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Arms Legislation Bill (Consistent) (Section 25(c)) [2019] NZBORARp 44 (6 September 2019)
Last Updated: 9 October 2019
6 September 2019
Attorney-General
Arms Legislation Bill: consistency with New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Our
Ref: ATT395/298
Summary
- We
have reviewed the Arms Legislation Bill (“the Bill”) for
consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“Bill of
Rights Act”). This advice is based on version 18958/14.0 of the Bill,
received the afternoon of Thursday 5 September 2019.
- The
Bill comprises amendments to, principally, the Arms Act 1983. It amends
several offences and penalties, as well as proposing
new offences.
- Some,
but not all, of these are strict liability offences or involve reverse onuses
– raising issues about their consistency
with the “right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law” in s 25(c) of the
Bill of Rights Act.
To the extent these offences (both new and amended) limit
the right in s 25(c), we consider the limits are reasonable and demonstrably
justified in terms of s 5.
Overview of the Bill
- The
Bill will amend the Arms Act 1983 by introducing:
- 4.1 a new
statement of its purposes (promoting safe possession and use of firearms and
other weapons, and imposing controls on them);
- 4.2 requirements
for dealers’ licences and permits to import firearms;
- 4.3 restrictions
on the sale or supply of ammunition;
- 4.4 provisions
as to obtaining, and disqualification from holding, firearms licences, as well
as for their suspension and revocation;
- 4.5 provision
for shooting clubs and shooting ranges, and the marking of firearms;
- 4.6 provision
for certain agencies and health practitioners to have access to the firearms
register;
5389797_2
4.7 amendments to existing offences (chiefly by increasing penalties but in
some cases reducing them or adding in a “without
reasonable excuse”
element) and some new offences;
4.8 various miscellaneous provisions.
Consistency with s 25(c) – strict liability offences
- Section
25(c) affirms the “right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.”
- Strict
liability offences are generally seen as prima facie inconsistent with s
25(c). This is because a strict liability offence may be proved by a finding
that certain facts occurred without
proof of mens rea. A defence of
“total absence of fault” is available in terms of the Court of
Appeal decision in Civil Aviation Department v
MacKenzie.1 The burden of proof of that defence is
on a defendant (to the balance of probabilities standard).
- Whether
a limit on a right is a reasonable one falls to be determined in accordance
with the test in R v Hansen:2
does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to
justify curtailment of the right or freedom?
(i) is the limiting measure rationally connected to its purpose?
(ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is
reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its
purpose?
- In
the specific context of strict liability offences, considerations especially
relevant to the reasonableness of limits on s 25(c)
are:
- 8.1 the
regulatory context – where a field of activity (as here, dealing in,
possessing and using firearms) is an activity that
is licensed and regulated in
the interests of public welfare, and persons entering the field (here, to
become owners, users or dealers
in firearms) do so in the knowledge that it is
a regulated activity;
- 8.2 whether
matters of justification and excuse for particular actions or states of affairs
are likely to be in the particular knowledge
of defendants rather than the
prosecution, such that it is reasonable to require that defendants advance
evidence of or prove
those matters to avoid conviction;
- 8.3 penalty
levels – generally fines or low levels of imprisonment are reasonable in
the regulatory context.
- Having
regard to these considerations we consider the amended and new offence
provisions are consistent with s 25(c).
1 Civil Aviation Department v MacKenzie
[1983] NZLR 78 (CA).
2 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1
(SC) at [104].
Offences where “without reasonable excuse” or similar is an
element of the offence
- A
number of the amended offences are to be amended so as to incorporate the
element of “without reasonable excuse”. The
same phrase is included
in some of the new offences.
- Until
its repeal by the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 67(8) of the Summary
Proceedings Act 1957 had placed on defendants a burden
of proving the
application of “any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or
qualification” to a summary offence.
Now there is no such statutory
requirement. The question whether a defendant bears any onus turns on
construction.3 If the defendant’s being
“without reasonable excuse” is an element of the offence then it is
a matter that must,
in addition to other salient facts, be proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
- We
consider the phrase “without reasonable excuse”, when employed in
the Bill, to be an element of the offence. Where
a defendant adduces or points
to evidence capable of amounting to a reasonable excuse, the burden is on the
prosecution to prove
the lack of any such excuse. On that basis, offences of
strict liability containing such a provision are consistent with the right
to be
presumed innocent. They would not enable defendants to be proved guilty where
there remains reasonable doubt that the defendant
was “without reasonable
excuse”.
