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COVID-19 Public Health Response Bill (Consistent) (Sections 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 27(3)) [2020] NZBORARp 17 (11 May 2020)
Last Updated: 12 May 2020
11 May 2020
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon Andrew Little, Acting Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: COVID-19 Public Health
Response Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the COVID-19 Public Health Response Bill (‘the
Bill’) is consistent with the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO 22923/4.2). We will provide
you with further advice if the final version includes amendments that affect the
conclusions in
this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with:
- s 11
(right to refuse to undergo medical treatment);
- s 16
(freedom of peaceful assembly);
- s
17 (freedom of association);
- s 18
(freedom of movement);
- s 19
(freedom from discrimination);
- s 21
(right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure);
- s 22
(liberty of the person); and
- s
27(3) (rights to justice in civil proceedings with the Crown).
- Our
analysis is set out below.
The Bill
- The
Bill creates a bespoke legal framework for managing the public health risks
posed by COVID-19 over the next two years, supplementing
existing powers. The
Bill is broadly based on powers in sections 70 and 92I of the Health Act 1956
and allows the Minister of Health (and the Director-General of Health in limited
circumstances) to make enforceable public health
orders in respect of people,
business, and activities. These orders can be applied at either a national,
regional, or cluster level.
- The
Bill empowers the Crown to continue its precautionary approach to preventing and
limiting the risk of the outbreak of COVID-19
in New Zealand, particularly at
lower alert levels and as the risk of transmission reduces over time. In doing
so, the Bill recognises
the highly contagious nature of COVID-19,
along with the potential for asymptomatic transmission, and provides for
continued applicability
of necessary public health measures.
- The
Bill also amends the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 to ensure the
orderly transition from the state of emergency
and ensure a nationally
consistent response.
- The
Bill is repealed on the earlier date of either 2 years after the date of
commencement, or a date appointed by the Governor-General
by Order in
Council.
Trigger for the availability of powers
- Orders
under the Bill can be made only where one of the following circumstances
applies:
- an
Epidemic Notice for COVID-19 issued under s 5 of the Epidemic Preparedness Act
2006 is in force;
- a
state of emergency or transition period in respect of COVID-19 declared under
the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002
is in force;
or
- the
Prime Minister authorises the use of orders after being satisfied that there is
a risk of outbreak or spread of COVID-19.
- Certain
prerequisites must be met before an order can be made by the Minister of Health.
These are that the Minister must:
- receive
advice from the Director-General of Health about:
- the
risks presented by the outbreak or spread of COVID-19;
and
- the
nature and extent of measures that are necessary to respond to those risks;
and
- have
regard to any decision by the Government on how to respond to those risks and
avoid, mitigate, or remedy the effects of the outbreak
or spread of COVID-19
(including taking into account any social, economic, or other
factors);
- consult
the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, and any other Minister that the
Minister of Health thinks fit;
- be
satisfied that the order is appropriate to achieve the purpose of this
Act.
- The
Bill also authorises the Director-General of Health to make orders in a more
restricted manner. They may only apply within the
boundaries of a single
territorial authority district, and can only be made when it is the
Director-General of Health’s opinion
that the order is urgently needed to
contain or prevent the outbreak of COVID-19 and is the most appropriate way of
addressing those
matters at the time .
- Orders
made by the Minister of Health are automatically revoked if not approved by a
motion of the House of Representatives within
a narrowly defined period of time,
and orders made by the Director-General of Health expire after one month. All
orders are disallowable
instruments.
Permissible orders may limit a number of rights
- The
scope of orders able to be made under the Bill is broad. An order may require
persons to refrain from taking any action that contributes
to the risk of
outbreak of COVID-
19. Orders may also require persons to comply
with measures or take action to contribute to preventing outbreak and spread of
the
virus. This includes significant restrictions on movement and
association.
- An
order may require any person or class of persons to report for a medical
examination or testing, to refrain from participating
in gatherings or
associating with certain people. Orders also extend to premises, ships,
vehicles, and animals.
