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University of Otago Law Theses and Dissertations |
Last Updated: 25 September 2023
ASPIRATIONAL, OR CYNICAL?
Tenets and Tensions of the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect Principle
Charlotte Elizabeth Dickie
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Bachelor of Laws (Honours) at the University of Otago – Te Whare Wānanga o Ōtākou
October 2022
Acknowledgements
To Steve, my supervisor, for your empathy, wisdom and help in transforming a vague musing that human rights are interesting into a (hopefully) coherent dissertation topic.
To Callum, for your constant support, unwavering faith in my abilities and endless love despite my being a law student.
Finally, to my parents, for your love and encouragement, reflected especially by Mum’s willingness to undertake obscene amounts of proofreading. And, really, for everything.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 3
1 AS A SOFT LAW NORM 15
NARRATIVES 29
CONCLUSION 60
Introduction
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of this year captured worldwide attention and provoked fervent debate on the aspects of human rights involved. Intriguingly, the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle has been invoked by numerous actors both involved in and external to the conflict. Putin justified intervention on the basis it is the Kremlin’s responsibility to protect ethnic Russians from discrimination,1 with critics arguing this weaponisation of R2P language has formed a crucial aspect of Russia’s recent foreign policy.2 Simultaneously, other commentators and observers have argued the international community has an imperative, stemming from the same norm, to protect Ukrainians from human rights abuses.3 This unfolding discussion has illuminated fundamental discrepancies in the doctrine: how can something supposed to be used for protection be deployed in such starkly contrasting and seemingly contradictory ways? It has also highlighted the significance of this question in contemporary international law: has the UN doctrine, supposedly intended to constitute an aspirational norm protecting against genocide and other atrocities, been co-opted for cynical ends?
Given these issues, this dissertation will identify and examine key tensions underlying the UN’s R2P principle in light of its purpose and operative effect. It contends that, despite being constructed with aspirational aims of galvanising an international response to mass atrocities and fundamentally reshaping discourse on intervention, its effects in practice have shown a more cynical application. Part I of this dissertation provides an overview of the principle, sketching its development before turning to clarify its content and status in international law. This is crucial in foregrounding how R2P was proposed as an
1 Heather Ashby “How the Kremlin Distorts the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Principle” (7 April 2022)
United States Institute of Peace <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/how-kremlin-distorts- responsibility-protect-principle>.
2 John Reid, “Putin, Pretext, and the Dark Side of the “Responsibility to Protect” (27 May 2022) War on the Rocks” <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/putin-pretext-and-the-dark-side-of-the-responsibility-to- protect/>.
3 Charles H Camp, Kiran Nasir Gore and Lilia Chu “Nation States Must Comply With Their Responsibility
to Protect Ukraine Against the Russian Federation’s Ongoing War Crimes” (1 March 2022) World Financial Review <https://worldfinancialreview.com/nation-states-must-comply-with-their-responsibility- to-protect-ukraine-against-the-russian-federations-ongoing-war-crimes/>; Thomas Cottier “Memorandum on Ukraine and the Responsibility to Protect” (19 March 2022) Vereinigung die Scweiz in Europa
<https://suisse-en-europe.ch/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Memorandum-R2P-Ukraine-190322.pdf> at 1.
aspirational solution to issues plaguing humanitarian intervention, as well as explaining what exactly the doctrine is purported to do. Part II identifies and analyses two major tensions that speak to its aspirational goals and cynical deployment: firstly, how R2P legitimises both action and inaction depending upon whether it is in states’ geopolitical interests to intervene and, secondly, how the principle continues to perpetuate colonial constructs and narratives. Finally, Part III examines two case studies to demonstrate how these tensions operate: firstly, the First Libyan Civil War in 2011 and, secondly, the ongoing Tigray War in Ethiopia. While R2P has been invoked in both cases and each possesses colonial dimensions, its deployment solely in the former reflects strategic considerations at work.
I An Overview of R2P
The impetus for R2P stems from two related trends which shot to the fore of human rights debates in the late 20th and early 21st century.
The first impetus for R2P’s development was the aspiration to curb the extent to which external state actors’ national interests determined whether intervention occurred in the face of mass atrocities. Accounting for this are spectres of certain cases that loomed over UN debates and general coverage of humanitarian issues in the 1990s. Though conflicts in Somalia, Srebrenica and elsewhere impacted the conscience of the international community, two cases in particular stand out. First is the Rwandan genocide, where, though the systematic persecution and slaughter of the Tutsi minority ethnic group by the majority Hutu population in 1994 sparked international outrage, no state intervened and peacekeeping forces proved ineffective.4 This was despite abundant evidence revealing UN and state officials knew a genocide was occurring and that it could have been prevented with international assistance.5 The staggering death toll, as well as failures by the international community to even label the conflict a genocide, led to the international community’s subsequent conceptualisation of Rwanda as “a matter of Western shame”.6
A second case with profound implications for how humanitarian intervention was viewed arose in 1999. Though military action had not been approved by the Security Council, NATO justified its bombing of Yugoslavia on humanitarian grounds by claiming it was driven by Yugoslavia’s ethnic cleansing of Albanians.7 Critics disputed this, contending intervention substantially worsened the humanitarian crisis unfolding there and
4 Touko Piiparinen “Reconsidering the silence over the ultimate crime: a functional shift in crisis
management from the Rwandan genocide to Darfur” (2007) 9 J Genocide Res 71 at 72.
5 Gregory H Stanton “Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented?” (2004) 6 J Genocide R 211 at 225-226.
6 Nesam McMillan “‘Our’ Shame: International Responsibility for the Rwandan Genocide” (2008) 28 A Fem LJ 3 at 4.
7 Independent International Commission on Kosovo The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) at 4-5.
highlighting the contradictions inherent in describing “humanitarian bombings.”8 Many argued it was instead primarily motivated by desires to integrate Yugoslavia into the Western neoliberal social and economic system, with NATO’s campaign overall having “the major purpose of imposing a political settlement on the Yugoslav Government.”9 The Independent International Commission’s Report on Kosovo concluded the bombing had been “illegal but legitimate” given its exceptional nature, with the case overall reflecting “use of military force may become necessary to defend human rights. But the grounds for its use... urgently need clarification.”10
These cases, with Rwanda reflecting the United Nation’s immobilisation and Yugoslavia reflecting cynical mobilisation for ulterior motives, produced a growing feeling more was needed to curb humanitarian intervention from being based upon the political will of states. As Ramesh Thakur, one of the chief architects of R2P, notes, conflicts in the 1990s “vividly highlighted... flaws of the then-existing normative architecture.”11 Hence, the emotive call of “never again” pervaded discourse on R2P’s development.
A further impetus for R2P’s development was criticisms humanitarian intervention was colonial in discourse and practice. The notion states possess obligations when mass atrocities are committed elsewhere has been echoed throughout history. Orthodox narratives trace its origins back to 16th and 17th century theorists like Hugo Grotius and Francisco de Vitoria,12 who, in expanding upon the Christian doctrine of the just war, were contended to have made the “first authoritative statement... exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when outrage upon humanity begins.” 13 Others located its
8 Ian Brownlie and C J Apperley “Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Further Memorandum on the International Law
Aspects” (2000) 49 ICLQ 905 at 910.
9 Ian Brownlie and C J Apperley “Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects” (2000) 49 ICLQ 878 at 897-898.
10 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, above n 7, at 4, 298.
11 Ramesh Thakur Reviewing the Responsibility to Protect: Origins, Implementation and Controversies
(Routledge, Abingdon (Oxfordshire), 2019) at 122.
12 Simon Chesterman Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) at 9; Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005) at 15-16. 13 Hersch Lauterpacht “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” (1946) 23 BYBIL 1 at 46.
inception in statements by 19th century classical liberals,14 epitomised by John Stuart Mill’s claim that, in the case of a “protracted civil war” where “the victorious side cannot hope to keep down the vanquished but by severities repugnant to humanity... neighbouring nations... are warranted in demanding that the contest shall cease.”15 By the 19th century, these kinds of external interventions were attributed to a “right of humanitarian intervention”, entailing a belief that states or groups of states possessed a right to use coercive measures, including military action, against another state to protect civilians from mass atrocities.16
In the 1990s, amidst the growing prominence of TWAIL as a critical school of jurisprudence and postcolonial theory generally, the concept of humanitarian intervention was increasingly scrutinised. Such scholars argued it had historically imposed a Eurocentric and paternalistic “standard of civilisation”, framing developing states as “morally handicapped or in a state or moral infancy”, with intervention justified on the basis they “deserve[d] a benevolent despot who [would] protect and look after them.”17 Its historical practical implications were also criticised. Fabian Klose notes Britain’s colonial penetration of Africa in the 19th century was justified on the basis of humanitarian concerns as the “banner of ‘abolition’... virtually gave them carte blanche under international law to interfere in the affairs of African states.”18
Decolonisation in the 20th century sparked what Richard Drayton terms a “new Westphalian moment of proliferating claims to exclusive national rights.”19 Central to this were principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality of states, enshrined in
14 Partha Chatterjee “Empire after Globalisation” (2004) 39 EPW 4155 at 4158.
15 John Stuart Mill A Few Words on Non-Intervention (London, 1859) as cited in Evan Luard Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas About International Society (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1992) at 182.
16 Gareth Evans The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Brookings Institution Press, Washington (DC), 2008) at 35.
17 Thakur, above n 11, at 84.
18 Fabian Klose In the Cause of Humanity: A History of Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2022) at 161.
19 Richard Drayton “Beyond Humanitarian Imperialism: The Dubious Origins of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ and Some Rules for its Future” in Bronwen Everill and Josiah David Kaplan (eds) The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (Hampshire), 2013) 217 at 221.
articles of the UN Charter and instruments like the Declaration on Friendly Relations.20 While some contended this caused a positive discursive shift in humanitarian intervention’s imperial connotations, postcolonial scholars considered little to have changed.21 Costas Douzinas contends humanitarian intervention remained yet another articulation of the “White Man’s Burden”, arguing “if the colonial prototypes were the missionary and the colonial administrator, the postcolonial are the human rights campaigner and the NGO operative.”22 This is evidenced by the problematic discourse surrounding cases of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. In Rwanda, conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi was framed as a “tribal conflict” that led to a “resurgence of ancient ethnic hatreds.”23 This simultaneously cast Rwandans as uncivilised barbarians in comparison to the enlightened West and obscured the roots of the genocide.24 In reality, German and, later, Belgian imperialistic policies had constructed ethnic differences leading to simmering resentment between the two populations.25 Similarly, narratives around the Kosovo War that portrayed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a “rogue or failed” state and NATO as a democracy-wielding beacon of humanity masked how, as Orford demonstrates, “the [Western] project of economic restructuring and liberalisation” created “conditions in which... hatreds were inflamed.”26 Thus, postcolonial scholars contended humanitarian intervention continued to promote imperial discourse in the 1990s, as it had historically.
20 Charter of the United Nations, art 2; Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA Res 2625 (1970), art 1.
21 W Michael Reisman “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” (1990) 84 AJIL 866 at 867.
22 Costas Douzinas Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge, New York, 2007) at 83.
23 Stephen Livingston and Todd Eachus “Rwanda: US Policy and Television Coverage” in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds) The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (Transaction Publishers, Piscataway (NJ), 1999) 209 at 215.
24 Jeremy Sarkin and Carly Fowler “The Responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent Genocide:
Lessons to Be Learned from the Role of the International Community and the Media during the Rwandan Genocide and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia” (2010) 33 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev 35 at 75.
25 At 41–42.
26 Anne Orford “Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism” (1999) 10 EJIL 679 at 681-682.
Criticisms were also levelled at humanitarian intervention’s operation in practice. For postcolonial states, sovereignty was a powerful protection against Western imperialism.27 However, this was increasingly eroded by interventions throughout the post-Cold War era, reflected by NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia’s framing as illegal but legitimate in international law.28 As Aidan Hehir notes, justifications behind such cases were “reminiscent of the arguments proffered by European empires in the 19th century” and raised the prospect of a “return to colonial habits and practices.”29 As prominent Western commentators contended that only the sovereignty of democratically governed nations should be inviolable,30 postcolonial states and scholars sought to have the principle of non-interference with state sovereignty reaffirmed in international law, or at least better ensured through controls on intervention.31 This uneasy relationship between sovereignty and human rights, revealed by the practice of humanitarian intervention, thus posed a challenge widely considered to require resolution via international law.
Given these issues, states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), scholars of international law and the public increasingly scrutinised the ethics, legality and effectiveness of humanitarian intervention. Shifting terminology from describing a “right to intervene” and providing mechanisms controlling intervention was considered necessary to counteract criticisms of humanitarian intervention being imperial and strategically motivated.32 This would provide the impetus for R2P’s development.
In the wake of these challenges, Secretary-General Kofi Annan posed a question to UN member states:33
27 Aidan Hehir Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010) at 121.
28 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, above n 7, at 4.
29 Hehir, above n 27, at 121.
30 Reisman, above n 21, at 871.
31 Thakur, above n 11, at 84.
32 Evans, above n 16, at 33.
33Report of the Secretary-General “We the Peoples”: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century
UN Doc DPI/2103 (3 April 2000) at 48.
...if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda... to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?
Pursuing an acceptable answer to this question, the Canadian government sponsored the establishment of an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). After a year of consultations, the ICISS published its seminal report The Responsibility to Protect in 2001.
From the outset of the report, Rwanda’s pervasive influence in the international community’s collective memory was evident. In discussing the way forward, the ICISS warned:34
When the call goes out to the community of states for action, that call will be answered. There must never again be mass killing or ethnic cleansing. There must be no more Rwandas.
Terminological concerns were also reflected. At the heart of the report was a “necessary recharacterisation” of Westphalian sovereignty from the notion of “sovereignty as control” to “sovereignty as responsibility”.35 The report proposed states possess three responsibilities: to prevent, to react, and, finally, to rebuild.36 Given concerns of overreach stemming from cases like Yugoslavia, it also outlined principles that should act as thresholds for military intervention to be deemed legitimate.37 Significantly, the ICISS invited the P5 to commit themselves to not casting a veto in cases of mass atrocities unless their vital national interests were at stake.38
R2P was contended to be distinct from humanitarian intervention in a multitude of ways. Importantly, it was perceived as less militaristic than humanitarian intervention, which,
34 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect
(International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001) at 70.
35 At 13.
36 At 17.
37 At 32-37.
38 At 51.
because of its terminological connotations and history, was considered to “[load] the dice in favour of intervention before the argument has even begun.”39 Contrastingly, R2P vested primary responsibility with the individual state as opposed to those seeking to intervene, serving to recognise and reinforce the importance of state sovereignty. Another crucial distinction was R2P did not merely emphasise the importance of reaction by the international community, but also preventing and rebuilding in the face of mass atrocities.40 Overall, the tone of the report was exceptionally aspirational and optimistic, one ICISS member warning that:41
would-be perpetrators of mass atrocities should fear the growth of universal justice as a result of which they will ultimately have nowhere else to run, no place left to hide.
Whether R2P would make this lofty aim capable of being actualised, however, was another matter.
The ICISS report met with a multitude of responses. The UK, Canada and Germany strongly advocated for R2P, while most other members of the Group of Western European and Other states were broadly supportive.42 Amongst African states, the ICISS’ articulation of R2P was publicly endorsed only by South Africa and Tanzania.43 In a speech, Benjamin Mkapa, president of the latter, declared “we must now stop misusing the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states to mark incidents of poor governance and unacceptable human rights abuses.”44 Again, the memory of Rwanda and similar crises clearly weighed on those states who rushed to support R2P and voiced their optimism about a new era of rights enforcement.
39 At 16.
40 At 17.
41 Ramesh Thakur “Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from the ICISS” (2002) 33 Sec Dialogue 323 at 331.
42 Hehir, above n 27, at 117.
43 Alex J Bellamy “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit” (2006) 20 Ethics Intl Aff (UK) 143 at 162.
44 Benjamin Mkapa, President of Tanzania, “Welcoming Statement” (address to the First Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes, Dar es Salaam, 19 November 2004).
Others were sceptical. The United States was concerned R2P could require it to deploy its forces in ways contrary to its national interests.45 It also expressed hesitation regarding the threshold requirements, considering them to potentially limit “its flexibility in deciding when and where to use force to promote the ‘common good’.”46 Thus, its agreement was conditional on R2P creating neither a legal duty to intervene, nor precluding the possibility of action that had not been authorised by the Security Council.47 For China and Russia, it was crucial that any action under the principle require the Security Council’s authorisation.48 Both states repeatedly insisted their agreement was contingent upon this throughout debates.49
Postcolonial states and countries negatively impacted by Western development echoed different concerns shaped by stigmas surrounding humanitarian intervention. While the majority of African nations did not individually comment on the ICISS’ proposal, a few, including Egypt and Algeria, explicitly opposed it.50 The Non-Aligned Movement rejected the idea of a R2P, contending it amounted to what Alex Bellamy summarises as an “argument for lawmaking by the Western elite.”51 Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela, argued it signalled an effort through which “a few countries try to reinterpret the principles of international law in order to impose new doctrines.”52 Similarly, Malaysia’s UN representative argued the new doctrine imposed a “potential reincarnation of humanitarian intervention, for which there was no basis in international law.”53 The
45 Letter from John Robert Bolton (United States Ambassador to the United Nations) to United Nations
Member States regarding the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (30 August 2005).