- The
above reasoning applies to the offences being amended, or introduced, by this
Bill, contained in clauses 10,14, 15, 16, 22, 31,
40, 47, 51, 52, 55, 64, 69,
70, 71, 72, and 79.
Clause 19, proposed new s 15(3)
- Under
proposed new s 15(3) a dealer whose licence has been revoked and who carries
on dealer activity commits an offence punishable
by up to one year of
imprisonment and a $15,000 maximum fine. To the extent this is an offence of
strict liability (potentially able
to be committed when a person did not
know their licence had been revoked) we consider it a reasonable limit
on the right to be presumed innocent.
- The
important purpose is the safety of the public. The limiting measure is
rationally connected to that purpose as it makes convictions
easier to secure
given the likely propensity of persons to deny facts peculiarly within their
knowledge. A person who is licensed
is in a position to know when their
licence has been revoked, and the processes leading to possible revocation under
s 27C include
written notice of revocation being given to them. Requiring the
prosecution to prove that a person knew their licence was revoked
would be more
onerous than requiring that person to affirmatively prove they did not know and
had made diligent inquiry about their
licence status. Ultimately, the defence
recognized by the Court of Appeal in Civil Aviation Department v
MacKenzie4 (of having acted with a total absence of
fault) may be available to a defendant whose licence has been revoked without
their knowledge.
The persuasive burden of proving that defence would rest in
such a defendant but
- A
Butler and P Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A
Commentary, (2nd Ed, LexisNexis, Wellington,
2015) ch 24.4.32; Adams on Criminal Law, paragraph
ED1.07.
4 Civil Aviation Department v
MacKenzie [1983] NZLR 78.
we consider this a reasonable limit on the right in the regulatory context
applicable to dealers.
Clause 21, proposed new s 16
- This
amends the offence of importing firearms without a permit, retaining existing
penalties save for the increase in the maximum
possible fine (from $2,000
to
$15,000). To the extent this is a strict liability offence the
defence of total absence of fault is available and we consider it a
reasonable
limit.
Clauses 29 and 30, proposed amended s 20(3) and 21
- Proposed
s 20(3) increases the penalty for possession of a non-prohibited firearm without
a licence) from 3 months to one year maximum
imprisonment and
from
$1000, to $15000 maximum fine); proposed s 21 reduces the
penalty in relation to possession of an airgun by removing potential
imprisonment.
In the regulatory context these offences of possession without a
licence, where such is required, are reasonable limits.
Clause 51, proposed amended s 36(3)
- The
proposed amendment is to penalty only; the existing offence provides that a
defendant carries the burden of proving that a pistol
or restricted weapon was
carried by him under and in accordance with the conditions endorsed upon his
firearms licence. These details
would be in the knowledge of a defendant and it
is a reasonable limit upon the right to be presumed innocent that proof of such
is
upon a defendant.
Clause 53, proposed new s 38B and s 38K
- These
relate to establishing a shooting club and operating a shooting range without a
permit or certification. They do not carry imprisonment.
To the extent a
person could operate a shooting club without knowing the club has no permit, it
is strict liability but in the
regulatory context this is a reasonable limit. In
a case of total absence of default the defence established in Civil Aviation
Department v McKenzie is available.5
Clauses 58 and 62, proposed amended s 43 and s 44
- This
offence of selling or supplying a firearm or airgun to an unlicensed person (s
43) or a pistol or restricted weapon (s 44) allows
a statutory defence if a
person can prove that they took reasonable steps to ascertain whether the
person to whom they sold or
supplied was the holder of a firearms licence. As
the steps taken would be in the knowledge of a defendant this is a reasonable
limit.
(The clauses amend the current provisions which have no such defence,
and which require the defendant instead to prove that the
person supplied held a
licence.)
Clause 63, proposed amended s 46
- As
it stands s 46 creates an offence of carrying an imitation firearm except for
some lawful, proper and sufficient purpose. It provides
that in any prosecution
the burden
5 Civil Aviation Department v MacKenzie
[1983] NZLR 78.
shall lie on the defendant to prove the existence of the lawful, proper and
sufficient purpose.
- Proposed
new s 46 does not change that, but reduces the penalty from a 2 year to a 1 year
maximum term of imprisonment (and retains
the $4,000 fine).
- On
its face s 46 might be said to criminalise a considerable amount of innocent
conduct. It is clear, however, that a police decision
to arrest and charge can
only be lawful if authorities have good cause to suspect there is no such lawful
excuse.6 At trial, however, the burden is on the
defendant to establish that excuse, and not simply to establish that there
is a reasonable
doubt about there being no such excuse.
