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Lawyers and Conveyancers Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 5, 17) [2010] NZBORARp 4 (15 February 2010)
Last Updated: 5 May 2019
Lawyers and Conveyancers Amendment Bill
15 February 2010 ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Lawyers and Conveyancers Amendment Bill (PCO13984/1.8) - Consistency with the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
Our Ref: ATT395/119
- We
have reviewed this Bill for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990. While the Bill gives rise to questions under
s 17 of the Bill of Rights
Act (freedom of association), we conclude that the possible limitation of that
right is in any event justifiable
under s 5 and that the Bill therefore appears
to be consistent with the Act.
The Bill
- The
Bill amends the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 to reinstate the office
or
rank of Queen’s Counsel (QC) and restore the pre-2008 [1] position where that office could only be
held by barristers sole.
- Currently,
s 118 of the Lawyers & Conveyancers Act 2006 expressly states that no
barrister or barrister and solicitor is ineligible for appointment as Senior
Counsel by reason only of the
fact that he or she:
- 3.1 Practices
either alone or in partnership with any other lawyer; or
- 3.2 Is actively
involved in the provision by an incorporated law firm of legal services; or
- 3.3 Is an
employee or statutory officer.
- The
section also provides that persons holding the rank of QC or Senior Counsel may
join such organisations.
- The
Bill proposes to reverse this (clause 6, proposed ss 118A and 118B).
- The
Bill contains transitional provisions which effectively allow those appointed
under the current regime to practice in association
with others, contrary to the
new rules (clause 6, proposed ss 118C and 118D).
Apparent inconsistency with the right to freedom of association
- The
repeal of s 118 and the re-introduction of the previous system raise an arguable
issue with freedom of association under s 17
of the Bill of Rights Act. Section
17 provides:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of association.”
- The
proposed amendments will prohibit QCs from practising their profession in
partnership with any other lawyer, or as part of a law
firm. The proposal
therefore directly limits the freedom to form an association for professional
purposes with other lawyers. Similarly,
the proposal penalises those who are in
such associations, by making them ineligible for the office or rank of QC.
- The
office of QC is recognised as being of substantive benefit to practitioners, and
partnership with those holding the office is
also likely to be of value to other
lawyers. Similarly, the freedom to choose a working environment, and in
particular the freedom
to choose between practicing one’s profession with
colleagues, or alone, is also significant. [2]
- On
its face therefore the proposal raises a possible inconsistency with s 17 of the
Bill of Rights Act. However, the position is complicated
by the uncertain scope
of that right in comparable jurisdictions, which do not necessarily recognise
the extension of the right to
protect associations of a commercial character.
However, in our view the proposal is in any event justifiable under s 5 of the
Bill
of Rights Act as reflecting a rational and legitimate policy choice by the
legislature to re-emphasise the importance of the independent
bar through
re-introduction of this limit to the office of QC.
The scope of s 17
- The
scope of the protected right in s 17 is not well-settled. There is a difference
in approach between the Canadian jurisprudence
and the European and United
Nation cases under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The difference is approach is not
clearly acknowledged or considered, and is further complicated by a possible
third approach indicated by a recent decision of the House of Lords.
- In
brief, the Canadian cases contain the most considered discussion of the scope of
the right, and lean towards protection for the
right to form any kind of
association, including those of a commercial or professional character. [3] The cases focus attention not on the
activity of the association, but rather on whether
the
“associational character” of the activity has been
targeted. [4] In simple terms the right is
infringed if the activity in question is permitted for an individual acting
alone, but prohibited for
those acting together in an association. Under this
approach, the proposal to prevent QCs practicing in association with others
would
infringe s 17.
- The
European approach is more focussed on whether there is a recognised
“association” of the character that the right
seeks to protect.
There is little discussion of what type of association would be protected, but
the underlying
rationale of the case law appears to be that only
private “civil society” associations, notably voluntary political,
social
or similar groupings, are protected – public or state run or
regulatory associations are not covered by the right. [5] While it is not clear, it appears from the
caselaw that the right currently does not extend to associations that are not
not-for-profit.
[6]
This is a far more limited approach and if adopted would mean that the s 17
right is not engaged by the proposal.
- The
House of Lords fox hunting decision suggests a possible third approach in the
United Kingdom. While the Court of Appeal adopted
a similar approach to
the
Canadian cases, and examined whether the prohibition on fox
hunting targeted the “associational character” of the activity,
[7] the House of Lords [8] instead appears to have focussed on the
constitutional importance of the activity itself, and found that as it was
merely “sporting
or recreational” is was not within the scope of the
right.
This approach, of differentiating between the value of the activity
concerned, does not appear consistent with either the European
approach, [9] or the Canadian.
- It
is also not consistent with the earlier approach taken by the Privy Council in
Collymore v A-G of Trinidad and Tobago [1969] 2 All ER 1207, which
– although the issue was not central to the decision – seems to
support a wider view of the right:
“In my judgment, then, freedom of association means no more
than freedom to enter into consensual arrangements to promote the
common
interest objects of the association group. The objects may be any of many. They
may be religious or social, political or philosophical,
economic or
professional,
educational or cultural, sporting or charitable...”