46 Bellamy, above n 43, at 162.
47 At 151–152.
48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms” (7 June 2005)
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/gjs_665170/gjzzyhy_665174/2594_66517 6/2602_665192/200506/t20050607_598303.html>; Bellamy, above n 43, at 151.
49 Bellamy, above n 43, at 151.
50 At 162.
51 At 147.
52 Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela “Statement on R2P” (speech at the General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 15 September 2005).
53 Radzi Rahman, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations and Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement “Concerning the Draft Outcome Document” (speech at the Informal Meeting of the Plenary of the General Assembly, New York, 21 June 2005).
Group of 77 contended greater emphasis should be placed on principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty, though it did not explicitly reject the principle.54
Ultimately, the ICISS report and states’ reactions formed a crucial step in the development of R2P. Based on the proposed obligations enshrined within it and the resulting reservations and objections, the doctrine was reworked until it was finally debated upon and adopted at the 2005 World Summit.
Though numerous articulations of R2P’s objectives and parameters have been made in documents issued by the UN, two in particular are generally acknowledged as authoritatively outlining its contents.
The existence of R2P was first agreed upon by member states at the 2005 UN World Summit.55 Following this, it was unanimously endorsed via a General Assembly resolution.56 Paragraphs 138 and 139 essentially act as the “constitution” of R2P.57 The former stipulates that each individual state possesses a primary responsibility “to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, and that the international community should encourage and help them achieve this.58 Paragraph 139 designates that the international community “has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with... the Charter, to help to protect populations” from these crimes.59 However, if peaceful means are inadequate, the international community is responsible for taking
54 Stafford Neil, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations and Chairman of the Group of
77, on the Report of the Secretary-General Entitled ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’” (6 April 2005), The Group of 77 at the United Nations
<https://www.g77.org/Speeches/040605.htm>.
55 2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1 (2005), at 138-139.
56 At 138–139.
57 Thakur, above n 11, at 157.
58 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 138.
59 At 139.
collective “timely and decisive” action “through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter.”60
The content of R2P as endorsed at the World Summit reflects fundamental changes shaped by states’ qualms with the ICISS report. Importantly, the document contains no criteria to guide decision-making on whether intervention should occur. Instead, R2P’s application is restricted to crimes largely existing already under international law.61 It also entails no mention as to how intervention not authorised by the Security Council should be dealt with, or whether it is even permitted, and does not impose a code of conduct for veto use. Furthermore, whereas the ICISS report suggested national authorities must be “unable” or “unwilling” to protect their populations,62 the Outcome document instead declared they must be “manifestly failing”.63
Though the World Summit created R2P, its scope and contents would not be clarified further until 2009 in Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”. This document is generally recognised as the most widely accepted description of the doctrine, though it essentially just reframes the consensus reached in 2005.64
This expression of R2P is significant in envisaging the doctrine as constituted by three pillars. Pillar 1 outlines each state has the “responsibility to protect its populations... from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”65 This includes
60 At 139.
61 For example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (signed 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951), Geneva Conventions (signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 12 February 1950), and Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987).
62 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, above n 34, at 17.
63 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 139.
64 Thakur, above n 11, at 158.
65 Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect UN Doc A/63/677 (12 January 2009) at 11.
preventive action.66 Pillar 2 highlights the responsibility of the wider international community “to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.”67 Pillar 3, the most contentious aspect of R2P, signifies a commitment by the international community to “timely and decisive” collective action where a state is “manifestly failing to protect its populations.”68 However, the Secretary-General emphasises this does not necessarily entail military intervention.69
This report confirmed the fundamental changes made to the ICISS’ articulation of R2P in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, reiterating R2P only applies to four mass atrocity crimes and confirming the absence of formal principles to guide Security Council decision-making on when the use of force is appropriate. However, it also addresses concerns raised by states in subsequent annual debates on R2P as to its perceived erosion of principles of sovereignty and non-interference.70 Hence, Ban emphasises R2P is an “ally of sovereignty, not an adversary” that seeks to “strengthen... not weaken it.”71
1 As a soft law norm
Like most of international law, whether R2P is a norm is contentious. However, a persuasive argument can be made it operates as a soft law norm. While there is no conclusive definition as to what soft law norms entail, given the contentiousness of their scope, effect and whether they even exist, they are generally characterised as expression of “a preference and not an obligation that states should act, or should refrain from acting, in a specified manner” that consequently often exert political influence.72
66 At 10.
67 At 11
68 At 11.
69 At 11.
70 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect – The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An Assessment” (August 2009) <https://www.globalr2p.org/wp- content/uploads/2020/01/2009-UNGA-Debate-Summary.pdf>.
71 Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, above n 65, at 10.
72 Joseph Gold Interpretation: The IMF and International Law (Kluwer Law International, London, 1996) at 301.
This effect is evident at the level of the UN. As of October 2022, it has been referenced in 87 Security Council resolutions, 31 General Assembly resolutions, and 67 Human Rights Council resolutions (addressing both regional and thematic issues).73 The General Assembly has held many informal interactive dialogues on R2P as well as open debates, each of which have been preceded by the release of an annual report by the Secretary- General.74 It is also apparent at a domestic level. Since 2009, more than 134 states and 6 regional organisations have participated in interactive dialogues on R2P and discussions in other human rights forums.75 Anne Orford highlights R2P has increasingly been referenced in domestic policy statements as relevant “to questions of international order, development and security”.76 This is evidenced by statements like that of United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2007 that “[Britain] now rightly recognise[s] our responsibility to protect behind borders where there are crimes against humanity”,77 and Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith’s declaration “Australia supports the R2P principle [and is] committed to making the principle central to conflict prevention and resolution.78” Other commentators note the doctrine plays a central role in civil society, reflected by its enthusiastic adoption by numerous human rights organisations.79 Thus, though critics like Spencer Zifcak argue R2P is “too fragile and uncertain” to constitute an international law norm, state and non-state actors recognise R2P as wielding some effect at both international and domestic levels.80
Furthermore, while R2P intentionally does not impose any duties upon states to intervene and thus the force of its prescribed “responsibility to react” is unclear, responsibilities
73 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Resources on R2P” (26 September 2022)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/>.
74 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “What is R2P?” <https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is- r2p/>.
75 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.
76 Anne Orford International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2011) at 17.
77 Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom “Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech” (London, 12 November 2007).
78 Stephen Smith, Minister for Foreign Affairs (Australia) “A New Era of Engagement with the World” (speech given to the Sydney Institute, Sydney, 9 August 2008).
79 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Case Summary” <https://www.globalr2p.org/about/>. 80Spencer Zifcak “The Responsibility to Protect” in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) 484 at 515.
relating to the necessity for individual states to protect their populations build upon foundations embedded in international law that are already well established, clearly defined and widely accepted. Under customary international law, states already possess “obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”81 These are also prescribed in conventional law through instruments like the Genocide Convention and Geneva Conventions.82 Though ethnic cleansing is hazier in its definition, the Secretary-General has recognised it “may constitute one of the other three crimes.”83 Thus, as Alicia Bannon contends, “the Summit agreement strengthens the legal justification for limited forms of unilateral and regional action.”84 This further reflects the influence R2P exerts in international law.
It is controversial whether soft law norms in themselves constitute international law. Positivists view international law’s sources as conclusively listed in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.85 However, this position has been increasingly challenged as approaches to, and views of, law-making in the international system evolve. A more aspirational approach is increasingly permeating academic discourse on this issue. As Harmen van der Wilt notes, “the function of international law [is changing], from a retrospective assessment of what the law is to a programmatic and future-looking approach [of] what the law should be.”86 Thus, commentators like Malgosia Fitzmaurice contend article 38 was “neither meant to fulfil the grand role of a meta-law, nor to serve as a definite statement of the formal sources of international law” and that, with the “advent of potential new sources of international law”, it “is now far from [being] considered... ‘finite’.”87
81 Jennifer M Welsh “Turning Words into Deeds? The Implementation of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’”
(2010) 2 GR2P 149 at 150.
82 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art 1; Geneva Conventions.
83 Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, above n 65, at 3. 84 Alicia L Bannon “The Responsibility to Protect: The UN World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism” [2006] YaleLawJl 6; (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1157 at 1158.
85 Ezequiel Heffes “Some Reflections on the Theory of Sources of International Law: Re-Examining
Customary International Law” (2018) 51 Israel L Rev 485 at 485.
86 Harmen van der Wilt “State Practice as Element of Customary International Law: A White Knight in International Criminal Law?” [2019] Int C L R 784 at 787.
87 Malgosia Fitzmaurice “The History of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: The Journey from the Past to the Present” in Samantha Besson and Jean D’Aspremont (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) 217 at 228-229.
Given international law’s capacity to recognise all sorts of norms is being increasingly recognised, R2P aligns with the idea state and non-state actors’ aspirational intentions define and create soft law norms. States have repeatedly referred to the international community’s “moral obligation”, “moral responsibility” and “moral burden” to prevent and react to mass atrocities in debates on the doctrine.88 Ultimately, these developments and the influence R2P wields substantiate Orford’s conclusion the doctrine is a “significant normative development.”89
Criticisms “humanitarian intervention” perpetuated colonial narratives and desires to curb external state actors’ strategic interests determining whether intervention occurred served as catalysts for R2P’s development. By the turn of the century, cases like Yugoslavia and Rwanda led to contemplation of how the international community could be galvanised to respond to mass atrocities, and how such action could be institutionalised through the UN. The ICISS’ proposal states possess a “responsibility to protect” was viewed as a compelling answer to this dilemma, reflected by its adoption at the 2005 World Summit. However, the political compromises required for its adoption were starkly reflected by the time of the Secretary-General’s 2009 report conceptualising the doctrine as constituted by three pillars. Overall, R2P likely constitutes a soft law norm, exerting political influence at both domestic and international levels.
Having foregrounded R2P’s development, content and status, the next section identifies and analyses two tensions underpinning the doctrine that stem from its aspirational intentions and cynical operation.
88 For example, see Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, above n 70.
89 Orford, above n 76, at 34.
II Key Tensions Underpinning R2P
This section identifies and examines two key tensions underpinning R2P in light of its purpose and effect in practice: firstly, its continued legitimation of both action and inaction depending on geopolitical considerations; and, secondly, its perpetuation of colonial constructs and narratives. Analysing these tensions reveals that, despite R2P’s aspirational intentions, the doctrine is plagued by many of the same criticisms levelled at humanitarian intervention. Thus, its effect in practice is more cynically motivated.
The first key tension underlying R2P is that it continues to legitimise both action and inaction depending upon whether it is in state actors’ geopolitical interests to intervene. This is demonstrable in how R2P’s vague terminology operates, and through its deployment being formulated to privilege the P5.
R2P’s vague terminology enables states to legitimately justify action or inaction depending upon their national interests. Its lack of threshold requirements and definition of what constitutes a “mass atrocity” mean political will still determines whether intervention occurs.
Humanitarian intervention was frequently criticised for presenting the international community with a stark choice between action and inaction in cases of mass atrocities, the ultimate decision whether to intervene typically depending upon external actors’ interests. R2P attempted to curb such critiques, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans stressing the “whole point of embracing the new language” was its purported capacity to “generate an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscience-shocking cases in a way that ‘right to intervene’ language simply could not.”90 Importantly, the doctrine sought to expand conceptions of intervention from the coercive, militaristic forms that had historically
90 Evans, above n 16, at 65.
plagued humanitarian efforts.91 In these ways, R2P was intended to depart from the “questionable state-centred motivations” that drove historical invocations of the right to humanitarian intervention, instead imposing upon the international community a “permanent duty to protect individuals against abusive behaviour.”92
Despite these lofty aims, R2P’s intrinsic ambiguities still enable states to legitimately both approve and reject its use depending on their strategic interests. R2P’s adoption at the 2005 World Summit was conditional on it not imposing any duty on states to intervene. Similarly, the General Assembly failed to adopt any threshold requirements as to when R2P’s invocation for coercive action is appropriate, instead merely requiring the Security Council approve deployment of the responsibility to react.93 Consequently, even the UN Secretary-General has acknowledged the wide-ranging “different views [of the] Security Council... in deciding whether to authorise the use of military means.”94 Thus, R2P’s fashioning into a politically acceptable doctrine has produced extreme indeterminacy as to when it applies.
One implication of this entails a “Trojan horse” type critique: given R2P imposes no threshold requirements, states can invoke the doctrine to claim there is a need to prevent, rebuild following or react to mass atrocities even in tenuous cases.95 Patrick Quinton- Brown notes “dissenter” states at the UN like Brazil, Zimbabwe and South Africa have repeatedly articulated concerns other members may “brandish R2P language... in order to justify politically opportune interventions under the false guise of mass atrocity prevention.”96 India has been a prominent exponent of this view, declaring in one debate “we are all aware... there have been attempts to disingenuously use responsibility to protect, including at the highest levels in the international community.”97 R2P’s vague
91 At 40-41.
92 Louise Arbour “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Rev Intl Stud 445 at 448.
93 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 139.
94 Report of the Secretary-General on Mobilising Collective Action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect UN Doc A/70/999 – S/2016/620 (22 July 2016) at 23.
95 Patrick Quinton-Brown “Mapping Dissent: The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics” (2013) 5 GR2P 260 at 267.
96 At 267.
97 Record of the General Assembly’s 99th Plenary Meeting UN Doc A/63/PV.99 (24 July 2009) at 26.
terminology thus means the principle offers no solution to historical allegations interventions are based on external states’ cynical motivations.
This vagueness also facilitates inaction by states. As Hehir notes, lack of clarity as to what actually constitutes a “mass atrocity” requiring intervention and the doctrine’s conceptualisation of sovereignty as responsibility enables states to claim, “in the spirit of R2P, host states have the primary responsibility to deal with intra-state crises and should be left alone to do so.”98 This utilisation of R2P language is evident in cases where external state actors lack geostrategic incentives to engage in preventing, rebuilding following or reacting to mass atrocities. For example, in debates on whether R2P should be invoked to respond to mass atrocities in Darfur, a region lacking economic and strategic significance, states opposing intervention legitimised their position through characterising the issue as an internal problem to be resolved by the Sudanese government. 99 As one United Kingdom Foreign Office Official declared, “the best way to deliver security to the people of Darfur is to get those with the primary responsibility for it to do it... the government of Sudan.”100 Thus, though the Secretary-General contended in his 2016 report that the doctrine “is designed... to raise the political costs of failing to act in the face of [mass atrocities]”, it does not seem to have done so in practice.101
Accordingly, the issue of political will, arguably the chief criticism made of humanitarian intervention, persists under R2P. This has been to such an extent that successive reports have recognised it poses a fundamental barrier to the principle’s effective operation. In 2019, Secretary-General António Guterres stated “stronger political will is... necessary to make the [R2P] a living reality” amidst a “troubling decline in international commitment to multilateralism.”102 Similarly, the Secretary-General’s 2017 report detailed the issues
98 Thakur, above n 11, at 210.
99 Hehir, above n 27, at 123.
100 At 123.
101 Report of the Secretary-General on Mobilising Collective Action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect, above n 94, at 63.
102 Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: lessons learned for prevention UN Doc A/73/898 – S/2019/463 (10 June 2019) at 7.
this posed specifically in relation to the responsibility of the international community to prevent mass atrocities, noting there was “still too little will to operationalise [the duty]”, especially given “climate[s] of fiscal restraint in many countries.”103 Therefore, R2P has diminished the political costs of failing to act in comparison to humanitarian intervention, as doing so can be justified on the basis it is the host state’s responsibility, and thus further enabled the UN’s paralysis in the face of crises.
Proponents of R2P contend political will is inevitable, and the doctrine recognises as much. Thakur states “the interplay between material self-interest and humanitarian norms in driving [great powers’] action” is undeniable, agreeing with Roland Paris’ critique that “unless humanitarian operations are at least partly rooted in self-interest, intervening states may lack the political commitment and resolve to complete the humanitarian tasks they undertake.”104 He purports R2P accounts for this, stating “the primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering.”105 This emphasis humanitarian necessity must be the “primary purpose” is intended to curb R2P’s abuse by self-interested states, ensuring political will cannot be the determining factor in whether intervention occurs.
