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Administration of Justice (Reform of Contempt of Court) Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 22, 25) [2018] NZBORARp 41 (29 March 2018)
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Administration of Justice (Reform of Contempt of Court) Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 22, 25) [2018] NZBORARp 41 (29 March 2018)
Last Updated: 3 January 2019
29 March 2018
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 23
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Administration of
Justice (Reform of Contempt of Court) Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Administration of Justice (Reform of Contempt of
Court) Bill (‘the Bill’), a member’s
Bill in the name of Hon
Christopher Finlayson, is consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed in
the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights
Act’).
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with ss 14 (freedom of expression),
22 (liberty of the person), and
25 (minimum standards of criminal procedure).
Our analysis is set out below.
The Bill
- The
Bill implements the Law Commission’s recommendations in its 2017 report
Reforming the Law of Contempt: A Modern Statute and is essentially the
same as the draft bill in Part 2 of the Report. The Bill replaces various
statutory provisions and common law
contempts and is intended to make the law
more accessible, modernise its language, and ensure it keeps pace with the
digital age.
- The
principal purposes of the Bill are to promote and facilitate the administration
of justice and uphold the rule of law, maintain
public confidence in the
judicial system, and reform the law of contempt. To those ends, the Bill enables
courts to make certain
orders and impose certain sanctions to achieve the
following objectives:
- civil
and criminal proceedings are heard and determined fairly by independent and
impartial Judges;
- jury
verdicts are based only on facts admitted or proved by properly adduced evidence
after free, frank, and confidential jury discussions,
and the finality of
verdicts is protected;
- individual
cases are heard and determined in a manner that is expeditious, efficient, and
consistent with the principles of justice;
- except
in unusual circumstances, proceedings are open to the public and news media;
and
- the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary are
protected.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 14 – Freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form.
- The
Bill prima facie limits the right to freedom of expression
by:
- providing
for suppression of certain pre-trial information, such as the defendant’s
criminal record (cls 8 – 13);
- prohibiting
publication of information relevant to a trial if there is a real risk that this
could prejudice the defendant’s
right to a fair trial (cls 14 and
15);
- providing
for judicial officers to cite and deal with disruptive behaviour relating to
court proceedings (cls 16 – 18);
- prohibiting
jurors from investigating and researching information relevant to the case
during the trial period, or to intentionally
disclose jury deliberations,
subject to exceptions (cls 20 and 21); and
- prohibiting
publication of untrue allegations or accusations against Judges and courts where
there is a real risk the publication
could undermine the independence,
integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary or a court (cls 24 –
27).
- Where
a provision is found to limit a particular right or freedom, it may nevertheless
be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered a reasonable
limit that is justifiable in terms of s 5 of that Act. We consider these limits
are justifiable
because they:
- fulfil
the important objectives of protecting fair trial rights, the expeditious
conduct of proceedings, the finality of verdicts,
and public confidence in the
judicial system;
- are
rationally connected to these objectives as they ensure trials are not
prejudiced by publicity, jurors decide cases only on lawfully
admitted evidence,
jury deliberations remain confidential, court hearings are not disrupted, and
public confidence in the judiciary
and courts is not undermined by false
attacks.
- are
proportionate to, and extend only as far as required to achieve, these
objectives, given:
- suppression
orders and prohibitions on publication are time-limited, and extend only so far
as required to protect fair trial rights.
Suppression orders are also able to be
reviewed at any time;
- limits on
jurors’ freedom to seek and impart information go only as far as required
to ensure jurors decide cases on lawfully
admitted evidence, and that the
confidentiality of jury discussions and finality of verdicts is protected;
and
- publishing
allegations or accusations about judges or courts are criminalised only where
they are substantively untrue and there is
a real risk that publication could
undermine public confidence in the
judiciary.1
Section 22 – Liberty of the person
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right not to be
arbitrarily arrested or detained. The Bill creates
two powers to detain outside
normal criminal procedure (although these largely reflect existing common law
and statutory powers).
- Clauses
16 and 17 provide that a judicial officer may order that a person be taken into
custody and detained until the rising of the
court if the judicial officer
believes the person is wilfully obstructing the court, or wilfully and without
lawful excuse disobeying
an order or direction of the court in the course of
proceedings.
- If
the Judge considers further punishment is required, the judge must adjourn the
matter for determination. If the judge subsequently
finds the person guilty, the
judge may issue a warrant committing the person to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three months.
- Clause
22 replaces the common law contempt of disobeying court orders. It provides that
a court may enforce certain court orders or
undertakings by issuing a warrant
committing the person, or a director or officer of a body corporate, to
imprisonment for a term
not exceeding 6 months.
- We
do not consider these powers to detain are arbitrary given their purpose and the
statutory requirements around their
use.2
Section 25(a) – Right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial court
- Section
25(a) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone charged with an offence
has the right to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial
court.
- The
Law Commission considered whether to require a different Judge to hear the case
regarding further punishment for wilfully obstructing
or disobeying the court
(discussed at paragraph 10 above). On balance, the Commission decided that this
was not required in order
to comply with s 25(a) of the Bill of Rights
Act.3 We agree. Judges are required to act fairly and
impartially in any proceedings, and cl 17(4)(a) requires the judge to consider
whether
there are exceptional circumstances that warrant a different judge
hearing the matter.
Section 25(c) – Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right to be
presumed innocent until
1 In Solicitor-General v Smith
[2004] NZHC 1223; [2004] 2 NZLR 540 (HC) at [133], the High Court considered that the common
law contempt of scandalising the court was a justifiable limitation on the
freedom of
expression as the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights Act depend
upon the rule of law, as upheld by the courts, which the courts
can only
discharge with the authority and respect of the public.
2 For a list of factors going to arbitrariness of
statutory powers of detention, see Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act : a commentary (2nd ed,
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at [19.8.6].
3 See 3.36 – 3.44 of the Law
Commission’s report Reforming the Law of Contempt (NZLC R140,
Wellington, May 2017).
proved guilty according to the law. The right to be presumed innocent
requires the prosecution to prove an accused person’s
guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
- Similar
to section 211 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (which relates to breach of
suppression provisions or orders under that
Act), the Bill creates alternative
mens rea and strict liability offences for breaching suppression and
takedown orders.4 The mens rea offences are
punishable by imprisonment and have a higher maximum fine than the strict
liability offences (which are fine only).
- Strict
liability offences prima facie limit s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act by
shifting the onus of proof onto a defendant. We have therefore considered
whether this
prima facie limit can be justified under s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- Suppression
and takedown orders are imposed to protect the relevant person(s) from the
negative effects of publication. Breach of
the orders is likely to cause harm,
but the culpability of the offender is higher when the offender knows or is
reckless as to whether
they are breaching the order, hence the difference in the
available penalties. In this context, we consider the use of strict liability
offences to be a justified limitation on s 25(c).
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
4 Cls 13 and 27. While the
drafting of the offences in cls 13(2) and 27(2) may raise the question of
absolute liability, we note the
Law Commission report and draft Bill
characterised these offences as strict liability. We have interpreted them
accordingly.
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