- The
scope of the right in s 17 has not been considered in any depth by the New
Zealand courts. The commentary by Drs Butler suggests,
however, that a broad
interpretation is appropriate. [10] A
broader view is also consistent with the
discussion in the 1985
White Paper “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand”, which
describes the proposed (now) s 17 in the following terms:
“10.64 Again, this is an important right with application to a wide
range of situations. A law which prohibits the formation
of political parties is
an obvious example of something which infringes this provision. Again it has be
reconciled with or weighed
against important competing interests. Consider for
instance the law relating to restrictive trade practices, or criminal or
tortious conspiracy.” [emphasis added]
- The
authors of the White Paper clearly envisaged that the right would not be
restricted to not-for-profit community associations,
but rather would be of wide
application, limited only by justified restrictions where competing interests
came into conflict with
the right.
- Therefore,
while the matter is not yet finally resolved in New Zealand, it is at least
arguable that the scope of s 17 is sufficiently
wide to encompass the
professional and commercial association of lawyers practicing in a firm, and is
therefore engaged by the proposal
in this Bill.
- However,
as noted, even if the right is engaged, in our view there is a reasonable basis
to support the view that the infringement
of this right is justified in terms of
s 5.
Justification under s 5
- In
applying s 5, it is necessary to consider whether the restriction serves an
important objective and, further, whether it is both
rationally connected and
proportionate to that objective. [11]
- The
Explanatory Note to the Bill indicates that the objective of the reinstated
restriction is to uphold the independence of the bar.
That requirement can, in
turn, be seen to serve two related purposes:
- 21.1 It
provides for an official recognised category of independent expert
practitioners; and
- 21.2 Given the
material and reputational advantages that such recognition entails, it provides
a structural incentive to expert practitioners
to enter into, or remain in, sole
practice, and thus strengthens and supports the independent bar.
- The
first of these purposes could be seen to provide a public benefit through such
practices as the appointment of QCs to conduct
public inquiries and the use of
“QC clauses” in certain commercial contracts. [12] However, such benefits could be achieved
by other means, as they are in other jurisdictions, and more importantly are
limited in
their relevance. It follows that this limited purpose could not by
itself justify a restriction that applies to the legal profession
as a
whole.
- The
second purpose reflects a broader contention that there is a public benefit in
the continuation of independent practice by some
expert practitioners, and the
promotion and strengthening of the independent bar. While New Zealand does not,
unlike a number of
jurisdictions, restrict any area of legal practice to sole
practitioners, it can nonetheless be suggested that the promotion of independent
practice is of benefit. For example: [13]
- 23.1 Independent
practice may assist in providing expert legal assistance to unpopular clients;
and
- 23.2 Independent
practice may provide a means to avoid or, at least to lessen the difficulty of
managing, conflicts of interest in
areas of specialist practice.
- These
are valid objectives in terms of s 5 and they are rationally connected to the
proposed restriction.
- In
assessing proportionality, however, it is difficult to quantify or indeed fully
verify the benefits associated with the independent
bar. They entail assumptions
about the behaviour of practitioners and their clients and are also, so far as
varying practices in
other jurisdictions are concerned, dependent upon the legal
and professional context of those jurisdictions. However, it is also
difficult
to quantify the adverse impact of the restriction, as that again depends upon
practice and context.
- In
seeking to apply s 5 in such an uncertain context, the Canadian courts have held
that where government seeks to regulate a matter
that is not readily measurable
and where the regulatory choices are open to reasonable debate, it is accepted
that there is some
margin open to the legislature. [14] The regulation of this aspect of the
legal profession and, more generally, the means taken to promote robust
independence in the
legal profession, are areas of substantial policy choice and
the proposed restriction falls within that scope.
- On
that basis, we consider that it is open to conclude that the restriction is
proportionate and so justifiable in terms of s 5.
Yours
sincerely
Victoria Casey Crown Counsel
|
Ben Keith
Crown Counsel
|
![2010_400.jpg](2010_400.jpg)
Footnotes:
- The
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 came into force on 1 August 2008.
- Black
v Law Society of Alberta 27 D.L.R. (4th) 527, 543–4:
“The pursuit of a livelihood through a trade or calling has
been, in Canada,
accepted as an appropriate and vital human ambition The relationship is not
merely commercial; it relates to the vital, fundamental
human activity, save
only for subsistence itself, of pursuit of a livelihood in the form of a
trade or calling. ”
Dunmore v Ontario [2001] 3 SCR 1016 noted that the purpose of the
right is to allow the achievement of individual potential through inter-personal
relationships and
collective action (p 31), that work organisations are a
powerful and vibrant example of the collective pursuit of common goals (p81),
and quoting Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act [1987] 1
SCR 313 , 368:
“Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life,
providing the individual with a means of financial support
and, as importantly,
a contributory role in society. A person’s employment is an essential
component of his or her sense of
identity, self-worth and emotional wellbeing.
Accordingly, the conditions in which a person works are highly significant in
shaping
the whole compendium of psychological, emotional and physical elements
of a person’s dignity and self-respect.”
