the
identity of
the offender); R v X (CA553/09) [2009] NZCA 531 (disclosure
regarding intent was “highly relevant” to the charge of attempted
murder). The majority in R v X (CA553/09) held that “it seems wrong
to us that the Crown should potentially be inhibited from pursuing the case at
what the face of it
appears to be the appropriate level of culpability”
(at [87]).
[975] See R v X (CA553/09)
[2009] NZCA 531 at [82], citing R v Lory (Ruling) [1997] 1 NZLR 44
(HC).
[976] R v X (CA553/2009)
[2009] NZCA 531, [2010] 2 NZLR 181 at [97]–[98].
[977] See, for example, R v
Hodgson HC Timaru CRI-2008-076-001397 30 March 2009, which required
treatment to have already been initiated by a doctor or clinical psychologist
in
order for someone to then be subsequently acting on their behalf, which is at
odds with the Torts and General Law Reform Committee’s
intention that the
section cover “preliminary acts”.
[978] Mahoney on Evidence
draws particular attention to the status of drug and alcohol addiction
practitioners in light of s 59’s stated application to
drug dependency,
noting that “questions will arise whether, in any given clinical situation
involving a multi-disciplinary
health team, drug and alcohol practitioners
registered with DAPAANZ fall within the scope of s 69(5)”: Elisabeth
McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis
(4th ed, Thomson Reuters. Wellington, 2018) at EV59.04
[979] The Te Pae Tata Interim
New Zealand Health Plan 2022 includes the “greater use of digital services
to provide more care in
homes and communities” as one of its six priority
actions: Te Whatu Ora | Health New Zealand and Te Aka Whai Ora | Māori
Health Authority Te Pae Tata: Interim New Zealand Health Plan 2022 (Te
Whatu Ora, October 2022) at 10.
[980] Digital Mental Health
Lab, Te Kura Tātai Hauora | School of Health, Te Herenga Waka | Victoria
University of Wellington Aotearoa New Zealand Digital Tools for Mental Health
and Wellbeing (Te Herenga Waka | Victoria University of Wellington, March
2021); Nuffield Council on Bioethics Briefing note: the role of technology in
mental healthcare (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London, April 2022).
[981] Maaka-Wanahi v
Attorney-General [2023] NZHC 187 at [6].
[982] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.125].
[983] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 15.
[984] See, for example,
Kupe Group Ltd v Seamar Holdings Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 209 (HC) at 213;
Saunders v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police [1998] FCA 1652; (1998) 160 ALR 469
(FCA) at 472; Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence
(online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [EC20.09(5)].
[985] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[254]. See also Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence
Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C244], which states that the
relevant provision “spells out what is essentially the present law on
privilege for legal advice”.
[986] R v Huang HC
Auckland CRI-2005-004-21953, 19 September 2007 at [54]–[56], finding that
s 54 applied to notes made by the defendant of
relevant events for the purposes
of instructing a lawyer but not communicated; and Bain v Minister of
Justice [2013] NZHC 2123 at [143], finding that s 54 applied not only to
advice given to the Minister of Justice by Ministry legal officers and the
Solicitor-General
but also to any “reasonably related documents held
within the Ministry” and within the Crown Law Office (at [154]).
[987] The decision in R v
Huang HC Auckland CRI-2005-004-21953, 19 September 2007 was criticised by
counsel in a subsequent High Court case, who argued that the
wording of s 54 is
not wide enough to cover an “intention to communicate”, but the
Court in that case did not have to
determine whether the approach in Huang
should be followed: Pernod Ricard New Zealand Ltd v Lion – Beer,
Spirits and Wine (NZ) Ltd [2012] NZHC 2801 at [27]–[29].
[988] As observed in Mathew
Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis)
[EVA54.12(d)] and Elisabeth McDonald and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on
Evidence: Act and Analysis (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at
[EV54.02(2)].
[989] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act and Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV54.02(2)].
[990] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “document”).
[991] See, for example,
Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television New Zealand Ltd [2008] NZCA 350 at
[165] and [169].