- Notably,
the Bill explicitly provides that orders may not limit or affect the application
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Enforcement and non-compliance
- The
Bill provides for the enforcement of orders and consequences for non-compliance
in the following ways:
- offences
relating to the exercise of enforcement powers and for intentionally failing to
comply with an order. Upon conviction, serious
offences carry a penalty of
imprisonment of up to 6 months or a fine of up to $4,000;
- infringement
offences with an infringement fee of $300, or a fine imposed by a court not
exceeding $1,000;
- businesses
can be ordered to close for up to 24 hours;
- warrantless
powers of entry onto all types of premises, including private house dwellings
and marae in certain circumstances; and
- enforcement
officers can direct people to stop any activity that is or is likely to
contravene an order.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Extraordinary powers in exceptional circumstances
- It
is important to acknowledge at the outset that the powers in the Bill allow for
the making of orders that may impose serious limitations
on the rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
backdrop to this Bill is an unprecedented public health emergency that requires
a number of exceptional powers that would be unlikely
to be justified in
ordinary circumstances. In this context, it remains important to scrutinise each
limit on a right or freedom carefully
to ensure that it is justified in the
circumstances.
Examination of the trigger for the availability of
powers
- As
noted above, the Bill specifies that the power to make orders under cl 10 may be
exercised only where an Epidemic Notice for COVID-19
is in force, where a state
of emergency or transition period in respect of COVID-19 is in force, or where
the Prime Minister is satisfied
that there is a risk of outbreak or spread of
COVID-19.
- While
the trigger provision does not directly raise an issue of inconsistency with the
Bill of Rights Act, the way the provision is
framed impacts on the
proportionality of the powers available once the conditions for their exercise
have been met. We have therefore
examined the reasonableness of the trigger
provision, together with the other pre- requisites and safeguards surrounding
the making
of orders under the Bill.
- In
our view, for a public health crisis to justify significant intrusions on
protected rights and freedoms the situation must:
- be of
an exceptional and temporary nature;
- pose
an actual or imminent threat; and
- affect
all branches of the life of the community.
- The
last two factors are taken from the decision of Lord Bingham in A v Secretary
of State for the Home Department.1 Although that
case concerned a terrorist threat, we consider that the same criteria need to be
satisfied in the case of a public health
threat.
- We
consider that the provisions in the Bill that trigger the use of order making
powers incorporate each of these factors. Most importantly,
under cl 8 it will
only be possible to use these powers in relation to COVID-19. There is no
question that the global COVID- 19 pandemic
constitutes an exceptional situation
that poses an actual or imminent threat affecting all branches of the life of
the New Zealand
community.
- With
respect to reasonableness and proportionality, we note that before making an
order the Minister of Health must receive the advice
of the Director-General of
Health, have regard to the factors set out in cl 8A(2)(b), and consult with
other Ministerial colleagues.
There is an express requirement for the Minister
to be satisfied that any order is appropriate to achieve the purposes of the
Bill.
The Director-General of Health, whose orders may apply only to a single
Territorial Authority district, must be of the opinion that
the order is
urgently needed to prevent or contain the outbreak or spread of COVID-19, and is
the most appropriate way of addressing
those matters at the time. We consider
that these pre-requisites will help to ensure that orders are reasonable and
proportionate.
- The
Bill also includes several safeguards to ensure that orders are reasonable and
will go no further than necessary in the circumstances.
The Bill contains an
express requirement for the Minister of Health and Director-General to keep any
orders under review (cl 13(5)).
Orders made under the Bill are also temporary in
nature. The Bill provides that all orders made by the Minister of Health are
automatically
revoked if not approved by a motion of the House of
Representatives within a narrowly defined period of time, and orders made by
the
Director-General of Health expire after one month. Ultimately the Act itself
expires within two years of its commencement, if
not earlier revoked by the
Governor-General by Order in Council.
- For
the reasons discussed above, we consider that the trigger provision for making
orders under the Bill is framed in a reasonable
way. We also consider that there
are appropriate safeguards in the process for making the orders. However, each
type of order enabled
by the Bill must still be a proportionate response to the
serious public health risk that has been identified. We examine these further
below in relation to the particular rights engaged.
1 [2004] UKHL 56.