However, invocations of R2P arguably obscure the extent to which political will underlies a given intervention to a greater extent than ever before. Historically, justifications for coercive action were linked to states’ sovereign rights to claim a “right of humanitarian intervention.” As Philip Cunliffe notes, this came “with all the political costs and deterrents [of] claiming such a ‘right’ (such as arousing suspicion of self- serving motives).”106 R2P was intended to depoliticise claims to intervention, instead involving appeals to higher moral and universal values in articulating an abstract duty to protect humanity from mass atrocities. However, Chris Brown notes this attempt to
103 Report of the Secretary-General on fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and
the responsibility to protect UN Doc A/68/947 – S/2014/449 (11 July 2014) at 73, 75.
104 Thakur, above n 11, at 148; Roland Paris “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention” (2014) 21 Intl Peacekeeping 569 at 573.
105 Ramesh Thakur The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) at 258.
106 Philip Cunliffe “Dangerous duties: power, paternalism and the ‘responsibility to protect’” (2010) 36 Rev Intl Stud 79 at 86.
“avoid... the toxic politics of previous approaches to state intervention” is problematic given intervention “is inherently a political act”, and “to work on the assumption that politics can be removed from the picture is to promote an illusion.”107 The result is that, as Cunliffe illuminates, invoking R2P “allows states to claim a higher legitimacy than their own political will in pursuit of their aims... to claim they are acting on behalf of humanity itself” while doing so entirely at their own discretion.108 Furthermore, as Hehir argues, R2P’s lack of threshold requirements means the “charge of indeterminacy” can be applied to determinations of whether “human protection is the ‘primary purpose’ behind a state’s desire to intervene.”109 As with humanitarian intervention, there are no mechanisms within R2P to hold states accountable for intervening or even to interrogate their motives. Use of the doctrine thus obscures the geopolitical motives driving intervention to an even greater extent than humanitarian intervention ever did.
Despite the vagueness inherent in R2P terminology, others argue interventions under R2P are not necessarily coercive. On this view, states’ self-interested invocations of the doctrine do not pose the same threat of worsening humanitarian crises that humanitarian intervention did. R2P sought to impose duties to prevent and rebuild alongside the responsibility to react and place equal emphasis on each.110 As the Secretary-General noted in his 2016 report, “the three pillars are mutually supporting.”111 Mónica Serrano illuminates the “implicit metaphor” is thus “an edifice: a structure that relies on the equal size, strength and viability” of each responsibility.112 Proponents of R2P, including within the UN, have been at pains to emphasise the responsibility to react does not necessarily entail military action, the Secretary-General emphasising “the choice is not between
107 Chris Brown “The Antipolitical Theory of the Responsibility to Protect” (2013) 5 GR2P 423 at 425.
108 Cunliffe, above n 106, at 94, 96.
109 Hehir, above n 27, at 120.
110 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 139; Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, above n 65, at 12.
111 Report of the Secretary-General on Mobilising Collective Action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect, above n 94, at 20.
112 Mónica Serrano “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: The Power of R2P Talk” (2010) 2 GR2P 167 at 171.
inaction and the use of force.”113 Rather, potential forms of reaction encompass “political, diplomatic and humanitarian means” as well.114
However, such assertions do not translate into R2P’s operation in practice or discourse. Much greater emphasis is typically placed on the responsibility to react and its capacity for military intervention. During his tenure as Secretary-General, Ban acknowledged “the third pillar... is still commonly perceived as being solely concerned with the use of force” and that: 115
despite considerable evidence... dialogue and preventive diplomacy play an important role in encouraging States to fulfil their responsibility to protect, the international community systematically continues to underinvest in these tools.
This contradicts claims R2P has shifted the focus of humanitarian efforts from military intervention to more peaceful forms. Rather, numerous commentators have raised concerns the principle has given rise to a problematic “new militarism”.116 Mary Ellen O’Connell argues “military intervention... was the one concrete change to international law” made by R2P.117 Given this, she highlights the doctrine’s proponents, including Thakur and others involved in its creation, have repeatedly cited it to contemplate military intervention in places like Kenya, Nepal, Sudan and Zimbabwe.118 Thus, coercive intervention clearly remains central to R2P in both perception and practice.
R2P’s vague terminology means it can be used to justify any kind of response to mass atrocities, which is problematic given the international community routinely defaults to military solutions. In this way, R2P carries all the threats humanitarian intervention historically posed.
113 Report of the Secretary-General on a vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect UN Doc A/69/981 – S/2015/500 (13 July 2015) at 38.
114 At 38.
115 At 38, 28.
116 Mary Ellen O’Connell “Responsibility to peace: A critique of R2P” in Philip Cunliffe (ed) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Taylor and Francis, New York, 2011) 71 at 71.
117 At 79.
118 At 76.
Again, a key tension underlying R2P is its legitimisation of both action and inaction. This is also demonstrable in that its deployment has been formulated to privilege the P5, their superior positions on the Security Council better equipping them to ensure action, and vetoes enabling them to facilitate inaction, depending on their national interests.
R2P sought to rectify criticisms humanitarian intervention was abused by great powers by encouraging the institutionalisation of any proposed action through the UN. Thus, “timely and decisive collective action” under pillar three requires the Security Council’s authorisation.119 However, this means the P5 possess a superior capacity to legitimate any intervention they desire. This speaks to issues with both the structure and working methods of the Security Council. Jonathan Graubart notes its decision-making process is largely shaped by political as opposed to normative deliberations.120 Accordingly, “drawing from [their] abundant military power, economic resources, and geostrategic influence”, the P5 are able to wield “a mix of incentives and threats to elicit support for [their] agenda[s]” amongst other member states.121 Similarly, Bellamy stresses assessments of factual elements and evidence of humanitarian crises where R2P may be applicable are never politically neutral.122 The economic, political and military power of the P5 means it is more likely any coercive action they propose will be legitimated. 123 Consequently, the political interests of the P5 typically determine whether Security Council authorisation is given, not the substantive merits of each case. A UN report on the veto notes “elected members [of the Council] frequently complain... they are treated like second class citizens... and... often believe that their input is not valid.”124
Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN contended R2P’s invocation in such a
119 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 139; Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, above n 65, at 49.
120Jonathan Graubart “R2P and Pragmatic Liberal Interventionism: Values in the Service of Interests” (2013) 35 Hum Rts Q 69 at 86.
121 At 86.
122 Bellamy, above n 43, at 149.
123 At 149.
124 Security Council Report “The Veto” (19 October 2015)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_3_the_veto_2015.pdf> at 7.
forum has the effect of “legitimising and reinforcing the pervasive inequality... of security, power and wealth, that characterises our times.”125 Overall, this demonstrates the principle has enabled great powers’ interests to exert influence over whether action is taken in the face of mass atrocities to a greater extent than ever before. That the operation of R2P’s third pillar occurs through the forum of the Security Council essentially equips the P5 with the sole capacity to authorise coercive action, simultaneously obscuring their ability to do so by representing decisions as those of the Security Council generally.
The requirement coercive action receive authorisation from the Security Council also means the P5 can veto action by the international community. The ICISS originally proposed a code of conduct for veto use, considering it “unconscionable... one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern.”126 Even though this proposed code provided a loophole for the P5, enabling them to veto matters threatening their “vital national interests”, it was dropped to secure political agreement.127 The continued ability of the P5 to exert such a power both further entrenches the uneven international hierarchy of power and means the paralysis observed in the wake of crises like Rwanda, a key criticism of humanitarian intervention, continues to afflict the UN despite the shift to R2P. Notable examples include Russia and China’s vetoing of a draft resolution condemning the use of force by Syrian authorities in 2011,128 and a draft resolution demanding the government of Myanmar cease military attacks on civilians living in ethnic minority regions in 2007.129 In the wake of ongoing immobilisation, Ban’s 2016 report on R2P concluded “vetoes by permanent members, whether used or threatened, preclude the identification and pursuit of a common purpose”, the crisis in Syria illustrating “the impact of this deadlock on the behaviour of the warring parties, who can feel emboldened by the lack of strong international engagement.”130
125 Record of the General Assembly’s 86th Plenary Meeting UN Doc A/59/PV.86 (6 April 2005) at 5.
126 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, above n 34, at 51.
127 Bellamy, above n 43, at 155.
128 France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution UN Doc S/2011/612 (4 October 2011).
129 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution
UN Doc S/2007/14 (12 January 2007).
130 Report of the Secretary-General on Mobilising Collective Action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect, above n 94, at 16.
This aspect of R2P has generated such opposition that a movement to restrain it has emerged, termed the “responsibility not to veto” (RN2V).131 Significantly, in 2015 France, with the support of Mexico, launched the ‘Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocity,’ which aimed at securing the voluntary restraint of the P5’s veto use when faced with mass atrocities.132 As of October 2022, 104 member states and 2 UN observer missions have signed in support of the declaration.133 Despite broad support for RN2V existing within the international community generally and the United Kingdom’s increasing inclination to countenance restraint,134 Justin Morris and Nicholas Wheeler highlight Russia, China and the United States’ “unwillingness... to accept calls for curtailment of their voting privileges is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.”135 In April this year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requiring that, when a veto is cast by the Security Council in general, the Assembly convene a formal meeting to debate the matter.136 This aligns to some extent with the ICISS’ original proposal P5 members publicly justify their position when seeking to bar intervention.137 However, it still fails to impose practical constraints on veto use and, given their vocal opposition to such measures, it is unlikely the initiative will pose much of a deterrent to the P5 where their geopolitical interests are at stake in cases of mass atrocities. Overall, these issues reflect the doctrine’s continuing inadequacy in ensuring the international community “never again” ignores victims of humanitarian crises.
131 Justin Morris and Nicholas Wheeler “The Responsibility Not to Veto” in Alex J Bellamy and Timothy
Dunne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 227 at 228.
132 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities” (1 August 2015) <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/political-declaration-on- suspension-of-veto-powers-in-cases-of-mass-atrocities/>.
133 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “List of Supporters of the Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto” (13 July 2022) <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-supporters-of-the- political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto/>.
134 United Nations Association (UK) “UN Security Council and the responsibility to protect: Voluntary restraint of the veto in situations of mass atrocity” (15 October 2015)
<https://una.org.uk/sites/default/files/Veto%20R2P%20code%20of%20conduct%20briefing%20October% 202015%20update_0.pdf>.
135 Morris and Wheeler, above n 131, at 228.
136 Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council GA Res 76/262 (2022), at 1.
137 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, above n 34, at 51.
Some argue R2P’s susceptibility to great power interests does not undermine its value, contending its power lies more in its rhetorical effects than practical operation. Sassan Gholiagha argues “R2P opens discursive spaces, in which a politics of protection becomes possible, even though not always enacted,” and should instead be viewed “as the beginning of a debate about preventing and stopping mass atrocities” as opposed to “the final result or solution.”138 This is probably the most compelling account of the extent of R2P’s aspirational value. Maggie Powers notes its “continued utilisation and entrenchment” has occurred in a wide range of forums by state and non-state actors alike, including the General Assembly, Security Council, Human Rights Council and in civil society.139 Evans similarly contends, “for all of the lamentable inadequacy of the Security Council’s response to the situation in Syria, no one... seriously argued that it [was] not an R2P case.”140 Thus, it still has some aspirational effect even if R2P remains afflicted by paralysis or cynical motivations due to the primacy of the P5.
It is important, however, not to overstate the discursive “revolution” R2P has produced. Thakur notes that, while “most analysts have accepted the conceptual-cum-normative significance of the shift in terminology [to R2P], a substantial number still persist in using the old [term].”141 Searching for literature produced in 2022 on the “responsibility to protect” yields around 29,100 results on Google Scholar, while “humanitarian intervention”, a term many R2P proponents consider to have been rendered obsolete, yields approximately 15,600 results. This relatively high figure conceivably stems from recent events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where the term “humanitarian intervention” has featured prominently in both academic and mainstream news.142 Even so, the fact this term has often been invoked to a greater extent than R2P reflects its
138 Sassan Gholiagha “‘To prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas.’ A critical constructivist view of the
Responsibility to Protect” (2015) 19 Intl J Hum Rts 1074 at 1087.
139 Maggie Powers “Responsibility to protect: dead, dying or thriving?” (2015) 19 Intl J Hum Rts 1257 at 1258.
140 Gareth Evans “The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age” (26 October 2011) Project Syndicate
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-responsibility-to-protect-comes-of-age-2011-10>.
141 Thakur, above n 11, at 95.
142 James S Robbins “The case for humanitarian intervention in Ukraine” (23 March 2022) American Foreign Policy Council <https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/the-case-for-humanitarian-intervention- in-ukraine>; Hans Petter Midttun “Why a humanitarian intervention in Ukraine is in NATO’s interest” (17 September 2022) Euromaidan Press <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/09/17/why-a-humanitarian- intervention-in-ukraine-is-in-natos-interest/>.
persistence in human rights debates. This diminishes arguments the doctrine wields substantial discursive power and that R2P and humanitarian intervention are distinct practices. Overall, any discursive power R2P wields is insufficient to counteract the frequent inertia stemming from its deployment through the Security Council and consequent susceptibility to P5 interests.
The second key tension underpinning R2P is its continued perpetuation of colonial constructs and narratives. Though its new terminology was purported to mark a progressive discursive shift, the doctrine still imposes a standard of civilisation.
Furthermore, R2P’s conceptualisation of sovereignty as responsibility obscures Western nations’ complicity in creating humanitarian crises.
One way R2P’s perpetuation of colonial narratives manifests is through continuing to import a “standard of civilisation” that promotes Western norms and “others” those who do not conform. This is in a political sense; in reconceptualising sovereignty as responsibility R2P requires states engage in “responsible governance”, with the responsibility to react holding that, if they fail to do so, external actors may intervene.143 However, this nebulous concept is generally defined by Western standards. As Drayton highlights, R2P’s reliance on the Security Council for authorisation of coercive intervention means “great powers (or at best the... Security Council) become the arbiters of what... constitutes order and disorder, good governance and failed states.”144 This produces a “standard of civilisation” where good governance is conceptualised as requiring Western-style parliamentary democracy. Reflecting this, in discussing how “the foundations of good governance based on the rule of law, democratic principles and
143 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 139.
144 Drayton, above n 19, at 226.
values and accountability” can be laid, the Secretary-General has pointed to the legislative chambers of France, Luxembourg and Romania.145
R2P thus makes each state’s sovereignty conditional upon whether it is perceived as meeting this Eurocentric standard. As Edward Newman illustrates, the idea that “legitimacy of sovereignty [is] conditional upon meeting certain standards related to human rights... has been widely internalised in liberal... mainly western... circles [but] is not universally accepted.”146 The ICISS background report explicitly noted that, for some states, “human rights are the contemporary Western values being imposed in place of Christianity and the ‘standard of civilisation’ in the 19th and early 20th century.”147 In one debate, Pakistan’s ambassador claimed “pillar three was introduced... years ago under another name: the right of [humanitarian] intervention”, reflecting persisting scepticism as to how progressive the new terminology is.148 As Newman contends, for postcolonial states, “R2P can all too easily be seen as a pretext for international judgments about the legitimacy of sovereignty by actors whose legitimacy can never be called into question.”149 Thus, R2P possesses many of the same effects as humanitarian intervention did, reinforcing power imbalances between the Global North and Global South within the international system.
This criticism is also observable in an economic sense, as responsible sovereignty is typically conceived of in Western-centric terms. Michael Ignatieff, a Commissioner of the ICISS, equates effective sovereignty to successful entry into the neoliberal world economy.150 Similar assumptions are enshrined in R2P’s founding documents, the 2005 Summit Outcome Document declaring the need to “accelerate and facilitate the accession of developing countries and countries with economies in transition to the World Trade
145 Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: state responsibility and prevention UN
Doc A/67/929 – S/2013/399 (9 July 2013) at 48.
146 Edward Newman “R2P: Implications for World Order” (2013) 5 GR2P 235 at 244.
147 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001) at 11. 148 Record of the General Assembly’s 98th Plenary Meeting UN Doc A/63/PV.98 (24 July 2009) at 4.
149 Newman, above n 146, at 252.
150 Michael Ignatieff “Intervention and State Failure” (January 2002) Dissent
<https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/intervention-and-state-failure>.
Organisation” given “the importance of universal integration in the rules-based global trading system.”151 These examples reflect the imposition of a standard of civilisation measured by participation in the globalising Western neoliberal social and economic system, of which the World Trade Organisation is a “key pillar.”152 Jessica Whyte parallels this standard with that imposed by Western trading companies in the 18th and 19th centuries, which increasingly intervened in the governance of independent territories to secure their trading interests.153 Ultimately, this reflects that, despite allegedly consisting of postcolonial and thus more progressive terminology, R2P is not substantively different to humanitarian intervention in its politically and economically Eurocentric definition of “civilisation”.
Furthermore, R2P’s imperial effects are arguably more insidious than those of humanitarian intervention as its terminology appears more neutral. In relation to human rights generally, Antony Anghie notes that “when international law begins to discard a vocabulary that appears racist and problematic and” adopts concepts “based on economics and... scientific fact rather than... cultural superiority”, this transforms the “uncivilised” into the “economically backward.”154 This presumes the inferiority of those who do not conform with the increasingly globalised Western neoliberal order. Whyte similarly argues that, despite the shift to more universal terminology, the “fundamental premise” underlying R2P “remains the same: certain people are not fit for self- government, and so need to be guided by the more ‘advanced’ or ‘developed’ powers.”155 Thus, R2P still imposes a standard of civilisation comparable to that of humanitarian intervention while doing so in a more insidious, less overtly-political manner.