[992] In Australia, legal
advice privilege extends to confidential documents “whether delivered or
not” prepared by the client,
lawyer or another person for the dominant
purpose of the lawyer or one or more of the lawyers providing legal advice to
the client:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 118(c); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s
118(c); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 118(c); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 118(c);
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 118(c).
[993] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.62].
[994] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.58]–[10.65] and Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [16.19]–[16.30].
[995] See, for example,
Allison Ferguson and Guy Tompkins “Update on Evidence Act for Civil
Litigators” (paper presented to
New Zealand Law Society Evidence Act
Update for Civil Litigators webinar, 14 June 2022) at 36–41 and Sean
McAnally “Litigation
privilege: permanent or temporary?” [2022] NZLJ
8.
[996] See, for example,
Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand [2015] NZHC 264, [2015] NZAR 293 at [22],
citing B v Auckland District Law Society [2003] UKPC 38; [2004] 1 NZLR 326 (PC) at
[44].
[997] Jung v Templeton
HC Auckland CIV-2007-404-5383, 30 September 2009 at [64].
[998] T v R [2020] NZCA
15. See also Re Harder [2023] NZHC 620 at [15].
[999] T v R [2020] NZCA
15 at [28].
[1000] T v R [2020]
NZCA 15 at [29].
[1001] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.64].
[1002] Blank v Minister
of Justice [2006] SCC 39, [2006] 2 SCR 319.
[1003] Blank v Minister
of Justice [2006] SCC 39, [2006] 2 SCR 319 at [34].
[1004] Blank v Minister
of Justice [2006] SCC 39, [2006] 2 SCR 319 at [34]; Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [10.62].
[1005] Snorkel Elevating
Work Platforms Ltd v Thompson [2007] NZAR 504 (HC) at [13] (a case decided
before the Evidence Act 2006 came into force); Houghton v Saunders [2013]
NZHC 1824 at [21]; Nisha v LSG Sky Chefs New Zealand Ltd (No 16) [2015]
NZEmpC 127 at [37]–[39]. See also Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand
[2015] NZHC 264, [2015] NZAR 293 at [21]–[22], where the Court noted
Blank and observed that, because the rationale for different forms of
privilege are different, “the persistent character of solicitor/client
privilege does not necessarily justify the same rule [of “once privileged,
always privileged”] applying to litigation
privilege” (at [22]).
[1006] Sean McAnally
“Litigation privilege: permanent or temporary?” [2022] NZLJ 8.
[1007] In A v
Attorney-General [2009] NZCA 490, the Court of Appeal noted that whether the
Court should adopt the approach in Blank was an “interesting
question” but one that did not need to be considered in that case (at
[27]). Similarly, in Reid v New Zealand Fire Services Commission [2010]
NZCA 133, (2010) 19 PRNZ 923, leave was granted to appeal to the Court of Appeal
on the issue of when litigation privilege should terminate, but the appeal was
never heard.
[1008] See discussion in
NZH Ltd v Ramspecs Ltd [2015] NZHC 2396 at [31].
[1009] Difficulties in
assessing when the privilege should end were recognised in Blank v Minister
of Justice [2006] SCC 39, [2006] 2 SCR 319 and by the Commission in Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006
(NZLC R127, 2013) at [10.62]–[10.63].
[1010] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.65] and R21.
[1011] Houghton v
Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824; Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand [2015] NZHC
264, [2015] NZAR 293; Nisha v LSG Sky Chefs New Zealand Ltd (No 16)
[2015] NZEmpC 127; and NZH Ltd v Ramspecs Ltd [2015] NZHC 2396.
[1012] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[16.21]–[16.23].
[1013] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [16.28].
[1014] Minister of
Education v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 3487 at [100].
[1015] Minister of
Education v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 3487 at [105].
[1016] Minister of
Education v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 3487 at [106].
[1017] Minister of
Education v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 3487 at [107].
[1018] Metlifecare
Retirement Villages Limited v James Hardie New Zealand Limited [2022] NZHC
511.
[1019] Metlifecare
Retirement Villages Limited v James Hardie New Zealand Limited [2022] NZHC
511 at [87].
[1020] Elisabeth McDonald
and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act and Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV67.07].
