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Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 21, 24-26) [2017] NZBORARp 7 (3 March 2017)
Last Updated: 5 January 2019
![2017_700.jpg](2017_700.jpg)
3 March 2017
Attorney-General
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Amendment Bill Our
Ref: ATT395/264
- We
have reviewed the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism
Amendment Bill (Bill). We advise it appears to be
consistent with the rights and
freedoms in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights Act).
- We
understand that the version of the Bill we have reviewed (copy attached)
is intended to be close to the final form in which it will be introduced to
Parliament. We will advise you if any significant changes
are made which might
impact on this advice.
- The
Bill amends the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act
2009 (Act) to extend the reporting and supervisory
regime under the Act to a
wider range of entities, namely real estate agents, conveyancers, many lawyers,
accountants, more gambling
operators than are covered at present and some
businesses that trade in high value goods. The Bill aims to protect businesses
at
risk of being targeted by criminals to launder money and to make it harder
for criminals to profit from and fund illegal activity.
- You
have previously accepted our advice that the Act as it is at present is not
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act. A copy of
that advice is attached.
We have reviewed the Bill for any additional issues that might arise by
virtue of extending the ambit of the legislation to more entities
and the other
changes made by the Bill.
- By
altering the definition of “reporting entity” to include a wider
range of entities, the Bill will have the effect of
broadening the ambit of the
mandatory reporting, production and inspection powers and the corresponding
civil and criminal consequences
for failure to comply with the requirements of
the Act. These changes raise issues with the right to be free from unreasonable
search
and seizure affirmed by s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act and the
protections in ss 24-26 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
information sharing powers in the Act are also to be expanded by the Bill, a
change which also raises issues with the right to
be free from unreasonable
search and seizure affirmed by s 21.
BORA-AML-AMENDMENT-BILL.DOC
- We
conclude, however, that none of these issues give rise to an inconsistency with
the Bill of Rights Act.
Search and seizure powers
- Lawyers,
conveyancing practitioners and firms, accounting practices, real estate agents
and trust and company service providers are
now to be defined as a designated
non-financial business or profession if they carry out certain activities set
out in cl 5. These
activities include acting as an agent for the formation of
legal persons, managing client funds and conveyancing (“certain
activities”). Reporting entities under the Act are now defined to include
designated non-financial businesses and professions
(cl 5). High value dealers
and the New Zealand Racing Board will now also be covered by the definition of
reporting entity. We have
considered whether the extension of the regime in this
way might give rise to inconsistencies with the Bill of Rights Act. We note
that
in Canada, some provisions of legislation setting out anti-money laundering and
anti-terrorist financing legislation have been
found to breach the
Charter1 but as
explained further below, we consider the
protections in this Bill go further than the Canadian equivalent and are
sufficient to ensure the search provisions do not infringe
s 21.
- The
alteration to the definition of reporting entities extends the group of entities
now required to report suspicious activities
under s 40 of the Act. There is an
express exclusion such that lawyers are not required to disclose any
privileged
communication.2 These powers could
arguably amount to a search or seizure but we
remain of the view as expressed in our earlier advice on the Act that they
would not be unreasonable even in this expanded form given
the important law
enforcement function, the minimal nature of the intrusion and the protection for
privilege.
- The
Bill has the effect of extending the powers of an “anti-money laundering
and countering the financing of terrorism supervisor”
(AML/CFT supervisor)
to require records relevant to the supervision of reporting entities for
compliance with the Act to be provided
by a wider group of reporting entities (s
132). There is nothing in s 132 that excludes privileged material but given the
focus on
establishing compliance rather than disclosing suspicious activities as
in s 40, that is an explicable omission. As noted in our
earlier advice,
requiring the production of information is less intrusive than on-site
inspection. We do not consider that amending
the power to include designated
non-financial businesses and professions is inconsistent with s 21 of the Bill
of Rights Act, for
the same reasons as with suspicious activity reports.
- The
Bill also extends the power of an AML/CFT supervisor to conduct on-site
inspections to include inspections of the expanded group
of reporting entities,
namely designated non-financial businesses and professions, high value dealers
and the New Zealand Racing
Board (s 133). However, these powers reserve the
right to refuse to answer incriminating questions and also provide that lawyers
need not provide privileged material. Although these powers will extend to
additional entities, we remain of the view that protections
in s 133 remain
sufficient to ensure they are not unreasonable in terms of s 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
1 Canada
(Attorney-General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada [2015] 1 SCR
401.