A criticism frequently levelled at claims R2P represents a modern iteration of the “White Man’s Burden” is that the doctrine is, at least in part, an African idea. Thakur argues such
151 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 31.
152 Kristen Hopewell Breaking the WTO: How Emerging Powers Disrupted the Neoliberal Project
(Stanford University Press, Redwood City (CA), 2016) at 43.
153 Jessica Whyte “‘Always on top’? The “Responsibility to Protect” and the persistence of colonialism” in Jyotsna G Singh and David D Kim (eds) The Postcolonial World (Routledge, New York, 2017) 308 at 318. 154 Antony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2012) at 189.
155 Whyte, above n 153, at 318.
arguments can themselves “be racist in assumptions and consequences”, denying agency to developing countries by portraying them as helpless victims and ignoring the influence of the Global South in the principle’s development.156 Similarly, Pinar Gözen Ercan stresses the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” itself was pioneered by Sudanese politician Francis Deng, noting ICISS co-chair Mohamed Sahnoun’s claim that, “unlike other regions, [African] legal systems have long acknowledged that in addition to individuals, groups and leaders having rights, they also have reciprocal duties.”157 She argues this is reflected by the similarities between R2P and the African Union’s principle of non-indifference on human rights abuses.158
However, while R2P may originally have been informed by such sources, this is arguably irrelevant given that, in practice, African nations and the Global South generally are largely unable to control how R2P has been deployed and defined. R2P’s institutionalisation through the UN has resulted in its characterisation of “good governance” as requiring states to possess Western-style democracies and economies.
Thus, R2P in practice clearly operates to promote a Eurocentric framework, undermining claims its partly African heritage necessitates its promotion of universal values. Foluke Ifejola Adebisi further highlights this “denies [non-European peoples] the freedom of choice and the fundamental freedom of existence.”159 In this way, R2P repudiates the agency and self-determination of individuals living in non-Western states, presenting them as needing to be civilised to Eurocentric standards.
That the doctrine’s third pillar requires authorisation from the Security Council is also a source of ire for many African scholars. Ademola Abass contends “precedents of the Security Council’s extremely costly inaction in African conflicts... have left many
156 Thakur, above n 11, at 125.
157 Pinar Gözen Ercan Debating the Future of the “Responsibility to Protect”: The Evolution of a Moral Norm (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016) at 115.
158 At 115.
159 Foluke Ifejola Adebisi “Is Côte d’Ivoire a Test Case for R2P? Democratization as Fulfilment of the International Community’s Responsibility to Prevent” (2012) 56 J Afr L 151 at 171.
Africans comprehensively disillusioned” with R2P’s implementation.160 Faith Mabera and Yolanda Spies similarly note that, while R2P’s normative underpinnings are not explicitly rejected, “implementation of the norm is viewed with suspicion of arbitrary or spurious intent” by many postcolonial states.161 Similar scepticism is reflected by the African Union. In 2005, the same time R2P was being debated and adopted, members ratified their right to intervene on the African continent regardless of whether prior approval had been given by the Security Council.162 This illuminates that, despite its partly African heritage, R2P possesses neocolonial attributes many remain acutely aware of. Overall, this reflects the doctrine imports a standard of civilisation, reinforcing the same colonial constructs as humanitarian intervention.
R2P also perpetuates an imperial project through obscuring Western nations’ responsibility for the historical conditions that produced these inequities and crises. The doctrine’s reconceptualisation of sovereignty means host states possess the primary responsibility to protect civilians and prevent mass atrocities.163 This was purported to counteract criticisms levelled at “humanitarian intervention”, reinforcing state sovereignty and making intervention more consistent with the UN Charter in doing so.164
A tendency to examine historical conflicts through a relatively reductionistic lens is evident in the major reports that developed R2P. In 2009, the Secretary-General contended “the brutal legacy of the twentieth century speaks bitterly and graphically of the profound failure of individual States to live up to their most basic and compelling
160 Ademola Abass ‘The African Union and the Responsibility to Protect: Principles and Limitations” in
Julia Hoffmann and André Nollkaemper (eds) Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice (Pallas Publications, Amsterdam, 2012) 213 at 219.
161 Faith Mabera and Yolanda Spies “How Well Does R2P Travel Beyond the West?” in Alex J Bellamy and Timothy Dunne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 208 at 215.
162 African Union “Ezulwini Consensus” (7-8 March 2005) <http://www.africa- union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/7th%20extra%20ordinary%20session%20ECL/Ext%20E XCL2%20VII%20Report.pdf> .
163 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 138.
164 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, above n 34, at 7.
responsibilities”.165 However, as David Chandler notes, such a focus “on the responsibility of the non-Western state” in cases like Rwanda has a “shaky basis in any historical understanding of the context of mass atrocities [and] distances the discussion from overt and coercive Western intervention.”166 Similarly, the 2005 Summit Outcome Document stated that “each country must take primary responsibility for its own development... the role of national policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasised in [its] achievement.”167 Notably, neither make any reference to the impact of colonialism, conflicts during the preceding century, or state capacities for sustainable development.
This blindness to historical contexts of Western interventions in developing states has subsequently plagued the doctrine in its operation. Successive reports of the Secretary- General have continued to reinforce pillar one’s assertion that “each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, including through ensuring their prevention, while diminishing and ignoring the culpability of external actors and the international community.168 In 2013, Ban remarked that “since the beginning of the twenty-first century, we have again witnessed atrocity crimes that are the direct consequence of the failure of States to take preventive action.”169 Subsequently, Guterres affirmed states possess “national moral responsibility for the prevention of atrocity crimes” as well as political and legal responsibility.170 As Chandler highlights, conceptualising responsibility in this simplistic manner “denies the economic, social and political frameworks that would inculcate Western powers in the problems and underdevelopment of post-colonial regimes” and “institutionally... seeks to relieve Western states of direct
165Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, above n 65, at 5.
166 David Chandler “Understanding the gap between the promise and reality of the responsibility to protect” in Philip Cunliffe (ed) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Taylor and Francis, New York, 2011) 19 at 26.
167 2005 World Summit Outcome, above n 55, at 22.
168 Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, above n 65, at 13. 169 Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: state responsibility and prevention, above n 145, at 72.
170 Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention UN Doc A/71/1016 – S/2017/556 (10 August 2017) at 15.
responsibility to respond to crises.”171 Whyte further argues this aspect of R2P possesses economic dimensions, contending “responsibility” is “better conceived of as a form of neoliberal responsibilitisation” enabling “Western states and international financial institutions to evade responsibility for the failures of previous forms of intervention.”172 Ultimately, this reflects how R2P shrouds historical context in conceptualising sovereignty as responsibility, thereby continuing to facilitate imperialism.
R2P’s formulation in this way has meant Western nations are directly intervening in Asia and Africa less and less. While this is probably a positive development in terms of coercive intervention, conceptualising sovereignty as responsibility has also enabled states to avoid assisting efforts to prevent and rebuild following mass atrocities. Bellamy notes that in Africa, such roles have largely fallen to regional peacekeeping organisations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States.173 R2P’s obscuring of Western states’ accountability for crises and its portrayal as a normative answer to the “toxic politics” historically plaguing intervention means political calculations are obscured and decisions to intervene are instead presented as morally guided. In this way, it is arguably more insidious than humanitarian intervention ever was. In an African context, Adam Branch illustrates R2P means “the West only relates to Africa within a philanthropic model”, possessing “no responsibility for conflict or violence in Africa” as a mere observer that intervenes “only out of charity... to stop violence that, it is assumed, is fated to erupt without international intervention.”174 This is clearly reminiscent of discourse underpinning humanitarian intervention, which similarly constructed Western states as heroic champions of human rights and the subjects of their interventions passive victims needing to be saved. Thus, despite R2P’s aspirational aims, this aspect of the doctrine facilitates the continuation of the colonial project.
171 Chandler, above n 166, at 33.
172 Whyte, above n 153, at 311.
173 Alex J Bellamy “The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot air?” (2013) 48 Coop & Conflict 333 at 345.
174 Adam Branch “The irresponsibility of the responsibility to protect in Africa” in Philip Cunliffe (ed) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Taylor and Francis, New York, 2011) 103 at 105.
R2P was proposed as a solution to criticisms humanitarian intervention was imperial in discourse and practice, as well as contentions external state actors’ geopolitical calculations determined whether intervention occurred. This aspirational purpose and the doctrine’s cynical operation in practice create two underlying tensions. R2P’s vague terminology and privileging of the P5 in requiring the Security Council authorise action, both results of political compromises for its acceptance, means states can use the doctrine to legitimise both action or inaction depending on their interests. Similarly, despite being heralded as a progressive terminological shift, R2P discourse continues to perpetuate colonial constructs and narratives. This occurs through its imposition of a “standard of civilisation”, making sovereignty hinge upon the extent to which a state conforms with Western economic and political norms, and through obscuring the continuing legacies of colonialism and Western fiscal interventions in developing states by insisting primary responsibility lies with the host state.
Having established these key tensions, the next section examines two case studies to demonstrate how they operate in practice.
III Case Studies
The First Libyan Civil War and ongoing Tigray War in Ethiopia demonstrate how these two key tensions underpinning R2P operate in practice. Though both are broadly comparable in terms of the types and scale of atrocities committed, R2P has only been invoked in the former. Examining why this is reflects how states’ strategic calculations determine whether the doctrine is used to legitimise action. Given both Libya and Ethiopia’s experiences with both political and economic Western imperialism, R2P’s perpetuation of colonial narratives is also relevant. This section examines these cases independently before concluding with a brief comparative analysis.
In 2010, anti-government protests proliferated throughout North Africa and the Middle East during the ‘Arab Spring’. Demonstrations against Muammar Gaddafi’s rule began in early February in Benghazi, and rapidly metamorphosed into “a country-wide popular uprising”.175 Gaddafi responded with a brutal crackdown on protestors. Following condemnations by various UN bodies, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 on 26 February.176 It determined “the widespread and systematic attacks... may amount to crimes against humanity” and imposed measures seeking to curtail human rights abuses.177 Despite this, the crisis continued to escalate and, on 17 March, a further measure was proposed. Resolution 1973 reiterated “the responsibility of... Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population”, established a no-fly zone and enforced an arms embargo.178 Significantly, it authorised member states “‘to take all necessary measures” to protect civilians, while “excluding a foreign occupation force of any form”.179 The Resolution was adopted with 10 affirmative votes, while China, Russia,
175 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Libya and the Responsibility to Protect (3 October 2012)
at 5.
176 SC Res 1970 (2011).
177 Preamble.
178 SC Res 1973 (2011), preamble, 6, 13.
179 At 4, 8.
Brazil, Germany and India abstained.180 Accordingly, the case of Libya marks the first, and only, invocation of R2P to justify coercive action.181
By 31 March, NATO had “assumed command of all offensive operations”, conducting air strikes and enforcing embargos and the no-fly zone under Operation “Unified Protector”.182 By the end of October, rebel forces with NATO’s aid killed Gaddafi and installed in his place the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC), a body intended to act as an interim government while democratic elections were held. The international community’s quick mobilisation initially led many to herald Libya as a success for R2P, Evans claiming it was a “textbook case of the... norm working exactly as it was supposed to.”183 Ban proclaimed the Resolution “[affirmed], clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own Government.”184 Such reactions were invariably linked to historical inertia, evident in British MP Thérèse Coffey’s contention Resolution 1973 had prevented “our generation’s Rwanda.”185
(a) Interests at stakeStates behind R2P’s invocation were motivated by a combination of factors relating to their national interests. Graubart notes that, for the United States, these included “establishing a more stable alliance with an oil-rich and geostrategically valuable state, exerting influence on the political and economic directions of the broader Arab Spring”
180 United Nations “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorising ‘All Necessary
Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions” (press release SC/10200, 17 March 2011).
181 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect “Compendium of Practice: Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect 2005-2016” (19 August 2016)
<https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/RtoP%20Compendium%20of%20Practice%20(Pro visional%20Pre-Publication%20Version)%20FINAL%2020%20March%202017.pdf>.
182 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya UN Doc A/HRC/19/68 (8 March 2012) at 83.
183 Gareth Evans “The “RtoP” Balance Sheet After Libya” (2 September 2011)
<http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech448%20interview%20RtoP.html>.
184 United Nations “Secretary-General Says Security Council Action on Libya Affirms International Community’s Determination to Protect Civilians from Own Government’s Violence” (press release SG/SM/13454-SC/10201-AFR/2144, 18 March 2011).
185 (18 March 2011) 525 GBPD HC (UN Security Council Resolution (Libya), Thérèse Coffey).
as well as “displaying the continued prowess of NATO capabilities.”186 Wiesław Lizak suggests ensuring “cooperation in the oil sector” and other “energy resources exported by Libya” were also key considerations for France and Britain, who were instrumental in Resolution 1973’s adoption.187 British Prime Minister David Cameron explicitly acknowledged national security as a motivating factor, stating:188
We should not forget [Gaddafi’s] support for the biggest terrorist atrocity on British soil. We simply cannot have a situation where a failed pariah state festers on Europe’s southern border.
Thus, resources, security and Libya’s image as a state of “limited reliability” were all key considerations in decisions to intervene.189 Western states’ failure to criticise the regime when their relationship was “relatively cordial and mutually beneficial”,190 including when Gaddafi assisted their War on Terror, and overlooking Sudanese human rights abuses in Darfur when utilising its military for NATO operations, reinforces the credibility of this view.191
(b) How R2P’s vagueness legitimised military action
Because of these interests, proponents of intervention like the United Kingdom and France used R2P’s vague terminology to frame coercive action as necessary under the doctrine’s third pillar, the responsibility to react. This occurred through Libya’s conceptualisation as an exceptional case, where the threat posed by state-perpetrated mass atrocities to civilian lives was so great it demanded external action. Cameron acknowledged “intervening in another country’s affairs should not be undertaken save in quite exceptional circumstances”.192 However, he emphasised the “demonstrable need” given Gaddafi’s continued “violence against the Libyan people” meant “in this instance
186 Graubart, above n 120, at 83.
187 Wiesław Lizak “Libya: Road to Dysfunctionality” (2018) 15 Politeja 23 at 32.
188 (18 March 2011) 525 GBPD HC (UN Security Council Resolution (Libya), David Cameron).
189 Lizak, above n 187, at 32.
190 Aidan Hehir “The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect” (2013) 38 Int Secur 137 at 159.
191 Alex de Waal “African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011” (2013) 89 Intl Aff (UK) 365 at 375.
192 Cameron, above n 188.
the case for action and the world coming together is very strong.”193 Similarly, France’s permanent representative to the UN stressed “every hour and day that goes by means a further clampdown and repression for the freedom-loving civilian population... that... increases the burden of responsibility on our shoulders.”194 Both instances reflect the deployment of R2P terminology to frame the conflict as requiring “timely and decisive” collective action. This further demonstrates that, as the doctrine possesses no threshold requirements nor guiding principles, what constitutes a “mass atrocity” demanding the international community’s response is highly malleable depending on political interests. In Libya, states’ claims of being motivated by universal values like human rights and dignity obscured this fact.
Prioritisation of the responsibility to react and neglect of the responsibility to rebuild further demonstrates R2P’s deployment is based on political as opposed to humanitarian considerations. As Drayton notes, despite R2P’s three pillars’ portrayal as “mutually supporting”, Libya was “devastated by Western bombing but not... rebuilt with Western assistance.”195 NATO’s intervention left “many thousands injured, hundreds of thousands displaced persons, and enormous damage to infrastructure.”196 The instability of the NTC and subsequent elected governments meant security became “largely non-existent, and no strong single armed force emerged to constitute itself as a ‘state’ with the monopoly of legitimate violence.”197 Despite this, given the likely costs, domestic pressures and that their political goal of installing the NTC had already been accomplished, Western states expended little effort on rebuilding the damage caused by both the bombings and the facilitation of regime change. The consequence of this has been “interlinked political, security and economic crises that are weakening state institutions”, creating “a fertile environment for the development of a pervasive war economy dependent on violence.”198
193 Cameron.
194 Record of the Security Council’s 6498th Meeting UN Doc S/PV.6498 (17 March 2011) at 3.
195 Drayton, above n 19, at 225.
196 Mediel Hove “Post-Gaddafi Libya and the African Union: Challenges and the Road to Sustainable Peace” (2017) 52 JAAS 271 at 279.
197 Dan Glazebrook “The Lessons of Libya” (12 November 2014) Counterpunch
<https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/11/12/the-lessons-of-libya/>.