[1021] Allison Ferguson and
Guy Tompkins “Update on Evidence Act for Civil Litigators” (paper
presented to the New Zealand
Law Society conference, Evidence Act Update for
Civil Litigators, 14 June 2022).
[1022] Sean McAnally
“Litigation privilege: permanent or temporary?” [2022] NZLJ 8. See
also James Anson-Holland “The Limits of Settlement Privilege in New
Zealand: Distilling the Guiding Principles”
[2022] 30 NZULR 79 at
99–103. Anson-Holland argues that, following the logic of Blank,
settlement privilege should terminate once the parties to the dispute have
reached a concluded settlement agreement except in circumstances
involving the
same legal combat.
[1023] Beckham v R
[2015] NZSC 98 at [93]–[94].
[1024] Evidence Act 2006, s
57(1). Privilege in respect of plea discussions in criminal proceedings is
addressed in s 57(2A)–(2B).
[1025] See, for example,
Morgan v Whanganui College Board of Trustees [2014] NZCA 340, [2014] 3
NZLR 713 at [11]; and Sheppard Industries Ltd v Specialised Bicycle
Components Inc [2011] NZCA 346, [2011] 3 NZLR 620 at [23]–[32].
[1026] James Anson-Holland
discusses 11 common law exceptions in “The Limits of Settlement Privilege
in New Zealand: Distilling the
Guiding Principles” [2022] 30 NZULR 79 at
84–87.
[1027] The three exceptions
that were originally codified in s 57(3) are described as exceptions that
promote the public policy principle
of encouraging settlement, while those
exceptions that subordinate that principle to other seemingly more important
principles of
public policy were not originally codified: James Anson-Holland
“The Limits of Settlement Privilege in New Zealand: Distilling
the Guiding
Principles” [2022] 30 NZULR 79 at 84–85.
[1028] See discussion in Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [10.49]–[10.52].
[1029] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.54].
[1030] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.56].
[1031] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.57].
[1032] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.57].
[1033] The separate
interests of justice exception, which applies only in relation to plea
discussions (s 57(2B)(c) of the Evidence Act
2006), was recently considered in
Re Harder [2023] NZHC 620. The case concerned a request for legal advice
given by the then Solicitor-General to WorkSafe about a voluntary reparation
payment
offered in connection with the prosecution of the Chief Executive of
Pike River Coal Ltd at the time of the Pike River Mine tragedy.
The Court held
that the exception applied in that case, concluding that transparency through
open justice outweighed the factors
that pointed against disclosure of the
documents over which privilege was claimed (at [20]).
[1034] Nina Khouri
“Mediation” [2021] NZ L Rev 169 at 195. See, for example, Smith v
Shaw [2020] NZHC 238, [2020] 3 NZLR 661, where counsel agreed that
authorities on the common law exceptions will be of guidance in the approach to
the new section (at [34]),
and the Court applied case law on the common law
“unambiguous impropriety” exception (at [45]). See also Body
Corporate 212050 v Covekinloch Auckland Ltd (in liq) [2017] NZHC 2642 at
[94], where one of the reasons the Court declined to order disclosure of
privileged communications was that the claim did not fall within any
of the
common law exceptions, and TPT Forests Ltd v Penfold [2022] NZEmpC
236, a Kōti Take Mahi | Employment Court decision where the Judge
observed that s 57(3)(d) “intended to pick up the common law
exceptions to
without prejudice privilege” (at [31]).
[1035] See discussion in
James Anson-Holland “The Limits of Settlement Privilege in New Zealand:
Distilling the Guiding Principles”
[2022] 30 NZULR 79 at 87; and
Minister of Education v Reidy McKenzie Ltd [2016] NZCA 326, (2016) 23
PRNZ 439 at [26].
[1036] See James
Anson-Holland “The Limits of Settlement Privilege in New Zealand:
Distilling the Guiding Principles” [2022] 30 NZULR 79 at 98; and Mathew
Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at
[EVA57.12].
[1037] Smith v Shaw
[2020] NZHC 238, [2020] 3 NZLR 661 at [45]–[46].