- Black
v Law Society of Alberta [1989] 1 SCR 591. This case concerned a rule
prohibiting members of the Law Society who ordinarily reside and practice in
Alberta from entering into
partnership with anyone who was not ordinarily
resident in Alberta. The majority found a contravention of the Charter
mobility rights, and did not answer the question of whether there was a
contravention of the right to freedom of association. McIntyre
and
L’Heureux and Dube JJ disagreed on the issue of mobility rights but found
that the restriction “no doubt offends
the provisions of s 2(d) of the
Charter, which guarantee freedom of association”, but was justifiable.
Black is referred to by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
Lewis v Real Estate Institute of New Zealand Inc [1995] 3 NZLR 385, which
noted that the issue in that case was clearly one of freedom of association.
Lewis did not engage the right as the question was whether a lawyer could
engage in real estate activities, and was thus a restriction on
professional or
business activities of the lawyer, not the lawyer’s association with
others.
See also for example the first instance decision in Costco Wholesale
Canada Limited v Board of Examiners in Optometry (1998) 157 D.L.R. (4th) 725
(Supreme Court of British Columbia) the prohibition on business associations
between optometrists and non-optometrists was held to contravene
s 2(d).
- Canadian
Egg Marketing Agency v Richardson [1998] 3 SCR 157.
- See
for example Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (6878/75,
7238/75, 1981) and Siguronsson v Iceland (16130/90, 1993).
- See
for example the decision of the UNHRC in Wallmann v Austria (1002/2001).
A broader approach may, however, be suggested in the judgment of the Grand
Chamber (full court) of the Court in Gorzelik v Poland (2004) 38 EHRR
4:
[92] While in the context of Article 11 the Court has often
referred to the essential role played by political parties in ensuring
pluralism
and democracy, associations formed for other purposes, including those
protecting cultural or spiritual heritage, pursuing
various social-economic
aims, proclaiming or teaching religion, seeking an ethnic identity or asserting
minority consciousness, are
also important to the proper functioning of
democracy. For pluralism is also built on the genuine recognition of, and
respect for,
diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and
cultural identity, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic
ideas and concepts. The harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied
identities is essential for achieving social cohesion.
It is only natural that,
where a civil society functions in a healthy manner, the participation of
citizens in the democratic process
is to a large extent achieved through
belonging to associations in which they may integrate with each other and
pursue
common objectives collectively.”
Note however to the contrary D Harris, M O’Boyle & E Bates & C
Buckley Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2ed:OUP 2009)
526, n 84.
- R
(Countryside Alliance & Ors) v Attorney-General [2006] EWCA Civ 817; [2007] QB 305 (CA) at
paragraph 105, quoting Adams v Scottish Ministers [2004] SC 665:
“Article 11 is engaged if a person is prohibited from doing
something so long as he is a member of a particular association;
for example, if
he is disqualified from holding an office, or is otherwise adversely treated, by
reason of his membership of a Masonic
lodge or of a political party ... but
there is a material distinction, in our opinion, between a restriction which
compels an individual
to join an association or prohibits him from joining it,
or penalises him in either event ... and the restriction that, without reference
to any association, merely prohibits a particular activity with the indirect
result that persons cannot associate for the purpose
of carrying it
out.”
- R
(Countryside Alliance & Ors) v Attorney-General [2007] UKHL 52; [2008] 1 AC 719.
- See
Chassagnou v France [1999] ECHR 22; (1999) 29 EHRR 615 specifically on the topic of fox
hunting, and Gorzelik v Poland (2004) 38 EHRR 4 (quoted at fn 6
above).
- A
Butler & P Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary
(LexisNexis, 2005), 449.
11. R v
Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) at [70], [123], [203]-[204] and [271].
- See,
for example, C Chapman & J Mallon “Conflicts of Interest Faced by
Solicitors Instructed by Insurers to Conduct Litigation
on Behalf of
Insureds” (1996) 26 VUWLR 679, 706 (QC clauses as means of redressing
potential conflicts of interest).
- See,
for example, J Farmer “The Application of Competition Principles to the
Organization of the Legal Profession” (1994)
17 UNSWLR 285, 292ff and
General Council of the Bar (UK) Competition in Professions: The Bar’s
Consultation Paper in response to the OFT Report (2001), [5.10] & [6.12]
and the contrary views noted in, for example, Office of Fair Trading (UK) The
Future of Queen's Counsel (2003).
- See,
for example, Canada v JTI-MacDonald Corp [2007] 2 SCR 610, [43], and
Hansen, above, [116]ff per Tipping J.
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this
website, please note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the
Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to Parliament
under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the Lawyers
and Conveyancers Amendment Bill. It should not be used or acted upon for any
other purpose. The advice
does no more than assess whether the Bill complies
with the minimum guarantees contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The
release of this advice should not be taken to indicate that the Attorney-General
agrees with all aspects of it, nor does its release
constitute a general waiver
of legal professional privilege in respect of this or any other matter. Whilst
care has been taken to
ensure that this document is an accurate reproduction of
the advice provided to the Attorney-General, neither the Ministry of Justice
nor
the Crown Law Office accepts any liability for any errors or omissions.
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