198 Tim Eaton Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness (Chatham House, London, 2018) at 1.
NATO also failed to disarm militia groups it had empowered to overthrow Gaddafi, leading to the proliferation of extremism and militarism.199 In 2012, Human Rights Watch noted the victimisation of alleged Gaddafi supporters by NATO-armed forces with concern, considering such abuses “so widespread and systematic they may amount to crimes against humanity” themselves.200
Thus, as Ruben Reike notes, “by having supported one side in a civil war, the international community unintentionally empowered that side to commit atrocities of its own”.201 Barack Obama claimed the “worst mistake” of his presidency was “failing to plan for the day after... in intervening in Libya.”202 Anne-Marie Slaughter, a foreign policy adviser to Hillary Clinton at the time, similarly conceded that, though she remained “committed” to R2P, she “would not now support a humanitarian action... that did not include extensive plans for the post military phase.”203 Libya’s fallout disillusioned some of R2P’s biggest proponents, Thakur writing that “by 2016 few would dissent from the judgement that the first R2P military intervention had left ‘Libya a failed state and a terrorist haven’.”204 Overall, this selectivity further demonstrates states’ geopolitical calculations determine how the doctrine is deployed.
(c) How R2P’s operation through the Security Council ensured action based on the P5’s interests
The P5’s interests in facilitating regime change further ensured R2P was used to legitimise action, impacting the formulation and operationalisation of Resolution 1973. Non-permanent members of the Security Council who had endorsed Resolution 1973 did
199 Hove, above n 196, at 279.
200 Human Rights Watch “Libya: Wake-Up Call to Misrata’s Leaders” (8 April 2012)
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/08/libya-wake-call-misratas-leaders>.
201 Ruben Reike “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Pillar Three and the Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes” in Daniel Fiott, Robert Zuber and Joachim Koops (eds) Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the Third Pillar Approach (The Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation, Global Action to Prevent War, the Global Governance Institute and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Brussels, 2012) 73 at 78.
202 Maya Rhodan “President Obama Admits the ‘Worst Mistake’ of His Presidency” (11 April 2016) Time
<https://time.com/4288634/president-obama-worst-mistake/>.
203 Interview with Anne-Marie Slaughter, as cited in Spencer Zifcak “The Responsibility to Protect” in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) 484 at 502.
204 Thakur, above n 11, at 159.
so on the basis intervention was for the sole objective of protecting civilians. Colombia’s delegate explained their conviction “its purpose is essentially humanitarian... creating conditions that will allow for the protection of the civilian population.”205 Nigeria’s representative similarly stated the Resolution’s language “specifically [constrains] the actions of states seeking to play a role in the quest for peace.”206
However, souring relations between Libya and Western nations and Gaddafi’s increasing orientation towards Africa caused Britain, the United States and France to view the regime as a formidable security threat.207 This made the prospect of NTC governance, which promised democratic elections and friendlier relations, highly appealing.208 Russia and China, though unwilling to endorse the Resolution, had incentives to not exercise their vetoes. For Russia, Gaddafi “was not an indispensable ally”, and vetoing the Resolution “would have endangered the valued “reset” of relations with the United States.”209 Chinese diplomats’ statements at the UN reflect China’s diplomatic and economic relationships with African and Arab perspectives caused it to abstain from both voting on the Resolution and exercising its veto.210 More cynical scholars claim the state “welcomed another ill-conceived, costly and potentially divisive Western intervention in the region” to consolidate its influence in Africa.211 British, French and American leaders’ rhetoric following Resolution 1973’s adoption changed markedly. Whereas they had previously been at pains to emphasise intervention was purely to protect Libyans, Obama, Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy increasingly articulated “it [was] impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power.”212
205 Record of the Security Council’s 6498th Meeting, above n 194, at 7.
206 At 9.
207 Lizak, above n 187, at 36.
208 Y H Zoubir and E N Rózsa “The end of the Libyan dictatorship: the uncertain transition” (2012) 33 TWQ 1267 at 1277.
209 Melinda Negrón-Gonzales and Michael Contarino “Local Norms Matter: Understanding National Responses to the Responsibility to Protect” (2014) 20 Glob Gov 255 at 263.
210 Record of the Security Council’s 6498th Meeting, above n 194, at 10.
211 Aidan Hehir “The Responsibility to Protect as the Apotheosis of Liberal Teleology” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds) Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013) 34 at 50.
212 The White House “Joint Op-ed by President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy: ‘Libya's Pathway to Peace’” (press release, 14 April 2011).
NATO’s operations under R2P subsequently shifted “from the politically neutral posture of civilian protection to the partial goal of... pursuing regime change.”213 Reflecting this is the magnitude of military action. A Human Rights Council commissioned inquiry examining air strikes by NATO noted “occasions the Commission confirmed civilian casualties and found targets that showed no evidence of military utility.”214 Its bombing of Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown, was viewed as particularly questionable given the forces stationed there “represented no threat... because the residents supported the regime.”215 NATO also prolonged the conflict by ignoring possible diplomatic solutions, instead pursuing military means of conflict resolution under R2P. The AU proposed a “five-point plan that include[d] an immediate ceasefire, negotiation between the two sides, and an end to the NATO bombing campaign”,216 which Gaddafi was reportedly willing to agree to.217 However, NATO refused to publicly support the proposal or incentivise the NTC to embrace it. Alan J Kuperman contends the militaristic character of R2P’s deployment “increased the duration of Libya’s civil war about six-fold and its death toll by 7 to 27 times.”218 Thus, it is questionable whether the driving purpose of intervention was to protect civilians, as R2P requires. The United Kingdom, United States and France’s interests in deposing Gaddafi and installing a democratic regime more friendly to Western states meant they exerted their superior military, political and economic capacities to legitimise taking action under R2P through the Security Council, becoming the defining voice in how Resolution 1973 was worded and executed. China and Russia’s interests in allowing intervention to occur meant they restrained their veto use, enabling regime change to occur despite other member states’ objections.219 This further demonstrates P5 interests dictated how R2P operated in Libya.
213 Thakur, above n 11, at 136.
214 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, above n 182, at 122.
215 Alan J Kuperman “NATO’s Intervention in Libya: A Humanitarian Success?” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds) Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013) 191 at 197.
216 Barak Barfi “Can Africa Really Help Libya Find Peace?” (13 April 2011) The New Republic
<https://newrepublic.com/article/86594/libya-nato-african-union-clinton>.
217 Brown, above n 107, at 438.
218 Kuperman, above n 215, at 212.
219 Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response UN Doc A/66/874–S/2012/578 (25 July 2012) at 3, 54.
(a) How R2P’s deployment imposed a standard of civilisationR2P imported a standard of civilisation in Libya, its “othering” of those failing to conform to Western norms reflected in how it depicted different actors in the conflict. Katherina Fallah and Ntina Tzouvala note Gaddafi and his sons “were commonly depicted as apes, with exaggerated lips and an afro”.220 Similarly racist discourse tainted descriptions of his supporters. Narratives Gaddafi was “recruiting African mercenaries in large numbers from Mali and Chad to fight for his collapsing regime” circulated amongst Western politicians and journalists.221 This was accompanied by rumours he was supplying hired soldiers with Viagra to encourage sexual violence,222 propounded even by prominent diplomats like Susan Rice, then-United States ambassador to the UN.223 Though such claims were unsubstantiated,224 Resolution 1973 called upon member states “to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel” and imposed a travel ban on the Libyan ambassador to Chad, alleging he was “directly involved in recruiting mercenaries.”225 Thus Fallah and Tzouvala highlight the Resolution “indirectly adopted the racialised and sexualised narratives about hypermasculine and savage black mercenaries, elevating them to a distinct threat” and distinguishing them from “the humanity that needed to be protected.”226 This narrative was viewed as justifying the imposition of Eurocentric liberal democracy despite its failure to account for indigenous arrangements and knowledge. As a result, former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki concluded “this is the same attitude as Westerners displayed during colonial times.”227
220 Katherine Fallah & Ntina Tzouvala “Deploying Race, Employing Force: ‘African Mercenaries’ and the
2011 NATO Intervention in Libya” (2021) 67 UCLA L Rev 1580 at 1589.
221 At 1589.
222 At 1593.
223 Ewen MacAskill “Gaddafi 'supplies troops with Viagra to encourage mass rape', claims diplomat” (29 April 2011) The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/29/diplomat-gaddafi-troops- viagra-mass-rape>.
224 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, above n 182, at 70.
225 SC Res 1973 (2011), at 16, annex I.
226 Fallah and Tzouvala, above n 220, at 1609.
227 Interview with Thabo Mbeki, as cited in Jessica Whyte “‘Always on top’? The “Responsibility to Protect” and the persistence of colonialism” in Jyotsna G Singh and David D Kim (eds) The Postcolonial World (Routledge, New York, 2017) 308 at 313.
Simultaneously, states invoking R2P ignored and downplayed the atrocities rebel forces were committing, likely because of their commitments to Western-style democracy and friendly relations with Western states. Black Africans especially were victimised by rebel forces during and after the civil war.228 However, these incidents received relatively little attention. Randy LaPrarie notes that, while articles condemning Gaddafi’s violence against protestors were numerous, few mentioned “anti-black racism in eastern Libya, or the killing of [black Africans]” by rebels.229 Rather, “black victims... were either called mercenaries... or their victimisation was [attributed] to Arab Libyans’ fear of mercenaries.”230 Additionally, NATO failed to view those loyal to Gaddafi as possible victims of the conflict, Slaughter explicitly stating in one interview “we did not try to protect civilians on Gaddafi’s side.”231 Thus, as Sassan Gholiagha illuminates, “individual human beings who were not positioned by NATO as worthy of protection did not receive protection” under the doctrine.232 Thus, much like the civilising missions embarked upon by Western empires in the 18th and 19th centuries, R2P’s deployment in Libya similarly distinguished between worthy and unworthy victims based on race and ideology.
Western states frequently refuted links between intervention and historic civilising missions through pointing to “regional support” for the endeavour, portraying Libya as Arab to justify R2P’s deployment.233 Realistically, the regional actor most appropriate to legitimate intervention should have been the AU. Libya is located in North Africa and a notable proportion of its population “identify primarily as African.”234 Libya’s foreign policy had also increasingly taken on a pan-African orientation, with Gaddafi donating
228 Fallah and Tzouvala, above n 220, at 1593.
229 Randy LaPrarie “Libya, The New York Times, and a Propaganda Model of the Mass Media” (Master’s Thesis, Western Michigan University, 2017) at 95.
230 At 95.
231 Jo Becker and Scott Shane “Hillary Clinton, ‘Smart Power’ and a Dictator’s Fall” (27 February 2016) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html>.
232 Gholiaga, above n 138, at 1083.
233 Cameron, above n 188; Barack Obama, President of the United States, “Address to the Nation on Libya” (speech to the National Defence University, Washington DC, 28 March 2011).
234 E Tendayi Achiume and Asi BaIi “Race and Empire: Legal Theory Within, Through, and Across National Borders” (2021) 67 UCLA L Rev 1386 at 1401.
extensively to regional organisations like the AU and stylising himself as “a traditional African political leader... the ‘king of kings’”.235
However, E Tendayi Achiume and Asi BaIi illustrate “Libyans themselves were racialised as exclusively Arab... by those in favour of intervention.”236 Arab states like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had been vocal in their approval of possible military intervention.237 Contrastingly, the AU was “leery of forcible regime change”, considering it likely to destabilise the region.238 Thus, it warned the Council “it should be left to Libyans to choose their leaders”, urging states to pursue a diplomatic solution instead.239 Portraying Libya as culturally Arab as opposed to African therefore enabled intervening states to claim they were supported by the relevant regional actors, diminishing the legitimate qualms of African states. This is evident in Resolution 1973, which “recognises the important role of the League of Arab States in... the maintenance of international peace and security in the region.”240 Contrastingly, the AU is mentioned only briefly in relation to previous efforts undertaken to mediate the conflict.241 Political speeches justifying intervention reinforce this, Cameron claiming “what is so convincing in this case is that the Arab League countries and Arab populations are... willing the international community on.”242 Alex de Waal notes that, as a result, Africa’s approach to the conflict “was derided by most international commentators.”243 Overall, this reflects Western nations’ claims of “regional support” were not only inadequate in deflecting criticisms intervention under R2P constituted a civilising mission, they actively perpetuated it.
235 Fallah and Tzouvala, above n 220, at 1590.
236 Achiume and BaIi, above n 234, at 1402.
237 Matteo Capasso “The perils of capitalist modernity for the Global South: the case of Libya” (2022) 29 RIPE 1 at 15.
238 Alex de Waal “The African Union and the Libya Conflict of 2001” (19 December 2012) World Peace Foundation <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and-the-libya-conflict- of-2011/>.
239 African Union “Statement on Intervention in Libya” (press release, 26 April 2012).
240 SC Res 1973 (2011), at 5.
241 Preamble.
242 Cameron, above n 188.
243 de Waal, above n 238.
(b) How R2P obscured that Western colonialism and economic interventions engendered the crisis
The narrative attributing the civil war to Gaddafi’s inability to resolve “troubled internal dynamics”, stemming from its “specific demographic characteristics and political culture, weak institutions, and a long history of misrule and oppression”, ignores any Western responsibility for the conflict.244 Libya’s colonial experiences under Italian and British rule impacted its development, as did subsequent Western interventions in Libya’s internal affairs.245 As Matteo Capasso contends, the crippling effect of Western-driven economic sanctions following Libya’s alleged involvement in the Lockerbie bombing “triggered a massive reconfiguration of the class and state structure of the regime, which heightened its internal contradictions” throughout the 1990s.246 This involved a project of liberalisation and privatisation that, by the early 2000s, formed part of “a rapid process of reintegrating with the West and the international community.”247 Western states encouraged Gaddafi in this endeavour, European and United States-based oil companies and investors flocking to the region amidst the growth of private investment.248 Reflecting this, a report released by Amnesty International in 2011 noted “members of the European Union (EU) and the United States . . . [were] turning a blind eye” to rights abuses “to further national interests.”249 However, privatisation and liberalisation promoted a "culture of corruption" that meant “social and economic inequalities became very visible and led to widespread popular discontent”.250 Thus, while racial divides and tribal affiliations had always existed in Libya, neoliberal reforms exacerbated tensions amidst the “[deepening] crisis of confidence in the political system as a whole”.251
244 Sally Khalifa Isaac “NATO’s Intervention in Libya: Assessment and Implications” (2012) European
Institute of the Mediterranean <https://www.iemed.org/publication/natos-intervention-in-libya-assessment- and-implications/>.
245 Matteo Capasso “The war and the economy: the gradual destruction of Libya” (2020) 47 ROAPE 545 at 551.
246 At 556.
247 Aidan Hehir “Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds) Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013) 1 at 2.
248 At 2.
249 Amnesty International ‘Libya of Tomorrow’: What Hope for Human Rights? (23 June 2010) at 9.
250 Capasso, above n 245, at 556.
251 Mabroka Al-Werfalli Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens’ Political Attitude and Behaviour
(Ithaca Press, Reading (UK), 2011) at 82-83.
Western states were also culpable in supplying Gaddafi’s regime with arms. In late 2011, Amnesty International noted numerous European nations, including France and Britain, had supplied Gaddafi with arms since 2005. 252 An EU Parliament motion similarly condemned numerous member states for engaging in intensive arms trades with Libya prior to and during the civil war.253 However, R2P’s attribution of primary responsibility to the host state rendered this historical context irrelevant in portrayals of the crisis and debates on whether to intervene. Thus, Western states’ culpability was obscured, despite their riling of internal tensions and their enabling of the very same violence they condemned in Resolution 1973.
This meant Western states’ decisions to intervene reinforced a narrative painting them as heroic saviours and Libyans passive victims. Justifications for intervention typically portrayed the United States, Britain and France as morally compelled to bring democracy and human rights to Libyans, who were suffering under their government’s failure to live up to its responsibility to protect. Obama remarked “when our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.”254 Throughout 2011, French diplomats repeatedly emphasised France was also defending democratic values, one stating “we must not abandon civilian populations, the victims of brutal repression, to their fate.”255 Such emotive calls failed to acknowledge how forcible regime change denied Libyans’ right to self-determination. Thus, even as its population continues to feel the devastating aftermath of intervention, Capasso notes Libya is still framed "as a site of study” reflecting “failures of Western ‘good intentions’.”256 Overall, this reflects R2P’s deployment in Libya is vulnerable to many of the same criticisms made by TWAIL scholars in relation to humanitarian intervention, demonstrating the doctrine’s colonial dimensions.
252 Amnesty International Arms transfers to the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for an effective
Arms Trade Treaty (19 October 2011) at 9.
253 The Left in the European Parliament (GUE/NGL) “Motion for a Resolution on the Situation in Libya” (12 September 2011) European Parliament < https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-7-2011- 0514_EN.html> at 7.