[1038] Smith v Shaw
[2020] NZHC 238, [2020] 3 NZLR 661 at [46].
[1039] Smith v Shaw
[2020] NZHC 1229.
[1040] Smith v Shaw
[2020] NZHC 1229 at [17].
[1041] Smith v Shaw
[2020] NZHC 1229 at [20].
[1042] Smith v Shaw
[2020] NZHC 1229 at [25].
[1043] James Anson-Holland
“The Limits of Settlement Privilege in New Zealand: Distilling the Guiding
Principles” [2022] 30 NZULR 79 at 98.
[1044] Gibbs v Windmeyer
[2021] NZHC 2582.
[1045] Gibbs v Windmeyer
[2021] NZHC 2582 at [75]–[76], citing Smith v Shaw [2020] NZHC
238, [2020] 3 NZLR 661.
[1046] Gibbs v Windmeyer
[2021] NZHC 2582 at [80]–[83].
[1047] Gibbs v Windmeyer
[2021] NZHC 2582 at [86].
[1048] Smith v Claims
Resolution Service Ltd [2021] NZHC 3424 at [39].
[1049] Smith v Claims
Resolution Service Ltd [2021] NZHC 3424 at [39].
[1050] Mathew Downs (ed)
Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA57.12]. See
also discussion in Allison Ferguson and Guy Tompkins “Update on Evidence
Act for Civil Litigators” (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society
Evidence Act Update for Civil Litigators webinar, 14
June 2022) at 35–36.
[1051] Nina Khouri
“Mediation” [2021] NZ L Rev 169 at 198.
[1052] James Anson-Holland
“The Limits of Settlement Privilege in New Zealand: Distilling the Guiding
Principles” [2022] 30 NZULR 79 at 98. We note that Mathew Downs (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) already describes s 57(3)(d) as a “substantial weakening”
of settlement privilege
(at [EA57.06]).
[1053] Briggs & Ors v
Clay & Ors [2019] EWHC 102 (Ch) at [118]–[119].
[1054] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at cl 70(2)–(3).
[1055] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at [C288].
[1056] Mathew Downs (ed)
Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA66.4].
[1057] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.189].
[1058] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at R28.
[1059] Mathew Downs (ed)
Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA66.4].
[1060] Evidence Amendment
Bill 2015 (27–1) (explanatory note) at 8.
[1061] Ministry of Justice
Evidence Amendment Bill – Initial Briefing (8 September 2015) at
8.
[1062] Mathew Downs (ed)
Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA66.4], citing
the recent cases of Whitley (as liquidator of Property Ventures Ltd (in liq))
v Connell (sued as a firm) [2022] NZHC 2994 at [62]–[64]; Katoria
Trustee Ltd (ato CA Quinn Trust) v Toon [2022] NZHC 3037 at [35]–[37].
Neither case refer to ss 66(2)–(4) when determining who
“owned” the privilege in the relevant material.
We have not
identified any other decisions that address the impact of the amendment to s
66(2).
[1063] Evidence Act 2006, s
88(1).
[1064] Evidence Act 2006, s
88(2).
[1065] Evidence Act 1908, s
23AA.
[1066] Elisabeth McDonald
Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington,
2012) at 96.
[1067] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 200–203 and 243. See also
Elisabeth McDonald In the absence of a jury: Examining judge-alone rape
trials (Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 2022) at
117–118.
[1068] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 201 and 243.
[1069] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 243. See, for example, R v Morgan
(No 1) [2016] NZHC 1427 at [9] (finding that “occupation” in s
88 does not include beneficiary status).
[1070] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 200–201.
[1071] Elisabeth McDonald
“Submission to the Justice Committee on Sexual Violence Legislation Bill
2019” at [27].
[1072] Ministry of Justice
Departmental Report for the Justice Committee: Sexual Violence Legislation
Bill (March 2020) at [387].
[1073] Section 23AA of the
Evidence Act 1908, inserted by s 2 Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1985.
[1074] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 203.
[1075] (5 December 1985) 468
NZPD 8849.
[1076] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 203; Gerald Orchard “Sexual
Violation: The Rape Law Reform Legislation”
(1986) 12 NZULR 97 at 109.