Section 11 - Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment
- Section
11 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to refuse to
undergo medical treatment. The right to refuse
to undergo medical treatment
protects the concept of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, specifically the
idea that individuals
have the right to determine for themselves what they do or
do not do to their own body, free from restraint or
coercion.2
- Clause
10(a)(viii) of the Bill allows for orders to be made requiring people to report
for medical examination or testing in any specified
way or in any specified
circumstances.
- The
right to refuse medical treatment is engaged where a medical service is provided
to an individual in the context of a therapeutic
relationship.3 We consider that the right to refuse
medical treatment is engaged by certain forms of medical examination, and
particularly, a test
for COVID-19. A COVID-19 test requires the collection of a
bodily sample from an individual for the purpose of diagnosis and assessment.
It
can include the use of a moderately invasive procedure – a nasopharyngeal
swab to collect nasal secretions from the back
of the nose and throat.
- Clause
10(a)(vii) prima facie limits the right to refuse to undergo medical
treatment. Where a provision proposes a limit on a right or freedom, it may
nevertheless
be consistent with the Bills of Rights Act if the limit is
reasonable and justifiable in terms of s 5 of that Act.
- The
s 5 inquiry may be approached as follows:4
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
- The
purpose of cl 10(a)(viii) is to ensure that appropriate public health control
measures can be applied in respect of people who
may have COVID-19, and also
that public health authorities can collect information about potentially unknown
vectors of transmission
in the community. The collection of this information is
clearly necessary and rationally connected to the wider objective of protecting
against future outbreaks of COVID-19. Public health concerns, particularly as it
relates to infectious diseases, have explicitly
been held to be a sufficiently
important objective to justify a limit on the right to refuse medical
treatment.5
- With
regard to the proportionality of the limit on the right, we note that an
outbreak of COVID-19 would have extreme consequences
for public health and
wellbeing. While the
2 New Health New Zealand Inc v South
Taranaki District Council [2014] NZHC 395 at [52]. 3
New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council
[2014] NZHC 395 at [84]. 4 See Hansen v R
[2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [123].
5 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki
District Council [2014] NZHC 395 at [86].
Bill empowers orders to be issued in respect of medical examination and
testing, it does not require a person to undertake any particular
ongoing form
of treatment. In this way, the Bill continues to preserve the scope of personal
autonomy and bodily integrity as far
as is possible while maintaining public
health.
- For
these reasons, we consider that this limitation on s 11 of the Bill of Rights
Act is justifiable. We note that the taking of a
bodily sample for assessment
would also amount to a search or seizure of the person. However, for the same
reasons that justify the
limitation that the proposed provisions place on s 11
of the Bill of Rights Act, we consider that the requirement to provide a bodily
sample would be reasonable in terms of s 21 of that Act.
Sections 16, 17 and 18 – Freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of
association and freedom of movement
- Section
16 of the Bill of Rights Act provides that everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly, s 17 that everyone has
the right to freedom of association,
and s 18(1) that everyone lawfully in New Zealand has the right to freedom of
movement and residence
in New Zealand.
- These
rights are closely connected, and together they protect core aspects of civil
life in New Zealand, enabling people to freely
go about their daily lives. In
relation to these rights (as they are affected by the Bill) we note the
following:
- the
choice of method, place, and time of peaceful assembly is integral to the free
exercise of that right;6
- the
ambit of freedom of association is “broad and encompasses a wide range of
associational activities...”.7 It has been held
to include the right of an individual to associate with any other
individual.8 Freedom of association protects informal
assemblies and participation in community life generally;9
and
- freedom
of movement includes the right to use roads and move through public
places.10
- Clause
10 of the Bill sets out the range of matters and kinds of requirements that can
be imposed by an order issued under cl 8A or
9 of the Bill. Clauses 18 and 19 of
the Bill set out the corresponding powers enabling the enforcement of these
restrictions. A number
of these requirements (and corresponding powers of
enforcement) appear to prima facie limit the above civil and democratic rights.
Particularly by:
- requiring
persons to stay in a specified place or refrain from going to any specified
place;
- requiring
persons to refrain from travelling to or from any specified
area;
- requiring
persons to be isolated or quarantined in any specified place;
6 Brooker v Police [2012]
NZSC, 45 at [14] per Elias CJ.