2 The definition of
privileged communication in s 42 will be amended by the Bill to ensure that
communications that are subject to the
general law governing legal professional
privilege or the definitions in the Evidence Act are also privileged under the
provisions
of the Bill.
- The
Police Commissioner’s powers under s 143 of the Act will now extend to
designated non-financial businesses and professions,
high value dealers and the
New Zealand Racing Board. These powers allow the Commissioner to order
production of records, documents
and information from any reporting entity that
are relevant to analysing the financial information and intelligence received by
the
Commissioner. This also allows for the compulsion of a broader class of
information than in the Act at present (previously it was
material relevant to
analysing a suspicious transaction report). Despite the expansion, we remain of
the view that as the power is
specifically for law enforcement purposes, is
limited in scope and the search or seizure is minimally intrusive, it is not
unreasonable
in terms of s 21.
- The
current powers in the Act to apply for a search warrant are amended to provide
that subpart 4 of the Search and Surveillance Act
applies, allowing for
warrantless searches when an offence is being committed that would be likely to
cause injury to any person
or serious damage of loss of property or there is a
risk to life and safety. Given the restriction to serious and urgent
circumstances
and the protections in the Search and Surveillance Act, we do not
consider a warrantless search to be unreasonable.
Pecuniary penalty for civil liability act
- The
civil liability regime in subpart 2 of Part 3 of the Act will also now apply to
a broader range of entities because of the Bill’s
amendment to the
definition of reporting entity. However, as the regime remains directed at a
limited group who voluntarily engage
in a regulated activity, we continue to
consider that proceedings under this subpart are properly characterised as civil
not criminal
and the protections in ss 24 to 26 of the Bill of Rights Act need
not apply.
Power to disclose
- The
information disclosure regime in s 139 of the Act will also be broadened by the
Bill as agencies gain the power to disclose personal
information (which is
presently expressly excluded). The disclosure of information must be for law
enforcement purposes or regulatory
purposes and the disclosing agency must be
satisfied the recipient has a proper interest in receiving the information
(proposed new
s 139(1) and (2)). The amendments to s 139 also establish a power
to make regulations or written agreements for the disclosure of
information that
does not fall within s 139(1) and (2) but is being disclosed for law enforcement
or regulatory purposes.
- The
disclosure of information in this way could amount to a “search” in
terms of s
21.3 However, even if
information disclosure of this type does amount to a search, the Bill only
authorises agreements for the disclosure
of information to the extent that it is
consistent with s 21.4
3 The Courts have accepted
that a request for information about an individual from a third party can be a
search for the purposes of
s 21, at least where a search is authorised by
statute or warrant. In New Zealand Stock Exchange v Commissioner of Inland
Revenue [1992] 3 NZLR 1 at 6, the Privy Council was “content to
assume” that the Commissioner of Inland Revenue was conducting
a search,
for the purposes of s 21, when requesting information from the New Zealand Stock
Exchange under statutory authority. In
R v Javid [2007] NZCA 232 at
[45(a)], the Court of Appeal accepted that the obtaining of confidential
information from a telecommunications company (text messages) by
the police was
properly seen as a search and seizure.
4 Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights Act; Drew v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 207; [2002] 1 NZLR 58 (CA) at [68].
- A
search is consistent with s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act if it is reasonable.5 We consider that
the new information disclosure regime does not authorise an unreasonable search
for the purposes of s 21. The information
disclosure powers are exercised in the
public interest, namely for law enforcement and regulatory purposes. The
exercise of the power
is restricted by the need for the disclosing agency to be
satisfied that the recipient of the information has a proper interest in
receiving it. The new provision is also generally consistent with the
information privacy principles in
the Privacy Act 1993.6 Regulations and
written agreements for information sharing
can only be made after consultation with the Privacy Commissioner. Therefore,
the power to disclose is not unreasonable in terms of
s 21.
- This
advice has been peer reviewed by Paul Rishworth QC, Senior Crown Counsel.
![2017_701.jpg](2017_701.jpg)
Kim Laurenson Crown Counsel
5 Cropp v Judicial
Committee [2008] NZSC 46; [2008] 3 NZLR 774 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at
[162].
6 In particular, we note
that information Privacy Principles 10 and 11 allow for the use and disclosure
of personal information where
necessary to prevent or lessen a serious threat
to the life or health of an individual or to prevent the commission of
offences.
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