[1077] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 203.
[1078] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 500 (recommendation 48).
[1079] Browne v Dunn
(1893) 6 R 67 (HL). The rule was affirmed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal
in Gutierrez v R [1996] NZCA 444; [1997] 1 NZLR 192 (CA) at 199.
[1080] See, for example,
C v R [2019] NZCA 653 at [76]; Martin v R [2015] NZCA 606 at [44];
Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 40 at
[44]; and Pitceathly v R [2010] NZCA 95 at [22].
[1081] See, for example,
Minister of Education v Carter Holt Harvey [2020] NZHC 1539 at [50]; R
v Stojanovich [2009] NZCA 210 at [22].
[1082] See, for example,
Wallace v Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 375 at [155]. This is consistent
with the common law case R v S (2002) 19 CRNZ 442 (CA) (at [19]).
[1083] Wallace v
Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 375 at [155], citing R v Dewar [2008]
NZCA 344 and R v S (CA369/01) (2002) 19 CRNZ 442 (CA).
[1084] R v Dewar
[2008] NZCA 344 at [44] and R v S [2009] NZCA 227 at [27]. Affirmed
in Kent Sing Trading Company Ltd v JNJ Holdings Ltd [2019] NZCA 388 at
[92] and Manukau v R [2013] NZCA 217 at [24].
[1085] See, for example,
Taylor v Asteron Life Ltd [2020] NZCA 354, 2 NZLR 561 at
[127]–[129]; Minister of Education v Carter Holt Harvey [2020] NZHC
1539 at [148]; Solomon v R [2019] NZCA 616 at [38] and [40]; Farmer v
R [2019] NZCA 430 at [16]–[18]; Manukau v R [2013] NZCA 217 at
[26]; Pitceathly v R [2010] NZCA 95 at [22]; R v K (CA531/2007)
[2009] NZCA 97 at [15]; R v S [2009] NZCA 227 at [29].
[1086] Elisabeth McDonald
and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV92.03].
[1087] Elisabeth McDonald
and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV92.03].
[1088] Mathew Downs (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [EA92.02]; Elisabeth McDonald and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on
Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at
[EV92.03].
[1089] Richard Mahoney
“Putting the Case Against the Duty to Put the Case” [2004] NZ L Rev
313 at 337.
[1090] James Farmer
“Witnesses in Civil Cases – the Consequences of Not Calling and of
Not Cross-Examining” (paper presented
to the Pacific Islands Lawyers
Association, Auckland, November 2019) at [17].
[1091] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [403].
[1092] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at 216; Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform
of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [403].
[1093] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [404]. See also Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence
Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C334].
[1094] It is unclear why
this was the case. The Cabinet paper that sought agreement on the proposal to
codify the cross-examination duty
in the Evidence Bill reflected the
Commission’s proposed wording: “I propose to codify the duty of a
cross-examiner to
“put the case” to the witness. A party must
cross-examine a witness on substantial matters of the party’s case
that
contradict the evidence of the witness if the witness might be in a position to
give admissible evidence on the matters and may be unaware that these matters
are part of the cross-examining party’s case” (emphasis added):
Cabinet Paper “Evidence Bill: Paper 4: The Trial Process” (4
December 2002) at [21].
[1095] Mathew Downs (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [EA92.01(3)]. See also Richard Mahoney “Putting the Case
Against the Duty to Put
the Case” [2004] NZ L Rev 313 at n 13.
[1096] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [404].
[1097] Andrew Barker KC
Submission to Rules Committee on Consultation Paper on Improving Access to
Civil Justice (July 2021) at [28]. The Rules Committee also expressed
concern with the operation of s 92 in civil proceedings. However, its concern
was that, outside of expert witnesses, cross-examination should be limited to
situations of factual dispute and not involve putting
arguments to witnesses or
inviting arguments in answers: Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules
Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at [191].
[1098] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 326.
[1099] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 354–358.
[1100] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 355.
[1101] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 383.
[1102] Elisabeth McDonald
In the absence of a jury: Examining judge-alone rape trials (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2022) at 204–205.