254 Obama, above 233.
255 Record of the Security Council’s 6498th Meeting, above n 194, at 2.
256 Capasso, above n 245, at 559.
This section examines R2P’s key tensions in relation to the Tigray War. Though R2P’s deployment in this case also possesses colonial dimensions, it is distinct from Libya in that external state actors’ interests are best secured by legitimising inaction through R2P.
In early November 2020, civil war erupted in Ethiopia’s Tigray region between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and its allies, and the Tigray Defence Force (TDF), headed by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF ruled Ethiopia from 1991 until Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn’s resignation in 2018 amidst popular discontent. Abiy Ahmed, a politician belonging to the Oromo ethnic majority, was elected to succeed him. Under his leadership, Tigrayans were increasingly purged from government positions.257 Tensions erupted in June 2020 when Abiy’s government postponed national elections, blaming the COVID-19 pandemic. Tigrayan leaders opposed this and held regional elections, resulting in the federal government suspending funding to the region. The dispute erupted into armed conflict on 3 November 2020, when the TDF attacked ENDF bases in Tigray. The federal government retaliated by unleashing an offensive the following day. Despite parties agreeing to ceasefires at various times, hostilities have continued. At the time of writing, war in Tigray is ongoing.
Numerous reports suggest the Ethiopian government is “manifestly failing” to protect its population. A commission established by the UN found there were “reasonable grounds” to believe the ENDF, its allies and the TDF have committed war crimes.258 It also concluded evidence pointed towards the Federal Government having committed “crimes against humanity”, given evidence of widespread extrajudicial killings, sexual violence and denial of aid.259 The violence has been so severe some consider the Ethiopian government’s forces may have committed genocide and ethnic cleansing. In July 2021, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, noted
257 Patrick Wight and Yuriko Cowper-Smith “Mass Atrocities in Ethiopia and Myanmar: The Case for
‘Harm Mitigation’ in R2P Implementation” (2022) 14 GR2P 1 at 10.
258 Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia UN Doc A/HRC/51/46 (19 September 2022) at 97.
259 At 98.
with concern “the use of pejorative and dehumanising language” like “cancer”, “devil” [and] “weed” by “top political leaders”.260 Numerous humanitarian organisations claim the Ethiopian government has engineered famines in Tigray,261 a Ghent University study estimating violence and starvation stemming from the war has led to as many as 500,000 deaths.262 Officials and military forces affiliated with the government have explicitly stated they intend to erase Tigrayans “from this land”, attempting to do so through discriminatory restrictions, including on the use of the Tigrinya language, mass killings, forced expulsions from the region and looting property, livestock and crops.263
Given R2P applies to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, a persuasive argument can be made it is relevant to the Tigray War. In July 2021, Nderitu “urge[d] the Government of Ethiopia to fulfil its responsibility” to protect its population from genocide, referencing R2P’s first pillar.264 In September 2021, 31 civil society organisations invoked the doctrine to call for “concrete action” by the Security Council.265 Despite these pleas and some states acting independently to impose sanctions on the Ethiopian government, R2P has not been used to contemplate possible responses available to the international community by state actors.
260 United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Alice Wairimu Nderitu “Statement on
the continued deterioration of the situation in Ethiopia” (30 July 2021) United Nations
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2021-07-30/note-correspondents-statement- alice-wairimu-nderitu-united-nations-special-adviser-the-prevention-of-genocide-the-continued- deterioration-of-the-situation>.
261 World Peace Organisation Starving Tigray: How Armed Conflict and Mass Atrocities Have Destroyed an Ethiopian Region’s Economy and Food System and Are Threatening Famine (6 April 2021).
262 Martin Plaut “Tigray mortality: has war and hunger cost 500,000 lives? Professor Jan Nyssen, Ghent University” (13 March 2022) Eritrea Hub <https://eritreahub.org/tigray-mortality-has-war-and-hunger-cost- 500000-lives-professor-jan-nyssen-ghent-university>.
263 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International ‘We Will Erase You from This Land’: Crimes Against
Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’s Western Tigray Zone (6 April 2022) at 1, 167, 172.
264 Nderitu, above n 260.
265 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “31 organisations urge action to end violence and famine in Tigray, Ethiopia” (21 September 2021) <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/31-organizations-urge- action-to-end-violence-and-famine-in-tigray-ethiopia/>.
(a) Interests at stake in TigrayStates have incentives to not intervene in Ethiopia. In recent years, China has sought to strengthen relations between the states through investing state capital, incorporating Ethiopia into its Maritime and Road Initiative.266 Ethiopia’s location also offers private capital “a diplomatic gateway into Africa”,267 Chinese companies having invested 2.17 billion dollars in the region as of August 2022.268 The West has long recognised Ethiopia as a key strategic location for anti-terrorism operations in the Horn of Africa,269 and as a lucrative mining investment.270 More fundamentally, Yohannes Woldemariam and Nic Cheeseman note fear of ceding further regional influence to China has made Western leaders “slow to publicly challenge Abiy’s handling of... Tigray.”271 Overall, the likely instability from legitimising action under R2P would greatly undermine these strategic, economic and political interests.
(b) How R2P’s vagueness has been used to justify inaction
Given these geopolitical interests, R2P’s indeterminacy has enabled states to justify inaction by emphasising the responsibility of the host state as opposed to that of the international community. Mike Hammer, United States Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, asserted that “the solution has to come from Ethiopians... [it is] their country.”272 Chinese UN representatives have similarly claimed “the Tigray issue is... an internal
266 Edson Ziso “The Political Economy of the Chinese Model in Ethiopia” (2020) 48 Politics & Policy 908
at 913.
267 At 913.
268 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China “China and Africa: Strengthening Friendship, Solidarity and Cooperation for a New Era of Common Development” (19 August 2022)
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202208/t20220819_10745617.html>.
269 Emily Estelle “Ethiopia’s Strategic Importance: US National Security Interests at Risk in the Horn of Africa” (12 September 2018) American Enterprise Institute <https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/09/2018-09-12-Ethiopia-written-testimony.pdf> at 1-2.
270 Mulubrhan Balehegn “Neoliberalism has enabled genocide in Tigray” (1 July 2022) Ethiopia Insight
<https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2022/07/01/neoliberalism-has-enabled-genocide-in-tigray/>.
271 Yohannes Woldemariam and Nic Cheeseman “Foreign powers are intervening in Ethiopia. They may only make the conflict worse” (19 November 2021) Washington Post
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/foreign-powers-are-intervening-in-ethiopia-they-may-only- make-the-conflict-worse/2021/11/19/55266426-487d-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html>.
272 United States Department of State “Digital Press Briefing with US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Mike Hammer” (20 September 2022) <https://www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-with-u-s- special-envoy-for-the-horn-of-africa-mike-hammer/>.
affair of Ethiopia”,273 and that “China supports African solutions to African problems.”274 Russian diplomats have arguably been most explicit in seeking to exclude contemplation of R2P, arguing “politicising this issue is unacceptable. The situation in Tigray must remain an internal affair of Ethiopia’s. Interference by the Security Council... would be counterproductive.”275 This prioritisation of Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity reflects strategic considerations, not humanitarian concerns, determine whether R2P is deployed. The doctrine’s lack of threshold requirements or guiding principles enables this, despite substantiated reports of mass atrocities that would seem to support an international response to protect civilians under pillar three.
(c) How R2P’s operation through the Security Council has further ensured inaction R2P’s deployment through the Security Council and its consequent susceptibility to P5 interests has resulted in inertia in Tigray. Though states have implicitly rejected the possibility of collective coercive action, some have contemplated what noncoercive measures could be pursued through the Security Council.276 However, such attempts to raise awareness of the crisis have been repeatedly blocked by Russia and China, both of whom have close diplomatic and economic ties to Abiy’s regime. In 2021, the United States and members of the EU sought to conduct “an open session on the Tigray region” linking the conflict to a prior Resolution condemning “the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” and “unlawful denial of humanitarian access.”277 However, China and Russia preferred “less Council involvement” and stalled such attempts.278 Coupled with the looming threat of their vetoes, this meant discussions of Tigray occurred in the “closed setting” of an informal interactive dialogue (IID).279 Mark Lowcock, Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator at the time, notes this meant the crisis was more likely to “deteriorate into mass loss of life”,
273 Record of the Security Council’s 8812th Meeting UN Doc S/PV.8812 (2 July 2021) at 13.
274 Record of the Security Council’s 8875th Meeting UN Doc S/PV.8875 (6 October 2021) at 10.
275 Record of the Security Council’s 8812th Meeting, above n 273, at 15.
276 Record of the Security Council’s 8875th Meeting, above n 274, at 4, 7.
277 Security Council Report “Ethiopia (Tigray): Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Humanitarian Situation” (14 June 2021) <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/06/ethiopia-tigray- informal-interactive-dialogue-on-the-humanitarian-situation.php>.
278 Security Council Report.
279 Security Council Report.
given IIDs are unrecorded and consequently attract less political and media attention.280 Consequently, he concludes “the current system is basically not fit for purpose, given how some states decided to behave.”281
Disagreements between Russia and China on one hand and Western states on the other also prevented the Security Council’s release of a press statement on the situation in March 2021. When a statement was finally agreed upon the following month, its contents “expressed deep concern” about “the humanitarian situation”, but ultimately reaffirmed members’ “strong commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Ethiopia.”282 A Security Council report notes “some members would have preferred stronger language relating to the human rights situation and... a reference to the presence of Eritrean forces was omitted due to opposition” from Russia and China.283 This further demonstrates R2P’s susceptibility to P5 interests. That this inertia has forced other states to contemplate action outside the forum of the Security Council and UN generally further reinforces R2P’s impotency to respond to crises when P5 interests are at stake.284
(a) How the international community’s emphasis on pillar one imposes a “standard of civilisation”Discussions of the Ethiopian government’s failure to protect its population import a “standard of civilisation”, tending to characterise the nation as a rogue democracy requiring intervention or guidance by Western powers. United States Senator Bob Mendenez states instead of pursuing a “historic transition to democracy... Ethiopia is... on a trajectory towards state collapse.”285 This, he contends “call[s] for a robust response
280 William Worley “Exclusive: Russia, China foiled UN meetings on Tigray famine, says Lowcock” (21
June 2022) Devex International Development <https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-russia-china-foiled- un-meetings-on-tigray-famine-says-lowcock-103473>.
281 Worley.
282 Security Council “Press Statement on Ethiopia” (press release S/14501, 22 April 2021).
283 Worley, above n 280.
284 For example, the US-EU High-Level Roundtable on the humanitarian emergency in Tigray held in June 2021.
285 United States Foreign Relations Committee “Chairman Menedez Opening Remarks at Committee Hearing on US Strategy and Policy Response to Crisis in Ethiopia” (press release, 27 May 2021).
from the United States.” Charles A Ray similarly characterises Ethiopia’s internal strife as resulting from a broader trend of “illiberal democracies” that needs to be rectified.286 Amidst such sentiments, Ethiopia’s permanent representative to the UN has warned of the “harmful... saviour mentality that seeks to undermine the... responsibility of states for... the well-being of their people”.287 Other states with colonial experiences have echoed similar criticisms. In an EU-prompted Human Rights Council debate on whether an independent commission should be established to monitor the civil war, the Philippines’ ambassador denounced the “cheap tactics of sovereign usurpation by the last countries in the world entitled to substitute their judgement for that of the specific country concerned”, claiming all interventions do “is make the self-righteous feel justified in their mistaken self-importance.”288 Some Ethiopians’ responses to the prospect of action further reinforces R2P is perceived as a civilising mission. #HandsoffEthiopia, a social media campaign instigated by the Ethiopian government encouraging citizens to “stand against any attempt to intervene in the domestic affairs of the country”, has gained considerable traction.289 Because such campaigns “resonate with African and diaspora audiences, whether or not they are cynically instrumentalised by politicians”, Jonathan Fisher contends “R2P faces profound challenges” in overcoming perceptions it is a civilising mission.290 Overall, arguments justifying the doctrine’s utility in Ethiopia on the basis it is uncivilised and relating to the civilising aspects of R2P itself reflect a common perception it perpetuates an imperial project.
Differing coverage of conflicts in Ethiopia and Ukraine further reflects this “standard of civilisation”. Whereas the Tigray War is typically portrayed as the latest drama in a “volatile region”, war in a European state is viewed as unthinkable and thus more deserving of attention.291 Describing Russia’s invasion of Kyiv, CBS correspondent
286 Charles A Ray “Is Democracy on the Retreat in Africa?” (10 March 2022) Foreign Policy Research
Institute <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/is-democracy-in-retreat-in-africa/>.
287 Record of the Security Council’s 8843rd Meeting UN Doc S/PV.8843 (26 August 2021) at 17.
288 Human Rights Council “Action on Resolution A/HRC/S-33/L.1 – 33rd Special Session” (17 December 2021) United Nations Web TV <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k14/k14a5sg62k>.
289 Ethiopian Herald “Hands Off from Ethiopia!” (22 May 2021) <https://www.press.et/english/?p=35009>. 290 Jonathan Fisher “#HandsoffEthiopia: ‘Partiality’, Polarisation and Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict” (2022) 14 GR2P 28 at 31-32.
291 Declan Walsh and Abdi Latif Dahir “Why Is Ethiopia at War With Itself?” (16 March 2022) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html>.
Charlie D’Agata stated “this is a relatively civilised, relatively European... city, one where you wouldn’t expect that.”292 Daniel Hannan, writing in the Telegraph, similarly contended what made conflict so shocking was that “Ukraine is a European country. Its people watch Netflix and have Instagram accounts... war is no longer something visited upon impoverished and remote populations.” 293 As Moustafa Bayoumi reveals, such statements imply “war is a natural state for people of colour, while white people naturally gravitate towards peace.”294 This problematic narrative is demonstrable in how R2P has been invoked. At the General Assembly’s Plenary Debate on R2P earlier this year, 18 speakers representing 23 countries condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.295 Contrastingly, only Croatia referenced the war in Tigray, doing so briefly as part of a list of regions affected by war that included Ukraine.296 This further demonstrates R2P’s imposition of a standard of civilisation, where some victims are positioned as more worthy of protection than others.
(b) How emphasis on R2P’s first pillar obscures that Western colonialism and neoliberal interventions fuelled the crisis
The international community’s disproportionate emphasis on the Ethiopian government’s primary responsibility obscures Western responsibility for the crisis. Ethiopia is frequently depicted as one of the only African states to have avoided formal colonisation.297 Thus, roots of the current conflict are typically located in sharp racial
292 Annabel Nugent “CBS News foreign correspondent apologises for saying Ukraine is more ‘civilised’
than Iraq and Afghanistan” (27 February 2022) The Independent <https://www.independent.co.uk/arts- entertainment/tv/news/charlie-dagata-cbs-apology-ukraine-iraq-b2024265.html>.
293 Daniel Hannan “Vladimir Putin’s monstrous invasion is an attack against humanity itself” (26 February 2022) The Telegraph <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/02/26/vladimir-putins-monstrous-invasion- attack-civilisation/>.
294 Moustafa Bayoumi “They are ‘civilised’ and ‘look like us’: the racist coverage of Ukraine” (2 March 2022) The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/civilised-european-look- like-us-racist-coverage-ukraine>.
295 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Summary of the 2022 UN General Assembly Plenary Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect” (20 July 2022)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/summary-2022-r2p-debate/>.
296 Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia Ivan Šimonović “Statement at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly” (28 February 2022) United Nations
<https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20220228/1VVoY1ERNJl8/ByEU2BAEu9JR_en
.pdf>.
297 Sara Maragoza “An Unequal Ethiopia in an Unequal World: Global and Domestic Hierarchies in Afäwärḳ Gäbrä-Iyyäsus’s and Käbbädä Mikael’s Political Thought (1908 and 1949)” (2022) 7 Glob
Intellect Hist 1 at 1.
divides that have plagued Ethiopia for generations, and the state’s subsequent failure to manage this ethnic federalism.298 However, Yerasework Kebede Hailu notes the threat posed by European empires’ “scramble for Africa” forced Ethiopia to introduce “modern systems of administration... harness modern technology... and to deploy her rich human and material resources in an effectively centralised manner.”299 This meant “European colonial influences and metaphysical colonialism” still impacted its development generally and sowed racial divides,300 the ensuing Eurocentric project of state building’s “hegemonic structure of knowledge and values” creating “entangled socio-economic problems with toxic political culture”.301 The Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941 exacerbated growing “ethnolinguistic hatred and conflict”, with perceived collusion leading to Tigrayans’ portrayal as “tainted... collaborators of the enemy”.302 This reinforces Tefera Assefa Moreda’s conclusion “post-1990s identity politics is only an intervening factor for the escalation of ethnic conflict”.303 Rather, Western colonialism primed such conditions.