7 Turners & Growers Ltd v Zespri Group Ltd
(No 2) (2010) 9 HRNZ (HC) at [72].
8 B v JM [1997] NZFLR 529 (HC) at 532.
9 Morse v Police [2018] NZSC, 45 at [110] per
McGrath J.
10 Kerr v Attorney-General [1996] DCR 951
(DC) at 955.
- requiring
persons to refrain from participating in gatherings;
- requiring
premises or other things to be closed or only open if specified measures are
complied with; and
- prohibiting
gatherings of any specified kind, in any specified place or in any specified
circumstances.
- Together,
the potential requirements that can be imposed via orders under cl 10 of the
Bill could, if applied to their fullest extent,
impose arguably the most extreme
and significant limitations on New Zealanders’ ability to freely go about
our daily lives
as has occurred in modern New Zealand history. Their broad scale
and scope have the potential to significantly impact on people’s
ability
to socialise, do business, and move freely.
- Nevertheless,
and despite the potential degree of these restrictions, the Bill may be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if the
limitations are necessary and can
be justified in a free and democratic
society.11
Do the limits serve a
sufficiently important objective?
- The
purpose of these provisions is to prevent, reduce, or eliminate the risks of an
outbreak of COVID-19. This occurs in the context
of an extraordinary global
pandemic and in respect of a virus that has been shown to have extreme impacts
on public health and wellbeing.
The full extent of the characteristics of the
virus are not yet fully known but what we do know is:
- the
virus is highly contagious;
- it
has an incubation period of up to 14 days;
- asymptomatic
people may be carriers; and
- although
the effect of contraction by any individual varies, in the worst cases the
effect is very serious requiring hospital, and
sometimes ICU, level
care.
- These
factors mean the utmost caution must be taken to protect public health. Notably,
public health measures have been singled out
by academic commentators as an
objective that is sufficiently important to justify proportional limits on, in
particular, the right
to freedom of
movement.12
Are the limits rationally
connected to the objective?
- The
restrictions on people's ability to assemble, associate and move freely is
rationally connected to the purpose of the Bill: preventing,
reducing, and
eliminating the risks of COVID-19. The virus is transmitted through physical
proximity. The restrictions target physical
association and moment, and thereby
limit the ability of the virus to spread between people and throughout the
country.
11 Section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
12 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler in New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at
16.6.18.
Do the limits impair the rights or freedoms no more than is reasonably
necessary for sufficient achievement of the objective?
- Parliament
is entitled to appropriate latitude to achieve its
objectives.13 The issue here is whether the means are
minimally impairing of the rights, and whether the means proposed are carefully
tailored to
the objective.
- The
Bill is designed to enable the Crown to carry on with its precautionary
elimination strategy. This requires the careful ongoing
management of latent
risks, even as the virus reaches lower levels of presence or transmission in New
Zealand, due to the high risk
that the virus poses to public health.
- Notably,
embedded within the Bill are several significant procedural and substantive
safeguards (as discussed at paragraphs 19 - 26
above). These together provide a
high degree of assurance that orders will be imposed only:
- where
a risk of transmission remains;
- in
consideration of the various public health concerns, rights affected, and wider
social interests at stake;
- through
means that provide significant public and Parliamentary oversight of any order
promulgated; and
- for a
period of time no longer than 2 years after the commencement of the Act, unless
repealed earlier.
- Notably
also, the Bill does not allow orders to be made in respect of core civil and
democratic institutions. No order requiring premises
to close may be made in
respect of a private dwelling house, Parliament, the courts, judge's chambers,
or prisons.
- Finally,
the discretionary power that the Bill gives to the Minister of Health (and
Director General of Health in limited circumstances)
to issue orders must be
exercised consistently with the Bill of Rights Act.
Overall, are
the limits in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
- The
Bill provides for unprecedented limits on freedom of association and movement.
However, this is in the context of a global pandemic
and highly transmissible
virus that in some of the worst cases can have very serious effects requiring
ICU level care. The powers
enabled under the Bill therefore reflect the
significant risk that COVID-19 poses to public health and wellbeing and any
orders made
would need to be proportionate to that risk.
- The
Bill contains safeguards to ensure the powers are used transparently, no more
than necessary, and are subject to extensive public
and parliamentary
scrutiny.