[1103] Elisabeth McDonald
In the absence of a jury: Examining judge-alone rape trials (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2022) at 190.
[1104] Isabel Randell
That’s a lie: Sexual violence misconceptions, accusations of lying, and
other tactics in the cross-examination of child and
adolescent sexual violence
complainants (Chief Victims Advisor to Government, August 2021).
[1105] Isabel Randell
That’s a lie: Sexual violence misconceptions, accusations of lying, and
other tactics in the cross-examination of child and
adolescent sexual violence
complainants (Chief Victims Advisor to Government, August 2021) at 30,
citing Kim McGregor Child witnesses in the NZ criminal courts: Issues,
responses, opportunities (Chief Victims Advisor to Government, 2017) at 14.
See also Emily Henderson, Jonathan Temm and Phillip Hamlin Pre-trial Case
Management Guideline (Benchmark, December 2018) at 23–24.
[1106] Isabel Randell
That’s a lie: Sexual violence misconceptions, accusations of lying, and
other tactics in the cross-examination of child and
adolescent sexual violence
complainants (Chief Victims Advisor to Government, August 2021) at 37
(citations omitted).
[1107] Isabel Randell
That’s a lie: Sexual violence misconceptions, accusations of lying, and
other tactics in the cross-examination of child and
adolescent sexual violence
complainants (Chief Victims Advisor to Government, August 2021) at 38
(citations omitted).
[1108] Emily Henderson,
Jonathan Temm and Phillip Hamlin Pre-trial Case Management Guideline
(Benchmark, December 2018) at [10].
[1109] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(e). See also s 8(1)(b), which provides for the exclusion of evidence if its
probative value is outweighed
by the risk that the evidence will needlessly
prolong the proceeding.
[1110] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(c).
[1111] Evidence Act 2006, s
95(1).
[1112] Evidence Act 2006, s
95(2).
[1113] Evidence Act 2006, s
95(5)(b).
[1114] See discussion in
Irving v Irving [2021] NZHC 2269 at [9]–[10].
[1115] Finley v
Wiggins [2020] NZFC 6481, [2020] NZFLR 958 at [11]–[13].
[1116] Millar v R
[2021] NZCA 548.
[1117] Millar v R
[2021] NZCA 548 at [74].
[1118] Irving v Irving
[2021] NZHC 2269 at [54].
[1119] Irving v Irving
[2021] NZHC 2269 at [55]–[56].
[1120] Irving v Irving
[2021] NZHC 2269 at [23]–[24].
[1121] Irving v Irving
[2021] NZHC 2269 at [25].
[1122] Irving v Irving
[2021] NZHC 2269 at [36].
[1123] R v Family
Court [2021] NZHC 3204 at [84]–[85]. This decision was appealed, but
the Court of Appeal did not need to determine whether the approach in Irving
was correct: see R v Family Court [2023] NZCA 27 at [12].
[1124] Elliot v Family
Court at Auckland [2022] NZCA 146 at [14].
[1125] Millar v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [34].
[1126] Ordinarily, questions
put by counsel during cross-examination are not subject to such a process,
although the trial judge has a
general power to disallow unacceptable questions
under Evidence Act 2006, s 85.
[1127] Irving v Irving
[2021] NZHC 2269 at [12]–[16] and [27]–[29].
[1128] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at [C341] and [C350].
[1129] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [414].
[1130] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at 36.
[1131] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at [C62].
[1132] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [31].
[1133] Wilson v R
[2015] NZCA 531 at [26].
[1134] Douglas v R
[2018] NZCA 26 at [14]–[15].
[1135] Wilson v R
[2015] NZCA 531 at [18]. See also Douglas v R [2018] NZCA 26 at
[14]–[15].
[1136] R v Wellington (No
4) [2018] NZHC 2080 at [44].
[1137] This approach is
consistent with an earlier Court of Appeal case, Hannigan v R [2012] NZCA
133, where the Court said (at [13(c)]) that admission by agreement under s 9
“does not relieve the Judge from the task of ensuring
that the trial is
fair. In particular, it does not relieve the Judge from the task of ensuring
that the general exclusion in s 8
is complied with”.