- While
we view this as finely balanced we conclude that in this case the reverse onus
is justifiable, on the ground that the material
information bearing upon lawful,
proper and sufficient purpose will necessarily be within the domain of the
defendant. It is
for them to proffer that purpose in evidence. The prospect of
there being a person who has a sufficient purpose but who cannot prove
it to the
requisite standard is low.
Clause 65, proposed amended s 50D
- This
is a decrease in the penalty for possessing a prohibited firearm in a public
place without lawful purpose. We consider that proviso
to be an element of the
offence such that an evidential burden only is on the defendant to adduce
evidence sufficient to generate
a reasonable doubt as to whether there was a
lawful and sufficient purpose.
Clause 66, proposed amended s 52
- This
is a simple increase in the penalty for presenting a firearm etc. at another
person except for some lawful and sufficient purpose.
We consider that proviso
to be an element of the offence such that an evidential burden only is on the
defendant to adduce evidence
sufficient to generate a reasonable doubt as to
whether there was a lawful and sufficient purpose.
Clause 67, proposed amended s 53A
- This
is a decrease in the penalty for possessing a prohibited firearm at the time of
committing an offence punishable by imprisonment
for a term of 3 years or more.
The affirmative defence – that the person had possession of the prohibited
firearm for a lawful
purpose – requires the person to prove that lawful
purpose. It therefore reverses the onus of proof and limits the right to
the
presumption of innocence.
- However,
the reverse onus applies only to the establishment of a positive defence, rather
than the elements of the offence. Where
a person has a lawful purpose for a
prohibited firearm being in their possession, it should lie easily within their
capacity to
provide proof of that lawful purpose on the balance of
probabilities. While s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act is limited by the
Bill,
that limitation is, in our view, justified.
6 Caie v Attorney-General HC
Auckland CP334-SD99, 6 April 2001.
Reverse onus in s 66 of the principal Act for possession offences –
whether it leads to inconsistency in this Bill insofar
as new or amended
possession offences are concerned
- Section
66 of the Arms Act 1983 is a reverse onus provision whereby a proved fact
(a person’s being in occupation of land or buildings or the driver of
a vehicle in which a firearm is found) becomes a deemed fact (that the
person is in possession of that firearm) unless the person proves (a)
the firearm was not his property and (b) it was in the possession of some other
person.7
- In
previous advice it was concluded that s 66 is inconsistent with s 25(c) insofar
as it is possible that a person who occupies
land or buildings or is a driver
may be able to generate a reasonable doubt as to whether they knew of (and so
possessed) a firearm
found on their land or in their car but are not able to
prove the same on the balance of probabilities.
- Section
66 is a provision of existing law and is not being amended by the Bill. There
is no new offence being introduced by the
Bill as to proof of which s 66 might
be invoked.
- Proposed
new ss 22A and 22B deal with possession (respectively) of non-prohibited
magazines and parts, and ammunition. These items
are not included in s 66 as
items to which the reverse onus attaches.
- The
offence in s 53A (being amended by reduction of the penalty) is committed only
when a person commits an offence punishable by
3 or more years imprisonment
while “at the time of ... committing the offence” is in possession
of a prohibited firearm.
That assumes actual possession, and not one
deemed to arise by dint of occupying premises or driving a car in which a
firearm is found.
- Sections
20 and 21 are being amended (possession of non-prohibited firearms and airguns,
respectively, without a licence). The penalty
for the former is increased from
3 months and $1,000 to one year and $15,000; the penalty in relation to airguns
is reduced by
removing the possibility of imprisonment and making it punishable
by fine only.
- In
our view the fact that ss 20 and 21 are being amended does not render the
amending provisions in the Bill (clauses 29 and 30)
inconsistent with s 25(c) on
the ground that the reverse onus in existing s 66 may (but not must, and in any
event is not likely
to) be used to prove those offences. The inconsistency is
between s 66 in the principal Act and s 25(c).
Conclusion
- The
Arms Legislation Bill appears to be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.
7 The courts have ameliorated this second
requirement. It is not necessary to prove the identity of another person who had
possession
of the firearm, only that it was not the defendant’s and, being
unknown to them, must have been in the possession of some other person:
R v McKeown (19880 4 CRNZ 438 (CA).
Recommendations
- We
recommend that you:
- 37.1 Note
this advice Yes/No
Noted/Declined
Vicki McCall Crown Counsel
Hon David Parker
Attorney-General
/ /2019
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