Western states’ emphasis of R2P’s first pillar also shrouds how pushes for Ethiopia to pursue neoliberalism stoked the crisis. Since coming into power, Abiy has embarked on a process of neoliberal reform.304 The international community’s provision of financial aid enabled this, including grants from Western-dominated institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank that imposed conditions “aiming at... liberalising the economic sector.”305 For Western states, this resulted in “Abiy-mania”, culminating in Abiy being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in resolving a historic territorial
298 Yohannes Gedamu “Residual anger driven by the politics of power has boiled over into conflict
in Ethiopia” (20 November 2020) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/residual-anger-driven- by-the-politics-of-power-has-boiled-over-into-conflict-in-ethiopia-150327>.
299 Yerasework Kebede Hailu “Did Ethiopia Survive Coloniality?” (2005) 2 JDD 1 at 2.
300 At 20.
301 At 19–20.
302 Tefera Assefa Moreda “The Imperial Regimes as a Root of Current Ethnic Based Conflicts in Ethiopia” (2022) 9 J Ethn Cult Stud 95 at 118.
303 At 123.
304 Balehegn, above n 270.
305 Review of African Political Economy “Neoliberal Shock Therapy in Ethiopia” (25 June 2019)
<https://roape.net/2019/06/25/neoliberal-shock-therapy-in-ethiopia/>.
dispute with Eritrea in 2019.306 However, for Ethiopians, this stirred racial tensions. The TPLF have historically favoured the “revolutionary-democratic and developmental state model” in which the state controls the entire economy.307 Thus, Tigrayans generally reacted negatively to Abiy’s pursuit of economic transformation, TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael stating “if we go the way the neoliberals advise... [Ethiopia] will go off the rails.”308 Tigrayans have been demonised for obstructing economicreforms, often labelled “ለውጥ ኣደናቃፊ”, meaning “obstacles of change”.309 This has
formed part of the impetus for purges of Tigrayan officials and the government’s desire to establish tighter control over Tigray.310 Overall, this reflects the central role of Western economic intervention in driving the conflict, with senior TPLF officials even accusing United States diplomats of grooming Abiy for the presidency given his sympathy to Western capitalism.311
Even now, neoliberal institutions continue to indirectly fund the conflict. In April 2022, the World Bank approved a $300 million grant to support Ethiopia’s recovery.312 This move has been widely criticised, one political economist claiming it “greases the war machine.”313 The European Commission similarly expressed the plan was “premature and could be counterproductive”,314 while advocacy group Women of Tigray called it “highly irresponsible”.315 Though the World Bank contends it “does not have the mandate to get involved in... internal governance issues”, continuing to fund the government despite its
306 Zach Vertin “Alfred Nobel catches “Abiy-mania”: Praise and caution for Ethiopia’s prize winner” (15
October 2019) Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/15/alfred-nobel- catches-abiy-mania/>.
307 Balehegn, above n 270.
308 Lionel Barber and David Pilling “‘My model is capitalism’: Ethiopia’s prime minister plans telecoms privatisation” (25 February 2019) Financial Times <https://www.ft.com/content/433dfa88-36d0-11e9- bb0c-42459962a812>.
309 Balehegn, above n 270.
310 Balehegn.
311 Balehegn.
312 The World Bank “World Bank Supports Ethiopia’s Conflict-Affected Communities, Targets Over Five Million People” (press release, 12 April 2022).
313 Vince Chadwick and Shabtai Gold “European Commission: $300M World Bank grant to Ethiopia ‘premature’” (13 April 2022) Devex International Development <https://www.devex.com/news/european- commission-300m-world-bank-grant-to-ethiopia-premature-103034>.
314 Chadwick and Gold.
315 Chadwick and Gold.
flagrant human rights abuses arguably constitutes some form of intervention.316 Overall, this reflects that the war in Tigray cannot be disconnected from historical contexts of colonialism and neoliberal reforms pushed for and enabled by Western states. However, in emphasising the Ethiopian government’s primary responsibility to protect its population, Western states have used R2P to do exactly that.
The consequence of this is the perpetuation of a saviour/victim dichotomy. Western states’ emphasis on the responsibility of the host state means their calls for humanitarian action are framed as heroic and moral, despite much of the conflict stemming from their previous interventions. At a roundtable on Tigray, United States Administrator Samantha Power claimed “the knowledge of mass atrocities came with a moral “duty to do all we can to end it... for the people of Tigray who have seen such suffering, for the sake of women.”317 Britain’s UN representative similarly contended “it is right” the Security Council consider what should be done given the “stark and... real... suffering” of “all of the people of Ethiopia.”318 Both examples reflect emotive language representing Ethiopians as passive victims, removing their self-determination and positioning Western states as their means of salvation. This demonstrates R2P propagates colonial narratives comparable to those underlying humanitarian intervention.
Ethiopia and Libya demonstrate key tensions underpinning R2P in light of its purpose and operative effect. In the Libyan civil war, evidence of crimes against humanity was considered sufficient to warrant a “timely and decisive” response. However, despite seeming to constitute a model case for R2P’s application amidst growing evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even ethnic cleansing and genocide, reference to the norm has been minimal in the case of Ethiopia. Civilian deaths in Tigray vastly
316 The World Bank “Statement on Current Situation in Ethiopia” (press release, 8 September 2022).
317 Samantha Powers “Statement at the US-EU High Level Roundtable on the Humanitarian Emergency in Tigray” (10 June 2021) United States Agency for International Development
<https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/jun-10-2021-administrator-power-us-eu-high-level- roundtable-humanitarian-emergency-tigray-ethiopia>.
318 Record of the Security Council’s 8812th Meeting, above n 273, at 7.
outnumber the total death toll of the First Libyan Civil War, with liberal estimates of the former totalling approximately 500,000 and the latter around 25,000.319 States’ geopolitical considerations, especially those of the P5, are the most compelling explanation for this striking selectivity. R2P’s flexible language cloaks such political determinations, enabling states to portray both action and inaction as legitimate. The doctrine’s deployment through the Security Council similarly means the P5’s national interests dictate whether and how action occurs, as they did in both Libya and Ethiopia, albeit with different results. R2P’s perpetuation of colonial narratives is also evident. In both cases the doctrine imported a “standard of civilisation” characterising the state as “savage”, requiring liberal democracy to tame human rights abuses. This “othered” Ethiopians and certain Libyans, positioning them as unworthy victims, and denied the self-determination of others. R2P’s first pillar also shrouds Western responsibility for both crises. While Libya was formally colonised by Italy, Ethiopia was similarly occupied by Mussolini’s forces and both states endured a period under British rule.Western states and financial institutions have also encouraged and incentivised both states to adopt neoliberal reforms. This historical context should inform analyses on the causes of the conflicts as well as the wisdom of intervention. However, because R2P vests primary responsibility in the host state, Western states’ responses to atrocities are framed in moral terms that perpetuate a saviour/victim narrative. Overall, these case studies demonstrate R2P is vulnerable to many of the same criticisms as humanitarian intervention. Though intended to be aspirational, Libya and Tigray reflect R2P is, in practice, cause for cynicism.
319 Plaut, above n 262; GlobalSecurity.org “Libyan Civil War – 2014 – 20??” (2018)
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/libya-civil-war-2.htm>.
Conclusion
This analysis does not purport to solve the contradictions inherent in R2P, which would likely require fundamentally reconfiguring the Security Council, UN and international law generally. Rather, by mapping the doctrine’s development and effect in practice, this study illuminates how issues plaguing humanitarian intervention persist. R2P’s inherent vagueness and susceptibility to P5 interests when action is debated at the Security Council reflect states’ geopolitical interests remain central to whether intervention occurs. Thus, the stark dichotomy between action and inaction and central role of state interests in determining whether intervention occurs remains. Similarly, R2P’s perpetuation of a civilising mission that “others” those who do not conform to Western norms and its obfuscation of Western states’ culpability in creating crises, both through historical colonialism and more recent neoliberal interventions, highlight its continuation of colonial narratives and constructs comparable to those underlying humanitarian intervention. The First Libyan Civil War and Tigray War demonstrate the devastating potential of these contradictions, where political calculations and colonial legacies are obscured through R2P’s insidious portrayal as a normative, universal solution to politics. Overall, this novel framing and examination of R2P’s tensions demonstrates that, while R2P is contended to be aspirational, its operation is marked by cynicism.
R2P is not cause for abject pessimism. NGOs’ work feature prominently in both case studies explored in Part III, with organisations like Amnesty International and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect employing the doctrine to urge state and non-state actors to act in certain ways. This supports that R2P carries some discursive power, capable of being wielded as an aspirational tool for the protection of human life. Overall, however, this capacity is frequently undercut by an international system that prioritises states’ national interests and continues to reflect its colonial heritage.
In 2002, a key architect of R2P claimed it signalled a new era in which “would-be perpetrators of mass atrocities... will ultimately have nowhere else to run, no place left to
hide.”320 As the world again contemplates how to respond to situations like those in Libya, Tigray and even Ukraine, it is difficult to shake the spectres of Kosovo and Rwanda. With extensive human rights abuses continuing largely unchecked in Ethiopia, the cries of “never again”, intended to galvanise the international community and enshrined in R2P, ring especially loud, and, arguably, somewhat hollow.
320 Thakur, above n 41, at 331.
I Bibliography
A Treaties
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (signed 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951).
Geneva Conventions (signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 12 February 1950).
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987).
B Books and Chapters in Books
Ademola Abass ‘The African Union and the Responsibility to Protect: Principles and Limitations” in Julia Hoffmann and André Nollkaemper (eds) Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice (Pallas Publications, Amsterdam, 2012) 213.
Mabroka Al-Werfalli Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens’ Political Attitude and Behaviour (Ithaca Press, Reading (UK), 2011).
Antony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2012).
Adam Branch “The irresponsibility of the responsibility to protect in Africa” in Philip Cunliffe (ed) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Taylor and Francis, New York, 2011) 103.
David Chandler “Understanding the gap between the promise and reality of the responsibility to protect” in Philip Cunliffe (ed) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Taylor and Francis, New York, 2011) 19.
Simon Chesterman Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002).
Costas Douzinas Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge, New York, 2007).
Richard Drayton “Beyond Humanitarian Imperialism: The Dubious Origins of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ and Some Rules for its Future” in Bronwen Everill and Josiah David Kaplan (eds) The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (Hampshire), 2013) 217.
Tim Eaton Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness (Chatham House, London, 2018).
Gareth Evans The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Brookings Institution Press, Washington (DC), 2008).
Malgosia Fitzmaurice “The History of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: The Journey from the Past to the Present” in Samantha Besson and Jean D’Aspremont (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) 217.
Joseph Gold Interpretation: The IMF and International Law (Kluwer Law International, London, 1996).
Pinar Gözen Ercan Debating the Future of the “Responsibility to Protect”: The Evolution of a Moral Norm (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016).
Aidan Hehir Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010.
Aidan Hehir “Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds) Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013) 1.
Aidan Hehir “The Responsibility to Protect as the Apotheosis of Liberal Teleology” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds) Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013) 34.
Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005).
Kristen Hopewell Breaking the WTO: How Emerging Powers Disrupted the Neoliberal Project (Stanford University Press, Redwood City (CA), 2016).
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001).
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001).
Fabian Klose In the Cause of Humanity: A History of Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2022).
Alan J Kuperman “NATO’s Intervention in Libya: A Humanitarian Success?” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds) Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013) 191.
Stephen Livingston and Todd Eachus “Rwanda: US Policy and Television Coverage” in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds) The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (Transaction Publishers, Piscataway (NJ), 1999) 209.
Faith Mabera and Yolanda Spies “How Well Does R2P Travel Beyond the West?” in Alex J Bellamy and Timothy Dunne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 208.
John Stuart Mill A Few Words on Non-Intervention (London, 1859) as cited in Evan Luard Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas About International Society (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1992).
Justin Morris and Nicholas Wheeler “The Responsibility Not to Veto” in Alex J Bellamy and Timothy Dunne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 227.
Mary Ellen O’Connell “Responsibility to peace: A critique of R2P” in Philip Cunliffe (ed) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Taylor and Francis, New York, 2011) 71.
Anne Orford International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2011).
Ruben Reike “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Pillar Three and the Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes” in Daniel Fiott, Robert Zuber and Joachim Koops (eds) Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the Third Pillar Approach (The Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation, Global Action to Prevent War, the Global Governance Institute and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Brussels, 2012) 73.
Ramesh Thakur The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).
Ramesh Thakur Reviewing the Responsibility to Protect: Origins, Implementation and Controversies (Routledge, Abingdon (Oxfordshire), 2019).
Jessica Whyte “‘Always on top’? The “Responsibility to Protect” and the persistence of colonialism” in Jyotsna G Singh and David D Kim (eds) The Postcolonial World (Routledge, New York, 2017) 308.
Spencer Zifcak “The Responsibility to Protect” in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law
(5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) 484.
C Journal Articles
E Tendayi Achiume and Asi BaIi “Race and Empire: Legal Theory Within, Through, and Across National Borders” (2021) 67 UCLA L Rev 1386.
Foluke Ifejola Adebisi “Is Côte d’Ivoire a Test Case for R2P? Democratization as Fulfilment of the International Community’s Responsibility to Prevent” (2012) 56 J Afr L 151.
Louise Arbour “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Rev Intl Stud 445.
Alicia L Bannon “The Responsibility to Protect: The UN World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism” [2006] YaleLawJl 6; (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1157.
Alex J Bellamy “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit” (2006) 20 Ethics Intl Aff (UK) 143.
Alex J Bellamy “The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot air?” (2013) 48 Coop & Conflict 333.
Chris Brown “The Antipolitical Theory of the Responsibility to Protect” (2013) 5 GR2P 423.
Ian Brownlie and C J Apperley “Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Further Memorandum on the International Law Aspects” (2000) 49 ICLQ 905.
Ian Brownlie and C J Apperley “Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects” (2000) 49 ICLQ 878.
Matteo Capasso “The war and the economy: the gradual destruction of Libya” (2020) 47 ROAPE 545.
Matteo Capasso “The perils of capitalist modernity for the Global South: the case of Libya” (2022) 29 RIPE 1.
Partha Chatterjee “Empire after Globalisation” (2004) 39 EPW 4155.
Philip Cunliffe “Dangerous duties: power, paternalism and the ‘responsibility to protect’” (2010) 36 Rev Intl Stud 79.
Alex de Waal “African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011” (2013) 89 Intl Aff (UK) 365.
Katherine Fallah & Ntina Tzouvala “Deploying Race, Employing Force: ‘African Mercenaries’ and the 2011 NATO Intervention in Libya” (2021) 67 UCLA L Rev 1580.
Jonathan Fisher “#HandsoffEthiopia: ‘Partiality’, Polarisation and Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict” (2022) 14 GR2P 28.
Sassan Gholiagha “‘To prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas.’ A critical constructivist view of the Responsibility to Protect” (2015) 19 Intl J Hum Rts 1074.
Jonathan Graubart “R2P and Pragmatic Liberal Interventionism: Values in the Service of Interests” (2013) 35 Hum Rts Q 69.
Yerasework Kebede Hailu “Did Ethiopia Survive Coloniality?” (2005) 2 JDD 1.
Ezequiel Heffes “Some Reflections on the Theory of Sources of International Law: Re- Examining Customary International Law” (2018) 51 Israel L Rev 485.
Aidan Hehir “The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect” (2013) 38 Int Secur 137.
Mediel Hove “Post-Gaddafi Libya and the African Union: Challenges and the Road to Sustainable Peace” (2017) 52 JAAS 271.
Hersch Lauterpacht “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” (1946) 23 BYBIL 1. Wiesław Lizak “Libya: Road to Dysfunctionality” (2018) 15 Politeja 23.
Sara Maragoza “An Unequal Ethiopia in an Unequal World: Global and Domestic Hierarchies in Afäwärḳ Gäbrä-Iyyäsus’s and Käbbädä Mikael’s Political Thought (1908 and 1949)” (2022) 7 Glob Intellect Hist 1.
Nesam McMillan “‘Our’ Shame: International Responsibility for the Rwandan Genocide” (2008) 28 A Fem LJ 3.
Tefera Assefa Moreda “The Imperial Regimes as a Root of Current Ethnic Based Conflicts in Ethiopia” (2022) 9 J Ethn Cult Stud 95.
Melinda Negrón-Gonzales and Michael Contarino “Local Norms Matter: Understanding National Responses to the Responsibility to Protect” (2014) 20 Glob Gov 255.
Edward Newman “R2P: Implications for World Order” (2013) 5 GR2P 235.
Anne Orford “Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism” (1999) 10 EJIL 679.
Roland Paris “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention” (2014) 21 Intl Peacekeeping 569.
Touko Piiparinen “Reconsidering the silence over the ultimate crime: a functional shift in crisis management from the Rwandan genocide to Darfur” (2007) 9 J Genocide Res 71.
Maggie Powers “Responsibility to protect: dead, dying or thriving?” (2015) 19 Intl J Hum Rts 1257.
Patrick Quinton-Brown “Mapping Dissent: The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics” (2013) 5 GR2P 260.
W Michael Reisman “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” (1990) 84 AJIL 866.