- We
are of the view that, for these reasons, the limits that these orders may place
on the rights to freedom of movement, peaceful
assembly and association are
justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
13 Canada v JTI-MacDonald [2007] 2
SCR 610 at [42]–[45].
Section 19 - Freedom from discrimination
- We
note that there is scope for orders under this Bill to have disproportionate
impacts on certain groups protected from discrimination
under s 21 of the Human
Rights Act 1993 (for example, the elderly, or people in one person
households).14
- We
consider that the power to make orders that might apply differently to different
groups is clearly justifiable on public health
grounds; however we would expect
decision-makers under the Bill to take these impacts into account when
considering whether an order
is a necessary and proportionate measure to further
the public health response.
- We
also note that the presence of the express provisions in the Bill that do not
allow an order to modify or derogate from the requirements
under the Bill of
Rights Act, which includes the right to be free from discrimination in s
19.
Section 21 – Right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, their property or
correspondence, or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including
personal privacy,
dignity, and property.15
- Clause
17 of the Bill provides warrantless powers of entry:
- clause
17(1) provides that an enforcement officer may enter any land, building, ship,
aircraft, or any other place or thing (excluding
private dwellings or marae) if
they have reasonable grounds to believe that a person is failing to comply with
any aspect of an order;
and
- clause
17(3) provides that a constable may enter a private dwelling house or marae only
if they have a reasonable belief that people
have congregated there in
contravention of an order and entry is necessary for the purpose of giving a
direction in accordance with
cl 18.
- Additionally,
cl 20 enables an enforcement officer to direct any person to provide their
personal identifying information, such as
their full name, date of birth, and
contact information.
- In
order for these search powers to be consistent with s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act they must be found to be reasonable. Logically,
an unreasonable search or
seizure cannot be demonstrably justified with reference to s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.16 The reasonableness of a search can be
assessed with reference to the purpose of the search and the degree of intrusion
on the values
which the right seeks to protect.
Clause 17(3)
– entry in private dwelling houses or marae
- The
purpose of the search authorised at cl 17(3) is to ensure that any risks posed
by gatherings (in breach of the requirements of
an order) that are taking place
in private
14 Both age and family status are
prohibited grounds of discrimination under s 21 of the Human Rights Act 1993. We
note that to date
government orders under the Health Act 1956 have taken into
account differential effects on people who live apart from their dependants.
15 Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per
Blanchard J.
16 Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] 3 NZLR
744 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [162].
dwelling houses or marae can be identified and enforcement action taken to
mitigate the risk. There is an extremely high public interest
in limiting and
preventing the outbreak of COVID-19 in New Zealand, which can be readily spread
by large private social gatherings.
- It
is unusual for a constable to have a warrantless power of entry to a private
dwelling house or marae. This is because of the high
expectation of privacy that
citizens place on these places. However, the exceptional nature of the risk
posed by COVID-19 does justify
some limits on this expectation.
- Notably,
the power of entry at cl 17(3) goes no further than is necessary to achieve the
public health objective. Entry is limited
to instances where a constable has a
reasonable belief that people are congregating in breach of an order, and then
only where the
entry is necessary to issue a direction. Social gatherings in
particular pose a high risk of widespread transmission (irrespective
of whether
they occur in a private or public place) and require careful management in the
public interest. This is in contrast to
other breaches of an order that might
occur in a private dwelling or marae, which have less significant social
consequences, and
where warrantless entry is not permitted.
- Further
to this, cl 17(4) – 17(6) require a constable to report each time a
warrantless power is used and detail the nature
of the circumstances. This
safeguard provides a check on the use of the power. For these reasons, the entry
power in cl 17(3) is
reasonable under s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Clause 17(1) – entry onto other premises
- For
the reasons above, and because there is a lower expectation of privacy for
buildings, land, aircraft, ships, or other things that
are not a private
dwelling house or marae, the entry power in cl 17(1) are reasonable under s 21
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Clause 20 – power to direct
people to provide information
- The
powers under cl 20 for an enforcement officer to require a person to provide
identifying information supports them to efficiently
carry out their enforcement
functions under the Act, such as issue infringement notices in respect of
breaches or to give effective
directions.