[1138] WM (CA714/18) v
R [2020] NZCA 338 at [62].
[1139] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(e).
[1140] WM (CA714/18) v
R [2020] NZCA 338 at [62].
[1141] We also note
defendants may have good reasons for agreeing to the admission of evidence that
may not be readily apparent. For example,
agreeing to the admission of hearsay
evidence may be considered preferable to having the witness give evidence at
trial because of
the risk they will provide further detail that is harmful to
the defence case.
[1142] We do not suggest
making s 9(1)(a) subject to s 8 as a whole. Evidence Act 2006, s 8(1)(b)
requires exclusion if the probative value
of the evidence is outweighed by the
risk that it will needlessly prolong the proceeding. As noted above, s 9 was
intended to enable
admission by agreement of potentially irrelevant evidence to
avoid the need for constant admissibility rulings. While this is intended
to
shorten proceedings overall, the evidence itself may be longer (and hence
admission may be seen as “needlessly prolonging
the proceedings”).
Requiring the judge to apply s 8(1)(b) could create confusion about whether
the judge is entitled to admit
such evidence. We suggest it would be preferable
to reflect the purpose of s 9 by requiring the judge to have regard to the
desirability
of avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay (as proposed in Option
1), which would encourage a more holistic view of the proceeding.
[1143] Hudson v R
[2010] NZCA 417 at [43].
[1144] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(c).
[1145] We note a defence
objection is not required to engage s 28. The judge may raise the issue under s
28(1)(b) and may then be required
to exclude the evidence under s 28(2).
[1146] Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc [1993] USSC 99; 509 US 579 (1993). Endorsed in New Zealand in
Lundy v R [2013] UKPC 28, [2014] 2 NZLR 273 at [138]–[139].
[1147] Lundy v R
[2013] UKPC 28, [2014] 2 NZLR 273 at [138].
[1148] Jack Oliver-Hood
“Challenging the Admissibility of Scientifically Invalid Evidence”
[2018] NZ L Rev 399.
[1149] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [237]–[248].
[1150] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [239].
[1151] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [241]–[242].
[1152] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [241] and [243].
[1153] Jack Oliver-Hood
“Section 25 Case Study: Scientific Expert Evidence” in Scott Optican
and Jack Oliver-Hood (Presenters)
“Evidence Law Update for Civil and
Criminal Lawyers” (CPD seminar presented for ADLS, Auckland, February
2018) at 57–58,
cited in Scott Optican “Evidence” [2019] 4 NZ
L Rev 565 at 594.
[1154] Attorney-General v
Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd [2020] NZCA 98, [2020] 3 NZLR 247 at
[492]–[495]; W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382
at [230].
[1155] We note
Attorney-General v Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd [2020] NZCA 98, [2020] 3 NZLR
247 suggests the courts may now be more willing to exclude expert evidence on
the basis that the relevant methodology has not received
general acceptance
within the scientific community (see at [497]–[498]).
[1156] We note, for example,
that two recent Court of Appeal decisions (which are subject to publication
restrictions until final disposition
of trial) did not refer to Lundy
when considering the admissibility of evidence about psychological
conditions.
[1157] Including offences
under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 for a term of at least five years,
participation in an organised criminal
group under s 98A of the Crimes Act 1961,
and breaches of s 41A or 42B of the Arms Act 1983.
[1158] Sections 108(2)-(3).
[1159] Evidence Act 2006, s
109(1). Leave may be granted under s 109(1)(d) if the test prescribed in s
109(2) is fulfilled.
[1160] Letter from Hon Kris
Faafoi (Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (President of Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission) regarding
the third statutory review of the Evidence Act
2006 (23 February 2022).
[1161] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP42, 2018).
[1162] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[18.2]–[18.21].
[1163] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[18.7]–[18.11].
[1164] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[18.13]–[18.15].
[1165] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[18.16]–[18.19].
[1166] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at
[18.20]–[18.21].
[1167] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [11.88]–[11.89] and [11.94]–[11.95].
[1168] Evidence Act 2006, s
108(1)(ca), inserted by s 14 of the Firearms Prohibition Orders Legislation Act
2022.
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