Jeremy Sarkin and Carly Fowler “The Responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent Genocide: Lessons to Be Learned from the Role of the International Community and the Media during the Rwandan Genocide and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia” (2010) 33 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev 35.
Mónica Serrano “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: The Power of R2P Talk” (2010) 2 GR2P 167.
Gregory H Stanton “Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented?” (2004) 6 J Genocide R 211.
Ramesh Thakur “Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from the ICISS” (2002) 33 Sec Dialogue 323.
Harmen van der Wilt “State Practice as Element of Customary International Law: A White Knight in International Criminal Law?” [2019] Int C L R 784.
Jennifer M Welsh “Turning Words into Deeds? The Implementation of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’” (2010) 2 GR2P 149.
Patrick Wight and Yuriko Cowper-Smith “Mass Atrocities in Ethiopia and Myanmar: The Case for ‘Harm Mitigation’ in R2P Implementation” (2022) 14 GR2P 1.
Edson Ziso “The Political Economy of the Chinese Model in Ethiopia” (2020) 48 Politics & Policy 908.
Y H Zoubir and E N Rózsa “The end of the Libyan dictatorship: the uncertain transition” (2012) 33 TWQ 1267.
D Reports
Amnesty International ‘Libya of Tomorrow’: What Hope for Human Rights? (23 June 2010).
Amnesty International Arms transfers to the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for an effective Arms Trade Treaty (19 October 2011).
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Libya and the Responsibility to Protect (3 October 2012).
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International ‘We Will Erase You from This Land’: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’s Western Tigray Zone (6 April 2022) at 1.
Independent International Commission on Kosovo The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia UN Doc A/HRC/51/46 (19 September 2022).
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya UN Doc A/HRC/19/68 (8 March 2012).
World Peace Organisation Starving Tigray: How Armed Conflict and Mass Atrocities Have Destroyed an Ethiopian Region’s Economy and Food System and Are Threatening Famine (6 April 2021).
E Internet Resources
African Union “Ezulwini Consensus” (7-8 March 2005) <http://www.africa- union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/7th%20extra%20ordinary%20session%20ECL/Ext%20EXCL2%20VII%20Report.pdf>.
Heather Ashby “How the Kremlin Distorts the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Principle” (7 April 2022) United States Institute of Peace
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/how-kremlin-distorts-responsibility-protect- principle>.
Mulubrhan Balehegn “Neoliberalism has enabled genocide in Tigray” (1 July 2022) Ethiopia Insight <https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2022/07/01/neoliberalism-has- enabled-genocide-in-tigray/>.
Lionel Barber and David Pilling “‘My model is capitalism’: Ethiopia’s prime minister plans telecoms privatisation” (25 February 2019) Financial Times
<https://www.ft.com/content/433dfa88-36d0-11e9-bb0c-42459962a812>.
Barak Barfi “Can Africa Really Help Libya Find Peace?” (13 April 2011) The New Republic <https://newrepublic.com/article/86594/libya-nato-african-union-clinton>.
Moustafa Bayoumi “They are ‘civilised’ and ‘look like us’: the racist coverage of Ukraine” (2 March 2022) The Guardian
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/civilised-european-look-like- us-racist-coverage-ukraine>.
Jo Becker and Scott Shane “Hillary Clinton, ‘Smart Power’ and a Dictator’s Fall” (27 February 2016) The New York Times
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html>.
Charles H Camp, Kiran Nasir Gore and Lilia Chu “Nation States Must Comply With Their Responsibility to Protect Ukraine Against the Russian Federation’s Ongoing War Crimes” (1 March 2022) World Financial Review
<https://worldfinancialreview.com/nation-states-must-comply-with-their-responsibility- to-protect-ukraine-against-the-russian-federations-ongoing-war-crimes/>.
Vince Chadwick and Shabtai Gold “European Commission: $300M World Bank grant to Ethiopia ‘premature’” (13 April 2022) Devex International Development
<https://www.devex.com/news/european-commission-300m-world-bank-grant-to- ethiopia-premature-103034>.
Thomas Cottier “Memorandum on Ukraine and the Responsibility to Protect” (19 March 2022) Vereinigung die Scweiz in Europa <https://suisse-en-europe.ch/wp- content/uploads/2022/03/Memorandum-R2P-Ukraine-190322.pdf>.
Alex de Waal “The African Union and the Libya Conflict of 2001” (19 December 2012) World Peace Foundation <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african- union-and-the-libya-conflict-of-2011/>.
Emily Estelle “Ethiopia’s Strategic Importance: US National Security Interests at Risk in the Horn of Africa” (12 September 2018) American Enterprise Institute
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-09-12-Ethiopia- written-testimony.pdf>.
Ethiopian Herald “Hands Off from Ethiopia!” (22 May 2021)
<https://www.press.et/english/?p=35009>.
Gareth Evans “The “RtoP” Balance Sheet After Libya” (2 September 2011)
<http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech448%20interview%20RtoP.html>.
Gareth Evans “The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age” (26 October 2011) Project Syndicate <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-responsibility-to-protect- comes-of-age-2011-10>.
Yohannes Gedamu “Residual anger driven by the politics of power has boiled over into conflict in Ethiopia” (20 November 2020) The Conversation
<https://theconversation.com/residual-anger-driven-by-the-politics-of-power-has-boiled- over-into-conflict-in-ethiopia-150327>.
Dan Glazebrook “The Lessons of Libya” (12 November 2014) Counterpunch
<https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/11/12/the-lessons-of-libya/>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect – The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An Assessment” (August 2009)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2009-UNGA-Debate- Summary.pdf>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities” (1 August 2015)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto- powers-in-cases-of-mass-atrocities/>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “31 organisations urge action to end violence and famine in Tigray, Ethiopia” (21 September 2021)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/31-organizations-urge-action-to-end-violence- and-famine-in-tigray-ethiopia/>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “List of Supporters of the Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto” (13 July 2022)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-supporters-of-the-political-declaration-on- suspension-of-veto/>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Summary of the 2022 UN General Assembly Plenary Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect” (20 July 2022)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/summary-2022-r2p-debate/>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Resources on R2P” (26 September 2022)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “Case Summary”
<https://www.globalr2p.org/about/>.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect “What is R2P?”
<https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/>.
GlobalSecurity.org “Libyan Civil War – 2014 – 20??” (2018)
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/libya-civil-war-2.htm>.
Daniel Hannan “Vladimir Putin’s monstrous invasion is an attack against humanity itself” (26 February 2022) The Telegraph
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/02/26/vladimir-putins-monstrous-invasion- attack-civilisation/>.
Human Rights Council “Action on Resolution A/HRC/S-33/L.1 – 33rd Special Session” (17 December 2021) United Nations Web TV
<https://media.un.org/en/asset/k14/k14a5sg62k>.
Human Rights Watch “Libya: Wake-Up Call to Misrata’s Leaders” (8 April 2012)
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/08/libya-wake-call-misratas-leaders>.
Michael Ignatieff “Intervention and State Failure” (January 2002) Dissent
<https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/intervention-and-state-failure>.
Sally Khalifa Isaac “NATO’s Intervention in Libya: Assessment and Implications” (2012) European Institute of the Mediterranean
<https://www.iemed.org/publication/natos-intervention-in-libya-assessment-and- implications/>.
The Left in the European Parliament (GUE/NGL) “Motion for a Resolution on the Situation in Libya” (12 September 2011) European Parliament < https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-7-2011-0514_EN.html>.
Ewen MacAskill “Gaddafi 'supplies troops with Viagra to encourage mass rape', claims diplomat” (29 April 2011) The Guardian
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/29/diplomat-gaddafi-troops-viagra-mass- rape>.
Hans Petter Midttun “Why a humanitarian intervention in Ukraine is in NATO’s interest” (17 September 2022) Euromaidan Press <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/09/17/why- a-humanitarian-intervention-in-ukraine-is-in-natos-interest/>.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms” (7 June 2005)
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/gjs_665170/gjzzyhy_665 174/2594_665176/2602_665192/200506/t20050607_598303.html>.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China “China and Africa: Strengthening Friendship, Solidarity and Cooperation for a New Era of Common Development” (19 August 2022)
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202208/t20220819_10745617.html>.
Stafford Neil, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations and Chairman of the Group of 77, on the Report of the Secretary-General Entitled ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’” (6 April 2005), The Group of 77 at the United Nations <https://www.g77.org/Speeches/040605.htm>.
Annabel Nugent “CBS News foreign correspondent apologises for saying Ukraine is more ‘civilised’ than Iraq and Afghanistan” (27 February 2022) The Independent
<https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/news/charlie-dagata-cbs-apology- ukraine-iraq-b2024265.html>.
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia Ivan Šimonović “Statement at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly” (28 February 2022) United Nations
<https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20220228/1VVoY1ERNJl8/By EU2BAEu9JR_en.pdf>.
Martin Plaut “Tigray mortality: has war and hunger cost 500,000 lives? Professor Jan Nyssen, Ghent University” (13 March 2022) Eritrea Hub <https://eritreahub.org/tigray- mortality-has-war-and-hunger-cost-500000-lives-professor-jan-nyssen-ghent-university>.
Samantha Powers “Statement at the US-EU High Level Roundtable on the Humanitarian Emergency in Tigray” (10 June 2021) United States Agency for International Development <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/jun-10-2021- administrator-power-us-eu-high-level-roundtable-humanitarian-emergency-tigray- ethiopia>.
Charles A Ray “Is Democracy on the Retreat in Africa?” (10 March 2022) Foreign Policy Research Institute <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/is-democracy-in-retreat-in- africa/>.
John Reid, “Putin, Pretext, and the Dark Side of the “Responsibility to Protect” (27 May 2022) War on the Rocks” <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/putin-pretext-and-the- dark-side-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/>.
Review of African Political Economy “Neoliberal Shock Therapy in Ethiopia” (25 June 2019) <https://roape.net/2019/06/25/neoliberal-shock-therapy-in-ethiopia/>.
Maya Rhodan “President Obama Admits the ‘Worst Mistake’ of His Presidency” (11 April 2016) Time <https://time.com/4288634/president-obama-worst-mistake/>.
James S Robbins “The case for humanitarian intervention in Ukraine” (23 March 2022) American Foreign Policy Council <https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/the-case- for-humanitarian-intervention-in-ukraine>.
Security Council Report “The Veto” (19 October 2015)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_3_the_veto_2015.pdf>.
Security Council Report “Ethiopia (Tigray): Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Humanitarian Situation” (14 June 2021)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/06/ethiopia-tigray-informal- interactive-dialogue-on-the-humanitarian-situation.php>.
United Nations Association (UK) “UN Security Council and the responsibility to protect: Voluntary restraint of the veto in situations of mass atrocity” (15 October 2015)
<https://una.org.uk/sites/default/files/Veto%20R2P%20code%20of%20conduct%20briefi ng%20October%202015%20update_0.pdf>.
United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect “Compendium of Practice: Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect 2005-2016” (19 August 2016)
<https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/RtoP%20Compendium%20of%2 0Practice%20(Provisional%20Pre- Publication%20Version)%20FINAL%2020%20March%202017.pdf>.
United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Alice Wairimu Nderitu “Statement on the continued deterioration of the situation in Ethiopia” (30 July 2021)
United Nations <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2021-07- 30/note-correspondents-statement-alice-wairimu-nderitu-united-nations-special-adviser- the-prevention-of-genocide-the-continued-deterioration-of-the-situation>.
United States Department of State “Digital Press Briefing with US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Mike Hammer” (20 September 2022) <https://www.state.gov/digital- press-briefing-with-u-s-special-envoy-for-the-horn-of-africa-mike-hammer/>.
Zach Vertin “Alfred Nobel catches “Abiy-mania”: Praise and caution for Ethiopia’s prize winner” (15 October 2019) Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from- chaos/2019/10/15/alfred-nobel-catches-abiy-mania/>.
Declan Walsh and Abdi Latif Dahir “Why Is Ethiopia at War With Itself?” (16 March 2022) The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-conflict- explained.html>.
Yohannes Woldemariam and Nic Cheeseman “Foreign powers are intervening in Ethiopia. They may only make the conflict worse” (19 November 2021) Washington Post
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/foreign-powers-are-intervening-in-ethiopia- they-may-only-make-the-conflict-worse/2021/11/19/55266426-487d-11ec-95dc- 5f2a96e00fa3_story.html>.
William Worley “Exclusive: Russia, China foiled UN meetings on Tigray famine, says Lowcock” (21 June 2022) Devex International Development
<https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-russia-china-foiled-un-meetings-on-tigray- famine-says-lowcock-103473>.
F International Materials
2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1 (2005). Charter of the United Nations.
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA Res 2625 (1970).
France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution UN Doc S/2011/612 (4 October 2011).
Record of the General Assembly’s 86th Plenary Meeting UN Doc A/59/PV.86 (6 April 2005).
Record of the General Assembly’s 98th Plenary Meeting UN Doc A/63/PV.98 (24 July 2009).
Record of the General Assembly’s 99th Plenary Meeting UN Doc A/63/PV.99 (24 July 2009).
Record of the Security Council’s 6498th Meeting UN Doc S/PV.6498 (17 March 2011).
Record of the Security Council’s 8812th Meeting UN Doc S/PV.8812 (2 July 2021). Record of the Security Council’s 8843rd Meeting UN Doc S/PV.8843 (26 August 2021). Record of the Security Council’s 8875th Meeting UN Doc S/PV.8875 (6 October 2021).
Report of the Secretary-General “We the Peoples”: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century UN Doc DPI/2103 (3 April 2000).
Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect UN Doc A/63/677 (12 January 2009).
Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response UN Doc A/66/874–S/2012/578 (25 July 2012).
Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: state responsibility and prevention UN Doc A/67/929 – S/2013/399 (9 July 2013).
Report of the Secretary-General on fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect UN Doc A/68/947 – S/2014/449 (11 July 2014).
Report of the Secretary-General on a vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect UN Doc A/69/981 – S/2015/500 (13 July 2015).
Report of the Secretary-General on Mobilising Collective Action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect UN Doc A/70/999 – S/2016/620 (22 July 2016).
Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention UN Doc A/71/1016 – S/2017/556 (10 August 2017).
Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: lessons learned for prevention UN Doc A/73/898 – S/2019/463 (10 June 2019).
SC Res 1970 (2011).
SC Res 1973 (2011).
Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council GA Res 76/262 (2022).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution UN Doc S/2007/14 (12 January 2007).
G Other Resources
(18 March 2011) 525 GBPD HC (UN Security Council Resolution (Libya), Thérèse Coffey).
(18 March 2011) 525 GBPD HC (UN Security Council Resolution (Libya), David Cameron).
African Union “Statement on Intervention in Libya” (press release, 26 April 2012).
Letter from John Robert Bolton (United States Ambassador to the United Nations) to United Nations Member States regarding the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (30 August 2005).
Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom “Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech” (London, 12 November 2007).
Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela “Statement on R2P” (speech at the General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 15 September 2005).
Randy LaPrarie “Libya, The New York Times, and a Propaganda Model of the Mass Media” (Master’s Thesis, Western Michigan University, 2017).
Interview with Thabo Mbeki, as cited in Jessica Whyte “‘Always on top’? The “Responsibility to Protect” and the persistence of colonialism” in Jyotsna G Singh and David D Kim (eds) The Postcolonial World (Routledge, New York, 2017) 308.
Benjamin Mkapa, President of Tanzania, “Welcoming Statement” (address to the First Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes, Dar es Salaam, 19 November 2004).
Barack Obama, President of the United States, “Address to the Nation on Libya” (speech to the National Defence University, Washington DC, 28 March 2011).
Radzi Rahman, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations and Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement “Concerning the Draft Outcome Document” (speech at the Informal Meeting of the Plenary of the General Assembly, New York, 21 June 2005).
Security Council “Press Statement on Ethiopia” (press release S/14501, 22 April 2021).
Interview with Anne-Marie Slaughter, as cited in Spencer Zifcak “The Responsibility to Protect” in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) 484.
Stephen Smith, Minister for Foreign Affairs (Australia) “A New Era of Engagement with the World” (speech given to the Sydney Institute, Sydney, 9 August 2008).
United Nations “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorising ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions” (press release SC/10200, 17 March 2011).
United Nations “Secretary-General Says Security Council Action on Libya Affirms International Community’s Determination to Protect Civilians from Own Government’s Violence” (press release SG/SM/13454-SC/10201-AFR/2144, 18 March 2011).
United States Foreign Relations Committee “Chairman Menedez Opening Remarks at Committee Hearing on US Strategy and Policy Response to Crisis in Ethiopia” (press release, 27 May 2021).
The White House “Joint Op-ed by President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy: ‘Libya's Pathway to Peace’” (press release, 14 April 2011).
The World Bank “World Bank Supports Ethiopia’s Conflict-Affected Communities, Targets Over Five Million People” (press release, 12 April 2022).
The World Bank “Statement on Current Situation in Ethiopia” (press release, 8 September 2022).
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