- There
is only a negligible privacy interest in revealing identifying information. The
information is purely factual in nature and
is wholly in the knowledge of the
person. It arguably has no expressive value. To the extent that the provision
compels the provision
of information that has some marginal expressive value
(and thereby engages the right to freedom of expression protected at s 14
of the
Bill of Rights Act), the limit is justified for the reasons outlined above.
- For
these reasons, the Police power to direct a person to provide information is not
an unreasonable search under s 21 of the bill
of Rights
Act.
Section 22 – Liberty of the person
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right not to be
arbitrarily arrested or detained. The purpose of
the right not to be arbitrarily
detained is the protection of human dignity, autonomy and
liberty.17
17 R v Briggs [2009] NZCA 244 at
[85] per Arnold J.
- To
trigger the concept of detention there must be a “substantial intrusion on
personal liberty”,18 whether a physical
deprivation or a statutory constraint. The Court of Appeal has held
that:19
“An arrest or detention is
arbitrary if it is capricious, unreasoned, without reasonable cause: if it is
made without reference
to an adequate determining principle or without following
proper procedures.”
- For
this reason, arbitrariness should not be equated with “against the
law”, but should be interpreted more broadly to
include elements of
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability.
- Clause
10(a)(vi) authorises that orders under the Bill can require that any person be
isolated or quarantined in any specific place
in any specific way.
- Where
an enactment is inconsistent with s 22, there can be no role for justification
under s 5. The term “arbitrarily”
is intended to provide a measure
of the reasonableness of statutory powers,20 as well as
the exercise of those powers. At issue is whether there is sufficient
justification for detention and whether the Bill
carefully circumscribes who may
detain a person, for how long, and under what conditions.
- In
our view, cl 10(a)(vi) is not “arbitrary” for the purposes of s 22
of the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching this view,
we have taken account of a
ruling of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the detention of
individuals suffering from an
infectious disease. In Enhorn v
Sweden,21 the Court held that such detentions will
only be justified if:
- the
response is proportionate to the threat the disease poses to the general
public;
- the
measure is a measure of last resort; and
- the
detention must be lifted as soon as possible as the person no longer poses a
threat to the public.
- We
consider that these factors are met in the present case. Requiring a person who
has been exposed to COVID-19 (for example through
travelling to countries where
there is a high outbreak of the virus, or who is waiting for results of a test)
is reasonable and necessary
as it will ensure that the person is kept apart from
other persons during the period that they would be capable of passing on the
virus. Similarly, it is reasonable to remove a person suffering from COVID-19 to
hospital where the person can be isolated from other
persons and receive
appropriate medical treatment (where consented to).
- The
Ministry of Health has advised that a person who may be exposed to COVID-19 (for
example through international travel) needs to
be self-isolated for up to 14
days which is the known incubation period of the virus. It would be reasonable
for an order to require
a person quarantine for this period of time in order for
any symptoms of the virus to develop.
- We
therefore consider the Bill appears to be consistent with the right not to be
arbitrarily arrested or detained affirmed in s 22
of the Bill of Rights Act.
18 Police v Smith [1993] NZCA 585; [1994] 2 NZLR 306
(CA) at 316 per Richardson J.
19 Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR
433; (2001) 5 HRNZ 334 (CA) at [34].
20 Butler and Butler, above n Error! Bookmark not
defined., at [19.8.1].
21 Application no 56529/00 (25 January 2005).
Section 27(3) - rights to justice in civil proceedings with the Crown
- Section
27(3) of the Bill of Rights Act protects the ability of an individual to bring a
proceeding against, or to defend civil proceedings
brought by, the Crown and to
have those proceedings heard in the same manner in which civil proceedings
between individuals can be
heard.
- Clause
33 of the Bill imports from the Health Act 1956 the existing protection from
liability for persons acting under the provisions of that enactment and applies
them to the Bill.
Under these provisions, an individual acting in pursuance
of any of the provisions of the Act is protected from civil or criminal
liability unless they have acted in bad faith or without reasonable care. We
note that this means that liability can still lie against
an individual, and
accordingly the Crown, in cases of bad faith or negligence. We consider this
immunity to be consistent with s
27(3) of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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